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Abstract 
 
Kant’s  philosophy  of  science  is  often  taken  to  be  straightforwardly  refuted  by  the 
development  of  modern  science  and  mathematics.  I  identify  two  ways  in  which  key 
Kantian  insights  can  be  defended  in  contemporary  physics:  the  first—associated  with 
Michael Friedman—emphasises the role of constitutive principles in Kant’s philosophy and 
the second—associated with Ernst Cassirer—emphasises the role of regulative principles. I 
argue that the regulative approach of Cassirer is the more promising. 
 
I identify two challenges that a Kantian philosophy of science must meet in order to be 
deemed plausible: (CR) it must provide an account of the rationality of theory change and 
(CC) it must make sense of the central Kantian idea of constitutivity. I use these challenges 
to gauge the success of constitutive and regulative approaches throughout. 
 
In  §1  I  introduce  Friedman’s  constitutive  approach.  His  answers  to  CR  and  CC  are 
examined. I outline the role of philosophy in Friedman’s answer to CR and stress the 
importance for Friedman of defending the syntheticity of the relativized a priori.  
 
In §2 I detail the origins of constitutive and regulative principles in Kant’s philosophy of 
science.  It  is  emphasised  that  for  Kant,  both  types  of  principle  are  essential  to  the 
possibility of science. 
 
In §3 I introduce Cassirer’s regulative approach. The regulative approach is defended from 
Friedman’s objection that it cannot provide an account of the prospective rationality of 
theory  change.  Cassirer’s  understanding  of  the  constitutive  and  regulative  a  priori  are 
distinguished. Cassirer’s structuralism is introduced. 
 
In §4 I provide a case study of the role of the equivalence principle in the development of 
general relativity. A regulative Kantian answer to CR is defended. 
 
In §5 I defend Cassirer’s answer to CC as a plausible contemporary alternative to ontic 
structural realism.  
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Introduction 
 
Challenges for a contemporary Kantian philosophy of 
science 
 
 
A.  The relativized yet constitutive a priori 
A  central  feature  of  recent  attempts  to  revive  a  Kantian  philosophy  of  science  is  the 
emphasis on the notion of a relativized, but still constitutive a priori. Michael Friedman’s 
work (2001; 2008; 2010a; 2012) has been especially influential in defending this view, but it 
is also an important feature of the work of Ryckman (2005) and DiSalle (2006) and is a 
common thread that runs through the articles of Bitbol, Kerszberg and Petitot’s (2009). 
In Kant’s philosophy constitutive principles governed the application of the faculty 
of understanding to the manifold of intuition. In effect they are rules for the construction 
of the phenomenal world. In Kant’s analysis of Newtonian physics, the constitutive parts 
of the theory were taken to be Newton’s three laws of motion and Euclidean geometry. 
Kant understood both Newton’s laws and Euclidean geometry to be necessary rules for the 
construction of the empirical side of the theory, i.e., the law of gravitation. The laws of 
motion are necessary because they are derived by carrying the idea of matter as possessing 
moving force through the categories of relation. Euclidean geometry is necessary because it 
is the geometry of pure intuition.
1 
It is no longer plausible to understand science in precisely Kant’s fashion, chiefly 
because Kant claims that his constitutive principles are necessary and true for all time. In 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries developments in physics and mathematics entirely 
undermined this aspect of Kant’s philosophy. The most damaging developments to Kant’s 
philosophy of science come from physics: general relativity takes the geometry of space to 
be  variable  and  a  matter  for  empirical  investigation  rather  than  known  a  priori  and 
quantum physics seems to cast doubt upon the constitutive role of Kant’s understanding of 
the causal principle.  
  While some of the details of Kant’s position must be abandoned, there remains a 
significant  appeal  to  aspects  of  his  philosophy.  In  particular  the  idea  that  in  science 
                                                 
1 I discuss Kant’s philosophy of science in §2 and explain Kant’s understanding of constitutivity in more 
depth there. 5 
 
humans, to an extent, seek to make the world fit our own conceptual framework seems to 
have some merit. Examples of this abound in physics. Consider the dual nature of the 
photon in quantum physics: on occasions it must be treated as a wave, on others it is 
treated as a particle. There is an intuitive, broadly Kantian, way to understand this practice: 
what we refer to is not adequately captured by either the concept of a wave or the concept 
of a particle. It is likely that what we refer to as a photon fits into some altogether different 
category that humans have no concepts for. Indeed the very desire to treat bosons and 
leptons as objects seems to be a consequence of our imposing a conceptual framework 
developed  in  the  realm  of  classical  physics  onto  the  quantum  realm.
2  Even  broad 
methodological demands in science—e.g. the demand for theoretic unity—should not be 
understood as revealing something about the world, but instead as revealing something 
about how humans must reason about the world.
3 
  The Kantian approach, broadly construed, recommends analysing the conditions 
for the possibility of science. The idea is that by identifying the presuppositions of our 
scientific theories then we can have a clearer idea of the extent to which we should accept 
what our theories tell us about physical reality. This type of approach, I would suggest, has 
the potential to capture and account for the human contribution to scientific knowledge.  
Two  of  the  most  prominent  early  philosophical  accounts  of  the  theory  of 
relativity—Reichenbach’s The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge (1965 [1920]) and 
Cassirer’s Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (1923 [1921])—took precisely this type of Kantian 
line:  in  particular,  both  sought  to  relativize  Kant’s  constitutive  a  priori.  Reichenbach, 
famously, expressed this central idea in the following fashion: 
Kant’s concept of a priori has two different meanings. First, it means “necessarily true” or 
“true for all times,” and secondly, “constituting the concept of object” (1965, p.48) 
So,  Reichenbach  and  Cassirer
4  both  seek  to  retain  some  sense  of  constitutivity  while 
dropping the claim that the constitutive a priori must be true for all time. 
  However it is not enough to simply drop the claim that constitutive principles have 
to  be  necessary  from  Kant’s  philosophy:  this  claim  that  the  categories  of  the 
                                                 
2 I develop my account of how we should understand objects in §3. The basic problem with understanding 
bosons and leptons to be objects is that one cannot re-identify the position of a putative object because the 
position  observable  is  a  continuous  function.  Re-identifiability  is  a  crucial  aspect  of  our  conception  of 
objecthood. See (French, 2001) and (Mittelstaedt, 2009) for discussion of this feature of quantum physics.  
3 See (Morrison, 2000) for the most detailed analysis of this understanding of the role of unity in science. 
4 My claim here that Cassirer held on to some notion of the relativized a priori is controversial. Friedman 
(2000, p. 155ff)) argues that Cassirer has only an absolute and regulative conception of the a priori, so he 
would certainly reject my ascribing this view to Cassirer. However, I think that Cassirer’s (1923) provides 
ample textual support for the idea that he defended a version of the relativized a priori (see, especially, p. 
415). I delay detailed discussion of this point until §3.3, where I return to Cassirer’s account of the a priori in 
depth. Ryckman (2005) and Heis (2012) both also ascribe a version of the relativized a priori to Cassirer. 6 
 
understanding—with which constitutive principles are intimately related—are necessary is 
central to Kant’s philosophy. This means that accounts of the relativized a priori have all 
sought to make more fundamental revisions to the notion of constitutivity that make it less 
dependent  upon  Kant’s  account  of  human  experience  in  terms  of  human  faculties. 
Reichenbach  understood  constitutive  principles  as  being  those  that  made  possible  a 
coordination between uninterpreted axiomatised mathematics and physical reality; Cassirer 
rejected  the  distinction  between  understanding  and  sensibility  and  emphasised  the 
constitutive function of the regulative a priori as a condition of the possibility of having 
knowledge of objects at all. 
  Cassirer and Reichenbach represent two divergent methodologies for seeking to 
apply Kantian insights to contemporary philosophy. Reichenbach took the central Kantian 
claim to be that constitutive principles were synthetic a priori. So, in order to retain a role for 
such principles he argued that they should be relativized and understood as a priori only 
from the perspective of a particular theory. Throughout, following convention, I refer to 
this  approach  to  Kantianism  as  the  constitutive  reading  of  Kant:  it  takes  Kant’s 
fundamental insight to be that our experience of the world is constituted by relativized 
synthetic  a  priori  principles.  This  is  to  be  contrasted  with  the  regulative  approach  of 
Cassirer.  The  regulative  approach  emphasises  the  regulative  role  of  reason  in  Kant’s 
philosophy and seeks to develop an understanding of contemporary science that is based 
on regulative principles. This is the version of Kantianism that I will ultimately advocate. 
  Whichever approach is to be preferred, though, a satisfactory Kantian account of 
science must meet two challenges: it must provide an account of the rationality of scientific 
theory  change  and  it  muse  also  provide  an  interpretation  of  constitutivity.  These  two 
challenges will be important throughout, so in this introductory chapter, let us spend a little 
time spelling the challenges out. 
B.  Two challenges for a Kantian philosophy of science 
In developing a Kantian philosophy of science that is fit for the modern era, we face two 
main challenges: 
 
(CR)  The  challenge  of  rationality:  How  can  it  be  rational  to  abandon  an  established 
conceptual framework in favour of a new one? 
 7 
 
(CC)  The challenge of constitutivity: Is it possible to make sense of Kant’s notion of 
constitutivity in the context of modern physics? 
 
CR deals with the problem of the rationality of theory change. This, of course, is not a 
problem that is unique to the Kantian, but it is a problem that is particularly sharp for that 
approach. This is for two main reasons. First, for Kant the objectivity of Newton’s account 
of gravitation was grounded upon the relationship between Newton’s laws of motion and 
the pure concepts of the understanding: that is, when we carry the concept of matter 
through the categories of relation we derive the laws of motion as a matter of necessity. So, 
for Kant, constitutive principles are necessary. When, for Kant, the objectivity of science is 
grounded upon the necessity of its constitutive principles, how is it possible to remain 
“Kantian” while allowing that constitutive principles can rationally change? 
Second the Kantian approach involves commitment to the idea that humans only 
have epistemic access to the objects of experience and it is these that are described by a 
scientific theory. This means that common, realist, explanations of theory change are not 
available to the Kantian. For example, a Kantian response to this challenge cannot appeal 
to the idea that new theories are closer to the truth than old theories. Similarly it is difficult 
for a Kantian to appeal to structuralist explanations of continuity across theory change to 
ground  the  rationality  of  abandoning  one  framework  for  another.
5  Instead  a  Kantian 
account must provide an internal rationale for theory change. 
Kant’s understanding of constitutivity is intimately connected to his account of 
human  experience  in  which  he  divided  the  intellect  into  the  independent  faculties  of 
sensibility,  understanding  and  reason.  CC  is  concerned  with  whether  it  is  possible  to 
separate the idea of constitutivity from Kant’s account of human experience. There are two 
broad  types  of  approach  to  this  endeavour  that  I  consider.  First,  Friedman,  following 
Reichenbach, seeks to reconceive Kant’s distinction between sensibility and understanding 
                                                 
5 The relationship between Kantian philosophy and structuralism is more complex than this. It is often 
suggested that Kantian philosophy, especially Cassirer’s work, presages a form of structural realism. Ladyman 
(2009) suggests that epistemic structural realism can be traced back to Kant through Poincaré’s Kantian 
influence. Ladyman’s “Kantian epistemic structural realism” draws upon Langton’s (1998) account of Kant’s 
philosophy, which reads Kant as advocating humility as an epistemic virtue: I will argue that Kant’s work 
contains richer insights than this. Gower (2000) also connects Kantian philosophy with structural realism, 
arguing that Cassirer should be read as anticipating the epistemic version of structural realism. It is, though, 
not just the epistemic version of structural realism that has been linked with Kantian philosophy: see (French, 
2001), (French and Ladyman, 2003) and (Cei and French, 2009) for arguments to the effect that Cassirer’s 
philosophy anticipates ontic structural realism. It is particularly clear in French’s work—especially his (2001) 
and (Cei and French, 2009)—that there is some tension between a reading of Cassirer that seeks to attribute 
to him a version of structural realism and Cassirer’s own explicit rejection of realism in favour of idealism. I 
discuss the relationship between Kantianism and ontic structural realism in §5. For my present purpose it 
suffices to say that any attempt to explain the success of theories on the grounds that they accurately capture 
the  structure  of  the  world  and  to  use  this  as  a  basis  to  justify  the  rationality  of  theory  change  is  not 
straightforwardly available to the Kantian. 8 
 
and,  in  so  doing,  to  relativize  Kant’s  synthetic  a  priori.  An  alternative  approach—
characteristic of the reading of Kant that emphasises the regulative role of reason in his 
philosophy—is  to  abandon  the  attempt  to  draw  a  fundamental  distinction  between 
understanding and sensibility, and instead seek to historicise Kant’s transcendental logic. 
On this approach the goal is to identify a general logical structure that is common to all 
scientific knowledge throughout its development: it is this that is judged, retrospectively, to 
have been constitutive of the entire sequence of scientific theories.
6  
  If my account is to represent a satisfactory Kantian approach for contemporary 
philosophy of science, it must meet both CR and CC. In what remains of this chapter I 
develop these two challenges in more depth and explain why they are of such central 
importance. 
C.  The challenge of rationality 
Since Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996 [1962]) there has been considerable 
emphasis in the philosophy of science on theory change: this is one of the most significant 
legacies of Kuhn’s work. When Kuhn began working on Structure, history of science was a 
relatively  young  discipline  and  Kuhn  perceived  there  to  be  a  naive  philosophical 
understanding of the development of scientific theories. It is not clear that there was a 
precise and well-defined philosophical account of the development of scientific theories to 
which Structure was intended to provide an alternative: instead, as Richardson (2007) argues, 
it seems that Kuhn primarily understood himself as responding to the view of science 
presented in the popular writings of the logical empiricists.
7 In particular, Kuhn understood 
the philosophy of his day to be committed to the idea that there was some form of neutral 
observation language against which theoretical statements were to be judged (1996, pp.125-
6). The consequence of this is that if there is an observed fact that is explained by any given 
theory,  then  any  successor  theory  that  accounts  for  the  same  observational  fact  is 
commensurable  with  the  earlier  theory:  that  is,  there  is  a  theory  neutral  realm  of 
observational  statements  that  can  adjudicate  the  rationality  of  scientific  development. 
Richardson emphasises that this is not a view of logical empiricism that would have been 
                                                 
6 This, at least, is how Friedman (2000) characterises regulative Kantianism. I argue in §3 that, while this 
account is correct in its broad detail, more can be said about the idea of constitutivity on this approach. 
7 This is indicated very clearly in an interview that Kuhn gave in 1995 (see, Richardson, 2007, p. 361), in 
which Kuhn stated “it was against that sort of everyday image of logical positivism—I didn’t even think of it 
as logical empiricism for a while—it was that that I was reacting to when I saw my first examples of history”. 
Richardson offers a few works as an example of the sort of popular image of logical positivism that Kuhn 
may have intended to respond to and pays particular attention to Frank’s Relativity: A Richer Truth (1951) and 
Reichenbach’s Rise of Scientific Philosophy (1973 [1951]).  9 
 
unique  to  Kuhn,  derived  as  it  was  from  the  many  popular  writings  of  leading  logical 
empiricists.  
Kuhn set about correcting this image of the development of science by providing a 
more careful historical account of the development of science than the logical empiricists 
were understood to have provided.
8 Kuhn, impressed by the work of Koyré among others, 
sought to provide a history that understood “what it was like to think scientifically in a 
period when the canons of scientific thought were very different from those current today” 
(1996, p.viii). This line of thinking led Kuhn to draw a distinction between periods of 
normal science and periods of revolution in science. In a period of normal science the 
research community accepts a particular paradigm and conducts its research within this 
framework. It is not entirely clear how Kuhn understood the idea of a paradigm, however, 
I favour understanding the notion—within the context of Structure—in a methodological 
fashion. That is, I understand Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm as being primarily defined by its 
set of exemplary puzzle-solutions.
9 Kuhn introduced this understanding of a paradigm as 
follows: 
Close historical investigation of a given specialty at a given time discloses a set of recurrent 
and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in their conceptual, observational and 
instrumental applications. These are the community’s paradigm, revealed in its textbooks, 
lectures,  and  laboratory  exercises.  By  studying  them  and  by  practicing  with  them,  the 
members of the corresponding community learn their trade. (1996, p.43). 
The idea is that, during a period of normal science, new practitioners are trained in the 
problem-solving methods of the tradition by use of standard examples—whether these be 
problems in a text book or standard experiments to be carried out in a lab. This training 
embeds a particular set of methodological practices within a community. The development 
of a new theory requires the development of new methodological practices: the question of 
the rationality of theory change then becomes one of how it could be that a group of 
practitioners would abandon their old methodological practices and accept new ones. 
Friedman  interprets  the  threat  of  incommensurability  in  a  somewhat  different 
fashion. He emphasises Kuhn’s later understanding of a paradigm, which is much closer to 
Carnap’s idea of a linguistic framework.  
                                                 
8 The popular writings, especially of Frank and Reichenbach, were widely scorned for their lack of attention 
to historical detail. Cohen’s view, expressed in his review of Reichenbach’s (1973), is typical: “Since the 
armory of the “scientific philosopher” appears to include so many episodes from the history of science, I 
must admit to prejudice in favor of having the facts correct to begin with…It seems a pity that a work that 
contains so much about the history of science and that is devoted to replacing “error” by “truth” should itself 
attempt to find truth by repeating error.” (Cohen, 1951, pp. 328-9). 
9 Kuhn emphasises this aspect of paradigms (1996, p. 187ff.) and Bird (2000, ch. 3) also emphasises this 
feature of the notion. 10 
 
Though it is a more articulated source of constitutive categories, my structured lexicon 
resembles Kant’s a priori when the latter is taken in its second, relativized sense. Both are 
constitutive of possible experience of the world, but neither dictates what the experience must 
be. Rather, they are constitutive of the infinite range of possible experiences that might 
conceivably occur in the actual world to which they give access. (Kuhn, 1993, p.331) 
Here  Kuhn  links  his  idea  of  structured  lexicons—which  was  how  he  had  come  to 
understand  his  paradigms—to  the  relativized  constitutive  a  priori.  The  idea  is  that 
constitutive principles are conditions for the possibility of the experience of the world, but 
they do not necessitate our own particular experience of the world. 
  What does it mean to change paradigms on the above understanding? Accepting a 
new paradigm, so understood, would involve accepting new conditions of our possible 
experience of the world. This would entail that some genuine possibilities according to the 
old paradigm are no longer possibilities on the new paradigm and, further, that the new 
paradigm could suggest that some things that were impossible on the old paradigm are now 
considered possible on the new one. The challenge of rationality—for the Kantian—is to 
explain how one can rationally accept the new set of possibilities from the perspective of 
the old paradigm: the new paradigm does not even represent a possibility.
10 
A proper account of science must explain the process by which an old theory is 
rejected and a new theory accepted. I take it that an account of science that treats this 
process  as  rational  and  concerned  with  scientific  evidence  should  be  preferred  to  an 
account that leaves the process either as irrational or as primarily driven by considerations 
that are not strictly to do with the theories (e.g. social considerations). 
If  we  consider  the  challenge  in  terms  of  Kuhn’s  “structured  lexicons”  it  is 
immediately clear why this will be difficult for a Kantian. Constitutive principles define the 
space of physical possibilities: this means that there is no possibility of our having an 
experience that directly contradicts our constitutive principles. It is conceivable that there 
will be experiences that do not fit with the current empirical system that is defined by the 
constitutive principles, but these can exist as anomalies and do not necessitate the adoption 
of new constitutive principles. The advance of Mercury’s perihelion is an example of this 
sort of anomaly: it was a possible experience that did not fit with the empirical theory given 
                                                 
10 This is precisely how Friedman understands CR: “Our problem, then, is to explain how transition from one 
scientific paradigm or constitutive framework to another can be communicatively rational, despite the fact 
that we are in this case faced with two different and even incommensurable “logical spaces”. Moreover, our 
commitment to a relativised yet still constitutive conception of the a priori only makes the problem more 
difficult. For this commitment implies that there is an important sense in which we must agree with Kuhn 
that  successor  paradigms,  in  a  genuine  scientific  revolution,  are  actually  non-intertranslatable:  the  later 
paradigm, from the point of the earlier paradigm is not even a coherent possibility. How, therefore, can it 
ever be (communicatively) rational to accept the later constitutive framework?” (Friedman, 2001, pp. 95-6) 11 
 
by the constitutive principles of classical mechanics, but on its own this was not enough to 
justify  abandoning  the  old  conceptual  framework.  If  experience  cannot  contradict 
constitutive  principles  and  empirical  anomalies  are  insufficient  to  justify  rejecting 
constitutive principles, what is left that can provide an account of the rationality of theory 
change? 
D.  The challenge of constitutivity 
The idea that certain concepts and principles are constitutive of experience was a central 
part of Kant’s critical project: constitutive concepts and principles are those that make 
objective  knowledge  possible.
11  In  the Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  the  pure  concepts  of  the 
understanding—the  categories—are  constitutive  of  experience  in  general.
12  Kant’s 
characteristic claim was that the objects of experience are not simply given to us: objects of 
experience are constructed from the manifold of intuition and the pure concepts of the 
understanding. The task of the pure concepts of the understanding is to order the manifold 
of intuition and make possible the cognition of unified objects. Without the pure concepts 
of the understanding, we would not be able to perceive any objects at all. It is in this sense 
that the pure concepts of the understanding are constitutive of experience: without the 
pure concepts of the understanding to give form to the manifold of intuition it would be 
impossible to have any knowledge of the objects of experience whatsoever. 
  Kant  understood  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  to  be  necessary:  their 
necessity being grounded in the very possibility of objects. However, they were not to be 
understood  as  being  necessary  in  a  merely  logical,  or  analytic,  sense;  rather,  the  pure 
concepts  of  the  understanding  are  necessary  in  a  transcendental  sense. The  distinction 
between logical and transcendental necessity is built upon a distinction that Kant drew 
between general and transcendental logic. General logic is itself divided into dialectic and 
analytic logic, but let us just consider analytic logic so as to make clear the significance of 
the distinction between general and transcendental logic. Analytic logic is based upon the 
principle of non-contradiction; it does not allow any judgment regarding objects at all. 
Transcendental  logic,  on  the  other  hand,  “concerns  itself  solely  with  the  laws  of 
understanding and reason solely in so far as they relate a priori to objects” (A57/B82): the 
                                                 
11 In this section I give a very brief summary of Kant’s understanding of the idea of constitutivity and its role 
in scientific knowledge so as to clarify why it is both important and difficult for contemporary Kantian 
approaches to philosophy of science to provide an account of constitutivity. Detailed discussion of Kant’s 
understanding of constitutive principles is given in §2. 
12 There are four categories—of quantity, quality, relation and modality—and each is sub-divided into three 
pure concepts of the understanding. The pure concepts of the understanding are concepts such as that of 
unity, of substance and of cause and effect. See (A80/B106) for the complete table of categories. 12 
 
pure concepts of the understanding are necessary in a transcendental sense just because, 
without them there could be no cognition of objects. This is what is meant by the claim 
that Kant’s constitutive pure concepts of the understanding are synthetic a priori. 
  Kant’s  philosophy  of  science  was  intimately  related  to  the  architectonic  of 
knowledge that he had developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. He argued that constitutive 
principles were necessary in order to secure the objectivity of the laws of nature. In the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (2004 [1786])—Kant’s major critical-period work 
on the philosophy of science—he argued that Newton’s laws of motion and the principles 
of Euclidean geometry were constitutive of the empirical law of gravitation.
13 Both the laws 
of motion and the principles of Euclidean geometry were understood as synthetic a priori 
knowledge. In the case of the laws of motion, this was because they could be derived by 
carrying  the  concept  of  matter  as  possessing  “moving  force”  through  the  category  of 
relation. In the case of the principles of Euclidean geometry this was because they could be 
known through construction in pure intuition. So, for Kant the possibility of objective 
knowledge  depended  upon  the  role  of  constitutive  principles  in  the  construction  of 
experience.  These  principles  were  synthetic  and  a  priori:  they  could  be  known 
independently of experience and they were transcendentally necessary. The transcendental 
necessity of the constitutive principles was crucial in explaining the objectivity of science. 
  It  should  be  clear  from  this  quick  sketch  of  Kant’s  position  that  the  idea  of 
constitutivity—i.e. the idea that certain principles are known prior to experience and play a 
crucial role in securing the objectivity of knowledge—played a vital role in the Critical 
project.  Any  would-be  Kantian  philosophy  of  science  must  provide  an  account  of 
constitutivity: i.e. it must provide an account of that which makes objective knowledge 
possible. 
  This task is far from straightforward. As we have seen, Kant’s understanding of 
constitutivity is intimately connected to his understanding of the human intellect as being 
divided into the sensibility and the understanding. For Kant, this understanding of the 
human  intellect  was  itself  an  answer  to  the  main  transcendental  question  as  to  how 
synthetic  a  priori  judgments  were  possible.  The  most  prominent  synthetic  a  priori 
judgments,  for  Kant,  were  those  of  mathematics:  e.g.,  Kant  argued  that  5+7=12  is  a 
synthetic  a  priori  judgment,  as  are  geometrical  judgments.  Developments  in  both 
mathematics and physics, though, make it difficult to understand mathematical judgments 
as being synthetic a priori. Modern mathematics gives us a much richer notion of analyticity 
than that which was available to Kant, and this means that arithmetical judgments can now 
                                                 
13 I examine the sense in which these principles were constitutive of the law of gravitation on Kant’s account 
in detail in §2. 13 
 
be understood as analytic rather than synthetic. Furthermore, the development of general 
relativity seems to have shown quite conclusively that the geometry of space is not to be 
stipulated prior to experience; on the contrary, it is a purely empirical question. If these 
judgments are no longer to be understood as synthetic a priori judgments, then this line of 
argument  for  Kant’s  account  of  the  human  intellect—and  its  associated  account  of 
constitutivity—would seem to be entirely undermined. How are we to provide an account 
of constitutivity that is suited to account for the objectivity of contemporary science, when 
this very science seems to undermine the motivation for explaining science in terms of 
constitutive principles in the first place? 
  I  consider  two  ways  in  which  this  challenge  might  be  addressed:  the  first  is 
influenced by the work of the early logical positivists, the second is influenced by the 
Marburg School of neo-Kantianism. As we have mentioned, one of the primary problems 
with Kant’s account of the synthetic a priori was the fact that by the start of the twentieth 
century Hilbert and Russell had developed a logic that seemed able to provide an analytic 
account  of  mathematical  judgments.  These  accounts  of  logic  came  with  a  platonistic 
philosophy according to which logical objects were understood to be abstract entities that 
the mind came into contact with through passive reception. The effect of this was to create 
a sharp distinction between logic (and mathematics, since this could be derived by the new 
theory)  and  science:  this  significantly  broadened  the  scope  of  that  which  could  be 
considered  analytic.  Now,  analytic  judgments  were  understood  to  include  logical  and 
mathematical judgments; synthetic judgments were those which required experience.  
This distinction between the realms of logic (and mathematics) and science was 
fully endorsed by the logical empiricists. It was now very difficult to see how a proposition 
can be both synthetic and a priori: after all, the synthetic is now just that which is given in 
experience. However, it was still possible to provide an account of constitutivity on this 
view. Kant’s distinction between the understanding and sensibility had been replaced by a 
fundamental division between mathematics and experience. Scientific knowledge required 
that  the  two  separate  realms  be  coordinated:  constitutive  principles  become  those 
principles that coordinate mathematical formalism with physical experience. 
This is how Friedman understands constitutive principles in his Dynamics of Reason 
(2001). However, as we shall see in §1.3, it is very difficult to secure the syntheticity of the a 
priori on this approach and Friedman is quite clear that he wishes to retain the syntheticity 
of the Kant’s constitutive principles while relativizing them. So, for Friedman to answer 
CC he must provide an account of the syntheticity of constitutive principles. It is here, I 
suggest, that his account faces the most serious difficulties. 14 
 
  This type of objection is precisely the same as the objection that Schlick raised 
against  Reichenbach’s  understanding  of  the  relativized  a  priori.  Schlick,  as  detailed  in 
§1.3.1.1, understood scientific knowledge as a coordination between the physical realm and 
the purely formal realm of mathematics. Schlick accepted that constitutive principles were 
needed  in  order  to  successfully  coordinate  these  two  realms.  However, he  denied  that 
constitutive  principles  should  be  viewed  either  as  a  priori  or  synthetic  (1978b,  p.333). 
Schlick does not accept that a priori can mean anything other than necessary and true for 
all time, and it was clear that constitutive principles had changed, so they clearly could not 
be a priori. Why did he deny the syntheticity of constitutive principles? Schlick understood 
Poincaré’s  work  to  have  fatally  undermined  the  Kantian  idea  of  the  faculty  of  pure 
intuition. This was  because  Kant  took  this  faculty to  necessarily  have  the  structure  of 
Euclidean  geometry:  Poincaré,  though,  had  shown  that  there  were  three  possible 
geometries that could describe the space of experience and that there was no possible 
experience that could enable us to choose between these three spaces.
14 Poincaré argued 
that we must select one of these geometries to treat as the geometry of experience on the 
grounds of mathematical simplicity alone. This is an analytic choice because the axioms of 
the chosen geometry are set out as definitions prior to experience. Poincaré understood the 
same process to be at work in the physical sciences as well: he argues that there are several 
versions of each of Newton’s laws that are compatible with experience and the principles 
that are ultimately chosen are done set out as definitions and experience cannot give us 
definitive  reason  to  pick  one  definition  over  another.  So,  Schlick,  following  Poincaré, 
understood constitutive principles to be analytic conventions in the sense that they are 
merely  definitions  that  permit  us  to  connect  mathematics  to  experience.  The  problem 
posed by Schlick, then, is that while an account of constitutivity can be given in terms of 
constitutive principles, it does not amount to a Kantian account of constitutivity in any 
sense. 
Friedman’s first argument for the relativized a priori in his Dynamics of Reason is 
susceptible  to  precisely  this  charge,  because  he  accepts  the  same  understanding  of 
mathematics as advocated by Schlick. Since his (2001), Friedman has attempted to distance 
himself  from  this  understanding  of  mathematics and develop a  historicised  account  of 
constitutive principles that makes it possible to defend a sense in which they are synthetic. 
In my discussion of Friedman’s account of constitutivity I argue that he does not provide a 
satisfactory answer to CC because he is unable to secure the syntheticity of the relativized a 
priori.. 
                                                 
14 See §3.1 for a detailed explanation of this feature of Poincaré’s philosophy. 15 
 
 
E.  Constitutive or regulative principles? 
The central question with which I am concerned throughout, then, is as to whether a 
contemporary Kantian philosophy of science can provide more convincing answers to CR 
and  CC  by  emphasising  constitutive  or  regulative  principles.  I  begin  by  outlining 
Friedman’s attempt to answer CR and CC within the framework the relativized synthetic a 
priori. Friedman seeks to answer CR via a particular historical take on the development of 
general relativity which affords philosophy a central role as a meta-paradigm that mediates 
the rationality of the adoption of new theories. Friedman seeks to answer CC by arguing 
that this historical narrative can be given a fruitful philosophical interpretation if we assign 
a  constitutive  role  to  relativized  synthetic  a  priori  principles.  I  argue  that  Friedman’s 
argument fails because he does not provide a satisfactory sense in which his constitutive 
principles are synthetic. 
I do not think that we can profitably understand contemporary physics in terms of 
the synthetic a priori. As such, I think it is preferable to pursue the approach to neo-
Kantianism  advocated  by  Cassirer  and  the  Marburg  School:  i.e.  historicising  Kant’s 
transcendental logic. This approach emphasises Kant’s account of the regulative role of 
reason—especially in providing the regulative ideal of unity—and downplays the role of 
constitutive  principles.  As  Friedman  points  out  (2000,  p.117),  this  means  that  it  is 
somewhat unclear that a regulative Kantianism can provide answers to CC: as we have 
seen,  this  claim  was  characteristic  of  Kant’s  approach  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a 
philosophical  position  can  be  meaningfully  Kantian  without  a  notion  of  constitutive 
principles. Furthermore, without relativized constitutive principles, Friedman argues that it 
is impossible to provide an account of the prospective rationality of a new theory. If we are 
to defend a meaningfully Kantian philosophy of science on the regulative approach, then, 
one of the main challenges will be to show that a regulative Kantianism is compatible with 
a notion of constitutivity.  
In §2 I take the first steps towards providing an account of constitutive principles 
that is compatible with a regulative Kantianism by examining the origins of constitutive and 
regulative  principles  in  Kant’s  account  of  Newtonian  physics.  In  particular  I  seek  to 
emphasise the crucial role that both constitutive and regulative principles have to play in 
Kant’s  derivation  of  the  law  of  gravitation.  This  is  important  for  the  dialectic  of  my 
overarching argument because it shows that, for Kant, the synthetic a priori was no more 16 
 
important to his architectonic than the purely regulative role of reason. As such, in light of 
the  development  of  physical  theories  that  are  incompatible  with  Kant’s  philosophy, 
emphasising either constitutive or regulative principles are equally valid methods to apply 
key Kantian insights to contemporary science. 
I then turn my attention to Cassirer’s neo-Kantian structuralism, which—I argue—
can form the basis of a satisfactory contemporary account of philosophy of science. In §3 I 
am chiefly concerned with arguing—contra Friedman—that Cassirer’s philosophy of science 
can provide satisfactory answers to CR and CC. Cassirer’s answer to CC has two parts: (i) 
he  seeks  to  secure  a  role  for  relativized  a  priori  principles,  although  these  are  not 
understood as synthetic a priori principles in the sense required by Friedman and (ii) he 
argues that objects of experience are constituted by the laws of a theory. I argue that 
Cassirer’s answer to CR is best understood as claiming that it is rational to adopt a new 
theory if it has a broader invariance group than the old theory. This, I suggest, can form the 
beginning  of  an  account  of  theory  change,  but  more  needs  to  be  said  to  develop  a 
satisfactory regulative answer to CR. 
This is the task of §4, which takes the form of a case study of the development of 
general relativity. In this chapter I develop a regulative answer to CR that serves as an 
alternative to the answer proposed by Friedman. I suggest in §5 that it will also help in 
providing a regulative answer to CC: in this section I focus on the idea of law-constitutivity 
and argue that—coupled with Friedman’s idea that physical principles play a historical role 
in making laws possible—a Kantian account of objects provides a viable alternative to 
contemporary structuralist accounts of objects. 
In so doing, I suggest, it is possible to do justice to those aspects of Friedman’s 
account  which  do  seem  to  capture  certain  features  of  the  development  of  science—
especially the emphasis on the role of constitutive principles—within the framework of a 
regulative Kantianism.  
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Friedman on the relativized a priori and the rationality of 
science 
 
 
1.1.  Introduction: Friedman and the relativized synthetic a priori 
By far the greatest single contributor to the attempt to reintegrate key Kantian insights into 
contemporary philosophy is Michael Friedman. In this chapter I introduce his account of 
the relativized yet still constitutive a priori. Friedman’s account of the nature of scientific 
theories  is  a  development  of  his  earlier  work  on  the  philosophy  of  the  early  logical 
empiricists. Friedman’s reconstructive account of the early works of Moritz Schlick, Hans 
Reichenbach and, especially, Rudolf Carnap has proven hugely influential in reversing the 
perception—prevalent  at  the  end  of  the  twentieth  century—of  logical  empiricism  as  a 
deeply flawed research programme. Friedman (1999) showed that the early work of each of 
these key logical empiricist figures was deeply influenced by Kantian considerations. 
In  his  Dynamics  of  Reason  (2001)  Friedman  sought  to  develop  his  reconstructive 
work on logical empiricism into an account of conceptual change in science. The project 
can be seen as addressing two central questions. The first is as to how theoretical concepts 
acquire empirical content. Friedman answers this along Reichenbachian lines by appealing 
to  the  relativised  a  priori:  i.e.  some  empirical  content  must  be  assigned  to  theoretical 
concepts to ensure the concept’s empirical applicability. In his (2001) Friedman identifies 
two philosophical developments since Reichenbach that pose the most significant obstacles 
to defending a version of the relativized a priori: Quinean epistemological holism and the 
Kuhnian  account  of  scientific  revolutions.  Epistemological  holism  questioned  any 
distinction  between  constitutive  and  empirical  principles  and  Kuhn’s  historiography  of 
science accepted the importance of conceptual frameworks but insisted that precursor and 
successor frameworks were radically incommensurable. 
The Dynamics of Reason is best understood as an attempt to address these concerns. 
Against Quine Friedman argues that scientific theories are better understood as having a 
coordinative  part  to  link  abstract  theoretical  concepts  with  empirical  content.  Against 
Kuhn he suggests that there is a role for philosophy in securing commensurability between 
paradigms.  Philosophy,  he  claims,  acts  as  a  “meta-paradigm”  in  which  ideas  from 18 
 
competing paradigms can be discussed and this allows scientists of differing paradigms to 
have  meaningful  discourse.  Friedman,  then,  ultimately  argues  that  science  has  the 
following, tripartite, structure. 
 
1.  The  base  level  consists  of  empirical  laws  which  are  directly  tested  by 
rigorous experimentation. 
2.  The intermediate level consists of the set of constitutive a priori principles 
that enable empirical testing.  
3.  A final level consisting of philosophical meta-paradigms which motivate 
and sustain scientific revolution. 
 
Since the publication of the Dynamics of Reason, Friedman’s notion of the relativized 
a priori has sparked substantial debate,
15 in response to which Friedman has modified his 
position (See his 2008; 2010a; 2012). Friedman still defends a version of the constitutive a 
priori,  and  still  maintains  that  philosophy  acts  as  a  meta-paradigm  that  secures  the 
rationality of scientific developments. The most notable change is that Friedman now seeks 
to  distance  his  understanding  of  the  constitutive  a  priori  from  Reichenbach’s,  whose 
philosophy Friedman now understands as relying on a mistaken view of the relationship 
between mathematics and physics. Instead Friedman now advocates a historicised account 
of the constitutive a priori. 
In this chapter I clarify Friedman’s answers to CR and CC and explain why the 
alternative approach I seek is to be preferred. Friedman’s explanation of the rationality of 
science hinges upon a historical narrative according to which the philosophy of Helmholtz, 
Mach and Poincaré drove the development of relativity. I examine Friedman’s historical 
argument and identify a number of concerns with it, which I return to discuss in §4. I then 
turn my attention to Friedman’s account of the syntheticity of his constitutive principles. I 
trace  the  roots  of  this  idea  back  to  the  early  logical  empiricists  and  explain  why 
Reichenbach’s  account  of  constitutive  principles  cannot  form  the  basis  of  a  synthetic 
constitutive a priori. I then introduce Friedman’s historicised version of the constitutive a 
priori. While this represents a more promising approach than that pursued in Friedman’s 
(2001),  some  concerns  remain:  in  particular  I  suggest  that  Friedman  places  too  much 
emphasis on seeking to reinterpret the Kantian faculty of sensibility and too little emphasis 
on the regulative role of reason in science. In the following chapters I seek to develop a 
                                                 
15 See (Domski and Dickson, 2010) and (Suarez, 2012) for substantial edited volumes discussing Friedman’s 
work. See also (Ryckman, 2005), (DiSalle, 2002a and 2006) for other detailed discussion of Friedman’s central 
ideas. 19 
 
Kantian approach for contemporary philosophy of science that builds upon Friedman’s 
highly innovative account while correcting these shortcomings of it. 
 
1.2.  Friedman’s  account  of  the  rationality  of  science,  or:  Einstein’s 
delicate dance  
Friedman answers CR by means of a historical narrative: i.e., he argues that Einstein’s 
development  of  general  relativity  is  rational  because  of  his  engagement  with  the 
philosophies of Helmholtz and Poincaré.
16 The main challenge for the rationality of the 
development of general relativity, from Friedman’s perspective, is to explain the process by 
which  a  four-dimensional,  variably  curved  geometry  became  a  “real”
17  or  “genuinely 
physical”
18  possibility.  The  importance  of  philosophy  is  that  it  provides  an  arena  of 
discourse that is informed by, yet distinct from, ordinary scientific practice. The meta-
scientific reflection that is characteristic of philosophy of science serves to develop a stock 
of  paradigm-independent  concepts  that  are  accessible  to  all  scientific  practitioners  and 
which can be used to develop new scientific theories.  
Friedman identifies two aspects of nineteenth century meta-scientific reflection on 
geometry  as  each  playing  a vital  role  in  the  development  of  the  space-time  of  general 
relativity:  Poincaré’s  conventionalist  methodology—especially  his  emphasis  on  the 
elevation  of  scientific  principles—and  Helmholtz’s empiricist  understanding  of  physical 
geometry. First, Friedman argues that, in introducing both his definition of simultaneity 
and the equivalence principle, Einstein sought to elevate empirical facts to the status of 
principles. Second, Friedman emphasises the role that Helmholtz’s account of geometry 
and the equivalence principle play in the rotating disk thought experiment in making four-
dimensional  space-time  a  genuine  physical  possibility.  Friedman  argues  that  the 
development of general relativity was only made possible through Einstein’s engaging in 
this “delicate dance” between Helmholtz and Poincaré (2010a, p.710). In this section I seek 
to clarify what Friedman means by this, and raise some initial concerns about the accuracy 
                                                 
16 The most detailed version of Friedman’s historical narrative is found in his (2010a), which is an expansion 
of the main line of argument of his (2001). The main additions to his (2010a) narrative are greater detail in his 
account of Kant’s philosophy of science, a longer discussion of the role of Naturphilosophie within his narrative 
and more emphasis on the influence of Ernst Mach’s work in developing the idea of inertial frames. My main 
focus in this section will be on Friedman’s account of the role of Poincaré and Helmholtz in providing 
Einstein with the philosophical tools to develop the theory of relativity. For further detail on this aspect of 
Friedman’s narrative see his (2002). 
17 (Friedman, 2001, p.114) 
18 (Friedman, 2010a, p.725) 20 
 
of  his  historical  narrative.  I  detail  this  aspect  of  Friedman’s  answer  to  CR,  before 
developing an alternative approach in the following chapters. 
First,  let  us  briefly  summarise  the  two  central  philosophical  ideas  upon  which 
Friedman’s historical answer to CR rests. Helmholtz began his career as a physiologist and 
was particularly interested in the physiology of the senses. His work in this area led him to 
conclude that visual perception was entirely subjective in the sense that what is perceived is 
governed by the constitution of our retinas, rather than the nature of the external world.
19 
For Helmholtz, this meant that we have no direct epistemic access to external reality and, 
of  relevance  here,  the  perceived  spatial  geometry  need  not  correspond  to  physical 
geometry. 
How  was  it  possible,  then,  to  say  anything  about  the  geometry  of  space?  The 
solution lay in considering our ability to interact with the world: in particular our ability to 
construct an idea of three-dimensional space through our interactions with other bodies. 
This  idea  was  made  more  precise  by  Felix  Klein  who  understood  geometry  group-
theoretically: i.e., the physically possible geometries are those which correspond with the 
group of rigid motions. This identified three geometries as physically possible—Euclidean, 
hyperbolic and elliptic—and the question became as to which one of these three is the 
correct physical geometry. Helmholtz resolved this problem by arguing that one could 
determine the correct description of geometry from among the three possible geometries 
by measuring, e.g., the interior angles of a triangle. Given his theory of perception, the 
matter was slightly more complex than this: the measurement procedure required the use 
of as many different senses as possible and a principle of trust in causal regularities of the 
world.
20  It  is  this  claim—that  the  geometry  of  the  world  can  be  determined  by 
measurement—that  Friedman  argues  influences  Einstein  in  coming  to  understand 
gravitation as curvature of four-dimensional space-time: I examine this claim in §1.2.2. 
Poincaré is renowned for the claim that the fundamental principles of science—
such as Newton’s laws of motion—are “conventions and definitions in disguise” (Poincaré, 
1905, p.138). Poincaré takes scientific knowledge to have a hierarchical structure; each level 
of the hierarchy makes possible those levels that are based upon it. The hierarchy begins 
with arithmetic, which he argues is a synthetic a priori science based on our capacity to 
represent an infinite iteration of a single operation. Next in the hierarchy is the concept of a 
continuous  mathematical  magnitude.  This  gives  rise  to  the  concept  of  space, which  is 
                                                 
19 This is because however he stimulated the retina—e.g. pressure, electricity—it was perceived as light. 
20 The idea is that in order to measure, e.g., length one would place unit measuring rods along a line and 
determine how many were used by both sight and touch. Both these senses are subjective on Helmholtz’s 
account, so one cannot have absolute faith in their ability to accurately determine lengths, so Helmholtz also 
needed to trust that the world was such that regularities in our perception of the world corresponded to 
regularities in the world. See §1.3.2 for full discussion. 21 
 
understood as a three dimensional continuous mathematical magnitude: the third level of 
the hierarchy is the study of the geometry of this space. The fourth level of the hierarchy is 
mechanics and this describes the motions of bodies in space.  
Poincaré argued that within a level of the hierarchy it was necessary to make some, 
purely conventional, decisions: e.g., he claimed that the choice of Euclidean geometry and 
of each of Newton’s laws was a matter of convention. Poincaré’s reasoning can be seen 
most straightforwardly in the case of geometry. Like Helmholtz, Poincaré understood the 
construction  of  geometry  to  be  based  on  our  intuitive  sensory  experience  of  bodily 
displacement.  Poincaré was  also  aware  that  this  experience  effectively  underdetermines 
spatial geometry. However Poincaré gave a different answer to how we should determine 
which of the three possibilities represents the correct spatial geometry: he argued that we 
could not, in principle, ever answer this question. This is where the methodological practice 
of elevation first appeared in Poincaré’s work. There are three geometries to choose from 
and Euclidean geometry is the most natural of these three in the sense that it allows for the 
simplest mathematical description of our experience. As such, Poincaré argued that it is 
elevated it to the status of a “convention or a definition in disguise” and is then held fixed 
as the geometry upon which the next stages of the hierarchy will be based. 
This account of the conventionality of geometry is typical of Poincaré’s treatment 
of all conventions: in the case of each convention we can identify the following three 
features and I suggest that these may serve as a set of necessary conditions for a principle 
to be conventional. 
 
i.  It is a natural idealisation of our sensory experience. 
ii.  There are other possibilities consistent with experience. And, 
iii.  Once accepted it can no longer be empirically tested and is, in that sense, 
irrefutable by experience. 
 
Friedman argues that Einstein understood the equivalence principle and simultaneity as 
conventions in precisely this sense. It is important to stress (iii) because it is this that 
distinguishes  Poincaré’s  process  of  elevation  from  simple  empirical  generalisation.  In 
§1.2.1,  I  argue  that,  while  Poincaré  may  have  influenced  Einstein’s  account  of  the 
conventionality  of  simultaneity,  there is  insufficient  evidence  to  support  the  claim  that 
Einstein understood the equivalence principle in this way. 22 
 
1.2.1.  Einstein’s Poincaréan methodology: elevation in the cases of the light postulate and the 
equivalence principle 
Friedman  characterises  Einstein—quite  correctly—as  something  of  a  philosophical 
opportunist:
21 Einstein would pick those parts of realist, positivist and idealist philosophies 
that  he  thought  may  be  useful  and  simply  paid  no  attention  to  any  unwelcome 
consequences  of  these  philosophies.  On  Friedman’s  account,  this  philosophical 
opportunism  afforded  Einstein  access  to  a  set  of  ideas  that  he  could  use  in  order  to 
develop a new conceptual framework within which to understand gravitation. 
On Friedman’s account it is Poincaré’s methodology of “elevation” that is vital for 
Einstein: Friedman argues that both the light postulate and then the equivalence principle 
were  developed  through  adopting  and  modifying  Poincaré’s  methodology:  Friedman 
characterises  the  development  of  both  principles  as  arising  through  the  elevation  of 
empirical laws to the status of principles “to which our mind attributes an absolute value” 
(Poincaré,  1905,  p.125).  For  the  purpose  of  discussing  Friedman’s  account  of  the 
development of relativity it is important to stress that principles that have been “elevated” 
should not be falsifiable by experience. 
So, in the case of the light postulate, Friedman argues that the experimental law 
that is elevated to a principle is derived from the failure to detect the Earth’s motion with 
respect  to  the  aether;  in  the  case  of  the  equivalence  principle  the empirical  law  is  the 
observed universality of free fall. In this section I examine Friedman’s argument to the 
effect that the process of elevation played a vital role in Einstein’s methodology. I have 
some  doubts  about  Friedman’s  account:  I  certainly  do  not  think  that  Friedman’s 
conclusion  is  forced  on  us  by  the  evidence  he  presents.  I  sketch  an  alternative 
understanding of Einstein’s methodology that emphasises the regulative role of the ideas of 
invariance and theoretic unity, which I suggest enjoys better historical support.
22  
Let  us  begin  by  examining  Friedman’s  argument  that  Einstein  is  implementing 
Poincaré’s methodology. Einstein had read and discussed Poincaré’s Science and Hypothesis 
between 1902 and 1904 as part of the curriculum of his Olympia Academy in Bern, so he 
would clearly have been well acquainted with Poincaré’s philosophy while preparing On the 
                                                 
21 It is important to point out this aspect of Friedman’s account: while Friedman argues that philosophy plays 
a role as a meta-paradigm that provides an arena of paradigm-neutral debate about physical ideas that can 
help scientists overcome conceptual problems, he does not require scientists to have any deep commitment 
to  the  ideas  that  they  take  from  the  philosophical  debate.  In  fact,  quite  the  reverse  is  true:  once  the 
philosophical idea has served its purpose then it is discarded and need not become entwined with the theory 
itself. Friedman repeatedly stresses that philosophy is not a branch of science, and the scientist’s ability to 
opportunistically adopt and discard philosophical ideas is part of the reason that the distinction between 
philosophy and science can be maintained. See (Friedman, 2010a, p.768 n. 208 and p.769 n. 211). 
22 See §4. 23 
 
Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies (1905).
23 In his (2010a) Friedman begins his discussion of 
Einstein’s work by quoting from (Einstein, 1905), and arguing that Einstein appealed to 
conventionalist methodology. The passage in question reads as follows: 
 
Examples of this sort, together with the unsuccessful attempts to discover any motion of 
the earth relative to the “light medium,” suggest that the phenomena of electrodynamics as 
well as mechanics possess no properties corresponding to the idea of absolute rest. They 
suggest rather that, as has already been shown to the first order of small quantities, the 
same laws of electrodynamics and optics will be valid for all frames of reference for which 
the  equations  of  mechanics  are  valid.  We  will  elevate  [erheben]  this  conjecture  (whose 
content  will  be  called  the  “principle  of  relativity”  in  what  follows)  to  the  status  of  a 
postulate [Voraussetzung], and also introduce another postulate, which is only apparently 
irreconcilable with it, namely, that light is always propagated in empty space with a definite 
velocity c which is independent of the state of motion of the emitting body. (Friedman’s 
translation of Einstein, 2010, p.653. Cf. Einstein, 1905, CPAE2, pp.140-1). 
 
Friedman interprets Einstein’s stated intention to elevate the conjecture that the laws of 
electrodynamics  and  optics  will  be  valid  for  all  frames  of  reference  to  the  status  of  a 
postulate  as  a  clear  sign  that  he  is  implementing  Poincaré’s  methodology.
24  Friedman 
suggests that the same is true for the postulate that “light is always propagated in empty 
space with a definite velocity c”. Although at the time Einstein had not been aware of the 
Michelson-Morley experiment to determine the motion of the Earth with respect to the 
aether, he was aware of the earlier experiments that had failed to detect any motion up to 
first order in v/c and claimed that he expected the first-order results to be confirmed for all 
other orders.
25 Some work needs to be done to clarify that Einstein had Poincaré’s work in 
mind here: as it stands this passage is perfectly compatible with an empiricist reading of the 
development of these principles.
26 
                                                 
23 The Olympia Academy was formed by Einstein, Maurice Solovine and Conrad Habicht in 1902, while 
Einstein was working at the patent office. It was an informal discussion group consisting of young physicists 
with an interest in philosophy. We know, from Solovine that the reading list contained—among others—
Dedekind’s What Are and What Should Be the Numbers?, Hume’s Treatise, Mach’s Analysis of Sensations, Mill’s 
System of Logic, Pearson’s The Grammar of Science and Poincaré’s Science and Hypothesis. Einstein clearly had a great 
interest in philosophy, it is certainly plausible to suggest that the discussion of topics at the Olympia Academy 
may impact upon Einstein’s methodology as a physicist. See (Miller, 1980, p.129 and p.139n) and (Howard, 
2005, p.36) and references therein for details of the Olympia Academy. 
24  “It  appears  from  Einstein’s  language,  then,  that  he  is  here  following  Poincaré’s  methodology  quite 
precisely” (Friedman, 2010a, p.654). 
25 This information is found in a footnote that Einstein added in 1913 for Lorentz’s (1952) collection of 
essays on relativity. 
26 See (Norton, 2010) for a detailed empiricist account of how Einstein developed these principles. Norton’s 
account has an interesting relationship to Friedman’s: like Friedman, Norton argues that philosophy played a 
role in the development of special relativity, but he suggests that it is an empiricist philosophy—derived from 
Hume and Mach—that was most influential. This, then, does not support a challenge to the general answer to 24 
 
Friedman  is  on  firmer  ground  in  his  discussion  of  Einstein’s  definition  of 
simultaneity.  Einstein  noted  that  there  is  seemingly  an  incompatibility  between  the 
principle of relativity and the light postulate: this is resolved by an analysis of the concept 
of simultaneity. In brief, Einstein’s argument ran as follows. He considered two distant 
clocks and asked how we should synchronise them. His idea was that an observer at the 
first clock should send out a signal to the second clock, this could then be reflected and 
received back at the first clock. What time should we say that the first clock read when the 
light signal arrived at the second clock? Einstein’s answer was that the natural way to define 
simultaneity is to say that the light arrived at the second clock after half of the time for the 
total  journey  (as  measured  on  the  first  clock)  had  elapsed.
27  This  understanding  of 
simultaneity is not forced on us: we could, for example, assume that space is not isotropic 
and that there is a level of resistance to motion in a given direction. 
Before  looking  at  Friedman’s  understanding  of  the  equivalence  principle  let  us 
pause briefly to emphasise that (at least Friedman’s understanding of) simultaneity meets 
the criteria for a convention set out above. First, that the speed of light is the same in all 
directions  and  independent  of  the  speed  of  the  source  is  a  natural  idealisation  of  the 
Michelson-Morley  experiment.  Second,  there  is—until  gravitation  enters  the  picture—a 
physically possible alternative that is also consistent with experience in Lorentz-Fitzgerald 
contraction. Third, in using the concept of simultaneity to define a new framework for 
space, time and motion Friedman takes it that Einstein puts the principle beyond empirical 
refutation.  
Friedman’s  argument  that  Einstein  understood  the  equivalence  principle  in  the 
same fashion is as follows: 
 
In  using  the  principle  of  equivalence  to  define  a  new  inertial-kinematical  structure, 
therefore, Einstein has “elevated” this merely empirical fact (recently verified to a quite 
high degree of approximation by Lorand von Eötvös) to the status of a “convention or 
definition in disguise”—just as he had earlier undertaken a parallel “elevation” in the case 
of  the  new  concept of simultaneity  introduced by  the  special  theory.  (Friedman  2010, 
p.709) 
 
The  claim  that  Einstein used  conventionalist  methodology  in  elevating  the  equivalence 
principle has an initial appeal: it would seem eminently rational for Einstein to repeat the 
same process that had led to success just a few years earlier. However Friedman does not 
                                                                                                                                               
CR that Friedman provides—according to which philosophy plays a role to drive theory change—but it does 
raise problems for Friedman’s argument that this history is chiefly derived from Kant. 
27 See DiSalle (2006, pp.103-11) for a more detailed account along these lines.  25 
 
offer anything more than this claim that Einstein was simply repeating a method that had 
previously brought success. 
  The  problem  with  understanding  Einstein  as  self-consciously  implementing 
Poincaré’s conventionalist methodology in the case of the equivalence principle is that it is 
not clear that he understood the principle to be unfalsifiable. In the case of the definition 
of simultaneity employed in special relativity, there is a much clearer sense in which this is 
unfalsifiable:  Einstein  introduced  simultaneity  as  a  definition—simultaneity  is  not  an 
objective feature of reality—and it is very hard to conceive of an experiment that would 
render this definition invalid. The equivalence principle is a very different type of principle. 
The equivalence principle does tell us something of the nature of objective reality—that the 
gravitational mass of a body is the very same property of a body as its inertial mass—and it 
is a straightforward matter to conceive of the experiment that would falsify the claim: all 
that is needed is to observe two objects falling at different rates in a gravitational field. 
While Einstein was convinced that the equivalence principle was an important physical 
principle, there is no reason to suggest that he understood it as unfalsifiable: if he thought 
that the principle could be falsified it is difficult to see how we can claim that he was 
deliberately implementing conventionalist methodology. 
Howard (2010) argues that Einstein understood the equivalence principle as an 
empirical generalisation:
  28 as such, it would be perfectly possible for the principle to be 
proven  false.  This  claim  is  based  upon  Einstein’s  treatment  of  general  relativity  as  a 
principle theory of precisely the same type as thermodynamics, in his well-known letter of 
1919 to the Times. Einstein distinguishes between two types of theory: constructive and 
principle.  Constructive  theories  are  those  that  “attempt  to  build  a  picture  of  complex 
phenomena out of some relatively simple proposition” (1919, p.13), as the kinetic theory of 
gases  does.  By  contrast,  principle  theories  analytically  derive  conclusions  from  certain 
general principles.
29 So, for Einstein, a principle theory is one that begins with a frequently 
observed empirical regularity and then uses this to derive additional consequences. Howard 
takes this to imply that the claim that the equivalence principle has precisely the same status 
as the claim that there are no perpetual motion machines. 
                                                 
28 This impression is reinforced by the argument of (Norton, 2010). Here Norton examines Einstein’s claim 
that the philosophy of Hume and Mach helped him in developing special relativity: he argues that all that 
Einstein  meant  by  this  is  that  these  philosophers  convinced  Einstein  that  scientific  concepts  must  be 
grounded in experience. 
29 “Their starting point and foundation are not hypothetical constituents, but empirically observed general 
properties of phenomena, principles from which mathematical formula are deduced of such a kind that they 
apply to every case which presents itself. Thermodynamics, for instance, starting from the fact that perpetual 
motion never occurs in ordinary experience, attempts to deduce from this, by analytic processes, a theory 
which will apply in every case.” (Einstein, 1919, p.13.) 26 
 
This would seem to imply that Einstein understood the equivalence principle to 
have the same status as the second law of thermodynamics. It would seem quite clear that 
the  discovery  of  a  perpetual  motion  machine  would  invalidate  the  second  law  of 
thermodynamics; surely it is equally clear that the equivalence principle would be falsified 
by the observation of one object falling in a gravitational field at a greater rate than another. 
The fact that these principles are stated as foundational does not mean that they cannot be 
proven  wrong.  For  Howard  (2010,  p.349)  Einstein  placed  so  much  confidence  in  the 
equivalence principle just because it was a generalisation from experience: its function is 
just to constrain the development of general relativity so that the theory does not violate 
this fundamental property of matter. 
Friedman argues that, e.g., the Eötvös experiments do not amount to tests of the 
equivalence principle because all that such experiments do is test the claim that objects of 
different mass fall at the same rate in a gravitational field. The equivalence principle, as it 
features in general relativity goes beyond this claim and coordinates free-fall trajectories 
with space-time geodesics. This means that the Eötvös experiments “do not function as 
empirical tests of the equivalence principle” (Friedman, 2001, p.91). Friedman is, I think, 
right that the empirical observation that objects fall at the same rate in a gravitational field 
does  not  amount  to  the  equivalence  principle  as  it  is  employed  in  general  relativity. 
However, I do not see how this prevents the Eötvös experiment testing the equivalence 
principle: if inertial and gravitational mass are not the same property of objects, then the 
equivalence principle—even understood as the claim that free-fall trajectories follow space-
time geodesics—would seem to be straightforwardly refuted. 
This, I take it, is good reason to doubt Friedman’s claim that Einstein was self-
consciously  following  Poincaréan  methodology:  conventions,  in  Poincaré’s  sense,  are 
unfalsifiable and the equivalence principle would seem to be falsifiable. I return to discuss 
this aspect of Friedman’s account in §4.2. I argue there that the equivalence principle is 
most  profitably  understood  as  resulting  from  an  analysis  of  conceptual  tension  within 
Newton’s  account  of  gravitation.    So,  while  I  will  ultimately  disagree  with  Howard’s 
reading, his empiricist reading of the development of the equivalence principle does seem 
preferable to Friedman’s.  
1.2.2.  Variably curved space-time: Einstein between Helmholtz and Poincaré  
The second time that, on Friedman’s account, philosophical debate played an important 
role  in  shaping  the  conceptual  development  of  relativity  was  in  Einstein’s  coming  to 
understand gravitation as curvature of four-dimensional space-time. Einstein engaged in a 27 
 
“delicate  dance”  between  Helmholtz’s  and  Poincaré’s  accounts  of  geometry  and,  in  so 
doing,  fundamentally  reconfigured  the  relationship  between  geometry  and  space 
(Friedman, 2010a, p.710). Friedman’s argument, in brief, is as follows. After Einstein had 
developed his theory of special relativity he sought to expand his theory so that it could 
account for gravitation. As we saw in the previous section, Einstein sought to achieve this 
via the equivalence principle. In its earliest formulation the equivalence principle is just the 
claim that uniformly accelerating frames of reference can be considered as inertial frames 
of reference equipped with a homogeneous gravitational field. This provided Einstein with 
a means to describe homogeneous gravitational fields using the physics of moving bodies. 
In 1912, Einstein published two papers that described the relativistic behaviour of bodies 
in  this  sort  of  (static)  gravitational  field.  However,  this  was  a  very  limited  class  of 
gravitational  field  and  Einstein,  naturally,  sought to  describe  more  complex,  stationary, 
gravitational  fields.  The  most  simple  example  of  such  a  field  would  be  that  which  is 
generated  by  a  uniform  rotation:  and  this  brought  Einstein  to  consider  the  uniformly 
rotating disk. In order to make sense of this thought experiment, on Friedman’s account, 
Einstein found himself drawing on elements of the philosophy of both Helmholtz and 
Poincaré. 
Now, there is strong evidence that the rotating disk thought experiment was very 
important to the genesis of general relativity: in particular Stachel (1989; 2007a) has argued 
convincingly  that  the  rotating  disk  thought  experiment  is  the  “missing  link”  in  the 
development of general relativity. Why the need for a “missing link”? Prior to his Entwurf 
theory of gravitation (1913), Einstein had made no mention of the need for a non-flat 
space-time and he still had not made use of four-dimensional formalism in his theory.
30 
However, by 1913 Einstein has fully integrated the use of the metric tensor to represent 
space-time curvature into his theory and there is no argument given in his Entwurf paper for 
the change of direction. The orthodox view now is, following Stachel, that the rotating disk 
thought experiment played a crucial role in the use of the metric tensor in this fashion. 
Friedman draws our attention to Einstein’s ‘Geometry and Experience’ (1954) as 
evidence for the crucial role of the rotating disk. This was a lecture that Einstein delivered 
to  the  Prussian  Academy  of  Sciences  in  Berlin  in  1922:  in  it,  Einstein  discussed  the 
influence  that  his  conceptions  of  mathematical  and  physical  geometry  had  on  the 
development of general relativity and he discussed how the philosophies of Helmholtz and 
Poincaré had impacted on his thinking. Friedman’s interpretation of this lecture is central 
                                                 
30 Einstein had, though, begun to familiarise himself with four-dimensional techniques in his 1912 exchange 
of papers with Abraham. See, e.g., (Einstein, 1912c) and (Renn, 2007b) for a discussion of the impact of 
Einstein’s exchange with Abraham on the development of general relativity. 28 
 
to his historical case: it is here that Einstein suggested that philosophical work on the 
foundations  of  geometry  influenced  his  development  of  relativity.  I  will  discuss  this 
element  of  Friedman’s  account  in  the  final  chapter,  for  now  I  will  detail  Friedman’s 
interpretation of this lecture and suggest some initial causes for concern with it. 
Einstein  began  his  lecture  by  drawing  a  distinction  between  mathematical  and 
physical geometry. Mathematical geometry treats the fundamental entities of geometry—
point, straight line, etc.—as intrinsically defined by the relevant geometrical axioms, which 
are free creations of the human mind and bear no relation to experience whatsoever.
31 On 
the other hand physical geometry requires us to coordinate the implicitly defined objects of 
mathematical  geometry  with  physical  objects.  For  example,  Einstein  suggests  that  we 
coordinate the <straight line> of axiomatised Euclidean geometry with the <practically 
rigid body>:  
 
It  is  clear  that  the  system of  concepts  of  axiomatic  geometry  alone  cannot  make  any 
assertions as to the relations of real objects of this kind, which we will call practically-rigid 
bodies.  To  be  able  to  make  such  assertions,  geometry  must  be  stripped  of  its merely 
logical-formal character by the coordination of real objects of experience with the empty 
conceptual framework of axiomatic geometry. To accomplish this, we need only add the 
proposition: Solid bodies are related, with respect to their possible dispositions, as are 
bodies  in  Euclidean  geometry  of  three  dimensions.  Then  the  propositions  of  Euclid 
contain affirmations as to the relations of practically-rigid bodies. (1922, pp.31-2) 
 
So, one of the chief aims of geometry is describe the spatial relationships between bodies. 
This is impossible using only mathematical geometry because the objects of which it treats 
do  not  exist  in  the  physical  world.  So,  in  order  to  apply  mathematical  geometry  to 
experience, we must coordinate the implicitly defined mathematical objects with physical 
objects. Einstein sought to do precisely this in coordinating <straight line> to <practically 
rigid body>. Friedman claims that Einstein understood physical geometry to be associated 
with  Helmholtz’s  account:  though  Einstein  does  not  explicitly  mention  Helmholtz  in 
relation to this understanding it does seem plausible enough that this is the case.
32 
                                                 
31 It is worth noting that Einstein explicitly associates this view with Moritz Schlick’s account of mathematical 
knowledge “The matter of which geometry treats is first defined by the axioms. Schlick in his book on 
epistemology has therefore characterised axioms very aptly as "implicit definitions" (Einstein, 1922, p.30). 
32 The best evidence to support Freidman’s claim is that Einstein in his (1925), in the context of a similar 
discussion, does mention Helmholtz in relation to this view: “Either one accepts that the ‘body’ of geometry 
is realized in principle by the solid bodies of nature, if only certain prescriptions are maintained regarding 
temperature, mechanical stress, and so on; this is the standpoint of the practicing physicist. Then a natural 
object corresponds to the ‘interval’ of geometry, and all propositions of geometry thereby attain the character 
of assertions about real bodies. This standpoint was represented especially clearly by Helmholtz, and one can 
add that without it establishing the theory of relativity would have been practically impossible. Or, one denies 
in  principle  the  existence  of  objects  that  correspond  to  the  fundamental  concepts  of  geometry.  Then 
geometry alone contains no assertions about objects of reality, but only geometry together with physics. This 
standpoint,  which  may  be  more  perfect  for  the  systematic  presentation  of  a  completed  physics,  was 
represented especially clearly by Poincaré. On this standpoint the total content of geometry is conventional; 29 
 
Einstein claimed that this understanding of physical geometry was essential in his 
formulation of general relativity: 
 
I attach special importance to the view of geometry which I have just set forth, because 
without it I should have been unable to formulate the theory of relativity. Without it the 
following  reflection  would  have  been  impossible  :  -In  a  system  of  reference  rotating 
relatively to an inert system, the laws of disposition of rigid bodies do not correspond to 
the rules of Euclidean geometry on account of the Lorentz contraction; thus if we admit 
non-inert  systems  we  must  abandon  Euclidean  geometry.  The  decisive  step  in  the 
transition to general co-variant equations would certainly not have been taken if the above 
interpretation had not served as a stepping-stone. (1922, p.33) 
 
So Einstein’s conception of physical geometry played an important role in the development 
of general relativity because it enabled him to understand that the geometry of a rotating 
system  could  not  be  Euclidean.
33  The  crucial  conceptual  insight  in  relativity  is  that 
gravitation should be represented by curvature of four-dimensional space-time. Einstein 
claimed that this insight was prompted by considering the application of physical geometry 
to the rotating disk. To see why, begin by considering a stationary disk: we determine the 
ratio of the circumference to the diameter by counting how many unit measuring rods we 
place to cover the diameter and the circumference. If this disk is set into relativistic rotation 
the  measuring  rods  placed  along  the  diameter  should  not  contract—because  they  are 
orthogonal  to  the  direction  of  motion  of  the  disk—whereas  the  rods  placed 
circumferentially will contract because they are placed in the direction of motion of the 
disk. This means that we would need to place more unit measuring rods on the disk in 
order  to  cover  the  circumference,  meaning  that  we  would  measure  the  ratio  of 
circumference  to  diameter  as  greater  than  π:  i.e.,  we  would  measure  non-Euclidean 
geometry.
34 
The importance of Helmholtz in Friedman’s narrative is clear: Helmholtz’s account 
of physical geometry was precisely the understanding of geometry that Einstein needed in 
order to develop relativity. Where, though, does Poincaré enter the narrative? Einstein 
went on to acknowledge that this reliance on rigid rods, sub specie aeterni, could not actually 
be  correct:  so  Einstein,  ultimately  agreed  with  Poincaré,  but  argued  that  for  practical 
purposes—under certain conditions—one could treat bodies as if they were rigid and use 
them to empirically determine spatial geometry. 
                                                                                                                                               
which geometry is to be preferred depends on how ‘simple’ a physics can, by its use, be established in 
agreement with experience.” (Einstein, 1925. pp.18-9; translation from Friedman, 2010a, p.768 n. 209).  
33 I discuss the role of the rotation in the development of general relativity in §4.3. 
34 This is how Einstein understood the rotating disk thought experiment, however the situation is not quite 
this straightforward: in particular, why is it not the case that the rotating disk would contract as well, with the 
result that the same number of measuring rods would be required to measure a rotating disk as a stationary 
disk?  30 
 
While the account of the development of general relativity that Einstein gives in his 
(1922) does lend weight to Friedman’s historical narrative, we ought to be careful about 
attaching too much weight to this sort of retrospective rationalisation of the development 
of a theory. In this case there are especially good reasons for caution. Einstein’s account of 
the  distinction  between  mathematical  and  physical  geometry  closely  follows  the 
understanding of mathematical and physical knowledge that had been developed by the 
early logical positivists at the time and as had been championed by Schlick.
35 This is a 
concern because in the period 1916-1922 Einstein had spent some time engaging with 
philosophers who sought to make sense of what was meant by general relativity: he read 
and discussed Kantian interpretations of his theory and, while he initially welcomed such 
interpretations, by 1921 he had rejected these in favour of Schlick’s realism.
36 This is cause 
to  pause  before  taking  Einstein’s  position  in  ‘Geometry  and  Experience’  to  reflect  his 
position in 1912: he essentially claims that the philosophical position that he had settled on 
in 1921—i.e. the distinction between mathematical and physical geometry as it had been 
drawn by Schlick—provided a crucial insight during the development of his theory back in 
1912. This is not to say that Einstein’s account is not accurate, but it does provide reason 
to be cautious about accepting Einstein’s (1922) account as decisive.  
As I have stressed, Friedman’s historical narrative is his argument for the role of 
philosophy in the development of science: before we can accept his conclusions it behoves 
us to undertake a detailed study of Einstein’s writings around the period in question—
1912—to see if these corroborate the later account. I undertake such a study in §4.3. I 
argue there that there is no need to appeal to the geometry of Helmholtz and Poincaré in 
order to understand Einstein’s solution to the problem of rotation. Furthermore, I argue 
that  in  ‘Geometry  and  Experience’,  Einstein  is  more  concerned  with  refuting  Weyl’s 
approach to geometry than Poincaré’s. These two factors, I suggest, mean that we should 
not read Einstein’s development of general relativity as being motivated by philosophical 
engagement with Helmholtz. 
1.2.3.  Philosophy and the rationality of science 
Friedman’s historical narrative is intended to provide sufficient evidence that philosophy 
has,  throughout  the  development  of  space-time  physics,  played  a  crucial  role  in  the 
                                                 
35 I discuss this account of the distinction between mathematical and physical knowledge in connection with 
the work of Schlick and Reichenbach in §1.4.1.1. For the purpose of my point here it suffices to note that 
Einstein’s understanding of geometry has clear parallels with Schlick’s view. 
36 For an account of Einstein’s attitude to the various philosophical accounts of relativity see (Howard, 2010). 
For an account of Schlick’s Duhem-inspired realism see (Friedman, 1999, ch.1). 31 
 
reconfiguration of the conceptual structure of space-time physics. The historical narrative is 
impressive in scope, beginning with Newton’s theory, and taking us through Leibniz, Kant, 
Naturphilosophie, Helmholtz, Mach and Poincaré: the philosophical debates that accompany 
the development of theories of space (and time), for Friedman, provide a set of common 
questions and concerns that feed back into the physics and that ultimately mediate the 
rationality  of  theory-change.  I  have  focussed  in  this  section  on  just  a  small,  though 
important,  part  of  this  narrative—the  role  that  Friedman  assigns  the  philosophies  of 
Helmholtz and Poincaré in the process—and have suggested that Friedman’s historical 
reconstruction may not be the most plausible available.  
How, though, should we characterise the role of philosophy in the above narrative? 
Friedman argues that when we move from one scientific framework to another there is an 
intermediate stage in which aspects of the old framework are still being transformed while 
the new framework is not yet fully articulated. So, in a case of conceptual change there is 
necessarily a period of time during which there is no stable conceptual framework for 
scientists  to  appeal  to:  scientists  in  this  revolutionary  period  are  “caught  in  a  deeply 
problematic  (but  nevertheless  intensely  fruitful)  state  of  inter-paradigmatic  conceptual 
limbo” (Friedman, 2001, p.115). The idea is that in this period philosophical ideas can be 
appealed to in order to try and work towards a new stable conceptual framework.  
This, argues  Friedman, is precisely how we should understand the influence of 
Helmholtz  and  Poincaré  on  Einstein.  Poincaré’s  methodology  of  elevation  enabled 
Einstein to develop the equivalence principle. In the early stages of the development of 
general relativity, the equivalence principle was applied to three-dimensional, flat space-
times. From our current perspective on relativity, this is not how we would understand the 
application of the principle, but, at the time—before the new conceptual framework was in 
place—this was the appropriate way to apply the principle. The role of the rotating disk 
thought experiment, similarly, occurs at an intermediate stage. The philosophical debate 
between Helmholtz and Poincaré, as we have seen, centred around which of the three 
space-times of constant (or zero) curvature describe spatial geometry: Einstein relied on 
this debate at a crucial stage of the development of general relativity, but given that the 
final version of the theory describes gravitation in terms of a four-dimensional, variable 
geometry,  there  is  an  important  sense  in  which  the  philosophical  debate  is  rendered 
irrelevant by the new theory.  
This  is  to  be  expected  on  Friedman’s  account.  Philosophy  is,  for  Friedman, 
emphatically not a part of science: it is a separate discipline whose debates are carried out in 
parallel to science. What is important is that it provides a series of settled questions that can 
be  discussed  in  a  theory-neutral  way.  For  example,  Helmholtz  and  Poincaré  disagreed 32 
 
about why the space of Newtonian physics was Euclidean: is it because it was measured as 
Euclidean or because it was the most mathematically simple geometry? Newtonian physics 
provided no answer to this. However the philosophical debate could be drawn upon by 
Einstein while he was developing a new theory. Because the philosophical debate existed 
independently of science and because its application depended upon ideas available in the 
old  conceptual  framework  the  procedure  by  which  Einstein  transformed  the  old 
conceptual framework to create a new one is rational from the perspective of the old 
theory. This, in the end, is Friedman’s answer to CR: 
 
Friedman’s answer to CR: Philosophical debate is theory neutral, it is appealed to 
in periods of conceptual limbo in order to rationally transform aspects of the old 
conceptual framework and to create a new one. 
 
While I have expressed some concerns over the detail of Friedman’s argument, his broader 
claim about the role of philosophy represents an innovative and intriguing answer to CR.
37 
I also would suggest that Friedman’s historical narrative captures something of importance 
in the development of the theory of relativity: Einstein certainly read and took on board 
philosophical ideas and also placed great emphasis on the definition of simultaneity and—
more strikingly—the equivalence principle.
38  
Friedman intends to do more, though, than just argue for a role for philosophy in 
providing a meta-paradigm that makes the process of theory-change rational: he argues first 
that it is a particularly Kantian philosophy that, historically, has been most useful in this 
regard
39 and, second, that there is an element of (transcendental) necessity in the process. 
                                                 
37  McArthur  (2008)  objects  that  on  Friedman’s  account  it  remains  the  case  that  rationality  needs  to  be 
constructed retrospectively. This is true to an extent, but misses an important nuance of Friedman’s account. 
For Friedman there are two stages to the process of developing a new theory: first, there is the intermediary 
stage, where philosophy has a role to play and then there is the stage where a new paradigm is in place and its 
relation  to the former paradigm must be  made rational. The latter stage is  only retrospectively rational: 
however the former stage provides an account of how theory change can be prospectively rational: when 
there is no fixed conceptual structure available, philosophical discourse provides a stock of ideas that permit a 
community of scientists to explore the rationality of a variety of possible conceptual frameworks. This is 
rational form the perspective of the old framework: a Newtonian scientist can consider Einstein’s special 
relativity to be a conceptual possibility because, for Friedman, there is a chain of reasoning from Newtonian 
ideas, via Poincaré, to the principles from which the empirical side of Einstein’s theory is derived. 
38 The importance of the equivalence principle to Einstein in developing general relativity is also noted by 
Norton (1989; 2007). This is particularly remarkable because at the time that Einstein was developing general 
relativity, the vast majority of Einstein’s peers were willing to abandon the universality of free fall: Einstein’s 
insistence on the equivalence principle was something of a peculiar obsession. I explore the role of the 
equivalence principle in general relativity in §4. 
39 “The relevant intellectual situation, on my account, essentially includes specifically philosophical elements 
that  directly  derive,  by  a  series  of  what  I  call  minimal  (and  in  this  sense  unique)  generalizations  and 
extensions, from Kant’s original transcendental analysis of the fundamental spatio-temporal structure framing 
Newton’s physical theory. It is not merely that we can now discern, in Einstein’s theories, principles which 
are analogous, in important respects, to what Kant took to be the (absolutely) transcendentally necessary 33 
 
This aspect of Friedman’s account, though, is best assessed in terms of his answer to CC. It 
is to this aspect that I now turn my attention. 
1.3.  Friedman, the relativized a priori and the legacy of the early logical 
positivists  
Friedman  answers  CR  by  providing  a  historical  narrative  according  to  which  the 
philosophy of Helmholtz and Poincaré played a crucial role in the development of general 
relativity.  It  comes,  though,  with  a  “philosophical  gloss”:  the  relativized  constitutive  a 
priori. Friedman’s philosophical goal is to describe these historical developments within the 
framework  of  a  reconceived  version  of  Kantian  philosophy  that  treats  constitutive 
principles as constitutive only with respect to a given theoretic framework.
40 So, Kant’s 
constitutive principles are now seen as constitutive only with respect to Newtonian physics: 
i.e., they function “as necessary presuppositions for applying our (changing) conceptions of 
space, time, and motion to our sensible experience, but they are no longer eternally valid 
once and for all” (Friedman, 2010a, p.697). Friedman’s account of the role of philosophy in 
the  development  of  relativity  is  then  meant  to  show  how  the  principles  that  were 
constitutive for Kant can start to change: Newton’s laws of motion become a limiting case 
and the geometry of space becomes a matter for empirical investigation. This is possible, 
for Friedman, through using empirical laws to reconfigure the way that our conceptions of 
space and time are applied to sensible experience. The empirical laws that were used in this 
fashion become constitutive principles—the light postulate and equivalence principle—for 
general relativity.
41 
It is at this stage that Friedman must seek to provide an answer to CC: how is it 
possible to make sense of Kant’s notion of constitutivity in the context of modern physics? 
Friedman provides a different type of answer to this problem in his more recent work 
(2009; 2010a; 2012) that he had previously in the Dynamics of Reason (2001). In his (2001), 
Friedman’s  philosophical  analysis  of  his  historical  narrative  effectively  endorsed 
                                                                                                                                               
principles  of  Newtonian  theory.  Rather,  the  principles  now  claimed  to  be  (relatively)  transcendentally 
necessary in Einstein’s theories are themselves derived, in the context of successive new developments in 
both  mathematics  and  the  empirical  sciences,  from  Kant’s  conception.  Kant’s  original  insight  into  the 
structure of Euclidean geometry, Newtonian physics, and, more generally, the state of both mathematics and 
the empirical sciences in the late eighteenth century, was so deep, and so systematic, that changes successively 
forced in one or another part of the Kantian framework in one or another new intellectual context…then 
reverberated throughout this framework in extraordinarily productive ways.” (Friedman, 2010a, p.727) 
40 See (Friedman, 2010a, p.696). 
41 Friedman is clear that both the light postulate and equivalence principle are constitutive of general relativity 
because both have a crucial role to play in the rotating disk thought experiment that led Einstein to the 
insight that gravitation could be represented by space-time curvature. The light postulate is implicit in the 
application of the special relativistic claim that rigid measuring rods contract when moving at relativistic 
velocities.   34 
 
Reichenbach’s  understanding  of  the  relativized  a  priori  as  axioms  of  coordination. 
Reichenbach’s relativized a priori was part of a broader account of the relationship between 
mathematics and experience: Reichenbach had taken from Schlick the idea that knowledge 
was coordination between uninterpreted mathematical formalism and physical experience. 
The purpose of axioms of coordination was to enable the application of mathematics to 
experience. The problem with Reichenbach’s approach, as Schlick pointed out, was that it 
is not clear that axioms of coordination can be understood as synthetic principles. Instead, 
they seem to be more naturally interpreted as analytic principles, which is clearly seen in 
Carnap’s  account  of  the  relativized  a  priori.  This,  ultimately,  is  why  Friedman  has 
abandoned much of the philosophical framework of the Dynamics of Reason in his more 
recent work. 
The  relationship  between  Friedman’s work  and  that  of  the  logical  positivists  is 
illuminating in that it clarifies an important feature of Friedman’s answer to CC. That is, he 
does  not  seek  just  to  secure  a  role  for  constitutive  principles  in  our  contemporary 
understanding of scientific theories: Friedman seeks to answer CC by relativizing Kant’s 
synthetic a priori. Friedman’s recent work, therefore, adopts a quite different approach from 
that  advocated  in  his  (2001):  he  now  defends  a  historicised  account  of  constitutive 
principles. By this I mean that he argues that a given principle is constitutive of a theory 
insofar as it played a historical role in making the empirical laws of a theory physically 
possible. 
This  section  is  structured  as  follows.  First,  I  outline  the  understanding  of  the 
relativized a priori in the work of Reichenbach and Carnap. The goal here is to clarify 
precisely  why  the  philosophical  framework  within  which  Reichenbach  understood  the 
relativized  a  priori  can  only  support  analytic  constitutive  principles.  Second,  I  detail 
Friedman’s account of the relativized a priori in his (2001) and show that it faces precisely 
the same problem as Reichenbach’s axioms of coordination. Then I turn my attention to 
Friedman’s current, historicised, approach to answering CC. In part I think that the current 
account is very helpful, but, I argue, it is not at all clear that it provides a means to salvage 
something of the synthetic a priori. This being so, I suggest that we should seek to answer 
CC without attempting to retain the synthetic a priori: the most promising alternative is the 
regulative  reading  of  Kant  according  to which we  should  seek  to  salvage  key  Kantian 
intuitions by historicising his account of transcendental logic. 
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1.3.1.   Reconfiguring the relativized a priori: a problematic picture 
In introducing CC, I mentioned that Schlick had objected to Reichenbach’s (1965 [1920]) 
formulation of the relativized a priori by rejecting the idea that there was any sense in 
which  the  principles  could  be  considered  a  priori.  Schlick  did  not  take  this  to  be  an 
objection  of  any  great  substance,  he  characterised  the  dispute  as  terminological:  he 
understood  Reichenbach’s  relativized  a  priori  just  to  be  Poincaréan  conventions  mis-
identified.
42 Reichenbach, too, took Schlick’s objection to be one merely of terminology 
and eventually comes to refer to his relative a priori principles as conventions. Friedman’s 
early  efforts  (1999;  2001)  to  secure  a  sense  of  syntheticity  for  the  relativized  a  priori 
proceed  by  arguing  that  there  was  more  at  stake  in  this  dispute  than  terminology:  in 
accepting  Schlick’s  terminology,  Reichenbach  also  found  himself  accepting  Duhemian 
holism. Friedman’s early answer to CC is just to advocate a return to—and reconfiguration 
of—Reichenbach’s  work  of  1920,  before  he  (mistakenly)  accepted  Schlick’s 
recommendation to treat his notion of the relative a priori as conventions. 
  The notion of the relativized a priori that Friedman defends in his (2001), then, is 
derived chiefly from Reichenbach. However Carnap’s influence on Friedman’s version of 
the relativized a priori is important too. This is because Friedman understands Carnap’s L-
rules as an explication of Reichenbach's version of the relativized a priori. However Carnap 
understands  his  L-rules  to  function  analytically:  Friedman,  then,  must  explain  what 
distinguishes his version of Reichenbach’s a priori from Carnap’s. I show how Friedman 
attempts to do this by tying the fate of Carnap’s logico-linguistic frameworks to the fate of 
naturalism—construed just as the attempt to treat philosophy as a branch of science—and 
argue, in §4.1.3, that Friedman’s (2001) version of the relative a priori ultimately cannot be 
distinguished from Carnap’s.   
                                                 
42  Discussing  Reichenbach’s  work,  Schlick  wrote:  “He  reaches  the  conclusion  that  Einstein’s  theory  is 
incompatible with the original doctrine of Kant, and proposes a transformation of the concept of the a priori, 
such  that  relativity  theory  will  no  longer  contradict  it,  and  the  most  important  thesis  of  the  Kantian 
philosophy will remain, as he thinks, intact. This thesis he professes to find in the insight that all knowledge 
becomes possible  only through the logical presupposition of certain principles, which first constitute its 
object as such. Such principles he calls a priori, but dispenses with the mark of apodeicticity; hence they are 
not necessary, and the progress of knowledge can provide motives for modifying them. “A priori means 
‘priori to knowledge’, but  not ‘for all time’, and not ‘independently of experience’” [Reichenbach, 1965, 
p.105]. In view of my earlier remarks…this strikes me as a total departure from the basis of the critical 
philosophy, and I should designate Reichenbach’s a priori principles as conventions, in Poincaré’s sense. Thus 
I cannot commend the author’s terminology, but in substance I agree entirely with him on most of the 
essential points.” (Schlick, 1978b, p.333). 36 
 
1.3.1.1.   The constitutive a priori in the work of Schlick, Reichenbach and Carnap 
Friedman’s account of the relativized a priori—certainly as it appears in his (2001)—can be 
profitably understood as an attempt to salvage Reichenbach’s notion of the relativized a 
priori from Schlick’s and Carnap’s attempts to treat the notion in an analytic fashion. In 
this section I examine the emergence of the relativized a priori in Reichenbach’s Theory of 
Relativity and A Priori Knowledge and explain why, ultimately, Reichenbach’s work lacks the 
resources to serve as a foundation for would-be Kantian attempts to answer CC.  
Reichenbach’s  account  of  coordination  was  deeply  influenced  by  Schlick’s 
interpretation of the nature of truth in logic and mathematics. Schlick (1978a [1910], p.83) 
argued that a proposition should be called true only when “it will always and under all 
circumstances  be verified”—he  called  this  the principle  of  universal  validity. This  principle 
applied first and foremost to mathematical and physical judgments: Schlick gives Euclidean 
geometry as an example of this type of a priori knowledge. How is this type of knowledge 
possible? Schlick first considers Kant’s answer to this question—i.e. that geometry is the 
pure  form  of  intuition—but  he  dismissed  this  possibility  on  the  grounds  that  “recent 
inquires into the principles of mechanics…make it appear doubtful” (ibid., p.84). 
Schlick  had  in  mind  here  the  work  of  Hilbert,  Russell  and  Couturat;  Hilbert’s 
axiomatisation of Euclidean geometry being particularly influential. Schlick took the lesson 
from Hilbert that mathematical objects are defined by a series of implicit definitions, that 
is,  by  relations  between  mathematical  concepts.  Truth  in  mathematics,  for  Schlick, 
depended solely on the consistency of this logical structure.
43 
However, Schlick did not think that it was only mathematics and logic that were 
capable of providing truth in the universal sense that he required: the physical sciences, he 
claimed, contain laws “which are just as exact and immutable as, say, the principle of [non-] 
contradiction”
44 (ibid., p.85). How were physical truths to be characterised as being capable 
of verifying themselves as surely as mathematical truths? 
Reichenbach  draws  a  distinction  between  mathematical  and  physical  truth  in  a 
manner that is very similar to that we have seen Schlick draw in his (1978a):
 45 
                                                 
43 “[For] apodeictically valid demonstrations it is not their intuitive properties which need to come into 
consideration, but ‘only the relations between geometrical concepts laid down in the principles of definitions 
employed’ [here, Schlick quoted from (Pasch, 1882, p.98)]” (Schlick, 1978a, pp.84-5) 
44 Kant refers to the “principle of contradiction”, however I refer to the “principle of non-contradiction” 
throughout as this is the accepted contemporary terminology. 
45 And, indeed, Reichenbach explicitly aligns his understanding of the distinction between mathematical and 
physical truth with Schlick’s: “Hilbert’s proposition is not an exhaustive definition; it is made complete by the 
totality of axioms…This peculiar mutuality of mathematical definitions, in which one concept always defines 
another without the need of referring to “absolute definitions,” has been clearly stated by Schlick in the 
theory of implicit definitions…Under these circumstances it is not surprising that mathematical propositions 
are absolutely certain.” (pp.35-6) 37 
 
 
The truth of mathematical propositions depends upon internal relations among their terms; 
the truth of physical propositions, on the other hand, depends on relations to something 
external, on a connection with experience. (Reichenbach, 1965, p.34) 
 
Reichenbach understood this difference as stemming from the fact that the objects of 
knowledge are different for the two types of science: mathematical sciences have as their 
object  objects  that  are  determined  by  sets  of  axioms  and  definitions, whereas  physical 
knowledge seeks to describe objects of experience. 
  So, the crucial feature of physical knowledge to capture is the sense that the laws of 
physics—which Reichenbach understood as systems of mathematical relations—are “true 
for reality” (ibid., p.36). Reichenbach claimed that the relation between the laws of physics 
and reality must be conceived of as a coordination: this meant both that the totality of real 
things  must  be  coordinated  to  the  total  system  of  equations  and  that  each  physical 
individual must be coordinated to individual equations (p.37). What this means precisely is 
somewhat opaque; Reichenbach offers a couple of examples that seek to clarify the matter. 
So, Reichenbach suggested that we should view the statement that “the Earth is a sphere” 
as the coordination of the mathematical figure of a sphere to visual and tactile perceptions 
of the Earth. He also suggested that the ideal gas law be understood as coordinating the 
equation pV = RT with direct perceptions of gases (e.g., the feeling of air on skin) and 
indirect perceptions of gases (e.g., readings on a pressure gauge) (ibid.).
46 I think it is clear 
how indirect perceptions can be coordinated with an equation like the ideal gas law: we can 
measure the variables with a pressure gauge, gas cylinder and thermometer and check that 
relationships between these numerical values correspond to those predicted by the ideal gas 
law.  Physical  knowledge,  then,  for  Reichenbach, depended  upon  establishing  a  relation 
between external reality and concepts (with the senses mediating between the two). 
  Reichenbach  immediately  saw  a  problem  with  treating  physical  knowledge  as  a 
coordination between reality and concepts: in paradigm cases of coordination both sides of 
the coordination are well defined, this is not so in the case of physical coordination. So, 
consider  mathematical  coordination  whereby  one  coordinates  a  discrete  subset  to  a 
continuum: e.g., the coordination of rational fractions to a continuum. In this case both the 
continuum and the rational fractions are implicitly defined and known: the coordination 
consists in selecting the points of the continuum that correspond to the rational fractions. 
Mathematical  coordinations  like  this  provide  us with  knowledge,  claimed  Reichenbach, 
                                                 
46 Reichenbach refers to pV=RT as Boyle’s law. I follow modern terminology in referring to this law as the 
ideal gas law. 38 
 
because  they  are  unique.
47  This  is  a  vital  component  of  Reichenbach’s  account  of 
coordination
: for a coordination to be true it must be unique.
48 
Even in the case of a mathematical coordination, it is not quite this straightforward 
to find a unique coordination. This is because the problem has not yet been precisely 
defined since there are an infinite number of ways to carry out the coordination (ibid., 
pp.38-9).  By  this  Reichenbach  meant  that  when  one  side  of  the  coordination  is  a 
continuum, there is no unique way to pick out a segment of the line that counts as a unit 
length. So, as the segment of the line chosen to be the unit length changes, so too does the 
part  of  the  continuum  that  the  rational  fractions  are  coordinated  to.  Furthermore  a 
continuum does not have a direction attached to it that tells us which way is the direction 
of increasing magnitude: so should one coordinate the fractions as they increase in size 
from right to left or from left to right? This problem was to be solved by the specification 
of additional conditions: that is, one would have to specify the unit length and the direction 
of  increasing  magnitude  before  a  unique  coordination  could  be  carried  out.  The 
coordination is unique when all the necessary additional specifications have been found.  
  The  difficulty  in  finding  a  unique  coordination  is  even  greater  in  the  case  of 
physical coordination. While in the case of a mathematical coordination certain additional 
conditions need to be identified before a unique coordination can be found, this is made 
easier by the fact that both sides of the coordination are implicitly defined. In the case of a 
physical coordination, this is not the case: a physical coordination is an attempt to identify 
physical  concepts  with  mathematical  concepts,  but  the  physical  side  is  “completely 
                                                 
47 This emphasis on a coordination needing to be unique in order to provide knowledge is derived from 
Schlick. The roots of this claim lie in Schlick’s (1978a) claim that for a judgment to be true it must be 
universal. Schlick’s position has evolved somewhat by the time of his (1985 [1918]): here Schlick made a 
distinction between knowledge and truth, claiming that knowledge required more than just truth: “Truth 
requires nothing but uniqueness of coordination; as far as truth is concerned, it does not matter what sign is 
used for that purpose. Knowledge, on the other hand, means unique coordination with the help of certain 
definite symbols, namely those that have found application elsewhere. If a physicist were to discover a new 
kind of rays and to name them Y-rays, then the judgment “The rays discovered by the physicist are Y-rays” 
would of course be true. But this would not mean any advance in knowledge, since the new object would 
have been designated simply by the use of a new word” (1985, p.66). A unique coordination, then, is enough 
for truth, but it does not tell us very much. For example one could identify each individual that one comes 
across  with  a  new  name:  each  coordination  is  unique—and  therefore  true—but  this  is  not  enough  for 
knowledge. A cognitive judgment requires a novel combination of old concepts, however these old concepts 
will have been involved in priori judgments and so the new judgment enters a system of judgments. And “By 
virtue of the interconnection of judgments a new truth receives a specific place in the circle of truths; the fact 
corresponding to this new truth is thereby assigned to the place that, by virtue of the interconnection of facts, 
it occupies in the domain of reality. And it is precisely because a judgment points this place out to us that the 
object or fact becomes known. Hence it is the structural connectedness of our system of judgments that 
produces the unique coordination and conditions of its truth” (ibid., p.67). So, for Schlick, we have knowledge 
of an object when it is uniquely coordinated to its place in the system of judgments. As we will see, this has 
distinct echoes in Reichenbach’s account of coordination. Reichenbach (1965, p.43) explicitly acknowledges 
that he takes truth to be a unique coordination in Schlick’s sense. 
48  This  feature  of  Reichenbach's  account  of  coordination  is  also  emphasised  in  (Padovani,  2011,  p.50). 
Padovani translates the original German “Eindeutigkeit” as “univocality”, I have followed Maria Reichenbach's 
(1965) translation. 39 
 
undefined” (1965, p.40). However, there is a “peculiarity” about physical coordination that 
provides a way of solving the problem: 
 
There remains the peculiarity that the defined side does not carry its justification within 
itself;  its  structure  is  determined  from  outside.  Although  there  is  a  coordination  to 
undefined  elements,  it  is  restricted,  not  arbitrary.  This  restriction  is  called  the 
“determination of knowledge by experience.” We notice the strange fact that it is the 
defined side that determines the individual things of the undefined side, and that, vice 
versa, it is the undefined side that prescribes the order of the defined side. The existence of 
reality is expressed in this mutuality of coordination. (p.42) 
 
In  the  case  of  the  mathematical  coordination  of  the  set  of  rational  fractions  to  a 
continuum, the direction of increasing magnitude needed to be set down as an additional 
condition.  In  the  case  of  physical  coordination,  the  order  of  the  mathematical  side  is 
determined by the physical side of the coordination while the “individual things” of the 
physical side are determined by the mathematical side. This means that the mathematical 
side provides concepts under which the physical side can be ordered—e.g. temperature, 
pressure, mass etc.—while the physical side is used to determine the specific numerical 
values of these concepts in any given case. 
  How do we determine the correct coordination in the physical case? As we have 
seen,  the  important  condition  for  the  truth  of  a  coordination  is  that  it  be  unique:  a 
coordination is said to be unique when “a physical variable of state is represented by the 
same  value  resulting  from  different  empirical  data”  (p.45).  Reichenbach  illustrated  what  he 
meant by this with an example from relativity. Einstein’s theory predicts that we should 
measure a deflection of 1.7” of light around the Sun; what would we say if, when it was 
tested, the measurement was 10”? Here Reichenbach appeals to the theory-ladenness of 
observation  to  suggest  that  in  both  the  case  of  the  1.7”  measurement  and  the  10” 
measurement we would have two different answers derived on the basis of empirical data 
and theory.
49 In the case of the predicted measurement, the empirical data goes in early on 
in the development of the theory; in the case of the actual measurement, theory is used in 
the construction of complex measuring instruments. For Reichenbach a coordination is 
unique when the same value is reached by both methods. 
  Now  we  are  in  a  position  to  make  sense  of  Reichenbach’s  version  of  the 
transcendental question “how is natural science possible?”: for Reichenbach, the important 
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question is “how is it possible to achieve such a coordination in a unique fashion?” (p.46). 
It is in answering this question that Reichenbach appeals to the “axioms of coordination”. 
Reichenbach introduced these as follows: 
 
Although  [coordinating  principles]  are  prescriptions  for  the  conceptual  side  of  the 
coordination and may precede it as axioms of coordination, they differ from those principles 
generally called axioms of physics. The individual laws of physics can be combined into a 
deductive  system  so  that  all  of  them  appear  as  consequences  of  a  small  number  of 
fundamental  equations.  These  fundamental  equations  still  contain  special  mathematical 
operations;  thus  Einstein’s  equations  of  gravitation  indicate  the  special  mathematical 
relation of the physical variable Rik to the physical variables Tik and gik . We shall call them, 
therefore, axioms of connection. The axioms of coordination differ from them in that they do 
not connect certain variables of state with others but contain general rules according to 
which connections take place. In the equations of gravitation, the axioms of arithmetic are 
presupposed as rules of connection and are therefore coordinating principles of physics.50 
(1965, p.54) 
 
The axioms of coordination, then, are those principles that act as prescriptions for the 
conceptual side of a coordination: that is, they are assumptions that serve to determine the 
physical side of the coordination so that a unique coordination can be found. These are 
contrasted with the axioms of connection which serve only to describe the relationships 
between physical variables. Axioms of connection, then, describe empirical relationships 
between physical variables: they include Einstein’s field equations, Maxwell’s equations, 
Newton’s  law  of  gravitation  etc.  The  axioms  of  coordination  are  those  principles  that 
permit a unique physical coordination so that these empirical laws can be stated at all. That 
is, axioms of coordination are those assumptions that are additional assumptions that are 
required in order to determine the physical side of a physical coordination. 
  Immediately after introducing the axioms of coordination as above, Reichenbach 
gives an example of how one particular axiom of coordination—genidentity, i.e., the idea 
that an object remains identical with itself throughout time—functions.
51 He considers the 
                                                 
50 The original manuscript , available at the Pittsburgh Archives, contains a marginal note attached to this 
passage that provides an alternative specification of the axioms of connection and coordination: The specific 
laws  can  be  combined  into  a  deductive  system  so  that  all  of  them  appear  as  consequences  of  a  few 
fundamental equations. We will call these equations axioms of connection because they express the connection 
between the specific physical magnitudes. Opposite to these are the axioms of coordination, which represent the 
properties of all bodies, reduced to a minimum of propositions. An example of coordinating axioms of old 
physics are the axioms of geometry; Maxwell’s equations are an example of connecting axioms. (Translated by 
Padovani, 2011, p.55). 
51 “when we speak of the path of an electron, we must think of the electron as a thing remaining identical 
with  itself;  that  is,  we  must  make  use  of  the  principle  of  genidentity  as  a  constitutive  category.  This 41 
 
path of an electron and claims that we can only interpret this as a single moving entity if we 
presuppose the idea of persisting objects. That is, the principle of genidentity serves to 
condition the otherwise unconditioned physical side of the coordination, and, in so doing, 
permits  a  unique  coordination.  It  is,  then,  quite  clear  why  Reichenbach  understood 
genidentity to be a constitutive axiom of coordination: it was a necessary assumption in 
order  to  have  persisting  physical  objects  that  the empirical  laws  could  describe.  Other 
axioms of coordination that he mentions—space, time and the principle of probability 
(p.53)—seem  to  be  similarly  fundamental  in  constituting  objects.  They  all  refer  to  the 
physical side of a coordination and are understood as, in a sense, defining what is real so as 
to permit a unique physical coordination. 
  Reichenbach,  as  we  have  seen,  understood  his  axioms  of  coordination  as 
relativizing  Kant’s  synthetic  a  priori;  however,  it  seems  clear  that  the  axioms  of 
coordination are better understood as analytic principles.
52 The problem that Reichenbach 
was addressing in The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, was essentially the same 
problem that had concerned Schlick: how can a unique coordination between implicitly 
defined  mathematical  structure  and  completely  undefined  experience  be  possible? 
Reichenbach understood this to be how the transcendental question should be formulated 
in light of mathematical developments since Kant.
53 The axioms of coordination are then 
appealed to in order to limit experience so as to permit a unique coordination. 
  Reichenbach  understood  the  experiential  side  of  a  physical  coordination  to 
correspond to the Kantian faculty of sensibility, and the axioms of coordination were taken 
to be assumptions about how experience was to be constituted. The problem, from the 
perspective of seeking to defend the syntheticity of the axioms of coordination, was that 
the axioms of coordination are treated in a manner analogous to the conditions that are 
needed to limit one side of a mathematical coordination—such as where on a continuum 
to place “zero”—which seem to be more clearly matters of convention. This meant that 
Reichenbach never managed to fully articulate a sense in which his analogue of Kant’s 
faculty of sensibility had any great significance or independence. As such, and given that his 
version of the transcendental question was based upon Schlick’s account of knowledge, it is 
plain to see how Reichenbach could have come to see his axioms of coordination instead 
                                                                                                                                               
connection between the conceptual category and the experience of coordination remains an ultimate, not as 
an analysable residue. But this connection clearly defines a class of principles that precede the most general 
laws of connection as presuppositions of knowledge though they hold as conceptual formulas only for the 
conceptual side of the coordination. These principles are so important because they define the otherwise 
completely undefined problem of the cognitive coordination.” (Reichenbach, 1965, p.55)  
52 This was precisely Schlick’s (1978b, p.333) objection to Reichenbach’s account. 
53 Reichenbach is quite explicit in this respect: see (1965, p.46). 42 
 
as conventional coordinative definitions which are directly analogous to those additional 
assumptions needed to secure the uniqueness of a mathematical coordination.
54 
  Reichenbach’s  work,  though,  is  not  the  extent  of  the  proto-logical  empiricist 
interest in the relativized a priori: Carnap, Friedman claims, sought to build upon and 
generalise  Reichenbach’s  insight.  Carnap’s  work  is  interesting,  from  the  perspective  of 
seeking  an  answer  to  CC,  because  ultimately  Carnap  offers  an  analytic  account  of 
constitutive principles: Friedman’s work on Carnap should, then, be read as arguing that 
the attempt to provide an analytic, non-Kantian, account of constitutive principles is a 
doomed project. This, for Friedman, means that it is essential to preserve a synthetic notion 
of the relativized a priori. Ultimately, as I will show in §4.1.3, Friedman’s argument to this 
end does not succeed. That is, Friedman seeks to show that the attempt to develop an 
account  of  science  that  secured  a  role  for  constitutive  principles  failed  only  because 
Reichenbach’s synthetic understanding of the relativized a priori was abandoned in favour 
of the doomed analytic understanding of constitutive principles. From the discussion of 
Reichenbach’s work, it should be clear that in interpreting Reichenbach’s relativized a priori 
analytically, Carnap was simply accepting that Reichenbach’s framework could not support 
a notion of the synthetic a priori. Let us now turn our attention, though, to the other part 
of Friedman’s argument: i.e., that Carnap’s project fails because it provides an analytic 
interpretation of constitutive principles. 
  In what sense, then, does Carnap seek to salvage the relativized a priori? Carnap 
first developed his philosophy of linguistic frameworks in his Logical Syntax of Language 
(2000 [1934]). His central argument was that all standards of “correctness”, “validity” and 
“truth” are meaningful only with respect to the logical rules of a given linguistic framework. 
As such, it does not make any sense to ask whether a particular set of logical rules is correct 
or valid; there is no linguistic framework in place that would allow us to judge such a claim. 
This, says Friedman, means that logical rules are “constitutive of the concepts of “validity” 
and “correctness”—relative to one or another choice of linguistic framework, of course—
and are in this sense a priori rather than empirical” (2001, p.31).  
  Friedman suggests that Carnap’s L-Rules can be interpreted as an explication of 
Reichenbach’s understanding of the relativized a priori: 
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his (2012), Friedman certainly stresses that the main problem is that Reichenbach’s account of what is given 
in sensibility is not given a “sufficiently independent a priori structure”. Furthermore, in Friedman’s more 
recent account he seeks to defend an independent faculty of sensibility while moving away from construing 
the transcendental problem as one of mapping abstract mathematics to experience. See §1.4.2. 43 
 
  I suggest that Carnap’s L-rules or analytic sentences can be profitably viewed as a precise 
explication of Reichenbach’s notion of the constitutive or relative a priori. And in this 
connection, it is especially interesting to note that Carnap’s L-rules include not only pure 
mathematics but also, in the context of some linguistic frameworks, principles of physical 
geometry. (Friedman, 1999, p.69) 
 
L-rules, for Carnap, form a logico-linguistic framework that is—as Friedman (2001, p.43) 
points  out—closely  analogous  to  Kuhn’s  later  understanding  of  paradigms.  Friedman’s 
account of the failure of Carnap’s research programme ultimately hinges on his reading of 
Carnap as advocating a variant of naturalism.  
  This is, of course, not naturalism in the sense that Carnap sought to apply empirical 
reasoning to the logic of science: Carnap’s methodology was, however, naturalistic in the 
sense that he understood philosophy of science as a branch of science.
55 Carnap was part of 
the “left-wing” of the Vienna Circle, along with Neurath and Frank among others. For this 
section of the Vienna Circle, the logic of science was just the a priori part of a broader 
meta-theory  of  science.  The  role  of  philosophy—as  part  of  this  meta-theory—was 
understood by Neurath as the study of the “behaviouristics of scholars” and by Frank as 
the “pragmatics of science”. On this understanding of philosophy of science, it is not an 
independent field but, instead, just plays a role in providing the logic and “pragmatics” of 
science. 
  Now,  as  we  have  seen  in  §1.2,  this  is  clearly  not  a  conception  of  the  role  of 
philosophy that Friedman can accept: philosophy has a vitally important role as an arena 
for  discussing  crucial  matters  of  interpretation  in  a  theory-neutral  environment.  So  his 
argument against Carnap is that by attempting to frame the constitutive a priori in these 
terms—i.e. as part of the logic of science that, with the pragmatics of science, is just a 
branch of science—he cannot possibly hope to fulfil the promise of the relativized a priori. 
That is, it is the error of treating philosophy just as a branch of science that leads Carnap to 
adopt a purely formal understanding of the a priori: i.e. there is no room for a synthetic a 
priori because on Carnap’s understanding of the a priori, statements cannot be considered 
cognitively significant if they are not testable. As we will see in the next section, the idea 
that the synthetic, relativized a priori is not testable is a central feature of Friedman’s (2001) 
account of constitutive principles. 
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1.3.1.2.   The relativized a priori in the Dynamics of Reason 
How,  then,  does  Friedman  recommend—in  his  (2001)—reconfiguring  the  original 
Reichenbachian conception of the relativized a priori in order to answer CC and maintain 
the syntheticity of his relativized a priori? Friedman accepts Schlick’s distinction between 
an uninterpreted mathematical framework and an interpreted external reality. As such he 
divides  constitutive  principles  into  two  types:  mathematical  principles  and  coordinating 
principles.  Mathematical  principles  are  those  that  implicitly  define  a  mathematical 
framework: e.g. the axioms of Euclidean geometry define the mathematical framework 
within which Newton constructed his theory of gravitation. Coordinating principles are 
akin to Reichenbach’s axioms of coordination; they serve to map physical reality to the 
uninterpreted mathematical framework. Hence: 
 
[It] is clear that the mathematical parts of our theories, considered independently of the 
empirical application in question, is in no way empirically tested by such a procedure [as, 
e.g., observation of the advance of the perihelion of Mercury]; what is empirically tested is 
rather the particular coordination or correspondence in virtue of which some or another 
mathematical structure is used to formulate precise empirical laws about some or another 
physical phenomena. (Friedman, 2001, p.80) 
 
Here, Friedman appropriates Reichenbachian terminology to claim that what is tested is the 
coordination of the mathematical part of our theories with observational phenomena. This 
coordination is to be carried out by coordinating principles. These are defined in the following 
fashion: 
 
Their  peculiar  function  is  precisely  to  mediate  between  abstract  mathematical 
representations  and  the  concrete  empirical  phenomena  these  abstract  mathematical 
representations are intended to describe. As such, they do in fact fulfil the characteristically 
constitutive function first delimited by Kant, and, accordingly they have a genuine claim to 
be considered as constitutively a priori. (2001, p.77) 
 
Friedman initially uses Newton’s laws of motion as an example of this sort of principle. 
Newton’s  theory  of  gravity  has,  as  its  foundation,  a  mathematical  theory:  Euclidean 
geometry. On the other hand there are empirical phenomena which one wishes to describe 
using the purely abstract mathematical theory (Friedman gives the example of the relative 
motions  in  the  solar  system).  Coordinating  principles  are  intended  to  ensure  the 
applicability  of  mathematical  theory  to  the  observed  world:  in  Newtonian  physics,  for 45 
 
example, the laws of motion act as the principles that coordinate the abstract mathematical 
foundations of the theory with the empirical laws. 
Coordinating principles fulfil this role by containing a minimal degree of empirical 
content plus some additional information about how this relates to the mathematical part 
of the theory. Friedman is quite clear that coordinating principles have empirical content 
and, indeed, can even be falsified: 
 
It must certainly be acknowledged, at the outset, that the principles in question do have 
empirical content. If the Eötvös experiments had detected a difference in the accelerations 
due to gravity in different materials, the principle of equivalence could not simultaneously 
be maintained. (2001, pp.86-7) 
 
However, if a putative coordinating principle is to successfully connect mathematical and 
empirical parts of a theory it is surely not enough that it contains only an empirical part: it 
must also say something about how we are to apply the mathematical part of a theory to 
the physical world. Friedman does not, as far as I’m aware, claim this himself, but this 
additional claim is clearly implicit in his conception of coordinating principles. So in the 
case of, for example, Newtonian physics the mathematical part of the theory contains the 
concept of straight lines. The law of inertia is taken to be a coordinating principle because 
it links this aspect of mathematical structure with empirical observations by defining these 
straight lines as the paths that force-free bodies follow.  
  So, Friedman answers CC here by arguing that the constitutive principles initially 
have empirical content. In being elevated to the status of a principle, though, they become 
more than just an empirical generalisation: they tell us how to coordinate a feature of the 
physical world with aspects of mathematical structure. It is in this sense that Friedman 
takes constitutive principles to be unfalsifiable: once one has accepted a certain mapping all 
experiments are carried out within a framework that takes that mapping for granted.  
  The foregoing, then, is how Friedman initially presents the relativised a priori. The 
empirical  side  of  a  scientific  theory  is  to  be  understood  as  constituted  by  a  purely 
mathematical part and a part that tells us how to connect the mathematics with empirical 
observations.  In  the  next  section  I  argue  that  Friedman’s  account  of  the  relativized  a 
priori—like Reichenbach’s—fails to secure the syntheticity of the a priori. 46 
 
1.3.1.3.   Syntheticity lost: the thinness of physical coordinating principles 
I think it is now clear, though, that Friedman cannot—and, indeed, no longer wishes to
56—
tie his understanding of constitutive principles too closely to Reichenbach’s. There are two 
reasons for this:  
 
(1) Reichenbach’s understanding of the relativized a priori—especially in the role 
that he sets aside for coordinating principles—is too closely associated with 
Hilbert’s understanding of mathematics as an uninterpreted axiomatic system. 
This is not a view of the relationship between mathematics and physics that 
seems plausible from a modern perspective. 
(2) It is not at all clear that even if we accept Friedman’s initial understanding of 
the relativized a priori we have sufficient resources to answer CC. 
 
First,  let  us  clarify  the  reasons  for  doubting  Hilbert’s  account  of  mathematics  as  an 
uninterpreted mathematical system. The main problem here is that Klein’s group-theoretic 
approach to geometry proved vastly more useful in the development of relativity after 
Einstein.
57 In particular the axiomatic approach entirely lacks the resources to makes sense 
of subsequent developments in general relativity that were pioneered by Levi-Civita, Weyl 
and Cartan.
58 
The  second  problem  is  derived  from  Uebel’s  (2012)  argument  that  Friedman’s 
(2001) notion of the relativized a priori is better understood as analytic than synthetic.
59 We 
have seen that Friedman, in effect, argues that when we use coordinating principles to 
provide the physical meaning of mathematical formalism we take a step beyond Carnap 
and bestow syntheticity on our constitutive principles. Uebel argues, though, that this is 
actually  better  understood  in  analytic  terms:  Friedman,  in  arguing  for  the  ultimate 
                                                 
56  That  Friedman  is  aware  of  the  problems  associated  with  his  view  is  clear  in  his  (2010a)  and  (2012). 
Friedman points to Ryckman’s (2005) as convincing him that his (2001) conception of the a priori was too 
closely  tied  to  Reichenbach’s  understanding  of  mathematics  (see  Friedman,  2010a,  pp.697-8).  Friedman 
(2012, p.53n) also suggests that he now doubts that Reichenbach’s understanding of the a priori is sufficiently 
rich to avoid descending into mere analyticity.   
57 Friedman (2010a, p.698) indicates that he is now aware of this, and, consequently, seeks to distance his 
account from Hilbert’s view of mathematics. 
58 See (Ryckman, 2005) and (Stachel, 2007b) for accounts of these developments and the role of group-
theoretic geometry. 
59 (Suarez, 2012, p.5) and Uebel himself (pp.15-6) both point out that it is a quite delicate matter to work out 
what precisely is meant by analytic and synthetic in relation to Carnap’s philosophy. The difficulty arises just 
because Carnap’s logic is so different to Kant’s. However, I think if we seek to maintain the distinction as an 
analytic judgment meaning that which is given by logic and which can be known independent of experience 
whereas a synthetic judgment does require some appeal to experience, the distinction is clear enough to be 
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syntheticity of constitutive principles, ignores an important continuity between Schlick and 
Carnap (p.17).  
The relevant aspect of Carnap’s account is in his Logical Syntax, §51. He argues that 
while  the  types  of  principle  that  Friedman  draws  attention  to—that  seem  to  have  an 
empirical  part—may  not  look  analytic  they  are,  in  fact,  framework  analytic.  This  is 
distinguished from definitional analyticity in the following fashion. In Logical Syntax Carnap 
recommended writing empirical laws into logico-linguistic frameworks as P-rules. P-rules 
are “extra-logical rules of transformation”; L-rules are “logical rules of transformation”. 
Both L-rules and P-rules are understood as being constitutive of a linguistic framework and 
as being analytically true with respect to that framework. This means that even though P-
rules have an empirical basis, they function as framework principles for a language and—as 
such—cannot be empirically refuted within that framework. 
From here, it should be clear why Friedman’s (2001) account cannot avoid this 
form  of  analyticity.  P-rules  are  not  definitionally  analytic:  they  come  about  through 
observation.  However  they  are  framework  analytic:  they  are  accepted  as  linguistic 
conventions  and—within  that  language—are  true  as  a  matter  of  definition.  This,  for 
Carnap,  is  sufficient  (by  the  time  he  came  to  write  Logical  Syntax)  because,  following 
Schlick, he has abandoned the idea that constitutive principles need to be constitutive of 
objects: they just need to be constitutive of linguistic frameworks. 
Uebel’s argument is sufficient to show that Friedman’s (2001) does not provide a 
satisfactory  Kantian  answer  to  CC:  once  one  has  accepted  Schlick’s  account  of  the 
relationship between physics and mathematics, one is driven—as Carnap showed—to treat 
empirical principles as framework analytic. Friedman now accepts this,
60 and argues that if 
we  are  to  secure  the  syntheticity  of  the  relativized  a  priori,  we  must  abandon  the 
understanding  of  constitutive  principles  as  coordinating  mathematical  formalism  with 
physical experience. Friedman instead seeks to answer CC by historicising the relativized a 
priori. 
1.3.2. A more radical reconfiguration: a transcendental role for history 
In §1.3.1 I showed that the version of the relativized a priori that Friedman defended in his 
(2001) is insufficient to allow a convincing Kantian answer to CC. Friedman has indicated 
in his recent works that he is aware of this difficulty: in his (2010a) he accepts that he was 
mistaken in his (2001) to tie his account of the relativized a priori so closely to Reichenbach 
and Schlick’s understanding of the relationship between mathematics and experience. He 
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suggests that we should, instead, focus on the group-theoretic account of the relationship 
between  mathematics  and  experience  that  is  advanced  in  Klein’s  work. There  are  two 
approaches that we might take to incorporating this key insight into a Kantian account of 
contemporary philosophy of science. 
I would argue that the most natural way to incorporate group-theoretic insights into 
a Kantian philosophy of science is that which was pursued by Cassirer in his regulative 
reading of Kant. For Cassirer the invariant properties of a group define the concept of 
objectivity  at  a  time:  this  is  the  starting  point  for  a  transcendental  analysis  of  science. 
Cassirer then, sought to explain the possibility of shared scientific objects-of-experience in 
terms of the concept objectivity, interpreted in a group theoretic fashion.
61 This, however, 
is  not  an  approach  that  Friedman  is  willing  to  take.  Friedman  is  reluctant  to  adopt 
Cassirer’s  account  of  constitutivity  because  doing  so  necessitates  the  rejection  of  an 
independent faculty of sensibility.  
Friedman argues that this has an important consequence: without the distinction 
between sensibility and understanding it is impossible to distinguish between regulative and 
constitutive principles.
62 This is because, for Kant, constitutive principles are those that 
govern  the  application  of  the  intellectual  faculties—understanding  and  reason—to  the 
distinct faculty of sensibility. Regulative principles are those that govern the operation of 
the intellectual faculties independently of sensibility. So, if there is no distinction between 
understanding  and  sensibility,  then  it  is  not  clear  how  we  can  distinguish  between 
constitutive and regulative principles. For Friedman, then, this means that there is no room 
for constitutive principles on Cassirer’s Kantianism: as such, Cassirer is in no position to 
provide an answer to CC and does not provide a meaningfully Kantian account of modern 
science. This challenge to Cassirer’s regulative Kantianism is a significant one: much of the 
work of the following chapters will be directed towards showing—contra Friedman—that a 
regulative Kantianism can draw a distinction between constitutive and regulative principles.  
Friedman, then, insists that if Kantian insights are to be applied to contemporary 
philosophy  we  must  emphasise  the  importance  of  constitutive  principles  and  seek  to 
relativize Kant’s synthetic a priori. In his (2010a) and (2012), Friedman has started to develop 
an alternative, historicised, version of the relativized a priori that aims to incorporate a 
more plausible account of the relationship between mathematics and experience. There are 
two key aspects to Friedman’s new account of constitutive principles: first, Friedman re-
interprets Kant’s original understanding of the faculty of sensibility in terms of frames of 
reference and, second, principles are constitutive of a theory in virtue of their historical role 
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in providing a conceptual framework that permits us to apply ideas of space, time and 
motion to sensibility thus understood. 
First let us clarify the manner in which Friedman seeks to re-interpret the faculty of 
sensibility  so  as  to  ground  a  distinction  between  constitutive  and  regulative  principles. 
Friedman suggests that we replace “the Kantian faculty of sensibility with what we now call 
physical  frames  of  reference—ostensively  introduced  and  empirically  given  systems  of 
coordinates (spatial and temporal) within which empirical phenomena are to be observed, 
described  and  measured”  (2012,  p.48).  So,  the  faculty  of  sensibility  is  replaced  by 
emphasising the idea that our experience of the world is frame-dependant. This means that 
any observation or measurement that we carry out can only describe the universe from our 
particular earth-bound perspective.  
Friedman (2010a, p.691) characterises the development of space-time theories as 
the increasingly complex task of describing our frame-dependent observations of the world 
in a manner that is applicable to all frames of reference. In particular, for Friedman, it is 
key to integrate laws describing the behaviour of objects from “laboratory frames” on earth 
with  universal  laws.  The  process  began  with  Newton’s  integration  of  Galileo’s 
mathematical  description  of,  e.g.,  falling  bodies  with  the  best  available  description  of 
celestial bodies. Newton achieved this by positing universal laws of motion, from which 
could be derived a universal law of gravitation. This, of course, gave rise to a new problem 
of  how  we  should  understand  the  mathematical  description  of  nature  to  relate  to 
experience: Newton depended on the concept of absolute space, which is not an object of 
experience. 
This,  as  we  see  in  §2  is  the  problem  that  Kant  was  concerned  with  in  his 
Metaphysical  Foundations  of  Natural  Science:  i.e.,  how  is  it  that  Newton’s  mathematical 
description of nature provides an objective description of sensory experience? Kant took 
absolute space to be the ideal limit of a series of “relative spaces”
63 that begin with our 
initial perspective on the universe from earth. We then consider relative spaces that are 
successively further removed from our particular earth-bound perspective: going from the 
perspective  from  the  earth via  relative  spaces  that  increase  in  scope  through  the  solar 
system, galaxy, cluster of galaxies all with Newtonian absolute space serving as the limit of 
definable relative spaces.
64 This sequence is meant to ground a sense in which our initial 
experience on earth—which is describable to a very good approximation by Euclidean 
geometry and Newtonian physics—can “reach” the astronomical frame of reference. 
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This, as was clarified by Mach,
65 effectively introduced into physics the idea of an 
inertial frame of reference.
66 Einstein’s development of general relativity proceeded by a 
series of natural extensions of this concept. In special relativity, Einstein put the idea of 
inertial  frames  front-and-centre  in  the  guise  of  the  relativity  principle.  However,  this 
principle  was  inconsistent  with  the  light  postulate.  In  resolving  this  tension,  Einstein 
revised the manner in which different inertial frames relate to each other (Friedman, 2010a, 
p.692).  Minkowski,  then,  used  the  coordinate  transformations  that  Einstein  derived  in 
order to develop a new mathematical framework within which to interpret experience. 
However, at this stage the mathematical framework could be related to our experience 
relatively straightforwardly: the new mathematical structure still prioritises the description 
of objects in inertial frames and these can be connected to our perceptual experiences in a 
manner analogous to that seen in the case of Newtonian physics. 
However, it is far more difficult to incorporate Newton’s account of gravitation 
into Minkowski’s mathematical framework: inertial frames of reference are, after all, no 
longer  privileged  in  general  relativity.  Here  the  rotating  frame  of  reference  and  the 
equivalence  principle  are  supposed  to  provide  a means  to  connect  the variably  curved 
space-time  of  general  relativity  with  perceptual  experiences  of  earth-bound  frames  of 
reference. In particular, the rotating disk motivates an understanding of the equivalence 
principle, which replaces Newton’s principle of inertia with the claim that force-free objects 
follow  space-time  geodesics. While  this  eliminates the  idea  of  global  inertial  frames  of 
reference it does permit us to define local frames of reference which can then be connected 
back to perceptual experience. 
So, for Friedman, constitutive principles are those that have played a historical role 
in permitting us to relate the increasingly abstract mathematical frameworks within which 
space-time theories have been described back to our ordinary perceptual experience. Our 
experience is understood as being confined to a particular, ostensively defined frame of 
reference that stands in for the Kantian faculty of sensibility. Friedman, then, aims to retain 
a sense in which sensibility is independent while also acknowledging that one must go 
beyond Kant’s description of this faculty as limited to Euclidean geometry and Newtonian 
physics. 
The  rotating  disk  thought  experiment  is  important  for  Friedman  because  it 
provides  a  way  to  relate  the  abstract  mathematical  structure  of  general  relativity  to 
phenomena observable from earth-bound laboratory frames. This is because the thought 
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Friedman’s understanding of the role of constitutive principles in the development of the theory: I provide a 
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experiment played a crucial historical role in establishing the possibility of representing 
gravitation by variably curved four-dimensional space-time in the first place. Once it is 
clear that it is possible to treat gravitation as space-time curvature, we then have a path by 
which it is possible to relate abstract mathematics to observable phenomena: i.e. because 
the four-dimensional space-time of general relativity is infinitesimally Minkowskian. The 
equivalence principle and the light postulate, then, are constitutive of general relativity on 
Friedman’s account precisely because of their roles in this thought experiment in making 
four-dimensional space-time a physical possibility. 
So, then, the idea is that while we must conduct the empirical parts of our scientific 
theories from the perspective of laboratory frames on earth there must be a mechanism by 
which these are able to provide reliable empirical data about the rest of world. Friedman’s 
idea  is  that  rather  than  treating  mathematics  as  wholly  uninterpreted,  it  should  be 
understood as connected to experience via an analogue of the Kantian schematism: this 
means that the abstract mathematical structures that we get in general relativity are to be 
understood via their relation to earth-bound frames of reference which (approximately) 
have the structure of the Kantian faculty of sensibility. This is how Friedman hopes to 
avoid the problems that we saw associated with Reichenbach’s view in §1.3.1.1: 
 
But  this  analogue  of  the  Kantian  schematism  is  also  much  more  substantial  than 
Reichenbachian coordinating principles in so far as the observable phenomena to which 
the theory is coordinated necessarily have a priori mathematical structure of their own. We 
thus have a (relativized) a priori mathematical structure at both the observational and the 
theoretical  levels,  and  the  two  are  coordinated  with  one  another  by  a  complex 
developmental interaction in which each informs the other. (Friedman, 2012, pp.48-9). 
 
So,  Friedman  hopes  to  avoid  the  problem  with  Reichenbach’s  understanding  of  the 
relativized  a  priori  by  arguing  that  the  observable  phenomena  of  a  theory  have  a 
mathematical structure of their own. So, mathematical and observational levels of a theory 
have a complex developmental interaction. The mathematical part of a theory is developed 
through  abstracting  away  from  our  earth-based  observational  limitations  (towards  a 
regulative ideal), but in order to be tested we must be able to consider the situation from 
our own frame of reference. Similarly experimental facts revealed on earth can be carried 
up to higher levels of abstraction and greater invariance.  
  Friedman’s  argument  in  his  (2012),  then,  is  that  all  of  our  observations  are 
necessarily frame-dependent and that this fact can serve as a modern analogue for Kant’s 
faculty  of  sensibility.  Frame-dependent  empirical  data  is  then  developed  into  a  global 52 
 
theory by applying our frame-dependent empirical data in reference frames that are far 
removed from that of our own experience: these more distant frames are connected to our 
own experience in the sense that they represent successively better approximations of the 
regulative ideal of absolute space.  
  In general terms, I think that the above represents a helpful way to understand the 
development of space-time theories: in particular, it is clear that Einstein was motivated by 
the desire to strip inertial frames of their privileged status.
67 The problem is that I do not 
think that this is a promising way to understand constitutivity for two main reasons. First, 
in appealing to the regulative ideal of absolute space in order to ground the possibility of 
applying empirical observations to frames of reference that are far removed from our own 
experience, I think Friedman is mystifying a process that is not, in fact, very mysterious. 
The only assumption that is required in order to justify the idea that local observations 
have global application is the idea that the universe has a uniform nature.
68  
Second, I do not see any particularly strong sense in which the idea of ostensively 
defined  frames  of  reference  is  analogous  to  the  Kantian  faculty  of  sensibility.  The 
important  feature  of  the  faculty  of  sensibility,  from  the  perspective  of  understanding 
constitutivity, is that it passively receives the manifold of intuition and does not interpret it: 
interpreting the manifold of intuition is the task of the understanding and the constitutive 
principles associated with it. On Friedman’s new account, observable phenomena come 
with  a  mathematical  structure  that  must  be  connected,  via  historicised  constitutive 
principles,  with  theoretical  mathematical  structures.    It  is  the  idea  of  an  uninterpreted 
manifold  of  intuition  that  is  threatened  by  developments  in  logic  and  Cassirer’s 
Kantianism. It is not clear how the account that Friedman presents salvages this aspect of 
Kant’s faculty of sensibility. Friedman seeks to avoid the problem faced by Reichenbach’s 
account by arguing that observations come in a mathematical structure of their own, which 
must then be coordinated with the theoretical mathematical structures.  
However, while  I  do  not  accept  Friedman’s  attempt  to  reinterpret  the  Kantian 
faculty of sensibility in terms of frames of reference, there is another aspect of Friedman’s 
answer to CC that is more promising. Friedman argues that principles are constitutive of 
                                                 
67 I return to this in §4. 
68 Additionally,  I do not think that this amounts to a  natural extension of  Kant’s understanding  of the 
regulative role of absolute space. Kant’s analysis of absolute space was intended to explain only why a physics 
that was built upon the assumption that motion is change of position with respect to absolute space—when 
there is no absolute space—could be objective. The interpretation of absolute space as a regulative ideal was 
intended only to secure the objectivity of the idea: I do not see any evidence to suggest that Kant thought 
that the regulative idea of absolute space was necessary so as to apply earth-bound observations to, e.g., the 
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the  empirical  side  of  a  theory  insofar  as  they  play  a  role  in  this  historical  interaction 
between mathematical and physical parts of a theory.  
This idea is the hallmark of Friedman’s historicised conception of the a priori as he 
presents it in his (2010a): 
 
In my reconceived version of transcendental philosophy…integrated intellectual history of 
both the exact sciences and scientific philosophy (a kind of “synthetic history”) takes over 
the  role  of  Kant’s  original  synthetic  method;  and  in  particular  constructive  historical 
investigation  of  precisely  this  kind  replaces  Kant’s  original  transcendental  faculty 
psychology. (2010a, p.702) 
 
This is, perhaps, most straightforwardly clarified by means of a concrete example. In his 
comparison of his own position with DiSalle’s, Friedman emphasises again the importance 
that  the  rotating  frame  plays  in  his  system.  It  is  through  this  thought  experiment,  in 
particular,  that  the  equivalence  principle  and  definition  of  simultaneity  gain  their 
constitutive status. Friedman makes this clear in the following passage (this is important, so 
I quote it at length): 
 
In the case of DiSalle’s…treatment of the principle of equivalence, however, we find a 
particularly clear and direct contrast between his approach and my own. For my approach 
gives a quite central place to Einstein’s example of a uniformly rotating frame (and the 
resulting non-Euclidean spatial geometry), while DiSalle suggests that Einstein’s use of this 
is  at  best  heuristic  since  it  cannot  actually  warrant  the  four-dimensional  geometrical 
structure employed in the finished theory. This is perfectly correct—and, indeed, from the 
point of view of the finished theory, Einstein’s example of the uniformly rotating frame 
reveals no true space-time curvature in any case, for it arises in precisely the context of a 
flat Minkowski space-time. Yet what DiSalle’s account does not satisfactorily explain, in my 
view, is how the idea of a four-dimensional space-time geometry became a real physical 
possibility in the first place, and, more generally, it seems to me that DiSalle does not 
adequately  capture  how  difficult  it  was  to  arrive  at  this  idea.  The  question  whether  a 
genuinely physical use of four-dimensional space-time is even possible is prior, in my view, 
to the question of its warranted correctness, and I claim that it was Einstein’s use of the 
rotating frame, in particular, which first made such a four-dimensional geometry physically 
possible. (Friedman, 2010, p.725) 
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Here, Friedman suggests that the equivalence principle is constitutive of general relativity in 
the sense that it makes a variably curved four-dimensional space-time a physical possibility 
through its role in the rotating frame thought experiment. 
  I  introduced  the  rotating  frame  in  §1.2.2:  the  general  idea  here  is  that  spatial 
geometry in a rotating frame is measured as non-Euclidean on the grounds that rigid rods 
contract  if  placed  in  the  direction  of  motion  and  do  not  contract  if  they  are  placed 
orthogonally to the axis of rotation. The role of the equivalence principle was to allow 
Einstein to treat the surface geometry of space-time to be four-dimensional and curved in 
the presence of a gravitational field. By the time that the rotating frame played a role in 
Einstein’s thought he had come to understand it as the claim that gravitation and inertia are 
two aspects of the one, inertio-gravitational, field. So, Einstein understood that inertial 
effects—such  as  the  centrifugal  force—could  be  transformed  away  and  replaced  by  a 
suitable  gravitational  field.  How  does  the  equivalence  principle,  then,  make  four-
dimensional space-time a real physical possibility? The most mathematically simple way to 
transform the situation from one of rotation to one in which the centrifugal forces have 
been replaced by gravitational forces—once one also adds in time-dilated clocks—is to 
appeal to a four-dimensional generalisation of Gauss’s theory of surfaces.
69 So, together, 
physical  geometry,  Lorentz  contraction  (and  the  definition  of  simultaneity)  and  the 
equivalence  principle—through  their  role  in  the  rotating  frame  thought  experiment—
allowed Einstein to treat four-dimensional space-time as a real physical possibility.
70 
  In his (2010a), then, Friedman seems to understand constitutive principles as being 
those that play a historical role in the process by which a purely mathematical possibility 
became a physical possibility. In his (2001), it was relatively clear what Friedman meant by 
mathematical and physical possibility. However, Friedman’s (2010a) disavowal of Schlick’s 
understanding of the distinction between mathematics and experience means that it is now 
no longer precisely clear what he means by this. Friedman does though state that he wishes 
to ground his account of a group-theoretic understanding of mathematics (2010a, p.698) 
                                                 
69 Friedman explicitly explains the role of the equivalence principle in terms of mathematical simplicity: see 
(Friedman, 2010a, p.789, n.302). 
70 It is worth pointing out here that it is not at all clear how plausible it is to argue that these principles 
together  rendered  four-dimensional  space-time  a  real  physical  possibility  when  the  argument  eventually 
hinges upon considerations of mathematical simplicity. I would suggest that there is a clear sense in which the 
rotating frame thought experiment—without the equivalence principle—renders the idea of non-Euclidean 
geometry physically possible because it enables us to see how we might actually measure a non-Euclidean 
geometry. The matter is nothing like as straightforward for explaining the role of the equivalence principle: 
the equivalence principle certainly can be appealed to in order to motivate the idea that gravitational fields 
cause spatial geometry to be measured as non-Euclidean, but the additional claim that this necessitates four-
dimensional variable geometry seems to be based on considerations solely of mathematical simplicity. It is, 
therefore, not clear that four-dimensional variable geometry is rendered a genuine physical possibility by the 
rotating frame thought experiment in the same way that the possibility of measuring non-Euclidean surface 
geometry is rendered physical by consideration of rotation. 55 
 
and this can provide some insight into how Friedman might understand mathematical and 
physical possibility. Mathematical concepts, such as four-dimensional space-time, can be 
applied  to  physical  situations  when  there  is  a  means  of  relating  those  concepts  to 
measurements.  In  the  case  of  four-dimensional  space-time,  this  requires  just  that  the 
invariant line element ds can be determined through measurements carried out with rods 
and clocks. So, Einstein became aware that, in virtue of its invariance, the line element was 
the physically significant aspect of four-dimensional treatments of relativity. Because the 
line element could be determined by measurements with rigid bodies and clocks, four-
dimensional space-time became a physical possibility. 
  This  gives  rise  to  a  problem.  From  the  perspective  of  the  contemporary 
understanding  of  general  relativity,  it  is  not  the  case  that  the  line  element  receives  its 
physical significance because it corresponds to measurements with rods and clocks: the line 
element is epistemically prior to rods and clocks and governs their behaviour.
71 The line 
element does not need to be granted physical significance through its determination with 
measuring  instruments:  it  gains  physical  significance  just  in  virtue  of  it  being  frame-
invariant.  From  this  emerges  the  crucial  difference  between  Friedman’s  approach  to 
constitutivity and the regulative approach. For Friedman, there is a problem as to how 
mathematics relates to physics; on Cassirer’s regulative view, which emphasises the group-
theoretic  view—mathematics  is  essentially  applicable  to  experience.
72  From  this 
perspective, Friedman appeals to constitutive principles to solve a problem that need not 
arise in the first place. 
  Friedman’s current answer to CC, then, can be summarised as follows. In providing 
an account of the possibility of a scientific theory—and its empirical concepts—we must 
pay  attention  to  the  complex  developmental  interaction  between  observational  and 
theoretical  parts  of  the  theory.  The  sensibility—as  ostensively  defined  frames  of 
reference—plays a crucial role here because it is at this level that the observational part of 
the historical development of a theory takes place. This is then connected to the abstract, 
mathematical, part of a theory through analogy to Kant’s treatment of absolute space as a 
regulative ideal. Principles are constitutive of the empirical side of a theory insofar as they 
render crucial empirical concepts a coherent possibility in the first place: this, in the case of 
the equivalence principle and definition of simultaneity, is achieved by the role that these 
principles played in the rotating frame thought experiment. 
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1.4.   Constitutive principles: the way forward 
Friedman, then, provides us with the following answers to CR and CC: 
 
CR:  The development and acceptance of the theory of relativity was rational 
because Einstein appealed to theory-neutral philosophical ideas that were 
available to all scientists. So, e.g., the representation of gravitation as space-
time  curvature  was  rendered  a  coherent  physical  possibility  through 
Einstein’s application of Helmholtz’s understanding of physical geometry 
and the equivalence principle. 
CC:  Constitutive principles are those that played a historical role in making a 
mathematical  possibility—e.g.,  four-dimensional  space-time—a  genuinely 
physical possibility. The syntheticity of the relativized a priori is secured 
through appeal to the historical interaction between theory and experience 
in  the  laboratory  frame.  Constitutive  principles  are  not  merely  analytic 
because  they  played  a  historical  role  in  allowing  abstract  mathematical 
structures to be related to empirical observations from the perspective of an 
earth-bound frame of reference. 
 
These  are  both  intriguing  and  rich  Kantian  answers  to  CC  and  CR.  The  idea  that 
philosophy can act as a meta-paradigm that provides a common stock of ideas to drive 
scientific revolutions and render them prospectively rational is innovative and the case-
study of Einstein’s development of relativity seems to give the idea weight. I think it is also 
clear that if Friedman’s reinterpretation of Kant’s faculty of sensibility is plausible, then this 
blocks any attempt to treat the constitutive a priori as mere conventions. This is especially 
clear when one recalls Friedman’s emphasis on the necessity of each of the developments 
in question (which is made more plausible than it initially appears when understood in 
terms of the style of conceptual analysis advanced by DiSalle). 
  Friedman’s historicisation of constitutive principles, I think, contains an important 
insight that will feature in my own eventual answer to CC. However, I do not think that 
Friedman’s attempt to defend the syntheticity of his constitutive principles is a particularly 
attractive  route  for  the  Kantian  to  take.  In  the  following  chapters,  I  argue  that  a 
Kantianism that places greater emphasis on the role of regulative principles can provide a 
more plausible contemporary account of science. I argue in the next chapter that in Kant’s 
account of science, the regulative role of reason features much more prominently than it 
does in Friedman’s contemporary Kantianism. 57 
 
  Friedman’s rejection of the regulative approach, I argue in chapter 3, is based on 
Friedman’s  own  characteristic  reading  of  Cassirer:  he  argues  that  in  abandoning  the 
distinction between understanding and sensibility Cassirer also loses the capacity to make 
any  distinction  between  constitutive  and  regulative  principles.  Now,  this,  I  argue  is  a 
misreading of Cassirer: it is quite clear in his (1923) that Cassirer does take some principles 
to be constitutive and not regulative. On the reading of Cassirer that I offer, the sorts of 
worries that Friedman has with an approach that draws on Marburg neo-Kantianism are 
substantially reduced. 
  I suggest that we can develop a far more appealing contemporary Kantianism if we 
make  use  of  some  of  the  resources  of  Cassirer’s  philosophy.  There  are  two  areas  in 
particular that Cassirer’s Kantianism seems more relevant to contemporary concerns than 
one  based  upon  Reichenbach’s.  First,  Cassirer  has  a  more  sophisticated  philosophy  of 
mathematics and logic than Schlick. Cassirer, in particular, fully appreciated the importance 
of Klein’s group-theoretic approach to geometry; this is a distinct advantage over accounts 
based on Hilbert’s axiomatic approach (especially given Weyl’s subsequent development of 
general  relativity  along  Klein’s  lines).  Second,  the  regulative  reading  of  Kant  as  it  is 
developed by Cassirer allows us to develop a Kantian version of structuralism according to 
which objects are only knowable insofar as they are embedded in structure. This, I suggest, 
is a form of ontic structuralism: the objects of modern physics do not exist independently 
of  structure  and  there  is  a  genuine  sense  in  which  structure  exists  independently  of 
individual objects. This, though, does not amount to full blown ontic structural realism 
because (i) structure is understood as a regulative demand of reason and (ii) there remains a 
sense in which the Kantian is primarily concerned with knowledge of objects—it is just 
that this is only made possible by regulative structural demands. I develop this view in my 
discussions of Cassirer (§3.3), the development of general relativity (§4) and ontic structural 
realism (§5). 
  A  regulative  Kantianism,  I  argue,  is  better  placed  to  explain  the  historical 
development of general relativity and will ultimately provide a more attractive philosophical 
account of science. I should stress that I do not seek a solely regulative Kantianism—of the 
kind that Friedman takes Cassirer to seek—I take it that there is a middle ground between 
Freidman’s constitutive Kantianism and Friedman’s reading of Cassirer. Constitutive and 
regulative principles, I suggest, dovetail more than is apparent in Friedman’s account of the 
development of relativity:
73 Friedman’s account on its own provides an inadequate account 
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of the historical development of relativity, while Cassirer’s view on its own struggles to 
provide a satisfactory account of the role of experience in science. A middle way, I suggest, 
is possible, addresses both these weaknesses and permits the development of a Kantian 
structuralism. The first step towards reuniting the constitutive and regulative aspects of 
Kantian philosophy is to provide an account of the roots of these ideas in Kant’s own 
philosophy of science. This will be the task of the next chapter. 
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2 
The role of constitutive and regulative principles in Kant’s 
understanding of the law of gravitation 
 
2.1. Introduction: constitutive and regulative principles 
In  the  previous  chapter  I  outlined  Friedman’s  account  of  the  constitutive  a  priori. 
Friedman, as we saw, is keen to emphasise the Kantian roots of this understanding of 
scientific theories. In broad terms, Friedman argues that Kant understands the laws of 
motion and Euclidean geometry to be constitutive of the empirical part of Newton’s theory 
in the sense that they provide the conceptual framework within which the law of universal 
gravitation is enunciated. The task of this chapter is to explore in more depth the sense in 
which the laws of motion, in particular, are constitutive of the empirical law of gravitation. 
  I begin the chapter by providing a brief outline of Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
so as to clarify the roles of the different faculties in Kant’s overall scheme. Of particular 
relevance  is  the  role  of  the  understanding  and  intuition  in  knowledge,  and,  more 
specifically,  the  role  of  constitutive  principles  in  governing  the  application  of  the 
understanding to intuition. The notion of regulative principles, which in Kant’s philosophy 
have a crucial role to play in making empirical judgments, is also introduced. 
  In  the  Dynamics  of  Reason—  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  in  “Synthetic  History 
Reconsidered”—Friedman presents his understanding of Kant’s treatment of Newton as 
relatively  uncontroversial.  That  this  has  become  something  close  to  a  received 
interpretation of Kant’s work is largely a result of Friedman’s (1992a). It is in this work that 
Friedman makes the most compelling case for treating the laws of motion as constitutive of 
the empirical side of Newton’s theory and the matter is not as straightforward as one 
would expect. 
  Friedman’s work is a response to Buchdahl who, in his (1969) argues that regulative 
principles play a much more pronounced role in Kant’s derivation of the universal law of 
gravitation than constitutive principles do. In §2.3 I examine two problems, identified by 
Buchdahl,  with  taking  there  to  be  a  strict  division  between  constitutive  and  regulative 60 
 
principles grounded in the claim that constitutive principles govern the function of the 
understanding  while  regulative  principles  govern  the  function  of  reason.  First,  Kant 
distinguishes between constitutive and regulative categories of the understanding. Second, 
Buchdahl claims that empirical causal laws can only be drawn from an already given series 
of events: this means that the construction of physical laws—e.g., the law of gravitation—
must be governed by reason rather than understanding. I argue that the first of these two 
problems  is  explained  by  Kant’s  drawing  a  distinction  between  principles  that  are 
constitutive of intuition and principles that are constitutive of experience: in this section I 
also explain what Kant might mean by this. In the rest of this chapter, I turn my attention 
towards analysing Kant’s understanding of the role of constitutive and regulative principles 
in establishing the law of gravitation. 
  My analysis has two steps. First, I consider Buchdahl’s more general concern that 
constitutive principles ultimately play little role in explaining the possibility of pure natural 
science. As an initial response to this I consider Kant’s defence of matter as necessarily 
possessing an attractive force, which, I suggest may serve as a model for how he intends 
both constitutive principles and experience to play a role in grounding empirical judgments. 
  Second  I  consider  the  derivation  of  the  universal  law  of  gravitation,  which 
describes the effects of the necessary attractive force of matter. I argue that the problem 
here is sharper: nevertheless, I will argue that one should not place as much emphasis on 
the role of regulative principles in deriving the law of universal gravitation as Buchdahl 
does. Instead one should view, as Friedman does, constitutive and regulative principles as 
acting together in order to secure the objective validity of pure natural science.   
2.2.  A sketch of Kant’s system of knowledge 
Before we can give an account of the role of constitutive principles in establishing the 
universal law of gravitation, it is helpful to clarify some of the central parts of Kant’s 
system of knowledge. In this section I will provide a brief survey of Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy. 
2.2.1.  Sensibility, Understanding & Reason 
The main transcendental question, which Kant’s  entire critical system is an attempt to 
answer, is as to how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. Synthetic judgments can be 
either a priori or a posteriori, and Kant contrasts them with analytic judgments. Analytic 
judgments are based entirely on the principle of non-contradiction and say nothing beyond 61 
 
that which is already contained in the concept that is the subject of the judgment. Thus he 
considers the judgment “Gold is a yellow metal” to be analytic, because the concept of 
gold  is  already  thought  of  as  containing  the  knowledge  that  gold  is  both  yellow  and 
metallic:  no  further  experience  is  necessary  (2010,  p.17;  4:267).
74  As  such,  all  analytic 
judgments are a priori. 
  Synthetic judgments are those which are not analytic and which involve experience 
of some form. Certain synthetic judgments, most notably those of mathematics, are taken 
to be a priori. Classifying mathematical judgments, such as 7+5=12, in this fashion ran 
contrary to the received wisdom of the time, which—seeing that mathematical inferences 
proceed  via  the  principle  of  non-contradiction—took  mathematical  judgments  to  be 
analytic. Now, Kant accepts that mathematical judgments have an a priori aspect, but he 
maintains that analyticity alone is insufficient to explain the possibility of mathematical 
judgments. 
  To understand the category of synthetic a priori judgments, let us consider—as 
Kant does in the Prolegomenon—the proposition 7+5=12. While we might initially imagine 
that the proposition 7+5=12 is purely analytic in that it can be deduced from the concepts 
of “a sum”, “5” and “7” with the principle of non-contradiction, this is in fact not the case. 
This is because the concepts “5” and “7” have no meaning without recourse to something 
external to them: Kant suggests that we must come to understand the numbers by, e.g., 
comparison with the number of fingers on our hands. So while we can be analytically 
acquainted with  the  concept  “the  sum  of  7  and  5”  we  cannot  know  that  this  sum  is 
equivalent to the number 12 independently of intuition (2010, p.19; 4:269). 
  The possibility of synthetic a priori judgments is ultimately explained by a division 
of the human intellect into the sensibility and the understanding. The sensibility is a purely 
receptive faculty that presents sensory data, called intuitions, to the human intellect. The 
understanding on the other hand is an active faculty which provides a priori conditions for 
knowledge of objects.  
Kant’s account of perception is given in the subjective deduction of the categories, 
and it is here that the role of the understanding in experience is explained. The categories 
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are the most general rules of the understanding for synthesising the manifold of sensibility 
into objects.  Kant explains this in the following manner: 
 
The a priori conditions of a possible experience are at the same time conditions of the 
possibility of the objects of experience.  Now I assert that the categories are nothing other 
than  the  conditions  of  thinking  in  a  possible  experience,  just  as  space  and  time  contain  the 
conditions  of  intuition  for  the  very  same  thing.    They  are  therefore  also  fundamental 
concepts for thinking objects in general for appearance. (A111) 
 
To explain Kant’s theory of perceptual synthesis we must also appeal to the synthesis of 
apprehension, which is defined by Kant in the following way: 
 
[By]  the  synthesis  of  apprehension  I  understand  the  composition  of  the  manifold  in  an 
empirical  intuition  through  which  perception,  i.e.,  empirical  consciousness  of  it  (as 
appearance) becomes possible.  (B160) 
 
To see how this might work, consider a body observed from a few different angles to 
illustrate how both the object and the intellect contribute to experiencing the body as a 
body.  Now, each image of the object is from a different perspective, but there is nothing 
perspectival about the object as it is conceived.  The body appears as an object of experience 
(as  a  body)  when  the  manifold  of  sense,  i.e.  the  images  of  the  body  from  different 
perspectives, is taken as a series of images with associated judgments (e.g. ‘this book is 
facing me side-on’).  The process of synthesis of apprehension allows one to conceive of 
the  images  of  the  body  from  different  perspectives  as  successive  encounters  with  one 
object.    This  synthesis  of  apprehension  arises  from  two  sources:  the  receptivity  of 
sensibility  which  provides  the  images  of  the  intuited  items  and  the  spontaneity  of 
understanding which accounts for the object appearing to us as a single object. 
  This situation is clarified towards the end of the Critique of Judgment. Kant asks: what 
would a non-human intellect be like? How would it think? How would nature appear to it? 
(2007, p.229; 5:401) Here Kant describes the human intellect as discursive, meaning that 
human  knowledge  of  the  world  must  proceed  through  concepts;  it  requires  mediation 
among  concepts  according  to  a  rule.  So,  whereas  God’s  immediate,  instantaneous 
understanding necessitates his intuition of objects as they there are in themselves, human 
intuition  must  be  sensible.  This,  Kant  emphasises  means  that:  “Human  understanding 
cannot avoid the necessity of drawing a distinction between the possibility and the actuality 
of things” (ibid.).  63 
 
So  for  humans  an  object  is  actual  when  it  is  present  in  sensible  intuition  and 
cognisable under the concepts of the understanding. Sensible intuition alone would not 
allow us to cognise anything as an object, understanding alone would tell us only of the 
possibility  of  an  object.  What  if  this  were  otherwise?  Kant  identifies  an  intuitive 
understanding as one in which there is no distinction between possibility and actuality. i.e. 
as  one  in which every  object  that  the  understanding  cognised was actual. This  type  of 
understanding is productive of the reality of the objects that it thinks (and – in the first 
critique – is suggested as the sort of intellect God might have). This is the first contra-
factual  conclusion:  that  a  non-human,  intuitive  understanding,  produces  in  actuality 
anything that it thinks. Sensibility would have no role to play. 
Kant  goes  on  to  make  a  second  contra-factual  conclusion:  that  an  intuitive 
understanding would know of no distinction between contingency and necessity: 
 
An  understanding  into  whose  mode  of  cognition  this  distinction  did  not  enter  would 
express itself by saying: All objects that I know are, that is, exist; and the possibility of some 
that did not exist, in other words, their contingency supposing them to exist, and, therefore 
the necessity that would be placed in contradistinction to this contingency, would never 
enter into the imagination of such a being. (2007, p.230; 5:403) 
 
This means, then, that the concepts of actuality, possibility, necessity and contingency are 
all only subjectively valid.
75  
  From this point Kant is able to argue that a faculty of judgment (or reason) is 
necessary. The faculty of judgment is defined as follows: 
 
The faculty of judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained 
under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given then the 
faculty of judgment which subsumes the particular under it…is determining. But if only the 
particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the faculty of judgment is 
merely reflective. (2007, p.15; 5:179) 
 
The  faculty  of  judgment,  then,  can  be  used  in  two  ways.  First,  to  make  determinative 
judgments and, second, to make reflective judgments. The distinction between determinative 
and  reflective  judgment  resembles  the  distinction  between  deductive  and  inductive 
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reasoning: in a determinative judgment one derives particulars from a universal and in a 
reflective judgment one seeks to determine a universal from a set of particulars.. In the 
Critique of Judgment Kant is primarily concerned with providing a justification of the use of 
reflective judgment is natural science. Kant argues that the use of this reflective judgment is 
merely regulative, as opposed to constitutive as the principles of the understanding are. 
This means that, while it doesn’t provide the conditions for the possibility of experience, it 
remains a necessary part of the manner in which we interpret experience.
76  
  In the Critique of Pure Reason emphasis is placed on the role of the related faculty of 
reason. This operates by regulative ideas—psychology, cosmology and theology—which 
guide our thoughts of experience but do not constitute experience. It works, then, by the 
same rules that govern reflective judgment. Kant describes the role of reason as follows: 
 
Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by 
means  of  rules,  and  reason  as  being  the  faculty  which  secures  the  unity  of  rules  of 
understanding  under  principles.  Accordingly,  reason  never  applies  itself  directly  to 
experience  or  to  any  object,  but  to  understanding,  in  order  to  give  to  the  manifold 
knowledge of the latter an a priori unity by means of concepts, a unity which may be called 
the  unity  of  reason,  and  which  is  quite  different  in  kind  from  any  unity  that  can  be 
accomplished by the understanding. (A302/B359) 
 
Reason, then, demands the systematisation of our knowledge: i.e. it strives for unity. This 
feature of the faculty of reason should be emphasised for it will play a crucial role in the 
argument of §2.4.  
  The above should serve as a clarification of the role of understanding and intuition 
in  experience,  on  Kant’s  account,  and  to  give  an  introduction  to  what  is  meant  by 
regulative principles as they are employed in both reflective judgments and reason. 
2.2.2.  The Analytic of Principles and the division of the Table of Categories 
In the previous section I have introduced the central problem that Kant sees himself as 
addressing in the first Critique—the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments—and the 
key conceptual tools which he mobilises to try and solve the problem. I provided a sketch 
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of Kant’s account of perceptual synthesis, according to which our cognition of objects as 
objects depends upon an interplay of the intuition and the understanding. However, this is 
not the end of the matter: Kant is left with the question of how two  such seemingly 
different faculties can be unified in a perceptual act. That is, how is a sensory intuition able 
to be bought under concepts? This is the problem with which Kant begins the Schematism 
(the second chapter of the Analytic of Principles) in which Kant treats ‘of the sensible 
condition under which alone the pure concepts of the understanding can be employed’ 
(A136/B175). That is, he argues that the pure concepts of the understanding can only be 
applied to the sensory manifold once the temporal nature of our intuition is taken into 
account. The Schematism is particularly pertinent for the project of this chapter for two 
reasons: 
 
1.  It provides a basis for a division of the Table of Categories into mathematical and 
dynamical categories. This distinction will impact upon our discussion because 
experience  is  assigned  a  greater  role  in  the  dynamical  categories  than  in  the 
mathematical categories. 
2.  The  discussion  of  the  Schematism  also  leads  to  the  central  problem  of  the 
Analogies of Experience. The Analogies, we will see, have an important role to 
play in Kant’s derivation of his laws of motion.  
 
As such it is worth looking at the Schematism, and how it informs the above issues, in 
some detail. 
  The problem of the Schematism arises for Kant because he takes it that for an 
object to be brought under a concept it must, in some sense, be ‘homogeneous’ with that 
concept: 
 
In all subsumption of an object under a concept the representation of the object must be 
homogeneous with the concept; in other words the concept must contain something which is 
represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it…Thus the empirical concept of a 
plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical concept of a circle. The roundness which is 
thought in the latter is intuited in the former. (A137/B176) 
 
So, in ordinary cases, one is able to subsume an object under a concept if a property of that 
object coincides with the concept. The special problem in the case of the categories is that 
the pure concepts of the understanding are quite heterogeneous with empirical intuitions. Kant 
gives the examples of causality, which he claims can never be met with in intuition. He 66 
 
solves this problem by positing some third thing which is homogeneous with both the pure 
concepts of the understanding and with empirical intuitions: 
 
Obviously there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with 
the category and on the other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes application 
of the former to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be pure, that is, 
void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one respect be 
intellectual, it must in another be sensible. Such a representation is the transcendental schema. 
(A138/B177) 
 
This  seems  a  natural  solution  to  the  problem:  but  it  is  one  that  raises  a  number  of 
questions. First, given the discussion in the previous section, it should be immediately clear 
that this transcendental schema seems to enjoy quite a strange status: if the understanding 
and intuition are meant to be entirely separate sources for our knowledge, how can any 
representation be both intellectual and sensible? 
  Second, some work is needed to clarify precisely what a schema is. It may seem 
natural to treat a schema as an image of some sort, but this is a possibility that Kant is 
quick to rule out. Instead he is keen to characterise a schema as either a product of the 
imagination
77 or as a representation of a process of the imagination.
78 
  Having a better idea of what a schema is will help us understand how it can have 
both sensible and intellectual elements, so let us look at that problem first. Kant’s account 
of what a schema is, and what it is not, is as follows: 
 
The schema is in itself always a product of imagination. Since, however, the synthesis of 
imagination  aims  at  no  special  intuition,  but  only  at  unity  in  the  determination  of 
sensibility,  the  schema  has  to  be  distinguished  from  the  image.  If  five  points  be  set 
alongside one another, thus, . . . . ., I have an image of the number five. But if, on the other 
hand, I think only a number in general, whether it be five or a hundred, this thought is 
rather the representation of a method whereby a multiplicity...may be represented in an 
image in conformity with a certain concept, than the image itself. For with such a number 
                                                 
77 Kant’s account of the role of the imagination in our cognition is somewhat complex: for our present 
purposes I take it that treating the imagination as a particular incarnation of the understanding is sufficient to 
understand Kant’s intention in the Schematism and does not, I think, lead to any obvious misunderstandings. 
That Kant understands the imagination to perform the same sort of role as the understanding is made clear in 
a footnote to the B-edition Transcendental Deduction: ‘the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, 
must necessarily be in conformity with the synthesis of apprehension, which is intellectual and contained in 
the category completely a priori. It is one and the same spontaneity, which in the one case, under the title of 
imagination, and in the other case under the title of the understanding, brings combination into the manifold 
of intuition’ (B162n).  
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as a thousand the image can hardly be surveyed and compared with the concept. This 
representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, 
I entitle the schema of the concept. (A140/B179-80) 
 
It is this paragraph that gives rise to the second problem: in the first sentence a schema is 
considered as a product of the imagination, at the end of the paragraph, Kant describes a 
schema as a representation of the procedure of the imagination. 
  The situation may be clarified somewhat by considering Kant’s explanation of why 
a schema cannot just be an image (A140-1/B180), which follows immediately from this 
paragraph. Here Kant considers triangles and points out that no image can ever capture the 
concept. This is because, first and foremost, ‘It would never attain that universality of the 
concept which renders it valid of all triangles’ (A141/B18). That is, every triangle is right-
angled, obtuse or acute and as such no single image can capture what is meant by the 
general concept ‘triangle’. The situation is the same with numbers. Every number can be 
depicted by the appropriate amount of dots, but this alone does not bring us closer to the 
concept of ‘number’ in general. For this, Kant claims, we need a process. So, the idea, 
presumably,  is  that  the  concept  ‘number’  must  be  understood  by  something  like  the 
process of counting by keeping a tally. 
The same is true, Kant says, for empirical concepts such as ‘dog’:
79 
 
The concept ‘dog’ signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the 
figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any determinate 
figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually 
presents. (A141/B180) 
 
Again  we  see  that  concepts  are  meant  to  signify  a  rule  according  to  which  individual 
instances of the concept can be recognised. The role of the imagination here is crucial: 
 
[The] image is a product of the empirical faculty of reproductive imagination; the schema of 
sensible concepts, such as figures in space, is a product and, as it were, a monogram of 
pure a priori imagination, through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves 
first became possible. These images can be connected with the concept only by means of 
the schema to which they belong. (A141-2/B181)  
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What  is  important  here  is  the  manner  in  which  imagination—a  function  of  the 
understanding—and sensibility combine in the schema. Now, the understanding is a faculty 
of rules that, through the imagination, constructs concepts as a process. Concepts in this 
form,  though,  cannot  be  applied  to  experience  because  they  are  spatial.  As  such,  the 
concept itself must have a sensible form: this is what Kant refers to as the “image” in the 
above passage. In some sense the process of the understanding that defines a concept can 
be represented spatially by the imagination, which allows the schema to act as the “third 
thing” homogeneous to both concepts and intuition. 
  Up to this point, however, we have dealt only with the Schematism as it applies to 
mathematical and empirical concepts. This is helpful in illustrating the sort of thing that is 
meant by a schema, but to fully understand the Schematism it is necessary to see how Kant 
also  schematises  the  categories.  The  empirical  and  mathematical  concepts  that  Kant 
schematised, are schematised in the sense that one must take into account the form of our 
(outer) intuition. The categories are schematised in a similar fashion, but this time with 
respect to inner intuition: time. 
  Kant argues that the categories need to be schematised because: 
 
Without schemata [the categories] are merely functions of the understanding of concepts; 
and represent no object. This [objective (NKS)] meaning they acquire from sensibility, 
which realises the understanding in the very process of restricting it. (A147/B187) 
 
Rosenberg (2005, p.152) suggests understanding this as follows: the pure concepts of the 
understanding, for Kant, are intended to be the same for all beings (with a receptive faculty 
of  sensibility).  It  is  the  specific  form  of  a  being’s  sensibility  that  determines  how  the 
categories  must  be  schematised.  Now,  for  humans,  the  most  fundamental  form  of 
sensibility  is  time.  As  such,  the  categories  are  schematised  for  us  by  being  restricted 
principles of the intelligible unity of specifically temporal manifolds. Hence: 
 
The schemata are…a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules. These rules 
relate in the order of the categories to the time-series [Quantity], the time-content [Quality], the 
time-order [Relation], and lastly to the scope of time [Modality] in respect of all possible objects. 
(A145/B184-5) 
 
The main task of the Schematism is to show that in order for it to be possible to apply the 
pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  in  synthetic  judgments  to  the  objects  of  possible 
experience the pure concepts must be considered as the pure concepts of beings whose 69 
 
perception  of  the  world  requires  the  intelligible  unity  of  a  temporal  manifold.  Once 
schematised: 
 
The  schemata  of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  are  thus  the  true  and  sole 
conditions under which these concepts obtain relation to objects and so possess significance. 
In the end, therefore, the categories have no other possible employment than the empirical. 
As  the  grounds  of  an  a  priori  necessary  unity  that  has  its  source  in  one  original 
apperception, they serve only to subordinate appearances to universal rules of synthesis, 
and thus to fit them for thoroughgoing connection in one experience. (A146/B185) 
 
This  is  a  slightly  quick  exposition  of  the  role  of  the  schematised  categories  in  Kant’s 
project: the more detailed discussion of empirical and mathematical concepts, hopefully, 
informs the discussion of the categories so that the importance of their being schematised 
according to our form of inner sense is clear.
80 At the beginning of this section I suggested 
that  the  Schematism  also  impacts  upon  a  distinction  that  Kant  draws  between 
mathematical and dynamical categories. This is a central distinction in Kant’s work and it 
impacts on the work of this chapter for two reasons: first, there are sections of Kant’s work 
where he seems to regard the dynamical categories as regulative—which seems odd given 
that  the  categories  are  usually  all  thought  of  as  constitutive—  and,  second,  Kant 
emphasises a distinction between mathematical and dynamical conceptions of how matter 
fills space and this distinction may be informed by the division of the Table of Categories. 
In broad terms the distinction can be drawn as follows: the mathematical is that which can 
be known independent of experience, whereas the dynamical—while still capable of being 
constitutive in a sense—requires some input from experience.  
  The distinction is first introduced in the Critique of Pure Reason in the B-edition 
version of the Transcendental Deduction, as a division of the table of categories. The 
categories  under  the  headings  of  quantity  (unity,  plurality  and  totality)  and  of  quality 
(reality,  negation  and  limitation)  are  mathematical;  the  categories  under  the  headings  of 
relation (of inherence and subsistence, of causality and dependence, and of community) 
and  of  modality  (possibility–impossibility,  existence–non-existence  and  necessity–
consistence) are dynamical. The distinction is drawn as follows: 
 
[The table of categories] may, in the first instance be divided into two groups; those in the 
first group being concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical, those in the 
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second group with the existence of these objects, in their relation either to each other or to 
the understanding. (B110) 
 
Kant  says  little  more  about  the  division  here—noting  that  it  is  only  in  the  dynamical 
categories  that  we  meet  pairs  of  leading  and  contrasting  concepts,  e.g.  substance  vs. 
accident—and  the  above  comments  are  somewhat  cryptic.  The  function  of  the 
mathematical  categories  seems  clear  enough:  they  apply  to  both  pure  and  empirical 
intuitions in the manner that was discussed in §2.2.1. It is less clear what it means for the 
dynamical categories to apply to the “existence of these objects [of experience]” whether in 
relation to each other or to the understanding. Some light, though, is shed on this in the 
System of Principles of Pure Understanding, which immediately follows the Schematism. 
Having shown in the Schematism that one is justified in applying the pure concepts of the 
understanding in synthetic judgments, Kant moves in the System of Principles to ‘exhibit, 
in  systematic  connection,  the  judgments  which  the  understanding,  under  this  critical 
provision, actually achieves a priori’ (A148/B187).  
  The task of the System of Principles, then, encompasses deriving both the analytic 
and synthetic a priori judgments that the understanding is compelled to make. Kant, then, 
begins this task by elucidating the ‘highest principle of all analytic judgments’: the principle 
of non-contradiction.
81 For our purposes, though, what Kant says of synthetic a priori 
judgments is much more interesting. Now, whereas analytic judgments were characterised 
by pure general logic, synthetic judgments lie in the realm of transcendental logic.
82 Kant 
here defines the difference as follows: 
 
In the analytic judgment we keep to the given concept, and seek to extract something from 
it. If it is to be affirmative, I ascribe to it only what is already thought in it. If it is to be 
negative, I exclude from it only its opposite. But in synthetic judgments I have to advance 
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this part of the Critique is intended to achieve before introducing the Table of Principles and its division into 
mathematical and dynamical principles, which is what I am primarily interested in at this point.  
82 The Analytic of Principles begins with Kant drawing a distinction between these different forms of logic. 
Here Kant argues that pure general logic cannot give us any way to subsume under rules (which, recall, is 
precisely the role of the faculty of judgment as described in §2.2.1): ‘since general logic abstracts from all 
content of knowledge, the sole task that remains to it is to give an analytical exposition of the form of 
knowledge [as expressed (NSK)] in concepts, in judgments, and in inferences, and so to obtain formal rules 
for all employment of understanding. If it sought to give general instructions how we are to subsume under 
these rules, that is, to distinguish whether something does or does not come under them, that could only be 
by means of another rule. This in turn, for the very reason that it is a rule, again demands guidance from 
judgment.’ (A133/B172) This is contrasted with transcendental logic: ‘the situation is entirely different for 
transcendental  logic.  The  latter  would  seem  to  have  as  its  peculiar  task  the  correcting  and  securing  of 
judgment, by means of determinate rules, in the use of the pure understanding…besides the rule (or rather 
the universal condition of rules), which is given in the pure concept of understanding, it can also specify a 
priori the instance to which the rule is to be applied.’ (A135/B174-5) Transcendental logic, then, is concerned 
with how humans can apply concepts to the objects given in intuition. 71 
 
beyond the given concept, viewing as in relation with the concept something altogether 
different from what was thought in it. This relation is consequently never a relation either 
of identity or of contradiction; and from the judgment, taken in and by itself, the truth or 
falsity of the relation can never be discovered. (A154-5/B193-4) 
 
So,  the  key  difference  between  synthetic  and  analytic  judgments  is  that  in  synthetic 
judgments we need to go beyond the given concept, which requires comparing it with 
some  other  concept.  But  in  order  to  compare  a  given  concept  with  another  ‘a  third 
something  is  necessary,  as  that  wherein  alone  the  synthesis  of  two  concepts  can  be 
achieved’ (A155/B194).  This third thing, Kant says, is the ‘one whole in which all our 
representations are contained, namely inner sense and its a priori form, time’ (ibid.). This 
demand  for  our  representations  to  be  unified  is  based  upon  the  findings  of  the 
Transcendental Deduction, where Kant argued that our synthetic judgments are possible 
insofar as they represent concepts as combined in an intuited object.
83  
Kant eventually states the highest principle of all synthetic judgments as follows: 
 
Every object stands under the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of 
intuition in a possible experience. (A158/B197) 
 
It  is  precisely  these  “necessary  conditions”  that  are  the  synthetic  principles  of  pure 
understanding.  Since  these  synthetic  principles  are  dependent  upon  the  understanding, 
Kant suggests that they can, quite simply, be read off from the Table of Categories. As with 
the Table of Categories, the Table of Principles is also divided into the mathematical and 
dynamical. Corresponding to the mathematical categories of quantity and of quality, Kant 
derives  the  axioms  of  intuition  and  the  anticipations  of  perception  respectively; 
corresponding  to  the  dynamical  categories  of  relation  and  of  modality  there  are  the 
analogies of experience and the postulates of empirical thought in general. Of the division 
of the Table of Principles into mathematical and dynamical, Kant says: 
 
In  the  application  of  pure  concepts  of  understanding  to  possible  experience,  the 
employment of their synthesis is either mathematical or dynamical; for it is concerned partly 
with the mere intuition of an appearance in general, partly with its existence. The a priori 
conditions  of  intuition  are  absolutely  necessary  conditions  of  any  possible  experience; 
those of the existence of the objects of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves only 
accidental. The principles of mathematical employment will therefore be unconditionally 
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necessary, that is, apodeictic. Those of dynamical employment will also indeed possess the 
character of a priori necessity, but only under the condition of empirical thought in some 
experience,  therefore  only  mediately  and  indirectly.  Notwithstanding  their  undoubted 
certainty  through  experience,  they  will  not  contain  that  immediate  evidence  which  is 
peculiar to the former. (A160-1/B199-200) 
 
Having set out the Table of Principles, Kant says a little more about this division: 
 
It  will  soon  become  clear that  the  principles  involved  in  the  a  priori  determination  of 
appearances  according  to  the  categories  of  quantity  and  of  quality…allow  of  intuitive 
certainty,  alike  as  regards  their  a  priori  application  to  appearances.  They  are  thereby 
distinguished from those of the other two groups, which are capable only of a merely 
discursive certainty. This distinction holds even while we recognise that the certainty is in 
both cases complete. I shall therefore entitle the former principles mathematical and the 
latter dynamical. (A161-2/B200-1) 
 
These paragraphs make it quite a lot clearer what is meant by the division of the categories 
into  mathematical  and  dynamical.  The  key  difference,  I  take  it,  is  with  regard  to  the 
mathematical categories’ applicability to pure intuition specifically. In the Schematism, we 
saw that Kant urged that geometrical and numerical concepts, like empirical concepts, were 
schematised as a process: for example the concept of number seems to consist in the 
process of counting by—something like—keeping a tally of individual marks. These marks 
can be made in the imagination as well as in the realm of experience: however it is the fact 
they need not exist that renders them mathematical. The dynamical principles, by contrast, 
deal with the question of the existence of, and relations between, intuitions.
84 
  It is also worth mentioning briefly—since this will be relevant to the discussion of 
§2.4—that  in  the  context  of  natural  science  there  is  also  a  distinction  between  the 
mathematico-mechanical and the metaphysico-dynamical,
85 which is drawn as follows: 
 
But now as to the procedure of natural science with respect to the most important of all its 
tasks—namely that of explaining a potentially infinite specific variety of matters—one can take 
only two paths in this connection: the mechanical, by combination of the absolutely full with 
                                                 
84 Guyer (1987, pp.185-8) characterises the difference between dynamical and mathematical categories as 
being distinguished by their degree of certainty: the mathematical principles are constitutive because they are 
certain, whereas the dynamical principles are regulative because they are uncertain, So: ‘a principle such as 
that of universal causation is merely regulative because it is indeterminate: For any given event it tells us that 
there is some cause or other, but not what the cause is’ (p.188). I think that this is not the best way to 
characterise the sense in which dynamical principles are regulative: I develop an alternative account in §2.3.2. 
85 Here I adopt Warren’s terminology (2001, p.63) in order to make clear that there is a relationship between 
the mechanical concept of matter and the mathematical categories. 73 
 
the absolutely empty, and an opposing dynamical path, by mere variety in combining the 
original forces of repulsion and attraction to explain all difference of matters. (2004, pp.71-
2; 4:532-3) 
 
Here the distinction, similarly, can be sketched in terms of the extent to which experience 
is involved. In the mathematico-mechanical case no experience is needed: we rely only on 
the concepts of the absolutely full and the absolutely empty. The dynamical approach, 
though, relies on the interaction of bodies—and parts thereof—in stressing the importance 
of forces. 
  Now that the basics of Kant’s system are in place, we are in a position to address 
the  specific  problem  with  which  this  chapter  is  concerned:  that  is,  how  do  the  pure 
concepts of the understanding and the ideas of reason contribute to establishing universal 
gravitation as an empirical law? 
2.3.  Regulative and Constitutive Principles 
In  Kant’s  philosophy  of  science  there  is  a  role  for  both  constitutive  and  regulative 
principles. The distinction between these principles is usually drawn along the following 
lines: the constitutive principles are those that govern the function of the understanding 
and are necessary conditions of experience, whereas regulative principles—the “ideas of 
reason”—govern the function of reason and are not instantiated in experience in the same 
way. The matter is not quite this simple though, because regulative principles must still 
function in order to guide empirical enquiry. Kant is clear about this in a number of places, 
e.g., in the Critique of Pure Reason, he writes: 
 
We declare…that the things of the world must be viewed as if they receive their existence 
from  a  highest  intelligence.  The  idea  is  thus  really  only  a  heuristic,  not  an  ostensive 
concept. It does not show us how an object is constituted, but how, under its guidance, we 
should seek to determine the constitution and connection of the objects of experience. If, 
then,  it  can  be  shown  that  the  three  transcendental  ideas  (the  psychological,  the 
cosmological and the theological), although they do not directly relate to, or determine, any 
object corresponding to them, nonetheless, as rules of the empirical employment of reason, 
lead us to systematic unity, under the presupposition of such an object in the idea; and that 
they  thus  contribute  to  the  extension of  empirical  knowledge  without  ever being  in  a 
position to run counter to it, we may conclude that it is a necessary maxim of reason to 
proceed in accordance with such ideas. (A670-1/B698-9) 
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This would seem to suggest that there is a role for regulative principles in the construction 
of  experience:  they  guide  the  manner  in  which  we  should  seek  to  determine  the 
constitution  of  objects.  Friedman  (1991,  p.73)  points  out  that  this  distinction  between 
constitutive  and  regulative  principles  is  also  mirrored  in  the  distinction  between 
determinative  and  reflective  judgment.  This  is  because  in  determinative  judgments  the 
universal is given, a priori, by the understanding and particulars are merely subsumed under 
it. In reflective judgments, on the other hand, the universal is not given a priori: it must be 
found:  to  find  a  universal  reflective  judgment  relies  upon  a  regulative  transcendental 
principle which postulates the unity and coherence of empirical concepts and laws so that 
empirical science can be systematised. Kant describes the operation of reflective judgment 
thus: 
Now the principle sought can only be this: as universal laws of nature have their ground in 
our  understanding,  which  prescribes  them  to  nature  (though  only  according  to  the 
universal concept of it as nature), particular empirical laws must be regarded, in respect of 
that which is left undetermined in them by these universal laws, according to a unity such 
as they would have if an understanding (though it be not ours) had supplied them for the 
benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of experience according 
to particular natural laws. (2007, p.16; 5:180) 
So,  it  is  in  assuming  unity  and  coherence  of  our  system  of  knowledge  that  reflective 
judgment  depends  upon  features  of  experience  that  cannot  be  known  a  priori:  the 
assumption of unity and coherence is thus a regulative ideal. 
  The task of this section is to draw out some problems with attempting to assign a 
sharp  distinction  between  the  operation  of  constitutive  and  regulative  principles  in 
developing a Kantian account of natural science. The root of the problems is that the 
putative constitutive principles for Newtonian science seem to have a degree of empirical 
content:  as  such  the  clear  distinction  between  the  roles  of  the  pure  concepts  of  the 
understanding and ideas of reason in providing knowledge of the world seems to begin to 
blur. 
2.3.1.   Two problems with the division between constitutive and regulative principles 
Initially it might appear that there should be a clear distinction between constitutive and 
regulative principles. Constitutive principles are known a priori and are conditions for the 
very possibility of experience and derive from the understanding; regulative principles do 
not  constitute  objects  of  experience,  instead  they  prescribe  the  maximal  unity  and 75 
 
coherence—systematicity—at  which  our  knowledge  of  nature  aims  and  are  within  the 
purview of reason and reflective judgment. However, the matter is not as clear cut as this, 
which has led to dispute between Buchdahl (1969) and Friedman (1991, 1992a) about the 
precise role of constitutive and regulative principles in science. 
  There are two main problems with taking there to be a sharp distinction between 
constitutive  principles  as  deriving  from  the  understanding  and  regulative  principles  as 
deriving from the faculty of reason in the critical period.
86 The first problem relates to the 
division, that was discussed in §2.2.2, of the categories into mathematical and dynamical: in 
the third analogy of experience, Kant claims that this distinction can be regarded as a 
distinction between constitutive and regulative: 
 
An analogy of experience is…only a rule according to which a unity of experience may 
arise from perception. It does not tell us how mere perception or empirical intuition in 
general  itself  comes  about.  It  is  not  a  principle  constitutive  of  the  objects,  that  is,  of 
appearances, but only regulative. The same can be asserted of the postulates of empirical 
thought in general, which concern the synthesis of mere intuition (that is, of the form of 
appearance), of perception (that is, of the matter of perception), and of experience (that is, 
of the relation of these perceptions). They are merely regulative principles and, and are 
distinguished from the mathematical, which are constitutive, not indeed in certainty—they 
both have certainty a priori—but in the nature of their evidence, that is, as regards the 
character of the intuitive (and consequently of the demonstrative) factors peculiar to the 
later. (A180/B22-3) 
 
As  we  saw  in  §2.2.2,  the  Analogies  of  Experience  are  the  synthetic  principles  that 
correspond  to  the  category  of  relation.  Kant  is  quite  clear  that  he  does  not  take  the 
Analogies to constitute the actual object of experience; instead they provide a rule for 
unifying experience in precisely the manner that regulative principles do. So, while the 
dynamical pure concepts of the understanding can be known a priori, they do not have the 
same role as the mathematical concepts. Given that constitutive principles are generally 
taken  quite  straightforwardly  to  be  those  derived  from  the  understanding  whereas 
regulative principles are taken to be at work only in reflective judgment and the faculty of 
reason,  what  should  we  make  of  some  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  having  a 
regulative role? 
  The second problem relates to the constitutive ground of the understanding more 
generally,  and  it  is chiefly  here  that  Buchdahl  and  Friedman  disagree.  Buchdahl  (1969, 
                                                 
86 There is a further difficulty that arises in the post-critical period in Opus Postumum, but this impacts only 
minimally on our present concerns. For details see Friedman (1991, pp.77-8). 76 
 
pp.499-501) argues that, for Kant, empirical causal laws can only be extracted from an 
already-given objective sequence of individual events by the inductive procedure that is 
governed  by  the  reflective  power  of  judgment.  Let  us  examine  Buchdahl’s  analysis  of 
Kant’s claim that the possibility of cognition of a sequence of states of an object necessarily 
presupposes the concept of a cause. 
  The central passage in question is from §26 of the B-version of the Transcendental 
Deduction. Here Kant discusses the role of the categories in the synthesis of apprehension, 
which is required for knowledge of objects. He writes: 
 
[All]  possible  perceptions,  and  therefore  everything  that  can  come  to  empirical 
consciousness,  that  is,  all  appearances  of  nature,  must,  so  far  as  their  connection  is 
concerned, be subject to the categories. Nature, considered merely as nature in general, is 
dependent upon these categories as the original ground of its conformity to law…Pure 
understanding  is  not,  however,  in  a  position,  through  mere  categories,  to prescribe  to 
appearances any a priori laws other than those which are involved in a nature in general, that 
is, in conformity to law of all appearances in space and time. Special laws, as concerning 
those appearances which are empirically determined, cannot in their specific character be 
derived from the categories, although they are one and all subject to them. To obtain any 
knowledge whatsoever of these special laws we must resort to experience. (B164-5)  
 
The idea here is that the pure concepts of the understanding provide us with a general idea 
of nature and provide the most basic conditions for our knowledge of it. However if we 
wish to know any specific laws, experience is required. 
  So, in the case of our intuiting a sequence of states of an object, Buchdahl stresses 
that while in general it is a necessary presupposition of our taking this to represent one 
object in a variety of states that our intuitions are subsumed under the category of relation, 
there is also a contingent aspect of the experience: 
 
It should be stressed with particular emphasis that the sequence whose notion (as an object 
of cognition) presupposes the concept of cause, and is thus made possible (a possible 
object  of  experience)  may  be,  and  indeed  as  such  must  be,  regarded  as  an  altogether 
contingent event…in being simply an individual particular happening. (Buchdahl 1969, p.500) 
 
So, the problem here for trying to establish something as an empirical law, is that the 
happenings that are made possible by the concept of causation are contingent in the sense 
that they need not have been observed: ‘The question whether some observed event or 
change  of  state  is  an  instance  of  an  empirical  law  can  be  determined  only  by  those 77 
 
inductive procedures distinctive of all scientific enquiry’ (ibid.). The most that we can say is 
the following: 
 
[Since] the notion of ‘nature’ contains the concept of cause, ‘the understanding has all it can 
demand’ if in the context of scientific enquiry—employing the principle of causality that we 
‘here  require’—we  (i.e.  ‘reason’)  ‘search  after  and  formulate’  the  ‘natural  conditions  of 
natural events’. So to explicate the existence of empirical law-likeness is a task for ‘reason’; 
the very definition of the concept of empirical law (as an entity with a necessitarian logic) 
will have to be given in terms of the activity of reason. (ibid., p.501) 
 
The formulation of empirical laws, for Buchdahl, then, seems to be a task for reason, 
primarily because the very contingency of the observations of instances of empirical laws 
means that completely specifying the content of the empirical law is impossible. 
Friedman, by contrast, argues that regulative function of the intellect has a lesser 
role to play in deriving the empirical laws of mathematical natural science. Friedman looks 
at Newton’s law of gravitation and argues that the laws of motion play a constitutive role in 
deriving the empirical law of gravitation. I will address the success of Friedman’s response 
to Buchdahl in §§2.4-5. In what remains of this section I will focus on dissolving the 
tension involved in Kant’s claim that the dynamical categories have a regulative rather than 
constitutive function. 
2.3.2.   Regulative Categories and the Analogies of Experience 
In this section I address the first of the two problems outlined above: that is, as to how 
Kant can claim that the dynamical categories are, in a sense, regulative. I suggest that we 
can  make  sense  of  this  by  treating  the  categories  as  conditions  of  the  possibility  of 
experience  in  the  most  general  sense  while  allowing  for  the  empirical  manifold—and 
regulative principles—to play a role in providing specific details. Kant’s treatment of this 
problem goes as follows: 
 
In  the  Transcendental  Analytic  we  have  distinguished  the  dynamical  principles  of  the 
understanding, as merely regulative principles of intuition, from the mathematical, which as 
regards intuition, are constitutive. None the less these dynamical laws are constitutive in 
respect  of  experience,  since  they  render  the  concepts,  without  which  there  can  be  no 
experience, possible a priori. But the principles of pure reason can never be constitutive in 
respect of empirical concepts, for since no schema of sensibility corresponding to them can 
ever be given, they can never have an object in concreto. (A664/B692) 78 
 
 
The  mathematical  principles  of  the  understanding  are,  then,  for  Kant  constitutive  of 
intuition; the dynamical principles of the understanding are regulative with respect to intuition 
but constitutive with respect to experience. It is not very clear what this claim amounts to 
though. Intuition for Kant can be either pure or empirical. In both cases it is the means by 
which  an  object  is  brought  before  the  understanding.  The  sensibility  is  affected  by 
empirical intuitions, which relate directly to an object. Pure intuitions are more like the 
mathematical constructions in thought that we saw in the discussion of the Schematism in 
§2.2.2. I take it that experience seems to most naturally result from bringing empirical 
intuitions under the categories.  
The dynamical synthetic principles, detailed in the Analogies of Experience, then, 
are  meant  to  be  regulative  with  respect  to  intuition  and  constitutive  with  respect  to 
experience.    It  is  not  immediately  clear  what  is  meant  in  either  case,  however,  the 
discussion of the division of the Table of Categories into mathematical and dynamical can 
help us to understand what Kant had in mind. The mathematical categories, recall, pertain 
as much to pure intuition, e.g. the use of the imagination to construct geometrical figures in 
thought. That is, the application of these categories enables one to construct intuitions. 
This is not the case for the dynamical categories which are concerned with only empirical 
intuitions:  that  is,  the  existence  of  an  empirical  intuition  and  the  relation  between  them. 
Especially in respect of the concern with the relation between intuitions it seems as if 
Kant’s considerations, at this point in the Critique, are approaching the realm of natural 
science:  it  is  therefore  natural,  I  think,  to  expect  regulative  principles—especially 
systematicity—to play a role in determining the relations between intuitions.  
  The other question is as to what it means for the dynamical synthetic principles to 
constitute  experience.  In  the  above  passage  Kant  claims  that  these  principles  are 
constitutive  in  the  sense  that  “they  render  the concepts, without which  there  can  be  no 
experience possible, a priori”. What concepts are rendered possible? Friedman (1991, p.179) 
stresses that here Kant must surely be referring to empirical concepts, for Kant immediately 
draws a contrast between the dynamical laws—which “render the concepts…possible”—and 
the “principles of pure reason”, which “can never be constitutive in respect of empirical 
concepts”. Friedman points to the following passage as further support of this interpretation: 
 
But  if  we  consider  them  in  themselves  in  relation  to  their  origin,  these  fundamental 
propositions of pure understanding are anything rather than knowledge based on concepts. 
For they would not even be possible a priori, if we were not supported by pure intuition (in 
mathematics), or by conditions of a possible experience in general. That everything that 79 
 
happens has a cause cannot be inferred merely from the concept of happening in general; 
on the contrary, it is this fundamental proposition which shows how in regard to that 
which happens we are in a position to obtain in experience any concept whatsoever that is 
really determinate. (A301/B357) 
 
Kant makes a similar point with respect to determinative judgment in the First Introduction 
to the Critique of Judgment (5:212): here Kant suggests that determinative judgments, too, 
make empirical concepts possible.  
The task of this section is to try and make sense of these dual claims: first, that the 
dynamical principles have a regulative role to play with respect to intuitions and, second, 
that they are constitutive with respect to empirical concepts. Let us begin by examining the 
claim that the dynamical principles are regulative with respect to intuition. I suggest that 
here Kant is best understood as claiming that the dynamical principles—and I will focus on 
the Analogies of Experience to illustrate this—are regulative with respect to intuition in the 
sense that temporally distinct appearances must be thought as related so that they can 
ultimately be grouped together as elements of one temporally extended experience.
87 
Let us look at the Analogies of Experience to clarify this claim. Recall, from §2.2.2, 
that the Analogies are those synthetic principles that state the conditions under which the 
categories of relation are applied. There are three Analogies, each of which is devoted to  
proving a separate principle. The Analogies begin with the statement of a general principle: 
 
Experience  is  possible  only  through  the  representation  of  a  necessary  connection  of 
perceptions.[88] (B218) 
 
This expresses the general idea that for it to be possible for humans to experience a single 
unitary  time—with  temporally  situated  and  related  objects within  it—it  is  necessary  to 
represent  perceptions  as  related  according  to  substance-accident,  cause-effect  and 
community. 
Now,  as  has  been  stressed  by  Watkins  (2005,  pp.188-95),  the  Analogies  are 
primarily concerned with the issue of time determinations: that is, how do we know that, 
e.g., the keyboard in front of me and the table upon which it rests exist at the same time? 
Watkins claims that this is a special problem for Kant for two reasons. First, we do not 
perceive time itself: 
                                                 
87 Here my understanding of the sense in which the dynamical principles are regulative follows Rosenberg’s 
(2005, chs.8 & 10) 
88 In the A-edition this is stated as ‘All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject a priori to rules 
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Since  time,  however,  cannot  itself  be  perceived,  the determination  of  the  existence  of 
objects in time can take place only through their relation in time in general. (B219) 
 
So, because we do not perceive time—it is, recall, the form of inner sense—we cannot 
simply assign objective temporal coordinates to every object that we perceive that tell us 
each moment that the object exists at.  
  Second, Kant draws a distinction between subjective time and objective time. This 
is the purpose of Kant’s discussions of the ship and the house (A192/B237): though our 
perception of an object must always be successive, this does not necessarily tell us anything 
about the object itself. So, in the case of a house we perceive first the door, then a window, 
then  some  walls:  though  these  parts  of  a  house  are  apprehended  successively  they 
nevertheless coexist. In the case of a ship moving along a river there, likewise, is it would 
seem,  an  objective  time  order  to  its  movement;  there  is  also  a  time-order  to  our 
representations  of  the  ship  by  which  it  is  apprehended.  In  both  cases,  once  one 
distinguishes subjective temporal relations between our representations of an object from 
objective  temporal  relations,  one  is  left  with  something  of  a  mystery  as  to  how  they 
connect. 
The best way to see how Kant resolves this is to look at one of the Analogies. I will 
look briefly at the Second Analogy, as this has ramifications later on in Kant’s derivation of 
the law of gravitation. 
  The principle that Kant seeks to prove in this Analogy is: 
 
All  alterations  take  place  in  conformity  with  the  law  of  the  connection  of  cause  and 
effect.[89] (B232) 
 
There has been some dispute about what this precisely means. The weaker reading of this 
principle  takes  it  to  mean  only  that  all  events  must  have  a  cause.  Friedman  (1992b) 
proposes a strong reading of this principle whereby it is understood as the claim that not 
only must every event have a cause, but that there must also be causal laws. That is, every 
event has a cause and that once we know the type of event A that brings about a type of 
effect B, Friedman claims that Kant intends to claim that ‘Events of the same kind as A are 
necessarily followed by, or result in, events of the same kind as B’ (p.163). 
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upon which it follows according to a rule’ (A189). 81 
 
  Now, I think that this is not the best way to understand the Second Analogy in 
isolation: if we just read the Analogy it simply does not seem as if Kant is trying to argue 
for causal laws. Friedman does present good evidence from other parts of Kant’s work that 
suggests he may, in places, take there to be causal laws, but my present focus is to try to 
understand the sense in which the dynamical principles are regulative, and this is best done 
without additionally complicating the issue by taking the argument of the Analogy to be for 
causal laws.  
  For the purposes of this section, then, I regard the second Analogy as arguing only 
that every effect must have some cause. Watkins provides a helpful and clear summary of 
the  main  argument  of  the  Second  Analogy,  which,  I  think,  accurately  captures  Kant’s 
intention. Watkins reconstructs this argument as follows: 
 
P1   Apprehension of objects (the subjective order of perceptions) is always successive. 
P2   There is a distinction between the subjective order of perceptions and the successive 
states of an object such that no immediate inference from the former to the latter is 
possible. 
C1  One  cannot  immediately  infer  objective  succession  from  the  successive  order  of 
perceptions. 
P3   To have knowledge of objective succession, the object’s states must be subject to a 
rule that determines them as successive. 
P4   Any rule that determines objective succession must include a relation of condition to 
conditioned, i.e., that of causal dependence of successive states on a cause. 
C2   To have knowledge of the successive states of an object, the object’s successive states 
must be dependent on a cause, that is, must stand under a causal rule (from P3, P4, 
and C1). (2005, pp.209-10) 
 
P1, P2 and C1 are intended to correspond to the problem of time-determination. The best 
bit of textual evidence supporting interpreting the argument in this fashion is as follows: 
 
[We]  must  derive  the  subjective  succession  of  apprehension  from  the  objective  succession  of 
appearances. Otherwise the order of apprehension is entirely undetermined, and does not 
distinguish  one  appearance  from  another.  Since  the  subjective  succession  by  itself  is 
altogether arbitrary, it does not prove anything as to the manner in which the manifold is 
connected in the object. The objective succession will therefore consist in that order of the 
manifold of appearance according to which, in conformity with a rule, the apprehension of that 
which happens follows upon the apprehension of that which precedes. Thus only can I be 82 
 
justified  in  asserting,  not  merely  of  my  apprehension,  but  of  appearance  itself. 
(A193/B238) 
 
Some care is required here. Guyer (1987, p.247) stresses that what Kant is concerned to 
show is that the irreversibility of a sequence of representations is a consequence of the 
occurrence of a perceived event.
90 P1, I take it, is something that we saw Kant clearly 
subscribe to in the description of the problem of time-determination. In the above passage 
we see Kant clearly argue for a form of P2: the subjective succession of representations can 
be entirely arbitrary and as such one cannot derive anything about objective succession 
from it, which is C1.  
  P3 is intended to represent Kant’s thinking in the last two sentences of the above 
quote:  he  argues  here  that  for  objective  succession  one  must  order  the  manifold  of 
appearance in such a way that the first thing that happens is followed by the second in 
accordance with a rule. P4 then simply characterises this rule as causal. Watkins takes Kant 
to express this point in the following passage: 
 
In conformity with such a rule there must lie in that which precedes an event the condition 
of a rule according to which this event invariably and necessarily follows. I cannot reverse 
this order…Therefore, since there certainly is something that follows [i.e. that is apprehended 
as following (NKS)], I must refer it necessarily to something else which precedes it and 
upon which it follows in conformity with a rule that is of necessity. The event, as the 
conditioned, thus affords reliable evidence of some condition and this condition is what 
determines the event. (A193-4/B238-9) 
 
The claim that the second event is conditioned, and it is this that provides evidence of 
some condition that determines the second event, seems a clear characterisation of the rule 
as causal.
91 These, premises, with C1, then licence the principle that Kant set out to prove. 
  The above, then, serves as a template of the argument of the Second Analogy. In 
what sense is this Analogy, as a dynamical synthetic principle, regulative of intuition? The 
Analogies are regulative with respect to intuition in the sense that they establish the unity of 
time (i.e. the claim that there is only one time, moments of time are successive parts of this 
one time and that all objects are located in this time). In the introduction to the Analogies, 
Kant  refers  to  three  modes  of  time:  persistence,  succession  and  simultaneity 
                                                 
90 That is in contrast  to the claim that  one can derive the occurrence of the perceived event from the 
irreversibility of the representation.  
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(corresponding to the relational categories). Each Analogy of Experience demonstrates the 
objective validity of these modes of time, so in the Second Analogy we have objective 
knowledge of succession through the causal relation. 
  Watkins explains how these three modes of time make the unity of time possible in 
the following fashion (2005, pp.192-3). Persistence is required because it expresses the idea 
that time stays the same even as its moments change. Succession and simultaneity are the 
two basic temporal relationships that all objects must bear to one another: these contribute 
to the unity of time because for objects to be situated in one and the same time, all objects 
must be either simultaneous with, succeed or be succeeded by all other objects. 
  The Analogies of Experience are important for connecting these temporal modes 
with the objective world, and as such unify “nature”. Kant explains this in the introduction 
to the Analogies: 
 
By nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection of appearances as regards 
their existence according to necessary rule, that is, according to laws. There are certain laws 
which first make a nature possible, and these laws are a priori…Our analogies therefore 
really  portray  the  unity  of  nature  in  the  connection  of  all  appearances  under  certain 
exponents  which  express  nothing  save  the  relation  of  time…to  the  unity  of 
apperception…Taken together the analogies thus declare that all appearances lie, and must 
lie, in one nature, because without this a priori unity no unity of experience, and therefore no 
determination of objects in it would be possible. (A216/B263) 
 
This is the crucial passage, which, I think, explains the regulative role of the Analogies. 
There is a strong connection between the unity of time and the unity of nature: temporally 
distinct appearances must be thought as related so that they can ultimately be grouped 
together as elements of one temporally extended experience. The role of the Analogies is 
just to link the unity of time to the unity of experience. However this is only possible by 
the manner in which the three modes of time contribute to the unity of time. Unifying the 
modes of time is a regulative procedure (since unification is a regulative ideal), and it is thus 
a  regulative  procedure  that  makes  intuitions—situated  within  a  unified  experience—
possible. It is in this sense, I suggest, that the Analogies of Experience are regulative. 
  It should now be clear in what sense the Analogies of Experience are regulative 
with respect to intuition. It remains to ask how  Kant understands dynamical synthetic 
principles  as  constitutive  of  experience. That  is  how  do  they  make  empirical  concepts 
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  I touched upon empirical concepts in §2.2.
92 It is clear that empirical concepts are, 
in some sense, derived from experience. For example, the empirical concept of a dog is 
presumably  formed  by  repeated  observation  of  objects-in-experience  that  share  certain 
essential  canine  properties.  The  immediate  concern  is  that  the  procedure  involved  in 
constructing  a  universal—i.e.  a  concept—from  particulars  is  precisely  the  task  that  is 
assigned to reflective judgment in the Critique of Judgment. This, as has been stressed, is a 
characteristically regulative use of reason. It is, as such, not immediately clear why Kant 
takes the dynamical principles to have a constitutive role to play with respect to experience. 
  The issue is clarified somewhat if we consider the most general empirical concept: 
matter. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant explicitly sets out to examine 
the role of the understanding and determinative judgment in elucidating the concept of 
matter. In this work Kant aims to show how mathematics can be applied to pure natural 
science by providing an account of how the concepts and principles of the understanding 
are to be brought into a determinate relation with the pure intuitions of space and time:  
 
But in order to make possible the application of mathematics to the doctrine of a body, 
which only through this can become natural science, principles for the construction of the 
concepts  that  belong  to  the  possibility  of  matter  in  general  must  be  introduced  first. 
Therefore, a complete analysis of the concept of matter in general will have to be taken as 
the basis, and this is a task for pure philosophy—which, for this purpose, makes use of no 
particular experiences, but only that which it finds in the isolated (although intrinsically 
empirical)  concept  itself,  in  relation  to  the  pure  intuitions  in  space  and  time,  and  in 
accordance with the laws that already essentially attach to the concept of nature in general, 
and is therefore a genuine metaphysics of corporeal nature. (2004, p.8; 4:472) 
 
So, in order to provide the “metaphysics of corporeal nature” Kant thinks that an analysis 
of the empirical concept of matter in general must be provided. This process involves 
asking as to the properties of matter that make it a priori suitable for application to outer 
experience (ibid.), which is achieved by considering matter as determined by each of the 
four classes of the table of categories: 
 
The  concept  of  matter  had  therefore  to  be  carried  through  all  four  of  the  indicated 
functions of the concepts of the understanding (in four chapters), where in each a new 
determination of this concept was added. (2004, p.12; 4:476) 
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In §2.3 I look in detail at the second chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations, in which the 
empirical concept of matter is articulated according to the categories of quality. For the 
time being, though, let us keep our focus on the question of how we should understand 
principles that are constitutive of experience. 
  Friedman (1991, p.82) suggests that the procedure for articulating the empirical 
concept of matter follows precisely the methodology suggested for the empirical concept 
of alteration in the Second Analogy, which is described as follows: 
 
How anything can be altered, and how it should be possible that upon one state in a given 
moment an opposite state may follow in the next moment—of this we have not, a priori,  
the least conception. For that we require knowledge of actual forces which can only be 
given empirically, as, for instance, of the moving forces, or what amounts to the same 
thing,  of  certain  successive  appearances,  as  motions,  which  indicate  [the  presence  of 
(NKS)] such forces. But apart from all question of what the content of the alteration , that 
is, what the state which is altered may be, the form of every alteration, the condition under 
which, as a coming to be of another state, it can alone take place, and so the succession of 
the states themselves…can still be considered a priori according to the law of causality and 
the conditions of time. (A206-7/B252-3) 
   
Here Kant is quite clear that the transcendental principle of causality, as a pure concept of 
the understanding, involves only the most general idea of an alteration. So, the Second 
Analogy  shows  that  we  must  take  the  objects  of  experience  to  stand  in  a  causal 
relationship. This is a necessary feature of our experience of the world and in that sense the 
dynamical principles are constitutive. However, all that is necessitated by the understanding 
is that we perceive objects as standing in this causal relation: how precisely this causal 
relation is empirically understood is left to be resolved. However the fact that there is room 
for  an  empirical  concept  of  causation  is  made  possible  by  the  structure  of  our 
understanding.  
  This, I think, is enough to solve the first of the two problems mentioned in §2.2.1. 
The  worry  here,  recall,  is  that  Kant  claims  that  the  dynamical  synthetic  principles  are 
regulative. In this section I have explained the sense in which this is intended: they are 
regulative with respect to intuition in the sense that temporally distinct appearances must 
be unified by the Analogies in order to provide us with a single intuition of the world. This 
function of the principles is regulative precisely because unification is a regulative ideal. 
There remains a constitutive role for the dynamical synthetic principles in that they reveal 
the  structure  of  the  understanding  which  grounds  the  most  general  features  of  our 86 
 
perception  of  the  empirical  world.  How  the  empirical  concepts  corresponding  to  the 
synthetic principles are developed remains to be explained. 
  It is at this point that the second problem mentioned in §2.2.1 reappears. Our 
concern here is with the extent to which the principles of natural science are constitutive. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Friedman’s central claim is that the laws of motion play 
a  constitutive  role  in  Kant’s  reconstruction  of  Newton’s  derivation  of  the  law  of 
gravitation.  The  three  laws  of  motion,  for  Kant,  correspond  to  the  Analogies  of 
Experience: in salvaging a sense in which the Analogies—though they are described by 
Kant as regulative with respect to intuition—are constitutive of empirical concepts, we 
have overcome the first threat to the constitutivity of these laws (for how can they be 
constitutive of Newtonian physics if the synthetic principles from which they are derived 
are merely regulative?).  
  Buchdahl’s argument, recall, is that empirical laws, such as the law of gravitation, 
are derived primarily by reason. Friedman urges, instead, that the laws of motion play a 
constitutive  role  in  the  derivation  of  the  empirical  law.  Before  this  problem  can  be 
addressed directly there is a subsidiary worry: on the account provided so far the laws of 
motion  are  empirical  concepts  that  are  made  possible  by  the  structure  of  our 
understanding. However, the content of these empirical concepts is known only through 
experience. It seems that here there is a further place in which reason in its regulative 
employment may play a role in the development of empirical laws. In particular the very 
basis of the empirical law seems to be based on the empirical claim that matter has a 
fundamental attractive force. Kant’s account of how matter can be known to possess an 
intrinsic attractive force is worth examining in some detail to see just how large a role 
experience and regulative reasoning have to play in this key empirical concept. 
2.4.  The  role  of  determinative  judgments  in  attributing  attractive  force  to 
matter 
In this section then, I investigate the grounds upon which Kant takes matter to be imbued 
with attractive force. In the following section I move on to consider the role of the laws of 
motion in the construction of an empirical law that describes the action of this attractive 
force. In the previous section I have attempted to explain how it is that Kant’s constitutive 
procedure stretches further into the empirical realm than one would initially assume: in 
agreement  with  both  Friedman  and  Buchdahl,  I  have  suggested  that  the  dynamical 
synthetic principles are constitutive of experience in the sense that they provide a general 
framework for knowledge to which empirical detail must be added.  87 
 
How is it that the content of the empirical concept is known in the first place? That 
is, while there is a straightforward sense in which, e.g., matter is the empirical correlate for 
substance, how is it that we come to know anything about the nature of matter? The 
temptation is to assume that the content of the empirical concept is discovered through the 
reflective use of judgment: this, after all, is the process by which a concept is derived from 
its individual instantiations. Given that the reflective power of judgment is governed by 
regulative principles, this seems to cast doubt on the idea that the principles of pure natural 
science are constitutive rather than regulative. 
  However,  it  is  relatively  clear  that  Kant  takes  the  constitutive  principles  of 
determinative judgment to play a key role in determining the content of empirical concepts. 
This is explained in the Critique of Judgment in the following fashion: 
 
A  transcendental  principle  is  one  through  which  we  represent  a  priori  the  universal 
condition under which alone things can become objects of our cognition generally. A 
principle,  on  the  other  hand,  is  called  metaphysical,  where  it  represents  a  priori  the 
condition  under  which  alone  objects  whose  concept  has  to  be  given  empirically,  may 
become  further  determined  a  priori.  Thus  the  principle  of  the  cognition  of  bodies  as 
substances, and as changeable substances, is transcendental where the statement is that 
their change must have an external cause. For in the first case bodies need only be thought 
through ontological predicates (pure concepts of the understanding), e.g., as substance, to 
enable the proposition to be cognised a priori; whereas in the second case, the empirical 
concept  of  a  body  (as  a  movable  thing  in  space)  must  be  introduced  to  support  the 
proposition, although, once this is done it may seem quite a priori that the latter predicate 
(movement only by means of an external cause) applies to bodies. (2007, pp.16-7; 5:181) 
 
In this section I aim to explain why it is that Kant takes the determination of the content of 
an empirical concept to be an a priori process: I will do this by means of Kant’s discussion 
of matter considered in relation to the categories of quality. This is a particularly helpful 
part of Kant’s discussion to look at because it is here that Kant argues that attractive force 
is a fundamental property of matter, which has a central role to play in Kant’s discussion of 
the status of the universal law of gravitation (which is the topic of §2.4).  
In  the  “Metaphysical  Foundations  of  Dynamics”,  in  which  Kant  brings  matter 
under the categories of quality, Kant considers matter as “movable insofar as it fills a space”: 
Matter fills a space, not through its mere existence, but through a particular moving force. (2004, 
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This latches onto then-contemporary debate about how precisely matter fills space. There 
were  two  schools  of  thought  on  this  subject:  Kant  refers  to  these  as  “mathematical-
mechanical” and “metaphysical-dynamical”.  
  The distinction between these explanations of how matter fills space is in line with 
the  distinction  between  the  mathematical  and  the  dynamical  sketched  in  §2.1.  The 
mathematical-mechanical approach is attributed to Lambert (2004, pp.34-5; 4:497-8) and is 
characterised by the claim that matter fills space through possessing the property of solidity. 
This  is  a  somewhat  mysterious  property  of  matter,  that  Warren  (2001,  p.64)  has 
convincingly  argued  is  understood  by  Kant  to  amount  to  the  claim  that  matter  is 
incompressible. Kant expresses this view in Explication 4: 
The filling of a space with absolute impenetrability can be called mathematical filling of space 
whereas  that  with  mere  relative  impenetrability  can  be  called  dynamical  filling  of 
space…According to the purely mathematical concept of impenetrability (which proposes 
no moving force as originally belonging to matter), matter is not capable of compression 
except insofar as it contains empty spaces within itself. (2004, pp.38-9; 4:502) 
So,  on  the  mathematical-mechanical  account,  matter  cannot  be  compressed.  This  is 
because, on this account of matter, space is either filled or it is not: it is not a matter of 
degree. As such if matter gets smaller it is not because it is being compressed, rather it is 
because there is less available space for it to fill. 
  This  is  contrasted  with  the  metaphysical-dynamical  account  which  posits  only 
relative impenetrability: 
[According] to our discussion of this property, impenetrability rests on a physical basis. For 
expanding force first makes matter itself possible, as an extended thing filling its space. But 
this force has a degree that can be overpowered, and thus the space of its extension can be 
diminished, that is, penetrated up to a certain amount by a given compressing force, but 
only in such a way that complete penetration is impossible, because this would require an 
infinite compressing force; therefore the filling of space must be viewed only as relative impenetrability. 
(2004, p.39; 4:502) 
On the metaphysical-dynamical account, then, because matter is taken to fill space by a 
fundamental  repulsive  force,  matter  can  be  compressed.  This  is  simply  because  the 
repulsive force has a magnitude, if a greater force is applied to matter then the repulsive 
force is diminished and matter fills less space.  
  As Kant’s referring to this view of matter as mathematical-mechanical suggests, Kant 
understands this explanation of matter’s filling space as an attempt to construct an a priori, 89 
 
geometrical physics. This is very clear in his discussion of Lambert’s physics. When two 
bodies collide they do not pass through each other, there is some resistance. Where, on the 
mechanical account, does this resistance originate? Kant answers: 
[The] presence of something real in space must already, through its concept, and thus in 
accordance with the principle of noncontradiction, imply this resistance and bring it about 
that nothing else can be simultaneously in the space where such a thing is present. But the 
principle of noncontradiction does not repel a matter advancing to penetrate into a space 
where another is found. (2004, pp.34-5; 4:497-8) 
This approach, then, is taken to be an attempt to derive physics from logical principles like 
that of noncontradiction. An object fills its space through its solidity, only one object can 
occupy any space at a time and it is a contradiction for two bodies to exist in the same 
space  at  any  given  time.  Kant  argues,  though,  that  more  than  this  is  needed  for  a 
contradiction: “Only when I ascribe to that which occupies a space a force to repel every 
external movable that approaches, do I understand how it contains a contradiction for yet 
another thing of the same kind to penetrate into space occupied by a thing” (2004, p.35; 
4:498). 
  Having  dismissed  this  account  of  how  matter  fills  space,  Kant  advocates  the 
dynamical approach: “Matter can be compressed to infinity, but can never be penetrated by a 
matter, no matter how great the compressing force of the latter may be.” (2004, p.37; 
4:501). Kant’s argument for the metaphysico-dynamical view of matter is as follows: 
 
Penetration into a space (in the initial moment this is called a striving to penetrate) is a 
motion. Resistance to motion is the cause of its diminution, or even the change of this 
motion into rest. Now nothing can be combined with a motion, which diminishes it or 
destroys it, except another motion of precisely the same moveable in the opposite direction 
(Phoron. Prop.). Therefore, the resistance that a matter offers in the space that it fills to 
every penetration by other matters is a cause of the motion of the latter in the opposite 
direction. But the cause of motion is called a moving force. Thus matter fills its space 
through a moving force, and not through its mere existence. (2004, p.34; 4:497) 
 
So, consider any piece of matter that you have to hand and think about exerting force on it. 
Whether you exert this force by rolling objects at your piece of matter or just squeezing it 
between your hands you meet with resistance. This resistance is the cause of the change in 
motion in either the objects you were rolling or your hands.  90 
 
At  this  point,  Kant  appeals  to  the  Remark  to  the  Explication  5  from  the 
Phoronomy  to  explain  how  motions  are  diminished.  This  Proposition  reads  “The 
composition of two motions of one and the same point can only be thought in such a way 
that one of them is represented in absolute space, and instead of the other, a motion of the 
relative space with the same speed occurring in the opposite direction is represented as the 
same as the latter” (2004, p.26; 4:490). Any given motion can only be cancelled out by an 
equal motion in the opposite direction. So a change in the motion of an object upon its 
striking  of  another  object  can  only  be  explained  by  the  presence  of  another  motion 
originating in the second object. Motion is caused by moving force: so, matter must fill its 
space through a moving force. 
But,  why  can’t  mechanists  say  that  their  incompressible  bits  of  matter  exert  a 
moving force when something collides into them? In trying to answer this we need to think 
of how Kant understands the alternative to his view: how does Kant understand the claim 
that  matter  fills  space  through  its  “mere  existence”?  Warren  (2001,  p.70)  provides  a 
plausible interpretation of Kant’s thought here. Kant, he points out, uses the phrase “mere 
existence” in a similar context in two of his earlier work: his Inaugural Dissertation (1992 
[1770]) and Nova Dilucidatio (1755). In these works Kant argued that the causal interactions 
of distant objects cannot be explained by the mere existence of the relevant objects; as in 
the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant considered the manner in which bodies (or pieces of 
matter)  causally  interact. Furthermore—and very  suggestively—Kant  seems  to  take  the 
phrase to be interchangeable with “mere subsistence”. This would seem to be the case in 
this passage from the Inaugural Dissertation: 
 
Given a plurality of substances, a principle of possible mutual interaction is not given by 
their mere existence; something more is required from which their mutual relations may be 
understood. Through their mere subsistence they do not necessarily refer to anything else, 
except perhaps to their cause. (1992, p.401; 2:407) 
 
The equation of mere existence and mere subsistence, seems to remain present in the 
Metaphysical Foundations: he describes the view of how matter fills space to which he 
intends to object as the claim that “solidity must be assumed in everything that exists 
(substance)”. Referring to “everything that exists” as “substance” in this fashion likewise 
suggests that Kant understands the mechanists to promote a view of matter as a substance. 
Now, a substance was taken to be something that could be understood apart from 
its relations to all other things, that is, in virtue of its own inner determinations. This leads 
Warren to suggest that we ought to understand the first proposition as meaning this: 91 
 
Matter fills a space, not [in virtue of how it is apart from all relations to others, i.e. in virtue 
of its inner determinations], but by a special moving force. (Warren, 2001, p.73) 
With the proposition understood in this way, we are now in a position to see why Kant 
thinks that the mechanist approach cannot account for collisions between matter. 
Maybe  it  is  worth  considering  how  an  argument  to  impenetrability  from  the 
principle  of  non-contradiction  alone  might  go.  Consider  a  Lockean  type  argument, 
whereby it is claimed that if two objects fill the same space then, in fact, it is just one 
object. The problem here is that this  type of explanation does not provide any causal 
grounds for explaining the impenetrability of matter. This, really, is the nub of the matter: 
understanding the universe is about understanding the interaction of matter. This is simply 
not possible if we consider the properties of an individual piece of matter by its inner 
determinations only and in isolation from all other pieces of matter. 
Kant’s aim is to give an account of the reciprocal interactions of pieces of matter. 
Matter in itself, devoid of any relation is not a possible object of mathematical construction 
(see for instance Galilean relativity) as well as a possible object of experience (because of 
the transcendental idealism). Plus the metaphysical assumption of all Kant’s system is that 
the actual world is constituted by actual mutual interactions of which we can determine the 
form, both a priori and a posteriori. In this context one has to ascribe his view of the 
interplay of attraction and repulsion. 
Having established how matter fills space, Kant is in a position to consider the 
makeup of bodies: in particular he is concerned with the relationship between different 
parts of material bodies. In proposition 2 Kant shows that each part of some piece of 
matter repels the other parts: through mutual repulsion of its parts every piece of matter 
has a tendency towards expansion. Furthermore, Kant is clear that the repulsive force does 
not have a limit to the distance over which it is effective: “because smaller degrees are 
possible to infinity for any moving force” (2004, p.46; 4:508). Kant is able to conclude: 
Hence,  matter,  by  its  repulsive  force…would,  alone  and  if  no  other  moving  force 
counteracted it, be confined within no limit of extension; that is it would disperse itself to 
infinity,  and  no  specified  quantity  of  matter  would  be  found  in  any  specified  space. 
Therefore, with merely repulsive forces all spaces would be empty, and thus, properly 
speaking, no matter would exist at all. (ibid.) 
How is this problem to be avoided? Quite simply, Kant postulates another, attractive, force 
of matter that operates in an opposite direction to the repulsive force. 92 
 
The  second  part  of  the  argument  is  the  inverse  of  this:  Kant  argues  from  the 
attractive force of matter to the repulsive force. The argument goes as follows: 
Active force is that moving force of matter whereby it impels another to approach it; 
consequently…nothing can hinder the action of a moving force except another moving 
force opposed to it, and that which opposes attraction is repulsive force. Hence, without 
repulsive  forces,  through  mere  convergence,  all  parts  of  matter  would  approach  one 
another unhindered, and would diminish the space they occupy. (2004, p.48; 4:510-1) 
In short, if there were only attractive forces, then all matter would be coalesced into a 
“mathematical point” (2004, p.49; 4:511). Since this is not the case, we can conclude that 
both attractive and repulsive forces must be at work.  
Kant’s arguments, I suggest, are best understood as modus tollens arguments, for 
example the repulsion-entails-attraction argument can be reconstructed as follows:  
 
(i)  If P then Q: if matter fills space only through repulsive force then “no specified 
quantity of matter would be found in any specified space”. 
(ii)  ¬Q: but specified quantities of matter are found. 
(iii)  Therefore ¬P: therefore matter cannot fill space through repulsive force alone. 
 
Viewing the balancing arguments as having this structure explains why Kant includes both 
repulsion-entails-attraction  and  attraction-entails-repulsion  forms  of  the  argument  when 
one might expect just the repulsion-entails-attraction argument to be sufficient for Kant’s 
purpose: it allows him to conclude that in either the case that matter were equipped solely 
with attractive force or the case that matter were equipped solely with repulsive force we 
would be in conflict with experience. This being so we are forced to conclude that matter 
must be equipped (given the argument of proposition 1) with both forces. While these 
arguments  have  initial  appeal,  closer  reflection  reveals  both  arguments  to  be  quite 
problematic.
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(i)  Repulsion-entails-attraction: A straightforward objection here is that it simply 
does not follow from the idea that matter is possessed only of a repulsive force 
that all matter would disperse to infinity and that, as a consequence all spaces 
would be empty. This is because the application of a finite force (that diminishes 
over distance) will never move matter to an infinite distance: there is no limit to 
how far it will propel matter, but it will always only be a finite distance. 
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(ii)  Attraction-entails-repulsion: The problem here is that it is not obvious why all 
matter must coalesce to a point. This can be seen quite clearly if we imagine an 
object exerting a strong attractive force on an object exerting a much weaker 
attractive force. The more attractive object will, roughly, stay still. Now, the less 
attractive matter’s behaviour is, properly, determined by its initial velocity. If it’s 
stationary it will be drawn towards the more attractive matter. But there is no 
reason for it not to pass straight through the more attractive matter: recall, what 
renders matter impenetrable is its repulsive force, and, ex hypothesi, this has been 
removed. So here our less attractive matter would simply oscillate through the 
more  attractive  matter.  Alternatively,  if  its  initial  velocity  was  appropriately 
valued and directed perpendicular to the direction towards the more attractive 
matter, then it could even orbit it. 
 
Both counterarguments work by denying the first premise of Kant’s arguments. Warren 
has  suggested  that  the  interpretative  problem  here  derives  from  attributing  inertial 
properties to matter earlier than is warranted within Kant’s system: i.e. instead of treating 
force as a change of acceleration, Warren suggests that at this stage in the Metaphysical 
Foundations, Kant treats a force as only a change in configuration.
94 Kant’s definitions of 
attractive and repulsive force seem to bear out a reading of force in the Dynamics as only 
being understood as a change in configuration. 
Attractive force is that moving force whereby a matter can be the cause of the approach of 
matter to itself (or, equivalently, whereby it resists the withdrawal of other matter from 
itself). Repulsive force is that whereby a matter can be the cause of making other matters 
withdraw from itself (or equivalently whereby it resists the approach of other matter to 
itself). (2004, p.35; 4:498) 
Beyond every expanding force a greater moving force can be found. But the latter can also 
act contrary to the former, whereby it would then decrease the space that the former 
strives  to  enlarge…Therefore,  for  every  matter  a  compressing  force  must  also  be 
discoverable, which can drive it from the space it fills into a decreased space. (2004, p.37; 
4:500) 
What is immediately striking is that in this discussion of force there is no mention of mass 
(or  quantity  of  matter,  as  Newton  treated  it)  in  either  paragraph.  Nor  have  I  found 
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reference to either term in the chapter on Dynamics: the first mention of “quantity of 
matter”, is in the Mechanics and appears in Kant’s definition of quantity of motion (that is, 
momentum): 
The quantity of motion of bodies is in compound ratio to that of the quantity of their 
matter and their speed. (2004, p.77; 4:538)  
So, I—with Warren—suggest, that the understanding of force in the dynamics is one in 
which matter is taken to have zero quantity of motion and as lacking inertial properties. 
Hence throughout the dynamics, as we have seen, forces are described as affecting motion 
only. 
  On this reading of the chapter on Dynamics, the modus tollens arguments are more 
defensible.  Recall  that  on  the  attraction-entails-repulsion  branch  of  the  argument  our 
concern was that it was not clear that matter would compress down to a single point: might 
we not have oscillating systems? If there were no inertial properties to matter, oscillating 
systems would not be possible. The matter is somewhat less clear on the repulsion-entails-
attraction branch. Here the concern was that matter would not be infinitely extended if 
there was no attractive force, because applying a finite force for a limited period of time 
does not lead to infinite separation. It is, at least, more plausible that matter would be 
infinitely  extended  by  constant  application  of  repulsive  force  if  matter  lacked  inertial 
properties. 
Now, this is of importance with respect to the current project because it affects the 
extent  to  which  we  consider  the  dynamical  conception  of  how  matter  fills  space  as 
empirical.  Friedman  (1991,  p.84)  stresses  the  empirical  nature  of  the  metaphysical-
dynamical  approach,  claiming  that  it  is  beyond  reason  to  comprehend  original  forces 
according to their possibility. He cites the following passage as evidence: 
If  the  material  itself  is  transformed  into  fundamental  forces  (whose  laws  we  cannot 
determine a priori, and are even less capable of enumerating reliably a manifold of such 
forces  sufficient  for  explaining  the  specific  variety  of  matter),  we  lack  all  means  for 
constructing this concept of matter and presenting what we thought universally as possible in 
intuition (2004, p.63; 4:525) 
If we interpret Kant in this way, then, the role of experience in shaping Kant’s judgment as 
to the manner in which matter fills space is quite minimal. The only empirical knowledge 
that Kant needs is that matter resists penetration (and that the universe is neither infinitely 
expanded nor a mathematical point). This is enough to reject the mechanist approach and 
derive that attractive force must also be an essential property of matter. 95 
 
  This  I  suggest  is  an  exemplar  of  what  might  be  meant  by  a  principle  that  is 
constitutive of experience. The category of quality provides the most general conditions for 
the possibility of experiencing substance; the experience of matter as resisting penetration 
is  then  sufficient  to  allow  this  purely  constitutive  principle  to  be  transformed  into  a 
principle  of  natural  science, which  remains  constitutive  but  not  entirely  divorced  from 
experience. 
2.5.  Establishing the universal law of gravitation 
In the previous section we saw that, for Kant, attractive and repulsive forces are derived a 
priori as belonging to the empirical concept of matter. This, I take it, resolves any concern 
about Kant being committed to the inductive procedure of reflective judgment as a means 
for developing the principles of pure natural science. However even if attractive force is a 
fundamental property of matter, this does not amount to the empirical law that governs the 
interaction of material bodies. More is needed to get to the universal law of gravitation. 
This leaves us to answer Buchdahl’s concern—expressed in §2.3.1—that it is regulative 
principles that play the chief role in determining specific empirical laws. In this section I 
will look at Kant’s derivation of the Newton’s law of gravitation and argue, with Friedman, 
that  this  is  best  understood  by  assigning  a  constitutive  role  to  the  laws  of  motion. 
However, the matter is not entirely straightforward, and there seems to be a key role played 
by regulative reasoning in deriving the laws of motion which are intended to be constitutive 
with respect to Newton’s theory. In this section I aim to clarify the role of both reason and 
the understanding in Kant’s account of the universal law of gravitation, and I will suggest 
that  this  need  not  diminish  the  role  of  the  understanding  in  the  manner  that  we  saw 
Buchdahl suggest it might in §2.3.1. 
  To begin with I will suggest a crude starting point for interpreting Kant’s argument 
about the derivation of the law of universal gravitation; I will refine this account in the rest 
of the section. So, for Kant the understanding provides the basis for all knowledge, and is 
guided  by  the  pure  concepts  that  are  given  in  the  table  of  categories.  Of  particular 
importance in Newtonian physics are those concepts corresponding to relation: of inherence 
and subsistence, of causality and dependence and of community (A80/B106). In the third chapter of 
the Metaphysical Foundations, these become: 
 
(1)  In all changes of corporeal nature the total quantity of matter remains the same, 
neither increased nor diminished. (2004, p.80; 4:541) 96 
 
(2)  Every change in matter has an external cause. (Every body persists in its state of rest 
or motion, in the same direction, with the same speed, if it is not compelled by an 
external cause to leave this state.) (2004, p.82; 4:543) 
(3)  In all communication of motion, action and reaction are always equal to one another 
(2004, p.844:545). 
 
Kant  attempts  to  derive  each  of  these  principles  from  the  corresponding  Analogy  of 
Experience.  
These  are  Kant’s  equivalents  of  Newton’s  laws:  (1)  the  principle  of  the 
conservation of mass, (2) the law of inertia and (3) a principle of action and reaction. 
Friedman  (1992a,  p.168n)  notes  that,  while  these  generally  seem  easily  convertible  to 
Newton’s  equivalent  laws,  we  may  have  concern  over  the  form  of  Kant’s  third  law, 
which—on  Friedman’s  reading—implies  Newton’s  second  law,  which  is  normally 
expressed as F=ma.
95 Kant, though, formulates his principle in terms of momenta. This 
means that in modern terms and for two bodies, e.g. A and B, Kant’s principle is best 
expressed as stating that B B A a m a - = A m . Because the third law remains about the equality 
of action and reaction it is clear that it relates to forces. So this previous equation entails 
that FAB= - FBA, which suggests that Kant’s third law presupposes Newton’s second law. 
This contributes towards Friedman claiming that Kant takes Newton’s derivation 
of the law of gravitation, given in Book III of the Principia, as his model for deriving his 
own law of gravitation.
96 So, before we look at Kant’s derivation of the law of gravitation it 
will be helpful to provide a brief summary of Newton’s argument for the inverse-square 
law. 
                                                 
95 There is a significant debate in the literature both about the extent to which Kant’s version of the laws of 
motion corresponds to Newton and about whether Kant even intended his laws to correspond to Newton’s. 
At first glance there are at least three serious problems in taking Kant’s laws to correspond to Newton’s. 
First, Kant states the conservation of quantity of matter as a principle whereas Newton is silent on whether 
quantity of matter must be conserved; second, Kant does not mention Newton’s second law at all; third, 
Kant’s law of inertia is stated in terms of “change of matter” and “external cause” rather than motion and 
forces.  See  Watkins  (1997)  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  differences  between  Kant  and  Newton’s 
statements of the laws of motion. For Watkins, Kant should be read as being influenced by a wider variety of 
sources than just Newton: in particular his laws of motion should be understood as being influenced both by 
the  Newtonianism  of  members  of  the  Berlin  Academy  of  Sciences—  and  by  Kant’s  pre-Critical 
Leibnizianism.. Friedman now accepts that Kant’s laws of motion do have a “Leibnizian purview” (2013, 
p.282n35).  He  argues,  however,  that  this  in  itself  does  not  mean  that  Kant  did  not  seek  to  provide  a 
metaphysical foundation for Newtonian mathematical physics. This is because, while Kant’s laws of motion 
do have Leibnizian provenance, Kant’s critical proofs of the laws entail a radical break from the Leibnizian 
tradition (Friedman, 2013, p.369n136). For this reason, I accept Friedman’s claim that Kant’s laws of motion 
do—albeit it non-straightforwardly—correspond to Newton’s laws of motion. 
96 Friedman makes a quite detailed argument for this in chapter 3 of his (1992a). For the most part the 
argument  is  quite  convincing.  The  main  question  mark  over  his  account  is  over  how  Newtonian  Kant 
considered the laws of motion to be (see previous footnote).  This issue will have some impact on this 
section,  and  I  will  look  at  Kant’s  derivation  of  his  second  law  later  on,  but  I  don’t  think  this  impacts 
significantly  on  Friedman’s  argument  that  Kant  is  modelling  his  derivation  of  the  law  of  gravitation  of 
Newton’s. 97 
 
  Newton, in the Principia, derived the inverse square law from Kepler’s observation 
that the orbits of the planets are elliptical and from Book 1 Proposition XI, which tells us 
how to work out the centripetal force on a body moving so as to describe an ellipse. In 
taking  Kepler’s  laws  as  his  starting  point,  Newton  is  starting  from  the  phenomena. 
Proposition  XI  is  a  proof—relying  on  geometry
97  and  Newton’s  laws—that  the  force 
towards on a body towards the centre of an ellipse is proportional to the inverse square of 
the distance from the body to the focus of the ellipse. Newton can then straightforwardly 
conclude from this that the force which acts upon each planet must vary inversely with the 
square of the distance from the centre of the Sun. 
  Friedman (1992a, p.172) points out that this is not sufficient for the full law of 
gravitation, however, as that states that any two bodies in the solar system mutually attract 
each other with the same inverse square force. Furthermore the force is proportional to the 
masses of the two bodies in question. The mutuality of attractions is given by Newton’s 
third law; what is less clear is how Newton can derive the universality of gravitation so that 
the  inverse  square  law  can  be  said  to  apply  to  any  two  bodies.  Newton  argues  for 
universality as follows: 
Universally, all bodies about the earth gravitate towards the earth; and the weights of all, at 
equal distances from the earth’s centre, are as quantities of matter which they severally 
contain. This is the quality of all bodies within reach of experiments; and therefore (by 
Rule III) to be affirmed of all bodies whatsoever. (1995, p.332) 
Rule III is detailed earlier in the Principia, and is just the claim that if we find a particular 
quality belongs to all the bodies within range of our instruments then we should assume 
that it is a universal quality of all bodies (p.320). 
  So the structure of the derivation is as follows. Newton begins with the phenomena 
of  observable  relative  motions  of  satellites with respect  to  primary  bodies,  taken  from 
Kepler. He then applies the laws of motion to the observable data to get first the inverse 
square law and then the universality of gravitation.  
Let us look at how Kant derives the laws of motion: I will focus on the second law 
of mechanics, which is Kant’s version of the principle of inertia. The proof of this principle 
proceeds as follows: 
(From general metaphysics we take as basis the proposition that every change has a cause 
and here it is only to be proved of matter that its change must always have an external cause) 
Matter, as mere object of the outer sense has no other determinations except those of 
                                                 
97 The proof is geometrical in that it proceeds by appeal to “similar triangles” and the “properties of the 
ellipse” (Newton, 1995, p. 52) 98 
 
external relations in space, and therefore undergoes no change except by motion. With 
respect to the latter, as change of one motion into another, or of a motion into rest, or 
conversely, a cause must be found (by the principle of metaphysics). But this cause cannot 
be  internal  for  matter  has  no  essentially  internal  determinations  or  grounds  of 
determination. Hence every change in a matter is based on external causes. (2004, p.83; 
4:543) 
This law of mechanics is based upon the findings of the second Analogy of Experience, 
which is the claim that every change has a cause. The claim that matter has no other 
determinations except those of external relations in space is a result from the Phoronomy 
(2004, p.17; 4:482). However in the next sentence, Kant shifts the terms of the discussion 
to  changes  of  motion. That  is,  the  argument  has  shifted  from  a  claim  about  how  objects 
change—by motion—to a draw conclusions about changes of motion. 
Buchdahl (1969, p.677) suggests that here Kant is making a tacit assumption: he has 
to  identify  ‘change  of  motion’  with  ‘change  of  velocity’  and  by  ‘velocity’  he  has  to 
understand  ‘uniform  velocity’.  For  without  these  assumptions,  it  is  neither  clear  why 
velocity  itself  shouldn’t be  regarded  as a  change  nor why when  there  is  no  change  in 
velocity it should be considered that there is no change of state. 
This  poses  some  difficulty  for  us  in  interpreting  Kant’s  intention  with  his 
derivations of the laws of motion:
98 how deductive are they intended to be? Is Kant, with 
hindsight, supplying the interpretation of change of motion as change of velocity, as he 
needs, or is he, instead, to be understood as intending this as a logically sound proof. If the 
former then we could treat Kant as aiming only to show that the metaphysical foundations 
are only demonstrations of possibility (in the sense that they display how much in the laws 
mirrors the general concepts and principles of a science). If this is so, Buchdahl claims: 
Such considerations could not be intended as inductive support for the laws, but solely as 
architectonic devices—not so very different from the procedures we noticed operate at the 
level of reason. (1969, p.678) 
It is difficult to say precisely which of these two interpretations better represents Kant’s 
intention—Buchdahl suggests that our conclusions probably depend as much on one’s 
own philosophical dispositions as on the content of Kant’s arguments. Buchdahl, though, 
seems to lean towards treating the arguments as analogues to those that operate at the level 
of reason in Kant. 
                                                 
98 I generalise to laws of motion here because the other derivations too involve a series of assumptions. See 
Buchdahl (1969, pp.678-81) for details. 99 
 
  Now, there is a considerable amount at stake here. The purpose of this section is to 
try to clarify precisely the role of constitutive principles in reason. The account sketched so 
far is that the categories provide the most general conditions of possibility, which are made 
particular by addition of a specific experience. In the previous section we saw that a quite 
convincing  case  can  be  made  for  treating  Kant’s  argument  in  the  “Metaphysical 
Foundations of Dynamics” in this fashion. The laws of motion are meant to correspond to 
the categories of relation: if reasoning characteristic of that involved with the faculty of 
reason is required here, then it would seem that the constitutive principles do not get us as 
far as we had thought. 
  Buchdahl’s suggestion, then, is that rather than being intended as a deductive proof 
of  the  second  law,  Kant’s  proof  is  really  intended just  to  make  the  law  ‘rational’.  On 
Buchdahl’s account there are three different criteria for the legitimacy of a hypothesis:
99  a 
hypothesis can be legitimate if it is probable, possible or rational. Might Kant have just 
intended to make his version of the second law rational? 
  The  criterion  of  rationality  is  best  defined  in  contrast  with  the  criterion  of 
probability. For Kant, empirical support can only ever make a hypothesis more probable 
and, in general, is of little importance in science. This, claims Buchdahl (p.515), though, is 
only  intended  to  apply  to  attempts  to  compare  the  deductive  consequences  of  single 
hypotheses with observation. However, this is a simplistic view of scientific procedure: the 
proper aim of science is to incorporate hypotheses into the framework of a theory. When a 
hypothesis is incorporated into the pre-existing framework of a theory, the hypothesis is 
made rational. 
  Now, the reason that incorporation into a theory’s framework makes a hypothesis 
rational—rather than just more plausible—is to do with the nature of the faculty of reason 
in Kant's system. Recall that one of the regulative principles that governs reason is a drive 
towards systematicity and unity, Kant expresses this thus: 
If,  then,  it  can  be  shown  that  the  three  transcendental  ideas  (the  psychological,  the 
cosmological and the theological), although they do not directly relate to, or determine, any 
object corresponding to them, nonetheless, as rules of the empirical employment of reason, 
lead us to systematic unity...and that they thus contribute to an extension of empirical 
knowledge without ever being in a position to run counter to it, we may conclude that it is 
a necessary maxim of reason to proceed always in accordance with such ideas. This, indeed, 
is the transcendental deduction of all ideas of speculative reason...as regulative principles of 
the systematic unity of empirical knowledge in general, whereby the empirical knowledge is 
                                                 
99 See (Buchdahl, 1969, pp.512-6) for a detailed account. 100 
 
more adequately secured within its own limits and more effectively improved than would 
be  possible...through  the  employment  merely  of  the  principles  of  the  understanding. 
(A671/B699) 
 So, for Buchdahl: 
 
[A] hypothesis is legitimised as rational because it is a creature of reason; a reason which, 
when  expressed  as  the  system  of  ‘regulative  principles  of  the  systematic  unity  of  the 
manifold  of  empirical  knowledge  in  general’,  is  what  Kant  calls  a  ‘transcendental 
presupposition’ of the very possibility of a theoretical system itself. (Buchdahl 1969, p.516) 
 
The force of Buchdahl’s charge should now be clear. Rather than intending the principle of 
inertia  to  be  derived  deductively  from  the  category  of  causation  and  dependence,  the 
“proof”  is  rather  intended  only  to  gesture  at  a  means  by which we  can  attain  greater 
systematic unity by treating the principle of inertia as, in hindsight, related to the categories. 
  To clarify the situation, here, it is helpful to emphasise a fundamental disagreement 
between Kant and Newton. Newton’s physics is based upon the idea that absolute motion 
is motion with respect to absolute space: this is a three-dimensional Euclidean structure 
within  which  the  motions  of  bodies  satisfy  the  laws  of  motion.  Newton’s  most 
fundamental problem is that in our experience of nature we are given neither absolute 
space nor, for example, force free bodies. As such it is not entirely clear how it is that we 
are meant to distinguish the true motions from merely apparent motions. This, in effect, is 
the goal of the universal law of gravitation: it eventually settles the question as to whether 
the earth orbits the sun or vice versa by demonstrating that they both in fact orbit around a 
point between them.  
  Kant, of course, cannot view the purpose of the universal law of gravitation in this 
fashion because he has rejected the existence of absolute space.  The problem for Kant, 
instead, is as follows: 
 
But if the movable, as such a thing, namely with respect to its motion, is to be thought of as 
determined for the sake of a possible experience, it is necessary to indicate the conditions 
under  which  the  object  (matter)  must  be  determined  in  one  way  or  another  by  the 
predicate of motion. At issue here is not the transformation of semblance into truth, but of 
appearance into experience; for in the case of semblance, the understanding with its object-
determining judgments is always in play, although it is in danger of taking the subjective for 
the objective; in the appearance, however, no judgment of the understanding is to be met 
with at all. (2004, pp.93-4; 4:555)  101 
 
 
Friedman  interprets  this  passage  as  claiming  that  the  derivation  of  true  motions  from 
merely apparent ones is a matter of constituting experience from appearance (1992a, p.142). 
This, I think, makes good sense of Kant’s claim here. It explains why he does not consider 
the task as transforming semblance into truth: semblance, he says, already incorporates the 
understanding in a way that is absent from mere appearance. What is to be explained is not 
just that there is this given appearance, rather that it can be considered an experience—
which, as we saw, in §2.2 means bringing mere intuitions under categories. 
  Understanding  Kant’s  intention  in  this  fashion,  in  effect,  inverts  Newton’s 
argumentative structure: whereas Newton started with absolute space and argued towards 
the true motions of the solar system, Kant “conceives this very same Newtonian argument 
as a constructive procedure for first defining the concept of true motions” (Friedman 1992a, p.143). 
Kant’s aim is not to find the true motions: rather it is to understand how it is that the 
concept of a true motion has objective validity. So, the question is as to how it is possible 
to have agreed upon the true motions of the solar system in such a way that everyone can 
accept it. 
  This is where the laws of motion come in on Friedman’s account: they are the 
conditions under which the idea of true motion has meaning: 
 
Kant…views  the  laws  of  motion  as  definitive  or  constitutive  of  the  spatio-temporal 
framework of Newtonian theory, and this, in the end, is why they count as a priori for him. 
Using laws of motion we do not then find, discover, or infer that the center of mass of the 
solar system is in a state of absolute rest; rather the center of mass of the solar system 
yields that frame of reference wherein the concepts of true or absolute motion are defined. 
(ibid.) 
 
Now, recall that in §2.3, we saw that Kant suggested that the dynamical categories were in 
some sense regulative, so it should not necessarily come as a surprise that we find the laws 
of motion derived from these categories as seeming to also exhibit a dual status. 
  If there is a role for reason, then it is in making the laws of motion rational. That 
they are involved at this stage does not obviously preclude the laws of motion from playing 
the constitutive role that Friedman assigns them. The important lesson is that even in 
Kant’s system the scope of what purely constitutive principles could achieve was limited. 
As the understanding stretches into the empirical realm regulative principles are required to 
provide  more  specific  detail  to  the  constitutive  principles.  Understood  in  the  manner 
outlined above, this does not, though, obviously undermine the constitutive status of the 102 
 
pure concepts of the understanding after they have been transformed into principles of 
pure natural science by the demands of reason. 
2.6.   A regulative or constitutive reading of Kant? 
In this chapter I have argued that a proper understanding of Kant’s philosophy of science 
must pay due attention to the role of both constitutive and regulative principles. I have 
considered  two  arguments  from  the  Metaphysical  Foundations  of  Natural  Science.  First,  I 
considered Kant’s account of matter: in particular his claim that it fills space by a repulsive 
force and is necessarily equipped with an attractive force as well. Second, I examined his 
account of the derivation of the universal law of gravitation. In both cases, I have argued 
that Kant’s account requires both constitutive and regulative principles. 
  With regard to Kant’s theory of matter I have argued that the empirical basis for 
Kant’s  claim  is  very  minimal:  it  requires  only  the  observation  that  matter  resists 
penetration. I have argued that Warren is correct in arguing that Kant was using a pre-
Newtonian  conception  of  force  in  this  chapter  (where  force  is  taken  to  affect  the 
configuration of bodies only) and, as such, the argument is not entirely convincing from 
the  modern  perspective.  Nevertheless  when  the  argument  is  treated  in  this  fashion  it 
permits a quite clear view about the particular role of the understanding at this stage of 
Kant’s  philosophy  of  science. The  mathematical category  of  quality  provides  the  most 
general conditions for the possibility of matter; however, this is only suitable to function as 
a principle of natural science once a role for experience is also specified. The constitutive 
principles of the understanding are not enough on their own to explain the possibility of 
Newton’s mathematical natural science.    
Matters become more complicated still when we consider the dynamical categories. 
Here it seems that Kant’s derivations of the principles corresponding to the relevant pure 
concepts of the understanding is much more difficult to understand in an appropriately 
deductive fashion. Buchdahl, I suggest, is correct in claiming that the derivations of the 
laws of motion are best understood as providing rationalisations for the laws: as such they 
seem to be appealing chiefly to the regulative ideal of systematicity. However, given how 
Kant intends to use these principles, as conditions under which the notion of true motion 
has objective meaning, this does not necessarily undermine his objective. Instead it seems 
that regulative and constitutive principles work in concert: the regulative principles pursue 
systematicity while the constitutive function of the understanding shows how the laws thus 
derived may function as providing objective meaning to empirical science. 103 
 
As we have seen, Kant’s philosophy of science can no longer be plausibly defended 
in its original form. Indeed, given that Kant’s philosophy was developed by means of an 
investigation into the conditions of the possibility of natural science, it would be somewhat 
remarkable if his philosophical framework survived major revolutions in physics. Friedman 
argues that we can retain a sense in which constitutive principles are synthetic and a priori 
and  it  is  these  that  ultimately  allow  for  the  construction  of  an  objective  science:  the 
constitutive principles are shared by all practitioners and the laws of a theory are deduced 
from them. However, I would suggest that the doctrine of the synthetic a priori emerges 
from the nature of the mathematics and natural science that Kant had available to him in 
the eighteenth century: e.g., with the contemporary understanding of mathematics, it would 
not seem natural to conclude that geometrical judgments are synthetic a priori. I suggest, 
then, that we ought to approach the question of the possibility of the objectivity of science 
in  a  quite  different  manner:  i.e.,  by  reconceiving  Kant’s  schematism  in  the  manner 
advocated by Cassirer. This, as we will see in §3.3.2, involves emphasising the role of 
regulative principles in Kant’s philosophy. 
The argument of this chapter is important because it shows that both constitutive 
and regulative principles played an equally important role in Kant’s explanation of the 
objectivity of science. This means that a contemporary Kantian philosophy of science that 
emphasises  either  constitutive  or  regulative  principles  has  equal  claim  to  be  “properly 
Kantian”.  Friedman  objects  that  a  regulative  approach  cannot  do  justice  to  Kant’s 
distinction  between  constitutive  and  regulative  principles,  as  such,  he  suggests,  the 
constitutive approach is to be preferred. In part, the task of the following chapters is to 
show that a regulative Kantianism can make sense of this distinction. I would suggest, 
however, that in seeking to retain a role for the synthetic a priori, Friedman does not do 
justice to Kant’s key insight: i.e., that philosophy of science should be concerned with the 
critical question as to the possibility of the objectivity of mathematics and natural science. 
  In the next chapter I examine Cassirer’s regulative reading of Kant. I argue that by 
placing emphasis on regulative principles, Cassirer is able to develop plausible answers to 
both  CR  and  CC.  Furthermore  a  regulative  Kantianism  has  room  to  incorporate 
Friedman’s most important insights into the nature of the relativized a priori. The main 
differences are the denial of the syntheticity of the a priori and the manner in which the 
objectivity of science is secured. So, we will see that as it was for Kant, so it must be for 
contemporary  Kantianism:  constitutive  and  regulative  principles  must work  together  in 
order to explain the objectivity of science. 
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3 
 
Reason, objectivity and structure 
 
Regulative principles in Cassirer’s philosophy of science 
 
 
3.1.  A role for regulative principles in mathematical science? 
In the previous chapter I introduced the constitutive and regulative readings of Kant’s 
philosophy  of  science  in  the  context  of  Kant’s  attempt  to  provide  metaphysical 
foundations for Newton’s law of gravitation. Friedman, we saw, argues that Kant should be 
understood  as  grounding  the  law  of  gravitation  in  the  constitutive  function  of  the 
understanding, while Buchdahl argues that it is the regulative function of reason that plays 
the crucial role. I argued that that regulative and constitutive principles work in concert: the 
regulative function of reason pursues systematicity while the constitutive function of the 
understanding  shows  how  the  laws  thus  derived  may  function  as  providing  objective 
meaning to empirical science. The aim of this chapter is to extend this conciliatory reading 
and to lay the foundations for my own account of scientific development that seeks to do 
justice to the intuitions of both constitutive and regulative readings. 
In the introduction I outlined two challenges that faced any Kantian account of the 
philosophy of science: the challenge of rationality (CR) and the challenge of constitutivity 
(CC). CR asks how the Kantian should provide an account of the rationality of scientific 
theory  change;  CC  asks  how  the  Kantian  should  retain  something  of  Kant’s  idea  of 
constitutivity given the threat that modern mathematics and physics poses to his idea of 
pure  intuition.  In  §1  I  detailed  Friedman’s  constitutive  approach  to  meeting  these 
challenges: my main objection to his approach being to his attempt to retain a sense of the 
syntheticity  of  the  constitutive  a  priori.  I  suggest  in  the  following  chapters  that  certain 
features of Friedman’s account—especially his historicisation of the constitutive a priori—
can be profitably understood within the framework of a regulative Kantianism. 
Friedman contrasts his position with Cassirer’s account of philosophy of science, 
which he argues provided a purely regulative account of science. By this Friedman means 105 
 
that what is ultimately a priori for Cassirer can only be known at the end-point of scientific 
inquiry:  this  idealised  end-point  serves  as  a  regulative  ideal  that  constitutes  the  entire 
sequence of scientific theories. Friedman is quite right that Cassirer emphasised the role of 
the regulative a priori in his account of science and he is also right that without some 
account of constitutive principles, Cassirer’s approach is unsuited to satisfactorily explain 
the development of science. In this chapter I offer an alternative reading of Cassirer’s 
philosophy  of  science  that  places  greater  emphasis  on  the  idea  of  constitutivity  than 
Friedman’s reading does. I argue that Cassirer understood constitutivity in two ways. The 
most well-known is his law-constitutive account of objects, which is the claim that the laws 
of physics make possible the objects of physics. I argue that Cassirer was also committed to 
a historicised account of the constitutive role of physical principles in the development of 
laws  that is similar to that defended by Friedman. In this way I hope to be able to develop 
answers to CR and CC that incorporate features of both Friedman’s constitutive approach 
and Cassirer’s regulative approach.  
For  Cassirer,  the  most  important  aspect  of  Kant’s  philosophy  was  the  critical 
methodology:  i.e.,  that  our  philosophy  of  science  must  be  address  the  transcendental 
question as to the possibility of the objectivity of science. This means that if we are to 
begin to understand Cassirer’s philosophy of science, we must first have a clear idea as to 
the scientific theories that Cassirer took to be the subject of his investigation. To this end, I 
begin this chapter with a discussion of the physics of Helmholtz and Hertz, which were the 
state-of-the-art scientific theories that Cassirer studied in his first work on the philosophy 
of science, Substance and Function. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In §3.2.1 I give an account of the pertinent 
aspects of Helmholtz’s philosophy. I examine the physiological origins of his theory of 
signs and explain how his account of geometry is, in part, a response to an epistemological 
problem that grows out of his physiological work. I also emphasise the role of the law of 
causality  in  Helmholtz’s  work  and  draw  attention  to  the  problem  of  validity  that  was 
considered to be among the most significant philosophical difficulties faced by the account. 
In §3.2.2 I show that Hertz developed his understanding of physics with the intention of 
resolving the problem of validity in mind: he took the problem as being connected with 
Helmholtz’s failure to consider unobservable mechanisms that may lay behind observable 
phenomena. I explain how Hertz alters Helmholtz’s theory of signs and replaces it by 
introducing a distinction between a theory and its model. I then briefly examine his account 
of mechanics, with a view to showing how this addressed the problem of validity. 
In §3.3 I turn to Cassirer’s work. Before it is possible to provide Cassirer’s answers 
to CR and CC, it is important to clarify how Cassirer understood the substance-theory of 106 
 
concepts and the function-theory of concepts. Understanding this distinction is crucial if 
we  are  to  understand  his  account  of  rationality  and  constitutivity:  it  is  a  proper 
understanding of the function-theory of concepts that permits us to see the sense in which 
Cassirer can be meaningfully Kantian while rejecting the distinction between sensibility and 
understanding. With this in place I then turn my attention to detailing Cassirer’s answers to 
CR and CC. Cassirer’s answer to CR relies upon several aspects of the regulative a priori: 
the idea of ultimate invariants of experience, principles of theory selection and an idea of 
systematic unity. I argue though that this account does not accurately capture historical 
examples  of  theory  change:  for  that we  must  emphasise  more  than  Cassirer  does  that 
theory change took place at the level of constitutive principles. So, as part of my account of 
Cassirer’s  answer  to  CC  I  argue  that  there  is  a  role within  his  system  for  constitutive 
principles in providing physical content to physical laws. However, there is another feature 
of Cassirer’s answer to CC: he argues that the objects of a theory are constituted by the 
laws of a theory. 
3.2.  Kant naturalised, objectivity lost 
If we are to understand Cassirer’s philosophy of science, we must first understand the 
scientific developments to which Cassirer was responding. In this chapter I consider two of 
the  most  important  scientific  developments  that  influenced  Cassirer’s  philosophy  of 
science:  Helmholtz’s  account  of  perception  and  geometry  and  Hertz’s  model-theoretic 
approach  to  classical  mechanics.  Helmholtz  developed  a  naturalised  account  of  spatial 
intuition, which was intended as an alternative to Kant’s normative account.
100 However, 
with this came a problem: Helmholtz argued that our perception of objects is entirely 
subjective in the sense that it tells us only about the nature of our own faculties. This left 
Helmholtz with a problem: how should he account for the objectivity of science? And what 
about  the  objectivity  of  geometry?  He  had  no  convincing  answer  to  this  problem. 
However, the problem would be taken up by Helmholtz’s student, Heinrich Hertz. Hertz 
developed Helmholtz’s account of perception and used it as the beginnings of a model-
theoretic account of science. Hertz was then able to develop this model-theoretic account 
so that it would serve to provide an account of objectivity. In §3, we see that turning 
Hertz’s account of objectivity on its head is one of the defining features of Cassirer’s 
account of science: as such, the process by which Helmholtz’s naturalisation of Kant’s 
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as a thing-in-itself: instead it is just a fact of the form of human intuition that sense-impressions are given in 
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work  leads  to  Hertz’s  understanding  of  objectivity  is  an  important  first  step  to 
understanding Cassirer’s philosophy of science.  
3.2.1.  Helmholtz on spatial perception 
Helmholtz’s central philosophical claim was that sensations should be understood as signs 
of the external world: i.e. sensations are effects that the external world produces in human 
sensory organs that should not be understood as bearing any relationship of similarity to 
the external cause of the sensation. This epistemological claim is central in understanding 
both Helmholtz’s account of geometry and his understanding of causation: the task of this 
section  will  be  to  clarify  the  theory  of  signs  and  to  detail  the  impact  that  it  had  on 
Helmholtz’s account of geometry. 
3.2.1.1.  The theory of signs 
 
The theory of signs has its origin in the physiological methodology that Helmholtz had 
learned from Johannes Müller. Indeed, in his (1977b) Helmholtz introduces the theory in 
connection to the work of his teacher: 
Regarding the qualities of sensation, Locke had already established a claim for the share 
which our corporeal and mental makeup has in the manner in which things appear to us. In 
this direction, investigations into the physiology of the senses, which were in particular 
completed and critically sifted by Johannes Müller and then summarized by him in the law 
of specific energies of sensory nerves, have now brought the fullest confirmation. (pp.118-9) 
Helmholtz, then, saw Müller’s physiological investigations
101 as supporting Locke’s account 
of the qualities of sensation. The aspect of Locke’s philosophy that Helmholtz seems to be 
referring to is the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
102 Primary qualities 
are spatial and temporal properties; secondary qualities are those such as colour that were 
thought to have their origin in the perceiving subject rather than in the external object 
                                                 
101  Müller’s  most  significant  contribution  to  the  physiology  of  sight,  as  Helmholtz  indicated,  was  his 
construction of the law of specific sense energies. This was intended to replace the projection theory of the 
physiology of perception that was prevalent in the early nineteenth century, which Müller showed could not 
explain stereoscopic binocular vision.  Müller’s alternative theory of perception,  which could account for 
stereoscopic binocular vision, consisted of two claims. First, Müller suggested that the two retinas should be 
understood as consisting of pairs of corresponding points. Second, was that doctrine which we have already 
seen Helmholtz refer to as the law of specific nerve energies. This is the claim that each type of nerve—e.g. 
optic nerve—is capable of only one type of response to any external stimulation. So, in the case of the optic 
nerve, whether it is stimulated by light, electricity or pressure it responds by giving the impression of light, 
darkness or colour. 
102 This is certainly the aspect of Locke’s philosophy that Schlick, in his notes accompanying the paper, takes 
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itself.  However,  Helmholtz  here  cannot  be  committing  himself  to  drawing  the  same 
distinction  as  Locke:  he  is  quite  clear  that  he  viewed  spatial  properties  as  subjective 
properties in precisely the same sense that colours are (1977b, p.124). The important lesson 
of Müller’s physiological investigations was that it is the internal organisation of a nerve-
type that is responsible for received images and not whatever the external cause of the 
stimulation is.
103 It is in this sense that Müller’s work confirms Locke’s philosophy: not in 
the sense that it justifies a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, but in the 
sense that it provides evidence that secondary qualities are purely subjective. 
The sense in which Müller’s law of specific sense energies raises epistemological 
concerns should be immediately clear: if the nature of our sense impressions depends solely 
upon our own constitution, how can we hope to have knowledge of the external causes of 
our sense impressions? 
Hence, we see Helmholtz summarise the fundamental question of epistemology in 
the following fashion: 
 
What  is  true  in  our  intuition  and  thought?[104]  In  what  sense  do  our  representations 
correspond to reality?[105] (1977b, p.117) 
 
Helmholtz viewed both philosophy and natural science as being chiefly concerned with 
addressing precisely this question. However, while they have the same concern, the two 
fields approach the matter from opposite directions. Philosophy, for Helmholtz, “considers 
the mental side” (ibid.): its aim is to discover how the mind works and philosophy proceeds 
by seeking to separate out from our knowledge all that which has its origins in the external 
world. The task of science, by contrast, is to discover the laws that govern the external 
world; it proceeds by seeking to identify and separate off those aspects of knowledge that 
are brought by the mind.  
Helmholtz does not, I think, see himself as partaking in philosophy. He seeks to 
explain how the natural world functions by identifying what aspects of our experience are 
                                                 
103 This is how Helmholtz (1977b, p.119) describes the significance of Müller’s theory. 
104 The German here reads “Was ist Wahrheit in unserem Anschauen und Denken”: “Anschauen” can be 
translated as either “intuition”, as it is here, or as “sensation”, as it is in Hatfield (1990). Helmholtz seems to 
take there to be a distinction between sensation and intuition. This is suggested by his claim that “Die 
Qualitten der Empfindung also erkennt auch die Physiologie als blosse Form der Anschauung an” (1903, 
p.223): i.e. the “qualities of sensation” are “forms of intuition”, Helmholtz uses “sensation” to refer to the 
actual physical process of perception whereas intuition seems to refer to the ability to receive impressions of 
the external world more generally.  This is intended to stress only that there is a distinction and that this fact 
suggests that it is preferable to translate Anschauen, here, as “intuition”. 
105 Schlick (1921, p.163) points out that the first of Helmholtz’s two questions is poorly phrased because the 
concept of truth should strictly only be applied to propositions. So, the former question is sensible only 
insofar as it inquires as to the truth of statements about our intuition. For this reason I will treat Helmholtz’s 
rephrased version of the question as more accurately reflecting his intent. 109 
 
brought  by  the  mind  and  then  asking  what  we  can  say  of  the  natural  world.  This  is 
particularly  clear,  as we will  see  in  the  following  section,  in  Helmholtz’s  discussion  of 
geometry. Helmholtz’s answer to this epistemological question followed on from Müller’s 
physiological studies: Helmholtz claimed that “sensations, as regards their quality, are only 
signs whose particular character depends wholly upon our own makeup” (1977b, p.122). 
For Helmholtz this meant that visual perception was purely subjective: i.e., just as for 
Müller, every sensation is dependent upon our own physiological make-up and not on the 
external world. 
This left Helmholtz with a quite serious problem about the nature of geometry. In 
the nineteenth century geometry-proper was understood as relating to the structure of the 
external  world.  Helmholtz’s  answer  to  the  epistemological  problem  in  general  can, 
therefore, be understood through his answer to how our spatial representations correspond 
to  the  geometry  of  the  physical  world.  In  the  next  section  I  examine  Helmholtz’s 
understanding of geometry to show how, by separating off the contribution to knowledge 
made by our mind, we are able to successfully measure the geometry of space. 
3.2.1.2.  Geometry, the problem of validity and the causal principles 
 
Helmholtz’s  theory  of  perception  meant  that  he  had  to  explain  how  geometry  was 
applicable to both physical and visual space. Because human perception of objects depends 
on  our  physiological  constitution,  and  not  the  constitution  of  the  external  world,  it  is 
mysterious both that, e.g., Newton can appeal to Euclidean geometry in deriving physical 
laws and that our visual space is Euclidean. Helmholtz’s answer to this problem provides a 
model by which we can hope to learn about the external world, even while our visual 
perception of it is entirely subjective: in short, he advocates nativism with respect to visual 
space and argues that we can learn about physical space through postulating the existence 
of rigid bodies which we can physically interact with and experiment on to learn about 
physical space.  
Helmholtz, it should be noted, took himself to be advocating an essentially Kantian 
position  in  that  he  understood  space  to  be  a  subjective,  necessary  and  given  form  of 
intuition. Of course, the details of this account are quite different to the details of Kant’s 
account. The Euclidean structure of visual space is subjective in the sense that human 
perception  of  space  depends  on  our  constitution;  it  is  necessary  in  the  sense  that  we 
necessarily connect perception of spatial relations to an external world; it is given just 110 
 
because perception of spatial relations is not learned, but is given to us by our “makeup”.
106 
The  key  difference  is  that  Helmholtz  does  not  take  physical  space  to  be  necessarily 
Euclidean.  Kant,  he  suggests,  made  this  additional  step  only  because  non-Euclidean 
geometries were still thought to be logically impossible at the time Kant was writing.
107 
Let us now set out Helmholtz’s account of geometry in more detail. Helmholtz 
understands the Euclidean method as being based on demonstrations of the congruence of 
lines, angles, bodies etc. This process, in turn, depends upon our ability to imagine the 
geometrical bodies being moved in thought—without changing their dimensions—so that 
they are next to each other and can be compared. This process, Helmholtz argued, is not 
enough on its own to establish the necessity of Euclidean geometry: 
But if we want to erect necessities of thought upon this assumption, that fixed spatial 
structures can be moved freely without distortion to any location in space, then we must 
raise the question of whether this assumption involves any presupposition which has not 
been logically proved. We shall soon see below that it does in fact involve one, and indeed 
one of far-reaching implications. But if it does, then every congruence proof is supported 
by a fact drawn from experience. (1977a, pp.4-5) 
This is the central claim in Helmholtz’s argument against the necessity of treating physical 
space as Euclidean. In applying Euclidean geometry to space, we assume that we can move 
bodies around in space, without distortion, precisely as we can in thought. If Euclidean 
geometry is to necessarily apply to physical space, then the assumption that bodies behave 
in space as they do in thought must itself be necessarily true. Helmholtz suggested that this 
is actually an empirical assumption. 
Why this is  so becomes clear in Helmholtz’s analysis of Riemannian geometry. 
Helmholtz’s (1977a) was intended to establish two propositions: first, that Kant’s treatment 
of geometrical axioms as being true of necessity is “at variance with facts” and, second, that 
there are two types of equivalence of spatial relations and magnitudes—subjective and 
objective. This distinction corresponds to visual space and the physical space to which we 
do not have direct epistemic access.
108 
By claiming that Kant’s view of geometry is at variance with facts, Helmholtz just 
means  that  new  forms  of  geometry  have  been  developed  that  render  non-Euclidean 
                                                 
106 Helmholtz discussed this in his (1977b, p.124) 
107  This  is  especially  clear  in  the  following  passage:  “When  Kant  asserted  that  spatial  relationships 
contradicting  the  axioms  of  Euclid  could  never  in  any  way  be  represented,  he  was  influenced  by  the 
contemporary states of development of mathematics and the physiology of the senses, just as he was thus 
influenced in his whole conception of intuition in general as a simple psychic process, incapable of further 
intuition” (1977b, p.129).   
108 Helmholtz states explicitly that this was the twin aim of his (1977a) and the beginning of his (1878), which 
is a response to Land’s criticism of his original argument. 111 
 
geometries  perfectly  conceivable.  Helmholtz  thought  that  the  reason  that  Kant  took 
Euclidean  geometry  to  be  necessarily  true  was  because  in  Kant’s  time  there  was  no 
conceivable physical alternative. Helmholtz appeals to the work of Beltrami and Riemann 
to demonstrate the conceivability of non-Euclidean geometry.  
Riemann’s formulation of geometry showed that the various possible geometries 
could be recovered from consideration of the notions of position and relations of position 
(distances). Riemann thought that in order to reflect our ignorance of the nature of space, 
we should seek to treat it in the most general possible terms: this meant treating space as a 
manifold upon which relations could be internally imposed to give the surface a variety of 
geometrical structures.
109 In this way he was able to provide a general abstract mathematical 
structure that was capable of describing Euclidean space and an incalculable variety of non-
Euclidean spaces. Using only ideas of position—the manifold—and relations of position—
the metric—Riemann, then, was able to both re-describe Euclidean geometry and point out 
a way to develop new geometries.
110  
Riemannian geometry seems to have played two roles in Helmholtz’s argument. 
First, Riemann had developed a geometry that had the structure to explain both Euclidean 
and non-Euclidean geometry. This, in effect, enabled us to conceive of geometries other 
than Euclidean geometry by treating space as curved. Helmholtz argued that this is an 
analytic process:  
I…wish to emphasise here that this so-called measure of curvature of space is a calculated 
magnitude obtained in a purely analytic way, and that its introduction in no way rests upon 
insinuating relationships which would only have a sense as ones intuited by the senses. 
(1977a, p.13) 
Helmholtz,  then,  argued  that  the  conceivability  of  non-Euclidean  geometry  is  entirely 
analytical. At this stage he is not dealing explicitly with the problem of physical geometry, 
or space as perceived by the senses. This part of his argument is concerned solely with 
showing—against the received wisdom of Kant’s time—that non-Euclidean geometries are 
conceivable. 
The second part of Helmholtz’s argument was related to physical geometry: he 
claimed that physical geometry can, in fact, be empirically determined to be non-Euclidean. 
                                                 
109 For a more detailed account of Riemannian geometry see (Gray, 1979). 
110 Gray provides a neat summary of Riemann’s position: “Riemann gave a wholly novel answer to the 
question: what is geometry? To him geometry was to do with concepts like length and angle which could be 
intrinsically defined on a surface or space of some sort. It follows that there are many geometries, one for 
each kind of surface and each definition of distance: a geometry arises from anything in which it makes sense 
to talk of a distance between two points, and this geometry will have a set of theorems associated with it” 
(2007, p.193). 112 
 
As part of his argument for this, Helmholtz considers Riemann’s crucial claim that “the 
essential basis of any geometry is the expression giving the separation between two points 
for any arbitrary direction of separation” (1977a, p.13). Helmholtz argues that whereas 
Riemann takes this claim simply as an axiom from which the theorem on the mobility of 
spatial structures can be derived, the axiom should instead be understood as being derived 
from three more fundamental presuppositions (p.15). 
First,  it  is  presupposed  that  the  situation  of  any  point  A  is  specifiable  by 
coordinates, Second, in order to be able to compare bodies by congruence, it must be 
presupposed  that,  for  any  fixed  body,  there  must  be  an  equation  that  describes  an 
unchanged spatial relation for any two points of the fixed body for any motion of the body. 
Thirdly, it needs to be specified that a 360˚ rotation of any fixed body will restore the body 
to its initial position. These conditions are supposed to be consistent with our experience 
of rigid bodies; they are not taken to be necessary.  
The second part of Helmholtz’s argument depended crucially on showing that, with 
these three presuppositions granted, we are able to measure non-Euclidean geometries. 
This part of his account of geometry is also central to understanding his answer the general 
epistemological question that he set out in his (1977b). The crucial step in his argument 
was  to  claim  that  there  do  actually  exist  rigid  bodies  that  are  described  by  the  three 
presuppositions that underlie Riemannian geometry: that is, there are rigid bodies that can 
be moved around and rotated without distortion. That there exist such bodies can, of 
course,  only  be  an  assumption.  However,  once  it  has  been  granted  it  becomes  a 
straightforward matter to make geometrical measurements: we can, for example, simply 
measure the interior angles of a triangle and see whether their sum is equal to, more than or 
less than 180 and use this to determine which of the three physically possible geometries 
accurately describe space.  
Now, there is a problem with Helmholtz’s account as it has been detailed so far. I 
have stressed in §3.2.1 that on Helmholtz’s theory of signs, humans have no epistemic 
access to the physical world whose geometry Helmholtz sought to determine. However, 
Helmholtz’s argument that we can measure non-Euclidean geometries would seem to rely 
on our perceiving the results of the measurements: i.e. if we seek to measure the sum of the 
interior angles of a triangle and find that this comes to more than 180, the measurement is 
relayed to us by perception. If our sensations are just signs that do not tell us anything of 
the external world, how is it possible to treat this measurement result as telling us anything 
about physical space? 
Helmholtz sought to explain this by appeal to a principle of causality, stated as 
follows.  113 
 
The only assumption we still maintain is that of the law of causation, to the effect, namely 
that all mental states having the character of perception that come to pass in us do come to 
pass according to fixed laws, so that when different perceptions supervene we are justified 
in inferring therefrom a difference of the real conditions determining them. As regards 
these conditions—the reality proper that underlies the phenomena—we know nothing. 
(1878, p.222)  
Helmholtz’s idea here was that we need to assume that while our sensations themselves do 
not  correspond  to  an  external  reality,  the  causal  relationships  that  we  perceive  do 
correspond to causal relationships in the external world. 
The  challenge  to  Helmholtz  can  be  summarised  as  follows.  Helmholtz  drew  a 
distinction between the physical world and the phenomenal world—that is, the world as it 
appears to our senses. Humans have no epistemic access to the physical world because our 
senses do not perceive any aspect of the external world: sensory impressions tell us only of 
the  nature  of  the  relevant  senses—e.g.  however  one  stimulates  a  retina  it  gives  the 
impression of colour. However, the task of science remains to tell us of the physical world 
by seeking to identify and remove those aspects of experience that are subjective products 
of the mind. This means, among other things, that the scientist should seek to determine 
the structure of physical space. 
Central to Helmholtz’s argument that we can determine the physical geometry of 
space  is  the  idea  that  elements  of  experience  seem  to  remain  constant  while  being 
perceived by different senses. So, consider attempting to measure a particular length with 
the aim of determining that it is of the same magnitude as a unit measuring rod. You place 
the unit measuring rod next to the length you seek to measure and see that the two are the 
same length. You check this by feeling the ends of the two rods to check that they are next 
to each other, and you can do this with each of your fingers separately.
111 
Helmholtz argued that it would be reasonable to conclude from the consistency of 
our  various  different  sense-impressions  that  objects  so-checked  do  actually  have  the 
physical properties that they appear to have in the phenomenal world. However, because 
we  have  no  direct  epistemic  access  to  the  external  world  this  principle  can  never  be 
accepted on the basis of anything more than trust. Helmholtz is explicit in accepting this 
consequence of his theory of signs: 
This is a trust in the lawlikeness of everything that happens. However lawlikeness is the 
condition of comprehensibility of the appearances of nature. While: should we presuppose 
that  this  comprehension  will  come  to  completion,  that  we  shall  be  able  to  set  forth 
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something ultimately and finally unalterable as the cause of the observed alterations, then we 
call the regulative principle of our thought which impels us to this the law of causality. We 
can say that it expresses a trust in the complete comprehensibility of the world. (1977b, p.142) 
At the root of Helmholtz’s method for determining the geometry of the physical world is 
trust in the idea that regularities in the physical world will remain constant and that our 
senses are capable of identifying these regularities. 
This is the source of Helmholtz’s disagreement with Kant over what Helmholtz 
views as Kant’s nativism. Helmholtz argued that once it is appreciated that our knowledge 
of the world is dependent upon this principle of trust, many principles that Kant took as a 
priori  are  better  understood  as  empirical.  So  Kant  assumed  that  we  perceive  space  as 
Euclidean because that is the structure of our form of intuition. However, for Helmholtz, 
the Euclidean nature of geometry is learned empirically through the consistent detection of 
Euclidean regularities in the phenomenal world that are caused by the Euclidean nature of 
the physical world. For Helmholtz Euclidean geometry appears to be true of necessity 
because we are psychologically adapted to detecting Euclidean regularities in the external 
world. 
This principle of trust in the lawful regularity of the physical world was the source 
of an objection to Helmholtz’s work—raised by various figures, including Bauch, Cohen 
and  Rickert—known  as  the  problem  of  validity.
112  This  objection  is  a  variant  of  the 
problem of induction: it is simply the claim that, given Helmholtz’s naturalism, we have no 
grounds at all to assume that the regularities detected in the world will continue indefinitely. 
That  is,  just  as  we  may  doubt  the  claim  “all  swans  are  white”  on  the  basis  of  our 
observations of a finite number of observations of swans, all of which are white, we ought 
to doubt the claim that the geometry of space is Euclidean on the basis of a finite number 
of observed regularities. To establish the validity of Helmholtz’s method for determining 
spatial geometry we are required to make an assumption that goes beyond any possible 
experience. Helmholtz’s naturalism—with its principle of trust in the lawful regularity of 
the world—certainly does not have a satisfactory resolution to this problem. 
The problem of validity plays an important role in this chapter’s narrative because 
one of the factors motivating Hertz’s account of classical mechanics was a desire to solve 
the problem of validity. In the next section I will detail Hertz’s response to this problem. 
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3.2.2.  Hertz’s “images of science”: objectivity regained? 
 
In  an  article  written  for  Helmholtz’s  seventieth  birthday,
113  Hertz  outlined  what  he 
understood  to  be  the  most  significant  achievements  of  his  tutor:  the  invention  of  the 
ophthalmoscope, the development of the principle of the conservation of energy and his 
work on the physiology of the senses. It is with the last of these that I will be primarily 
concerned in this section. Hertz took Helmholtz’s physiological research to show that the 
senses mediate between two worlds: the “cold and alien world of actual things” and the 
“intellectual world of conceptions and ideas” (1891, p.335). The senses are the only means 
through which communication between the two worlds is possible: i.e. it is only through 
impacting upon our sense organs that changes in the external world can make themselves 
felt. This particular characterisation of the relationship between human ideas, the senses 
and the external world is very much central to Hertz’s own philosophy of science. He also 
noted several questions that Hertz’s account of vision had raised and left unanswered, one 
of which has definite echoes in the Principles of Mechanics (2007 [1894]), published three years 
later: 
Is the manifold of these relations sufficient to portray all conceivable manifolds of the 
external world, to justify all manifolds of the internal world? (1891, p.336) 
That is, do the mental conceptions of the world that we form through the process of the 
external world impacting upon our senses exhaust the possible conceptions of that world? 
Helmholtz’s theory of signs dealt only with the external world insofar as it is available to 
the senses; Hertz, here, is concerned with whether that is sufficient, or whether we need to 
postulate unobservable objects and relations in order to explain experience. 
It is in answering this question that Hertz begins to develop an account of Bilder:
114 
His  answer,  provided  in  the  Principles  of  Mechanics,  is  that  “the  manifold  of  the  actual 
universe must be greater than the manifold of the universe that is directly revealed to us by 
our senses” (2007, p.25). Hertz argued that if we attempt to explain the motions of bodies 
with reference only to that which can be directly observed, we will, in general, fail. For 
Hertz  the  central  problem  with  which  science  should  be  concerned  is  with  “the 
                                                 
113 (Hertz, 1891). 
114 This translates as “pictures” or “images”. In the English translation of the Principles of Mechanics, “Bild” is 
translated as “image”. However, as Patton notes (p.281n)—translating the word as “image” or “picture” may 
give the impression that a Bild should be understood as a mental image or picture, which is potentially 
misleading. 116 
 
anticipation of future events” (p.1).
115 Now, if we concern ourselves solely with what can 
be observed, it proves impossible to accurately make future predictions. This means that 
our Bild of the universe must make appeal to unobservable objects and/or forces to ensure 
successful prediction of future events.
116 
From  a  contemporary  perspective,  then,  Hertz’s  Bilder  are  best  understood  as 
models.  They  are  intended  to  provide  accurate  predictions  about  the  behaviour  of 
observable objects and they do so by positing hypothetical entities and mechanisms that 
underlie  observable  phenomena  and  make  successful  predictions  possible.  In  Hertz’s 
(2007) Bilder is translated as “image”. However, since Hertz employed the term to refer to 
what we would now clearly understand as models, and “image” has potentially confusing 
connotations, I will translate Bild as “model” throughout. Hertz contrasted models with 
“symbols of external objects”:  
We form for ourselves images [innere Scheinbilder] or symbols of external objects; and the 
form which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images [models, 
Bilder] in thought are always the images [models, Bilder] of the necessary consequents in 
nature of the things pictured. (ibid.) 
There were two types of “image” in the Bildtheorie. First, there are what Hertz referred to as 
innere Scheinbilder or symbols.
117 These are the impressions that are produced in us by means 
of external objects impacting upon our senses. These symbols, I suggest, are essentially the 
same as Helmholtz’s signs: they are just external objects as they appear to us as mediated 
through the senses. However, as we have seen, Hertz does not think that this alone is 
sufficient  to  provide  knowledge—understood  in  terms  of  predictive  success—of  the 
external  world.  In  order  for  this  a  second,  model-theoretic,  understanding  of  Bilder  is 
introduced:  it  is  these  models  that  are  of  primary  interest  in  Hertz’s  Bildtheorie.  Hertz 
understood  models  as  theoretical  frameworks  that  aim  to  accurately  predict  the  causal 
behaviour of actual objects. So, the purpose of a model is just to accurately predict the 
behaviour  of  the  observable world—as  it  appears  to  us  as  symbols—and  to  do  so  by 
postulating  various  unobservable  entities  whose  behaviour  is  governed  by  hypothetical 
laws. This can be represented pictorially as follows:
118 
 
                                                 
115 It is with this idea, that the purpose of our conscious knowledge of nature is to enable the anticipation of 
future events, that Hertz opens his (2007): as such, it is clear that it is a vital aspect of Hertz’s account of the 
nature of science. 
116  “If  we  wish  to  obtain  an  image  [Bild]  of  the  universe  which  shall  be  well-rounded,  complete,  and 
conformable to law, we have to presuppose, behind the things we see, other, invisible things—to imagine 
confederates concealed beyond the limits of our senses” (1894, p.25). 
117 Henceforth, for clarity, I will refer to innere Scheinbilder  as “symbols”. 
118 This diagrammatic representation of the Bildtheorie is adapted from van Fraassen’s (2008, p.196).  117 
 
 
External events are observed and represented as symbols. As we have seen, Hertz argued 
that the symbols that we form are such that the “necessary consequents of the images in 
thought are always the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured”. Consider 
the following simple two events: (1) a moving body impacts a stationary body and (2) the 
stationary body starts moving and the velocity of the body striking it is decreased. We then 
create symbols that correspond each of these two events. Now, these symbols need to be 
related to each other so that Symbol 2 is a necessary consequent of Symbol 1. This requires 
a model that aims to capture the unobservable process that occurs between Event 1 and 
Event 2. In the simple case of two colliding objects, this model would appeal to concepts 
such as mass, velocity and elasticity to ensure that the representation of Event 2 captures 
the velocity at which the two bodies are symbolised as moving. The problem is that we can 
perfectly well form symbols of observable events, but we need to ensure that the symbols 
that we make are related as cause-to-effect and this is the role of models. Hertz’s further 
step is to assume that the models that explain how each of our symbols is a necessary 
consequence of earlier symbols represent the actual unobservable process between Event 1 
and Event 2. 
In the discussion of Helmholtz’s sign theory I stressed what has been called the 
problem of validity: how can Helmholtz justify the assumption that the world-as-it-appears 
will continue to display the same set of regularities for all time. Helmholtz, we saw, was not 
entirely clear on how this problem was to be avoided: in his (1878) he seemed to treat the 
stability of observed regularities as a matter of trust, whereas earlier in his (1977a [1868]) he 
had  argued  for  a  species  of  psychological  adaptationism. As  Hertz’s  account  has  been 
sketched so far, one might think that precisely the same objection applies to Hertz’s model-
theoretic  account:  what  guarantees  that  our  models  accurately  represent  unobservable 
processes? Hertz, though, provided a much more compelling solution to this problem than 
Helmholtz. Hertz’s solution to this problem can be found in his Electric Waves (1893). 
Hertz’s account of models was closely related to his understanding of precisely 
what  a  scientific  theory  is.  Hertz  discussed  this  in  relation  to  Maxwell’s  theory  of 
electromagnetism, famously—if somewhat misleadingly—declaring that the answer to the 118 
 
question  “What  is  Maxwell’s  theory?”  is:  “Maxwell’s  theory  is  Maxwell’s  system  of 
equations” (1893, p.21). This, understandably, has been taken to demonstrate that Hertz 
understands a scientific theory to amount to its mathematical expression in the form of sets 
of equations. However, to draw this conclusion would be mistaken. 
Prior  to  posing  this  question,  Hertz  had  described  how  he  learned 
electromagnetism (p.20). Here he admitted great admiration for Maxwell’s “mathematical 
conceptions” while confessing that he was unsure of the physical significance of Maxwell’s 
work. For this reason, Hertz had hoped to be able to derive Maxwell’s equations by using a 
limiting case of Helmholtz’s electromagnetism that would give the equations a more sure 
physical  grounding.
119  Hertz  had  studied  electromagnetism  under  Helmholtz  and  had 
practiced in accordance with Helmholtz’s version of the theory. As Buchwald (1994, ch.6) 
demonstrates,  this  involved  incorporating  certain  Helmholtzian  concepts  into  his 
experimental practice: as such, it should be no surprise that Hertz was more comfortable 
with  the  physical  significance  of  Helmholtz’s  electromagnetism  than  he  was  with  the 
physical significance of Maxwell’s. However, as Hertz noted in his (1893), Helmholtz could 
never firmly banish action-at-a-distance from his theory, and as soon as this is recognised 
the physical significance of Helmholtz’s theory is not clearer than that of Maxwell’s. This 
situation  led  Hertz  to  revise  Maxwell’s  theory  again  in  his  (1893);  he  aimed  to  keep 
Maxwell’s equations, but leave out as much of the mathematical confusion that he could. 
Central  to  all  three  versions  of  electromagnetism,  though,  were  Maxwell’s 
equations. These, Hertz described as the “undying part of Maxwell’s work” (p.21). It is at 
this  point  in  his  discussion  that  Hertz  stated  that  Maxwell’s  theory  is  just  his  set  of 
equations. Hertz goes on to clarify that what he means by this is just that in order to 
provide the same description of observable reality as Maxwell, one must provide the same 
set of equations. Hertz does not intend to designate both the equations and the account of 
their physical significance as Maxwell’s theory: Maxwell’s theory instead describes just the 
behaviour  of  that  which  is  observable.  Hertz  does  not  wish  to  dispute  this  aspect  of 
Maxwell’s account: Maxwell’s equations, he thought, correctly predict the behaviour of 
observables. Hertz was quite clear that his objection was only to Maxwell’s account of what 
                                                 
119  Helmholtz  was  a  central  figure  in  recognising  the  importance  of  Maxwell’s  electromagnetism  and  in 
introducing it to the German-speaking world. He initially viewed the theory as an argument against Weber’s 
account  of  electrodynamic  interaction,  which  was  based  on  the  interaction  of  moving  charges.  Weber’s 
account  was  considered  problematic  because  it  seemed  to  require  a  violation  of  energy  conservation; 
Helmholtz saw in Maxwell’s theory—with its postulation of the contiguously-acting aether—the possibility of 
avoiding this problem. Helmholtz sought to develop his own theory of electromagnetism with a view to 
deciding between Weber’s action-at-a-distance theory and Maxwell’s contiguous-action theory. Helmholtz’s 
attempts in this direction were not wholly successful—he was not able to derive Maxwell’s equations under 
all conditions—and Maxwell’s theory was near-universally preferred: however, Helmholtz’s own version of 
electromagnetism was able to recover Maxwell’s equations under limiting conditions. For detailed discussion 
of Helmholtz’s electrodynamics see (Kaiser, 1993) and (Buchwald, 1994, Appendix 16). 119 
 
underlies  his  equations.  His  intention  was  to  provide  an  alternative  representation 
(Darstellung)  of  Maxwell’s  theory  that  would  predict  precisely  the  same  observable 
outcomes, but physically ground them in a quite different fashion.
120 
It would, then, be more precise to say that Hertz understood a theory to be the 
mathematical expression of that theory only in the sense that a theory’s set of equations 
provides a stable description of the behaviour of observable regularities and relations. The 
model-theoretic  representation  of  a  theory—that  is,  the  concepts  and  unobservable 
mechanisms that it appeals to—is just as crucial in assessing a theory. 
The  reason  for  this,  I  suggest,  is  that  it  is  the  representation  of  a  theory  that 
provides the grounds to avoid the problem of validity. Maxwell’s equations, on their own, 
describe observable relationships between various concepts.
121 On Helmholtz’s theory of 
signs,  Maxwell’s  equations  successfully  describe  observed  regularities;  however,  on 
Helmholtz’s  theory  alone  we  can  have  no  reason  for  thinking  that  the  equations  will 
continue to describe these regularities. In effect Helmholtz’s account is faced with a species 
of the problem of induction: while the equations have successfully described the generation 
of electric and magnetic fields in the past, how can we be sure that they will continue to do 
so in the future? The theory of signs struggled with this question because it did not allow 
for any epistemic access to the external world. Hertz sought to remedy this by outlining a 
means  by  which  we  might  have  knowledge  of  the  unobservable  realm  that  underlies 
experience. 
Hertz argued that we could judge three ways in which we could test a model in 
experience: 
 
i.  Permissibility. This is a question of the logical consistency of a model. If a model 
is  logically  consistent  it  is  permissible;  if  it  is  logically  inconsistent  it  is 
impermissible. 
                                                 
120 “Every theory which leads to the same system of equations, and therefore comprises the same possible 
phenomena, I would consider as being a form or special case of Maxwell's theory; every theory which leads to 
different equations, and therefore to different possible phenomena, is a different theory. Hence in this sense, 
and  in  this  sense  only,  may  the  two  theoretical  dissertations  in  the  present  volume  be  regarded  as 
representations of Maxwell's theory. In no sense can they claim to be a precise rendering of Maxwell's ideas. 
On the contrary, it is doubtful whether Maxwell, were he alive, would acknowledge them as representing his 
own views in all respects.” (1893, p.21) 
121 Maxwell’s equations describe the relationship between the concepts electric field, magnetic field, charge 
and current. Assuming that we have reliable measurement procedures that can determine the values of these 
concepts, then there is a purely phenomenological level upon which Maxwell’s equations work: i.e., they 
provide predictions for the strength of the electric and magnetic fields generate in the presence of each other 
and certain charges and currents. If we have the appropriate measurement devices we do not need to know 
the theoretical explanation of why these fields take the value that they do, we can determine that the values 
accord with Maxwell’s predictions by measurement alone. 120 
 
ii.  Correctness. This is a question of whether or not a model predicts relations that 
contradict  observed  relations:  if  a  model  makes  predictions  that  contradict 
observation then it is judged as invalid. 
iii.  Fitness for purpose. This is a more subjective measure of the validity of a model. It 
is possible for several models to explain the same phenomena and be correct 
and  permissible.  Hertz  suggested  that  we  decide  between  such  models  by 
seeking  that  model which  coordinates  one  relation  within  the  model  to  one 
relation in the world. 
 
In the Principles of Mechanics Hertz demonstrated how this would work for physics. For 
example, he argued that while Newton’s model of classical physics—based on the concepts 
space, time, mass and force—was both correct and (probably) permissible, it was not fit for 
purpose. Hertz considered a solitary bit of iron resting upon a table. Newton’s model 
supposed that there are attractive forces operating between all the atoms in the universe 
and yet “in spite of a thousand existing causes of motion, no motion takes place” (p.13). 
This, for Hertz, coordinated one relation in the world (the iron staying at rest on the table) 
to uncountable relations in a model and, thus, he argued that his alternative model (which 
is discussed in §3.3.1) could do better. This way of testing a model in experience, then, was 
how Hertz sought to solve the problem of validity. It gave Hertz a schema that allowed 
him to argue for the objectivity of models of science, and this objectivity was based on the 
idea that it was most likely that the concepts and relations appealed to in a scientific model 
accurately represent concepts and relations in the physical world. Hertz’s position, then, 
represents  a  clear  development  of  Helmholtz’s  sign  theory.  On  the  one  hand  Hertz 
accepted the central part of Helmholtz’s claim: that objects appear to us only as signs (or 
symbols) and that we can have no direct knowledge of the world as it is in itself. However, 
Hertz also argued that Helmholtz’s philosophy was overly restrictive: he wished to argue 
that we can have a degree of knowledge of the external world by constructing models that 
predict the responses of the world-as-it-appears to causal interference.  
3.2.3.  Helmholtz, Hertz and objectivity 
The aspect of the philosophy of Helmholtz and Hertz that I have paid most attention to 
here is the problem of validity. The root cause of this problem was Helmholtz’s argument 
that our sense impressions are purely subjective in the sense that they tell us about the 
nature of the perceiving subject rather than about the nature of the external world. This 
subjectivity clashed with the supposed objectivity of our scientific knowledge: e.g., the facts 121 
 
of geometry were thought to be the same for all observers and at all times. However, if our 
epistemic access to the external world is mediated in the sense that Helmholtz and Hertz 
understood it to be, how can we possibly secure the objectivity of scientific phenomena? 
Helmholtz had no convincing answer to this question, relying solely on a principle of trust 
in the lawful regularity of the external world. Hertz inherited precisely this problem from 
his teacher. Like Helmholtz, he understood the senses as mediating our epistemic access to 
the external world, and he too had to explain the objectivity of science. Hertz developed an 
early form of a model-theoretic account of science in order to solve this problem. On 
Hertz’s account, we create models of science with the aim of capturing causal relationships 
among observable phenomena. He provided three criteria for choosing between alternative 
possible models of science and argued that the model that best meets these criteria should 
be understood as accurately representing physical reality. So, for Hertz, the objectivity of 
science  was  secured  by  assuming  that  the  concepts  and  processes  appealed  to  in  our 
models of observable reality correspond to actually existing entities in the external world.
122 
This account of objectivity is important, as we will see in the next section, because it is this 
that is eventually turned on its head by Cassirer. 
3.3.  Cassirer’s normative turn: a Kantian account of objectivity 
Cassirer detailed his philosophy of science in three main works: Substance and Function
123 
(1923 [1910], henceforth SF), Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (1923 [1921], henceforth ETR) 
and Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics (1956 [1936], henceforth DIMP). The 
task of this section is to clarify the role of the a priori in Cassirer’s work. This has recently 
been the cause of some dispute. Friedman argues that Cassirer identified a regulative and 
absolute role for the a priori in science (2000, p.115ff); Richardson argues that Cassirer’s 
philosophy  of  science  is  best  understood  as  a—losing—struggle  to  find  a  role  for  the 
relativized and constitutive a priori consistent with the regulative a priori (1998, p.136); 
Heis agrees with Richardson that Cassirer defended both constitutive and regulative aspects 
of the a priori, but argues that Cassirer’s account does not fail as Richardson suggests 
(2012); finally, Ryckman suggests that Cassirer defended a version of the a priori according 
to which certain scientific principles, such as general covariance, are a priori in both a 
constitutive and a regulative sense (2005, p.46). The end goal of this section is to resolve 
this dispute and provide clear answers on Cassirer’s behalf to CR (§3.2.1) and CC (§3.2.2). 
                                                 
122 In introducing the problem of validity I pointed out that it was a variant of the problem of induction. 
123 In German, this was published as “Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff”: it is better translated as Substance-
concepts and Function-concepts. 122 
 
However, before we get to this problem, a more fundamental problem must be solved. 
Cassirer  makes  an  important  distinction,  in  each  of  SF,  ETR  and  DIMP  between  the 
substance-theory of concepts and the function-theory of concepts. The first task of this 
section will be to make sense of the difference between these two theories of concepts. It is 
here that the discussion of the work of Helmholtz and Hertz will be particularly helpful to 
our analysis: this is because in SF Cassirer took both Helmholtz and Hertz to advocate a 
version of the function-theory of concepts. However, after the developments of general 
relativity  and  quantum  physics,  Cassirer  came  to  understand  both  as  representing  the 
substance-theory  of  concepts.  A  discussion  of  what  prompted  this  change  is  deeply 
informative  from  the  perspective  of  clarifying  the  distinction  between  substance  and 
function theory of concepts. 
  Cassirer’s claim that the development of logic, mathematics and science has shown 
that a substantial theory of concept formation must be replaced by a functional theory of 
concept  formation  is  central  to  each  of  SF,  ETR  and  DIMP:  the  first  half  of  SF  is 
dedicated to arguing for the emergence of a functional theory of concept formation and in 
both ETR (e.g., p.392) and DIMP (e.g., p.130) Cassirer emphasised the importance of this 
theory of concept formation. Indeed, for Cassirer, the philosophy of science just was the 
theory of the formation of scientific concepts. This understanding of the philosophy of 
science as a theory of concept formation provided Cassirer with a unifying theme that 
enabled  him  to  draw  together  the  three  key  aspects  of  scientific  knowledge:  logic, 
mathematics  and  empirical  observation.
124  It  also  allowed  Cassirer  to  construe  the 
relationship  between  these  aspects  of  science  in  a  significantly  different  fashion  to 
Helmholtz and Hertz. Both Helmholtz and Hertz, we have seen, took objects to be of 
primary epistemological interest: in both cases it was assumed that the world consisted of 
self-subsisting  objects  that—because  we  gain  knowledge  of  the  world  through  our 
senses—we do not have direct epistemic access to. The task of science was understood as 
being  to  develop  concepts  suitable  to  providing  true  descriptions  of  the  behaviour  of 
external objects. Thus, on this view of science, the objectivity of science is a goal that is 
achieved through providing a true description of the behaviour of objects. Cassirer turns 
this entirely on its head: the objectivity of science is the fundamental epistemological fact 
while objects are known only in virtue of their relation to mathematical structures. When 
the two theories of concepts are understood in this fashion, it greatly illuminates Cassirer’s 
account of both constitutivity and the rationality of science. 
                                                 
124 See Heis (2011b, §1) for a detailed discussion of why Cassirer places so much emphasis on philosophy of 
science as a theory of concept formation. 123 
 
3.3.1.  From substance-concepts to function-concepts 
Cassirer organised SF around the theme of theories of conceptual development: Cassirer 
sought to show that in arithmetic and geometry we are compelled to abandon a substance-
theory of concept formation and embrace instead a function-theory of concept formation. 
Clarifying  the  precise  distinction  between  these  two  theories  of  concept  formation  is 
central to understanding Cassirer’s account of the a priori. I argue that there were two 
aspects to Cassirer’s understanding of substance-concepts and function-concepts: the first 
is related to the type of concepts that should be used in science and the second is related to 
epistemological theory. That is, there are differences in: 
 
1.  Types of concepts: At this level there is a distinction between substance-concepts 
and function-concepts in how concepts are understood. So, e.g., at this level on 
the  substance-theory  of  concepts,  a  concept  such  as  <natural  number>  is 
understood  as  an  individual;  on  the  function-theory  of  concepts,  <natural 
number> is understood in terms of the “general logic of relations” (SF, p.37). At 
this level, then, the transition from substance-theory to function-theory implies 
a  transition  from  understanding  concepts  as  individuals  to  understanding 
concepts in terms of relations. 
2.  Epistemological theory: At this level, the substance-theory and the function-theory 
of concepts represent entirely different approaches to epistemological inquiry. 
The substance-theory treats the concept of <object> as the fundamental entity 
of  epistemological  inquiry.  On  this  account  the  concepts  <truth>, 
<knowledge> and <objectivity> are all explained in terms of the basic concept 
<object>. However, on the function-theory of concepts, <objectivity> is taken 
to be the fundamental entity of epistemological inquiry. Instead of seeking to 
explain  how  we  have  objective  knowledge  of  the  world,  that  we  do  have 
objective  knowledge  of  the  world  is  taken  as  primitive  and  the  concept 
<object> is eventually explained in terms of <objectivity>.
125  
                                                 
125 See Mittelstaedt (2009), who argues that an essential component of the Kantian approach is that scientific 
practice should be understood as beginning with <objectivity> and ending in <object>. This aspect of the 
distinction between substance-theory and function-theory of concepts is also emphasised in (Heis, 2011b, §2), 
where the concepts <truth> and <knowledge> are also introduced as mediating between <object> and 
<objectivity>. Heis, though, focuses his analysis on the mathematical part of SF. I argue that in the part of 
SF that addressed the development of the function-theory in the natural sciences, it is not clear that Cassirer 
entirely  ruled  out  an  explanatory  role  for  the  concept  <object>.  As  we  will  see,  while  Cassirer  quite 
emphatically rejected the idea of mathematical objects in SF, he did not as clearly reject physical objects: this, 
as is clear from the discussion of Hertz and Helmholtz in the previous section was because, at the time, 
physicists still held to the idea of independently existing objects. It is only in DIMP that Cassirer rejected the 
physical concept <object> as having any possible explanatory role. 124 
 
 
The task of this section, then, is to defend the above understanding of Cassirer’s distinction 
between  the  substance-theory  and  function-theory  of  concepts  and  to  draw  out  the 
implications for Cassirer’s understanding of natural science. 
The  concepts  <object>,  <truth>,  <knowledge>  and  <objectivity>  represent 
different  stages  in  the  cognition  of  objects:  the  relationship  between  these  stages  is 
understood differently in the substance and function theories of concepts. It was through 
interpreting the relationship between these concepts in accordance with the functional-
theory  of  concepts  that  Cassirer  sought  to  historicise  Kant’s  transcendental  logic.
126 
Cassirer interpreted logicism as implying that fundamental mathematical relations could not 
be explained in terms of the principle of non-contradiction—as they would have been on 
Kant’s  account—and  instead  had  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  function  and  relation. 
Cassirer, then, understood this to be a call for a “logic of objectual knowledge” in general: 
[These] same basic syntheses (Grundsynthesen) upon which mathematics and logic rest, also 
govern the scientific structure of empirical knowledge and first enable us, by a fixed lawful 
ordering  of  phenomena,  to  speak  of  its  objective  significance.  (Cassirer  1907,  p.45, 
translated by Ryckman, 1991, p.65) 
This, then, is a demand that we account for objects in terms of a transcendental logic that 
would reveal the constitutive presuppositions of the concept of object.  
It is important to emphasise the distinction between pursuing a Kantian account 
that places transcendental logic at its core as opposed to a Kantian account that emphasises 
the synthetic a priori. I take it that there are two key distinctions: first, Cassirer’s approach 
requires that we consider the objectivity of the entire sequence of scientific theories and, 
second, on Cassirer’s approach there is no division between the faculties of sensibility and 
understanding. 
I will argue that there is a certain resemblance between Reichenbach’s attempt to 
relativize Kant’s a priori and Cassirer’s attempt to historicise his transcendental logic: i.e., in 
that relative a priori principles that play a constitutive role do have a place within Cassirer’s 
system.
127  However,  the  difference  in  the  approaches  is  significant.  Consider  Cassirer’s 
description of his approach in the first volume of Das Erkenntnisproblem: 
The task, which is posed to philosophy in every single phase of its development, consists 
always anew in this, to single out in a concrete, historical sum total of determinate scientific 
concepts and principles the general logical functions of cognition in general. This sum total 
                                                 
126 This point is made by Ryckman (1991, pp.65-6). 
127 I discuss this in §3.3.2. 125 
 
can change and has changed since Newton: but there remains the question whether or not 
in the new content that has emerged there are some maximally general relations, on which 
alone the critical analysis directs its gaze, and that now present themselves under a different 
form and covering. The concept of the history of science itself already contains in itself the 
thought  of  the  maintenance  of  a  general  logical  structure  in  the  entire  sequence  of  special 
conceptual systems. (Cassirer, 1922, p.16, translation in Heis, 2011a, p.767) 
Here, Cassirer began by setting out an idea that is close to Reichenbach’s: that there are 
certain  concepts  and  principles  that  underlie  each  stage  of  scientific  development. 
Cassirer’s approach, though, goes beyond Reichenbach’s. It is not enough for Cassirer just 
to  identify  the  underlying  concepts,  in  addition  he  argues  that  one  must  look  for 
“maximally general relations” that can provide an account of how new conceptual content 
has emerged from the old. That is, in seeking to provide an account of the history of 
science, it is important to ensure that we identify a general logical structure that is adequate 
to  describe  the  entire  sequence  of  theories.  In  other  words,  where  Reichenbach  and 
Friedman seek to provide the conditions for the possibility of a given scientific theory, 
Cassirer sought to provide the conditions for the possibility of the sequence of scientific 
theories within a given field. 
The distinction between the two approaches is even more marked in their attitudes 
towards Kant’s division of the human intellect into sensibility and understanding. Friedman 
seeks  to  maintain  some  sense  in  which  the  manifold  of  intuition  can  be  retained  in 
contemporary philosophy. Cassirer’s historicised transcendental logic provided a manner in 
which to pursue a Kantian philosophy without the manifold of intuition. The key to seeing 
how this is possible is Kant’s Schematism:
128 here, recall, Kant argued that objects could be 
brought  under  concepts  only  by  appeal  to  mediating—spatial  and  temporal—schema. 
Without  the  manifold  of  intuition,  this  solution  is  impossible.  As  such,  Cassirer’s 
transcendental logic sought to provide an alternative to the Schematism according to which 
objects are brought under concepts by emphasising a functional understanding of objects. 
So,  Cassirer’s  argument  that  the  concept  <object>  is  constituted  by  the  concept 
<objectivity> was his means to provide an alternative to Kant’s Schematism.  
The details of how objects are constituted differs according to the type of object—
for the objects of natural science the relevant fundamental epistemological concepts are 
understood in the following fashion:
129 
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(a)  <Object>: This concept refers, in the first instance, to the individuals whose 
behaviour is described or predicted by a scientific theory. These individuals can 
be either observable or unobservable. Examples of instances of <object> are 
solid mass particles (in classical physics), space-time in the theory of relativity
130 
and electrons in quantum physics. 
(b) <Truth>: Hertz, as we saw in the previous section, emphasised the role of 
models  within  a  scientific  theory.  Models,  and  their  success  in  representing 
reality, provide a helpful way to understand the concept <truth> in science. 
<Truth> applies to representations: it is a question of whether the empirical 
laws that hold between individuals in the models of a theory correspond to 
what is observed in experience. It is purely about correspondence between the 
relations  of  a  model  and  phenomenal  relations.  Examples  of  instances  of 
<truth>  are  Newton’s  law  of  gravitation,  Einstein’s  field  equation  and  the 
Schrödinger equation. 
(c)  <Knowledge>: Like <truth>, <knowledge> is best understood in terms  of 
representation.  <Knowledge>,  though,  requires  more  than  <truth>:  in 
particular,  representations  that  count  as  <knowledge>  must,  in  addition  to 
accurately  recreating  the  phenomenal  relations  between  bodies,  provide  an 
additional,  non-observable  basis  for  these  relations.  Examples,  then,  of 
representations that constitute instances of <knowledge> are those that capture 
Newton’s laws of motion, the equivalence principle and the Pauli Exclusion 
Principle.  
(d) <Objectivity>: This concept is intended to capture the idea that science should 
not tell us just about a single observer and his sense impressions. A theory’s 
objectivity  consists  in  the  fact  that  its  results  are  independent  of  any 
preconditions  that  are  unique  to  a  given  observer.
131  <Objectivity>  is  now 
commonly expressed in terms of invariance principles: these, e.g., ensure that 
whatever an observer’s spatio-temporal location may be the laws of physics 
take  the  same  form.  Examples  of  instances  of  <objectivity>  are  Galilean 
                                                 
130 As we will see in the next chapter, one of the interesting features of the development of relativity theory 
relates to how space-time moves under the concept <object> from the concept <knowledge>.  
131 It is important to stress that, for Kant, a theory’s objectivity consists in its being built upon preconditions 
of knowledge that are common to all (human) observers: i.e. the categories of the understanding. 127 
 
invariance,  Lorentz  invariance,  general  covariance
132  and  permutation 
invariance.
133 
 
On the substance-theory of concepts then, the concept <object> is fundamental 
and  understood  as  referring  to  physically  real  individuals.  Let  us  see  how  Newtonian 
physics would be interpreted on the substance-theory. So, first the truth of Newton’s law 
of gravitation would be understood in terms of the concept <object>. That is, a model 
describing the force experienced on a falling object on earth is true if it accurately describes 
the behaviour of a physical object free-falling to earth. <Knowledge> would, then, be 
explained  in  terms  of  the  concept  <truth>.  So,  in  Newtonian  physics,  an  instance  of 
<knowledge> would, e.g., be the representation of a solitary mass particle with no force 
acting on it. There is no way to justify the claim that this representation corresponds to 
experience  by  straightforward  observation:  this  represents  a  situation  with  no  physical 
analogue. Instead one must argue that, given the observed regularities among objects, i.e. 
<truth>, this representation does correspond to what would be observed if it was possible to 
observe  a  solitary,  force-free  object.  Finally,  <objectivity>  is  explained  in  terms  of 
<knowledge>: those representations that count as <knowledge> govern the behaviour of 
objects  in  the  world  and,  as  such,  the  theory  is  objective  in  the  sense  that  it  gives 
predictions about objects that are confirmed by any observer. 
  In the case of mathematics, I think it is clear that Cassirer understood the function-
theory of concepts to involve the claim that the concept <object> should be analysed in 
terms  of  <objectivity>.
134  However,  the  function-theory  of  concepts  did  not  apply  as 
straightforwardly to natural science as it did to mathematics. In 1910, when Cassirer wrote 
SF, he was most familiar with the work of Helmholtz and Hertz and took their work to 
represent the most significant recent developments in how natural scientists understood 
                                                 
132 Where this is understood as the invariance of the form of physical laws under arbitrary (active) coordinate 
transformations. 
133 That Cassirer understood the conceptual categories in this fashion is suggested in DIMP. Here Cassirer 
argued that there are three types of statement in science: statements of the results of measurements (ch.3), 
statements of law (ch.4) and statements of principles (ch.5). These, I suggest, correspond to three of the four 
fundamental epistemological concepts that Cassirer discussed in SF: i.e. results of measurements are instances 
of the concept <object>, laws are instances of the concept <truth> and principles are instances of the 
concept <knowledge>. 
134 Cassirer, e.g., is quite clear that it is only meaningful to hold a system of relations as fixed and constitutive 
of the concept <number> when we hold “the form of the system itself as an invariant” (SF, p.40). That is, it is 
the objectivity of the system of relations that defines the concept <number> that is ultimately what explains 
the possibility of the structuralist account of numbers. Heis (2011b) makes a detailed case for this being how 
Cassirer understood the function-theory of concepts in mathematics. I am in complete agreement with Heis’s 
account here and so, rather than rehearse the details of how the function-theory of concepts applies to 
mathematics, I will instead focus on Cassirer’s more problematic discussion of the sense in which natural 
science has adopted the function-theory of concept formation. 128 
 
the nature of concepts.
135 However, both Helmholtz and Hertz took the concept <object> 
to be the most fundamental explanatorily concept. I argue that the physical concepts that 
Cassirer surveyed in SF, then, do not support the claim that the natural science of the time 
had embraced the function-theory of concepts in the same sense as mathematics had.
136 It 
is only when Cassirer had general relativity and quantum physics available that he was able 
to  clearly  demonstrate  that  natural  science,  like  mathematics,  had  transitioned  to  the 
function-theory of concepts.  
  In SF the most recent developments in natural science that Cassirer discussed were 
Helmholtz’s theory of signs and Hertz’s model of classical mechanics. Hertz, as we saw in 
§2.2, sought to explain all the phenomena of classical mechanics in terms of just the three 
fundamental concepts of space, time and mass. Cassirer focussed his discussion of Hertz’s 
model  of  mechanics  on  the  means  by which  mathematical  symbols  came  to  represent 
“concrete sensations” (SF, p.184). 
  Hertz had divided his (2007) into two parts: the first part considered space and time 
as  “a  priori  judgments  in  Kant’s  sense”  (p.45),  that  is,  as  they  are  offered  to  “inner 
intuition”. He intended to develop the mathematics of his account in a manner that was 
independent of how the key concepts that he appealed to in his model were actually used in 
experience. It was only in the second part of the Principles of Mechanics that Hertz sought to 
connect his mathematical system to the geometry and kinematics of the physical world. 
This was achieved by taking certain fixed units of measurement as a basis and using these 
to compare empirical spaces, times and masses.
137 So, to take the simplest example, in the 
first part of his (2007), Hertz had defined the position of a particle as being “the point of 
space which is indicated by a given particle at a given time” (p.48). How should this feature 
of the model of mechanics be understood to correspond to external experience? Instead of 
being determined with respect to space understood as an absolute, given by inner intuition, 
                                                 
135  That  Cassirer  took  Helmholtz  and  Hertz  to  be  the  key  figures  in  the  development  of  scientific 
epistemology since Newton is clear from the introduction to ETR. Here, Cassirer cites both Helmholtz and 
Hertz  as  the  scientists  between  Newton  and  Einstein  who  contributed  to  developing  answers  to 
epistemological  questions  in  physics  (ETR,  p.354).  Furthermore  in  SF,  Cassirer  cited  Hertz  as  being 
responsible for having “finally developed” a new understanding of the concepts of space and time (SF, 
p.170).  He  also  discussed  Helmholtz’s  theory  of  signs  and  the  impact  that  this  theory  had  on  his 
understanding of objects (SF, p.304ff.). 
136 This, I suggest, is what Cassirer had in mind when he wrote in DIMP: “I have attempted elsewhere [SF] to 
show at length how this “substantialistic” conception underwent a gradual change…In these considerations I 
confined myself to the development of classical physics and its contemporary situation, but they could have 
been formulated much more briefly and precisely had I had the general relativity theory and modern atomic 
physics before me at the time” (p.131). As we will see, the conceptual advancements of Helmholtz and Hertz 
only secured the first of the two features of the function-theory: i.e., they suggested that we had knowledge of 
objects only through their relations. It is only in ETR and DIMP that Cassirer clearly explains how the 
second feature of the function-theory is suggested by the development of natural science. 
137 “We mean to say that by our senses we can determine no time more exactly than can be measured with the 
help of the best chronometer, no position more exactly than can be referred to the coordinate system of the 
remote fixed stars, and no mass more exactly than is done by the best scales.” (2007, p.141) 129 
 
position is to be determined with respect to the coordinate system that is defined by the 
fixed stars.
138 Similarly, Hertz argues that the ideas of space and time that feature in his 
model correspond to measurements with rigid bodies and clocks respectively. 
Cassirer (SF, p.185) pointed out that even if, for some reason, we have to abandon 
the fixed stars as a reference frame for mechanics, we can equally well select another and 
doing so in no way affects the meaning of Hertz’s model: “its empirical realization would 
only be shifted to another place” (ibid.). Cassirer suggested that this meant that the absolute 
space of mechanics, rather than being something that is given, is something that is always 
sought. So, for example, if we can no longer take the fixed stars to serve as a reasonable 
approximation of the absolute space of inner intuition, we would go beyond the fixed stars 
to find something else that would serve as a reasonable empirical realisation of absolute 
space. So, Cassirer, in a similar way to Kant on Friedman’s reading,
139 interpreted absolute 
space as a regulative ideal: that is, the end-point of a series of frames of reference that 
permit us to coordinate the space that appears in our models of mechanics with empirical 
space. Cassirer understood this as meaning that “the physical space of bodies is no isolated 
essence but is only possible by virtue of the geometrical space of lines and distances” (SF, 
p.186):  the  physical  concept  of  space  is  constructed,  aiming  at  the  regulative  ideal  of 
absolute space, from relationships between bodies and this, in turn, can only be known 
through  measurements  of  distances.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  Cassirer  took  Hertz’s 
science to support the function-theory of concepts in SF: Hertz’s mechanics was based 
upon the idea that the physical concept of space was coordinated to the ideal of absolute 
space by relationships between bodies. 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  Cassirer  understood  the  development  of  science  to  have 
shown that the concept of space should be understood relationally. However, there is no 
mention  of  the  second  part  of  the  function-theory  of  concepts,  according  to  which 
<objectivity>  is  the  fundamental  explanatory  concept.  From  our  discussion  of  Hertz’s 
philosophy in §3.2.2, it is clear why Cassirer did not yet have the resources to make this 
additional claim. Hertz’s Bildtheorie was conceived as a means to solve Helmholtz’s problem 
of validity: it provided a means, beyond trust in causal regularity, to think that our physical 
models might represent reality. Hertz assumed, that is, that the objects and concepts that 
were found in his model of classical mechanics—space, time and bodies—literally referred 
to objects and concepts with counterparts in the physical world. 
There is a clear contrast between Cassirer’s account of classical mechanics in SF 
and his account in ETR. It was general relativity that made it clear to Cassirer that the 
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function-theory of concepts must be applied to the realm of natural science in precisely the 
same fashion as it had been in mathematics. General relativity, on Cassirer’s reading, clearly 
explained the possibility of the concept <object> in terms of the concept <objectivity>. 
This is why the first question Cassirer asks about general relativity is the following: 
Each answer, which physics imparts concerning the character and the peculiar nature of its 
fundamental concepts, assumes inevitably for epistemology the form of a question. When, 
for example, Einstein gives as the essential result of his theory that by it "the last remainder 
of physical objectivity" is taken from space and time ([Einstein, 1916, p.153]), this answer 
of  the  physicist  contains  for  the  epistemologist  the  precise  formulation    of  his  real 
problem. What are we to understand by the physical objectivity, which is here denied to the 
concepts of space and time? (ETR, p.356) 
The “essential result” of the theory of relativity, according to Einstein, is seemingly the 
denial that objectivity about space and time is possible. No wonder, then, that Cassirer 
took this to be the “real problem” for the epistemologist: Einstein seemed to be claiming 
that  the  most  fundamental  concept  in  Cassirer’s  understanding  of  epistemology  is  be 
incompatible  with  physics.  This  is  how  Cassirer  begins  ETR  and,  it  is  clear,  that  one 
important  function  of  ETR  is  to  argue  that  Einstein’s  understanding  of  “physical 
objectivity”  differs  from  the  epistemologist’s  understanding  of  the  concept 
<objectivity>.
140  
Cassirer is quick to rule out two of the more obvious potential answers to this 
question. First, he considers Planck’s formulation of a criterion for physical objectivity 
“that everything that can be measured exists” (ETR, p.357). This, Cassirer says, cannot help 
the epistemologist: as soon as an epistemologist considers even the simplest measurement 
it is clear that it must rest upon various theoretical propositions.
141 It is also insufficient to 
try  and  suggest  that  Einstein  is  simply  denying  that  space  and  time  possess  physical 
objectivity in the sense that naïve realists mean. In light of Cassirer’s analysis of concepts in 
                                                 
140 My reading here is in contrast to Ihmig’s who introduces this passage as follows: “Even at the beginning 
of his deliberations in Zur Einsteinschen Relatiditvtstheorie, he points explicitly to a comment by Einstein on the 
problem with the concept of the object” (1999, p.524). Ihmig takes the central question that the passage 
raises to be: “How relevant is the principle of the logical priority of the concept of law over the concept of 
object for the special and the general theory of relativity?” (ibid.). As we have seen Cassirer takes the concept 
<object> and the concept <objectivity> to be quite different: as such, given that Cassirer is talking here 
about the concept <objectivity> then, I think, it must be mistaken to view Cassirer as being concerned in this 
passage with the concept <object>. The problem is not that the space and time of general relativity are not 
objects because, in Cassirer’s sense, they are (in that the object space-time features in representations of the 
world). The problem is, instead, that relativity seems to undermine the idea that space and time are objective: 
after  all,  no  particular  representation  of  space  is  diffeomorphism  invariant.  This,  I  suggest,  is  why  it  is 
important to emphasise that there were two aspects to Cassirer’s understanding of the function-theory of 
concepts. 
141 Cassirer takes this to have been clearly demonstrated by Duhem’s analysis of the physical construction of 
concepts (SF, p.138). 131 
 
SF, though, this is true of any concept: ‘the property of not being thing-concepts but pure 
concepts of measurement, space and time share with all genuine physical concepts’ (ibid.). 
In dealing with space and time we must recognise that they have a special logical position; 
they are forms of measurement “a step further removed” than the likes of energy and mass. 
If one is to successfully analyse Einstein’s remark then one must be sure to analyse the 
concepts of space and time within their special logical position. 
  Cassirer—in keeping with Marburg idea that transcendental philosophy begins with 
the fact of science—intended to show that the question as to what it means for general 
relativity  to  deprive  space  and  time  of  their  physical  objectivity  must  be  answered  by 
examining  the  development  of  the  concept  of  objectivity  within  physics.  This  is  how 
Cassirer’s argument proceeds (ETR, pp.356-81) until he eventually reaches the conclusion 
that classical mechanics had “believed itself at the goal” of physical objectivity too soon: “It 
clung to certain reference bodies and believed that it possessed, in connection with them, 
measures in some way definitive and universal, and thus absolutely ‘objective’” (p.381). 
Cassirer,  then,  understood  Einstein  as  claiming  that  the  classical  understanding  of 
objectivity was in error. The problem was that classical mechanics began with “reference 
bodies”—i.e.,  the  concept  <object>—and  took  these  to  represent  something  universal 
from  which  an  “objective”  understanding  of  the  universe  could  be  constructed.  In 
relativity, objectivity means something quite different: 
For the new theory, on the contrary, true objectivity never lies in empirical determinations, 
but only in the manner and way, in the function, of determination itself…To wish to know 
the laws of nature without relation to any system of reference is an impossible and self-
contradictory desire; all that can be demanded is that the content of these laws not be 
dependent on the individuality of the system of reference...Measurements in one system, or 
even  in  an  unlimited  number  of  "justified"  systems  would  in  the  end  give  only 
particularities, but not the true "synthetic unity" of the object. The theory of relativity 
teaches, first in the equations of the Lorentz-transformation and then in the more far-
reaching substitution formulae of the general theory, how we may go from each of these 
particularities to a definite whole, to a totality of invariant determinations. (ibid.) 
Cassirer is quite clear here that objectivity should be understood as meaning only that the 
laws of physics should take the same form in any frame of reference.
142 In pointing out that 
even measurements in an unlimited number of “justified systems” will only give a series of 
particularities, Cassirer explained why his account of Hertz’s mechanics in SF does not 
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invariant. I return to this in §3.3.2.2. 132 
 
quite  amount  to  embodying  the  full  function-theory of  concepts:  Hertz’s  methodology 
would lead to us always viewing the laws of nature from one particular perspective.  To 
avoid this, one must start from the idea of objectivity—as embodied in the invariance 
principles of the theory of relativity—and it is this that will ultimately secure the “synthetic 
unity” of physical concepts such as space. By ETR, then, it is quite clear that Cassirer 
understood the fundamental explanatory concept of physics to be <objectivity> and that 
he understood this concept to be instantiated by invariance principles.
143 
It is also clear in DIMP that Cassirer thought that the concept <object> could not 
be fundamental.
144 In the early part of DIMP Cassirer says little about how the relationship 
between  principles,  laws  and  measurement  results  (corresponding  to  the  concepts 
<knowledge>,  <truth>  and  <object>).  There  is  just  a  small  clue  in  his  discussion  of 
statements of the results of measurements: 
If we choose a spatial analogy for the structure of physics, we must not liken the structure 
to a pyramid resting on a broad base of immediately given and independent “facts,” rising 
gradually from this and ending in a highest point…For this would involve overlooking the 
mutual  interconnection  and  forgetting  that  “everything  significantly  factual  is  already 
theory.” There would always be the possibility of imagining the highest layers removed 
without destroying the bottom layer or even altering it essentially. But we will attempt to 
show in detail later why such an assumption is untenable and impracticable for every part 
of physical knowledge. Physics accordingly is to be compared not to a pyramid but…to the 
“well-rounded sphere”. (DIMP, p.35). 
The  understanding  of  physics  as  a  “pyramid-structure”  corresponds  to  the  substance-
theory of concepts. At base there are the results of series of measurements—which, as we 
have seen, is just how Cassirer understood modern physics as describing objects—and 
from this we would derive laws, which are explained in more depth by appeal to principles 
and which altogether finally gives an objective view of reality. Cassirer is very clear that this 
is not how he understands the three different types of physical statement as functioning. 
This is because, in a pyramid it is possible to remove higher levels without altering the 
lower level. However, in the case of physics if we change either the statements of principles 
or the statements of laws, we affect the statements of the results of experiments. Cassirer 
does not explain why this is the case at this stage of DIMP: in this part of the book he is 
                                                 
143 Cassirer’s discussion of Helmholtz in SF is similar to his discussion of Hertz in the respect that he does 
not yet take Helmholtz to advocate the full version of the function-theory of concepts. Cassirer described 
Helmholtz  as  advocating  a  relational  account  of  objects,  even  though  he  still  retained  the  concept  of 
<object> as fundamental (SF, p.304ff.).  
144 Where Cassirer understood the concept <object> in terms of the results of experiments (DIMP, p.36). 133 
 
simply  intending  to  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  there  are  three  different  classes  of 
statement because he thought this had been overlooked.
145 
  Cassirer  eventually  resolved  this  problem  in  terms  of  substance-concepts  and 
function-concepts and it is here that he most clearly associated Helmholtz and Hertz with 
the substance-theory of concepts. This indicates a slight shift in Cassirer’s understanding of 
the substance-theory of concepts between ETR and DIMP. In SF Helmholtz and Hertz 
were both only associated with the function-theory of concepts because, in the case of 
Helmholtz he had argued that objects could only be known via relations and in the case of 
Hertz  because  he  advocated  a  relational  understanding  of  space.  In  his  discussion  of 
Helmholtz, we saw Cassirer indicate that Helmholtz still had an idea of “absolute objects”: 
however in SF Cassirer focussed on the fact that even with an idea of absolute objects, 
Helmholtz still argued that they could only be known through their relations.
146 The move 
towards the function-theory of concepts proper was only possible in natural science after 
the development of general relativity. 
  In DIMP, Cassirer clearly indicates that he considers both Helmholtz and Hertz to 
have advocated the substance-theory of concepts on the grounds that they took matter to 
be the “fundamental reality” which scientific concepts seek to describe. Cassirer argued 
that  Helmholtz’s  central  claim—that  sense  impressions  are  subjective  signs  of  external 
objects and that the interpretation of these signs is the work of the intellect—sought to 
explain objectivity in terms of persisting external objects: 
The  objectively  real  is  presupposed  as  something  persisting  and  substantial,  but  in  its 
substantial existence it cannot fit into the sign language of our concepts of nature. This 
language is merely able to reproduce relations between individual phenomena but not the 
general substratum underlying them. (DIMP, p.130) 
Cassirer, then, understood Helmholtz to have taken a step towards the function-theory of 
concepts insofar as he argued that the language of the sign-theory could only hope to 
capture relations between phenomena, while having no access to the underlying reality. 
This means, Cassirer argued, that “the substantialism essential to the mechanical viewpoint 
always  contains  a  trait  of  agnosticism:  the  unknowable  becomes  a  presupposition  of 
knowledge itself” (ibid.). This is how Cassirer understood the influence of Helmholtz’s 
work: in taking the senses to be a mediating realm between the human intellect and external 
reality we must always maintain a degree of agnosticism about whether science provides 
knowledge of external reality. It is this idea that gave rise to the problem of validity: i.e. 
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given  the  subjectivity  of  our  representations  of  the world,  how  can we have  objective 
knowledge? Cassirer, by taking objectivity as the foundational epistemological concept, was 
able  to  side-step  this  problem:  the  concept  <object>  is  constituted  by  the  concept 
<objectivity>. There is, thus, no problem of how our knowledge of objects is objective: we 
are  only  able  to  know  objects  that  are  embedded  in  a  structure  defined  by  specific 
invariance principles. 
  Thus, in the final analysis, we should understand Cassirer’s fundamental distinction 
between the substance-theory and function-theory of concepts as follows. The substance 
theory posits that there are externally existing objects that ultimately explain the success of 
science. That is, it begins with the concept <object> and seeks to explain the concept 
<objectivity> via <truth> and then <knowledge>. The function-theory begins from the 
fact that scientific knowledge is objective and seeks to explain the possibility of objects in 
terms of objectivity. That is, the order of the epistemological concepts is reversed and the 
concept <object> is accounted for ultimately in terms of <objectivity> via the concepts of 
<knowledge> and then <truth>. This is the most significant meaning of the function-
theory of concepts. With this understanding of the function-theory of concepts in place, 
we are in a position to detail Cassirer’s answers to CR and CC. This will be the task of the 
next section. 
3.3.2.  Cassirer’s  answers  to  the  two  challenges:  regulative  principles,  the  a  priori  and  the 
rationality of science 
In the previous section I have sought to clarify Cassirer’s function-theory of concepts and 
show  how  this  constitutes  a  reasonable  modification  of  Kant’s  insights  in  light  of  the 
development of modern science and mathematics. Cassirer was Kantian in the sense that 
he sought to historicise Kant’s transcendental logic: this involved (i) inquiring as to the 
objectivity of the entire sequence of scientific theories and (ii) taking the function-theory of 
concepts to stand in for Kant’s Schematism. We are now in a position to ask whether 
Cassirer’s regulative Kantianism is able to provide satisfactory answers to CR and CC. In 
§3.3.2.1 I detail Cassirer’s answer to CR and in §3.3.2.2 I address CC and argue that a sense 
of constitutivity can be retained even within a regulative framework.  
3.3.2.1.  Regulative principles and the rationality of science 
The idea that the entire sequence of scientific theories is objective is central to Cassirer’s 
methodology. His account of the a priori was intended precisely to secure the objectivity of 
science  as  a  whole.  The  reason  that  Cassirer  needed  to  appeal  to  something  beyond 135 
 
experience in order to secure the objectivity of science should be clear from the discussion 
of the previous section. A key claim in his analysis of the history of  science was that 
statements of the results of measurements depend upon statements of laws and statements 
of  principles.  This  is  equivalent  to  the  well-known  claim  that  experiment  is  theory-
dependent.  Now,  from  our  present  perspective,  this  means  that  measurements  do  not 
necessarily mean the same thing before a scientific revolution as they do after a scientific 
revolution:  as  such,  appeal  to  the  results  of  experiments  cannot  be  sufficient  to 
demonstrate  that,  e.g.,  Einstein’s  theory  of  relativity  has  the  same  subject  matter  as 
Newton’s theory of gravitation.
147 The version of CR that Cassirer’s Kantianism had to 
face, then, contains the version of CR that Friedman seeks to address. However, Cassirer 
has an additional problem to face. For Friedman, the challenge of rationality arises because 
there is a real sense in which precursor and successor theories refer to different worlds: 
constitutive  principles  define  a  theory’s  logical  space,  so,  from  the  perspective  of  a 
precursor theory, the claims of its successor will not even represent a coherent possibility. 
CR, for Friedman, consists in explaining how it can be rational for scientists to adopt a new 
framework when the phenomena described by that theory are not even possibilities for 
those  scientists.  Cassirer  had  also  to  show  that  the  worlds  described  before  and  after 
theory-change are the same, in spite of the fact that even statements of the results of 
measurements need not mean the same thing after a revolution as they did before.
148 Of 
course,  even  with  this  difference,  Cassirer  still  also  had  to  explain  the  rationality  of 
scientific theory change in the more familiar manner that we discussed in the first chapter. 
This means that CR, for Cassirer, can be stated as follows: 
 
CR:  (i)   How is it possible to treat the sequence of past scientific theories as 
part of a single logical structure? 
  (ii)  How  can  it  be  rational  to  abandon  an  established  conceptual 
framework in favour of a new one? 
 
                                                 
147 In SF Cassirer gives numerous examples to show that measurements presuppose various other concepts. 
E.g.  he  argued  that  the  temperature  measured  by  a  thermometer  depends  on  a  “network  of  theoretical 
presuppositions” about geometry and the expansion of mercury (SF, p.141ff); he argued that Regnault’s test 
of  Mariotte’s  law—which  states  that,  at  constant  temperature,  the  pressure  of  an  ideal  gas  is  inversely 
proportional to the volume—depends on assumptions about the apparatus used to establish the volume of 
the gas related to geometry and general and celestial mechanics (p.143ff); he argued that measurement is not 
possible without first identifying units to treat as constants, but this constancy “is never a property that 
belongs to the perceptible as such, but is first conferred upon the latter on the basis of intellectual postulates 
and definitions” (p.144ff).  
148 See (SF, pp.143-6). 136 
 
Cassirer sought to address (i) by identifying those elements that remain invariant 
throughout all experience. These “invariants of experience” were introduced in the context 
of  the  discussion  of  induction  with  which  he  begins  the  second  part  of  SF.  Cassirer 
understood induction as involving one of two processes: “the gaining of particular facts 
and  the  connecting  of  these  facts  into  laws”  (p.265).  In  both  of  these  cases  inductive 
thought  is  characterised  by  the  tendency  to  search  for  “something  permanent  in  the 
coming and going of sensuous phenomena” (p.249). He explains how the development of 
geometry displays precisely this tendency:  
 
  Thus all experience is directed on gaining certain “invariant” relations, and first in these 
reaches its real conclusion. The conception of the empirical natural object originates and is 
grounded in this procedure; for it belongs to the concept of this object that it remains 
“identical with itself” in the flow of time. We must, indeed conceive each natural object as 
subject  in  principle  to  certain  physical  changes,  called  forth  by  external  forces;  but  the 
reaction to these forces could not be represented in the form of law, if we were not able to 
recognise the object as logically permanent and provided with the same properties. (p.250) 
 
This, I take it, is what Cassirer meant when he claims that “in both cases [of induction], the 
problem is to raise from the flux of experience that which can be used as constants of 
theoretical construction” (p.265): the development of mathematics, geometry and science is 
marked by an attempt to isolate, from amongst all the changing features of experience, 
those connections that are permanent and can be retained. In the case of geometry we see 
this in the move towards group-theoretic accounts, whereby the various types of geometry 
are coordinated to a definite group of transformations. 
Central to the scientific method is the second moment of induction that Cassirer 
mentions: the connecting of empirical facts into laws. Empirical laws, for Cassirer, are 
“constants  of  a  higher  order”  that  are  arrived  at  by  isolating  and  superposing  simpler 
relations. So, empirical laws are just the result of the human tendency to seek something 
unchanging in experience. Now, as we have seen, Cassirer takes the history of scientific 
development to be the proper subject of transcendental inquiry, so his account of empirical 
laws  cannot  stop  here.  Instead,  he  argues  that  the  constants  that  are  found  in  earlier 
sciences  become  variables  for  later  sciences  and  the  demand  to  seek  constants  is  the 
applied to these new variables.
149 
                                                 
149 “Thus we stand before a ceaseless progress, in which the fixed form of being and process that we believed 
we  had  gained,  seems  to  escape  us.  All  scientific  thought  is  dominated  by  the  demand  for  unchanging 
elements, while on the other hand, the empirically given constantly renders this demand fruitless. We grasp 
permanent  being  only  to  lose  it  again.  From  this  standpoint,  what  we  call  science  appears  not  as  an 137 
 
The demand of science, then, is to seek elements that are invariant throughout all 
scientific development. As such, science will reach its end point when there are no more 
variables.  Cassirer,  then,  posited  certain  ultimate  invariant  concepts  that  serve  as  a 
regulative  ideal  and  govern  the  development  of  science.
150  This  regulative  ideal  is  one 
way—though, as we will see, there are others—in which Cassirer understood the a priori: 
 
From this point of view, the strictly limited meaning of the "a priori" is clearly evident. 
Only those ultimate logical invariants can be called a priori, which lie at the basis of any 
determination of a connection according to natural law. A cognition is called a priori not in 
any sense as if it were prior to experience, but because and in so far as it is contained as a 
necessary premise in every valid judgment concerning facts. If we analyse such a judgment, 
we find, along with the immediate contents of sensuous data and elements differing from 
case to case, something permanent; we find, as it were, a system of “arguments,” of which 
the assertion involved represents an appropriate functional value. (SF, p.269) 
 
So, this meaning of the a priori extends to that which is contained in “every valid judgment 
concerning facts”. The ultimate goal of science—the ideal limit towards which the scientific 
endeavour is aimed—is to identify those elements of experience that remain unchanged 
from theory to theory.
151 
  Friedman interprets this as meaning that, for Cassirer, the a priori is constitutive of 
the entire sequence of scientific knowledge.
152 We need, though, to be very careful about 
how we understand the constitutive role of this regulative ideal. Cassirer does clearly assign 
some  constitutive  role  to  the  ultimate  invariants  of  experience,  claiming  that  they 
                                                                                                                                               
approximation to any “abiding and permanent” reality, but only as a continually renewed illusion.” (Cassirer, 
SF, p.266) 
150 Examples of the ultimate invariants of experience might be concepts such as <space>, <time>, and 
<cause>. These are all concepts that Cassirer thinks will continue to underwrite all scientific knowledge. 
However, he is clear that he does not necessarily expect them to be interpreted in the same way throughout 
science.  For  example,  Cassirer  argued  that  the  development  of  the  theory  of  relativity  has  replaced  the 
concept <space> as it was understood in classical physics with a concept of <spatiality-in-general>, which is 
just  the  claim  that  objects  must  stand  in  some  form  of  spatial  relation.  Clearly  the  actual  invariants  of 
experience cannot be known until we reach the end-point of science, but from the present perspective these 
concepts—understood  in  the  most  general  possible  terms—serve  as  an  approximation  of  what  sort  of 
concepts might be part of the regulative ideal. 
151  As  Ferrari  (2012)  stresses,  this  represents  an  extension  of  Marburg  neo-Kantianism.  For  Cohen,  the 
importance of the a priori lay in making experience—specifically scientific experience—possible. Given the 
rejection of the distinction between sensibility and understanding, Cohen’s transcendental philosophy must 
have a quite different direction to Kant’s. For Cohen, the goal of transcendental philosophy is to ‘anticipate a 
priori  the  general  form  of  experience  according  to  the  “plan  of  reason”’  (ibid.).  Cohen’s  vision  of 
transcendental philosophy, then, suggests that we start from the historically given fact of natural science and 
seek to uncover the a priori foundations of scientific facts. SF represents a clarification of this aspect of 
Cohen’s philosophy: we can attempt to uncover the a priori foundations of science by seeking those concepts 
that are invariant throughout all changes in the material content of scientific theories. 
152 See Friedman (2000, p.111; 2010, p.783n273). He reads Cassirer as arguing that if the regulative ideal is 
ever  attained,  then  the  ultimate  invariant  concepts  will  be  understood  to  have  been  constitutive  of  all 
scientific theories even though this is only clear with hindsight.  138 
 
“constitute both the presupposition and goal of investigation” and that “the system of 
these unchanging elements constitutes the type of objectivity in general,—in so far as this 
term is purely limited to a meaning wholly comprehensible to knowledge” (SF, p.277). 
What does Cassirer mean here? 
  The situation is clarified if we distinguish between two notions of objectivity in 
Cassirer’s work: “objectivity in general” and “objectivity at any time”. The distinction is just 
that  “objectivity  in  general”  refers  to  the  ultimate  invariants  of  experience,  while 
“objectivity at any time” just refers to the particular invariance group of a given theory. The 
primary role of the ultimate invariants of experience in Cassirer’s philosophy is to answer 
the first part of CR, by providing an account of the unity of successive scientific theories. 
Whereas the scientific realist locates the unity of science in physical reality by arguing that 
successive theories give successively better approximations of physical reality, this is not an 
argument that is open to Cassirer. Cassirer, instead, located the unity of science in the 
ultimate invariants of experience. That is, Newtonian physics and the theory of relativity 
are “about the same subject” in the sense that limited versions of the ultimate invariants of 
experience feature in the construction of both theories. So, for example, the idea of space 
as a three-dimensional container for objects whose structure was described by Euclidean 
geometry was central to the construction of Newton’s theory of gravitation. In the theory 
of relativity, this understanding of space is replaced by the idea that space has a dynamic 
structure that is dependent upon the presence of masses and, crucially, the idea of space as 
an  object  is  replaced  by  the  understanding  of  space  in  terms  of  “pure  relations  of 
measurement” (ETR, p.446). So, “objectivity in general” is grounded by the idea that the 
ultimate invariants of experience are captured to an increasing degree of approximation as 
science develops.
153   
  The  central  claim  of  the  Marburg  School  was  that  the  object  of  scientific 
knowledge is not “given [gegeben]”, but is, instead “set as a task [aufgegeben]”. Objectivity in 
general, then, is precisely that which is “set as a task” for Cassirer. It is a crucial component 
                                                 
153 Ryckman’s (1999; 2005) discussion of Cassirer’s account of general relativity places great emphasis on 
Cassirer’s  talk  of  de-anthropomorphisation.  This,  I  think,  is  helpful;  in  understanding  the  role  that  the 
ultimate invariants of experience play. Cassirer (SF, pp.304-8) suggested that one of the fundamental results 
of Helmholtz’s philosophy is that we can only know of the properties of objects through their relation to our 
senses—this is just a result of the theory of signs that was introduced in §2.1. It may be helpful, then, to 
consider the ultimate invariants of experience as how we would eventually understand fundamental concepts 
such as <space>, <time> and <cause> once we have removed all remnants of sensibility from them. If the 
problem of objectivity is understood as being the problem of how the statements of experimental results in 
science are the same for all observers, even though the results must be mediated by each individual’s senses, 
then we can see why Cassirer would treat the ultimate invariants of experience as the end-point of a process 
of de-anthropomorphisation. By removing any trace of sensibility from these concepts, we have removed the 
feature of experience that placed the objectivity of experience in doubt in the first place.  139 
 
of answering CR as it applies to Cassirer’s work because it ensures the unity of the subject 
of scientific study.  
  There is, of course, a rather striking problem with seeking to secure the unity of the 
subject of scientific study in this manner: we will only discover the ultimate invariants of 
experience at the ideal end-point of the scientific process, when we will be able to look 
back at the history of scientific theories and see the extent to which each of these theories 
instantiated the ultimate invariants. This is precisely Friedman’s objection to the regulative 
approach: he objects that the a priori elements that are constitutive of experience are never 
known  in  advance  and  will  only  be  known  at  the  end-point  of  scientific  inquiry.  For 
Friedman, this means that the prospective rationality of theory change cannot be secured on 
Cassirer’s account; it is only possible to explain the retrospective rationality of adopting a 
new physical theory.
154 We can, however, begin to develop a response to this problem on 
Cassirer’s behalf.  
  Cassirer did not just appeal to the idea of “objectivity in general”; he also appealed 
to a notion of “objectivity at any time”: 
[We] can very well replace a relatively narrower aspect of experience by a broader, so that 
the given data are thereby ordered under a new, more general point of view. The earlier 
results are not thereby rendered valueless, but are rather confirmed within a definite sphere 
of validity. Each later member of the series is necessarily connected with the earlier ones, in 
so far as it answers a question latent in them. We face here a perpetually self-renewing 
process with only relative stopping-points, and it is these stopping points, which define the 
concept of “objectivity” at any time. (SF, p.278) 
So, for Cassirer, as science advances it replaces a “narrower aspect of experience by a 
broader” aspect of experience. Here Cassirer is best read as referring to science developing 
by broadening its invariance group—e.g., when he was writing SF, the Galilean invariance 
of classical mechanics had been broadened to the Lorentz invariance of special relativity.
155 
Science, as we have seen, is understood as a sequence of theories making successively 
better approximations of the ultimate invariants of experience: this is the “perpetually self-
renewing process with only relative stopping-points”. The stopping-points, where a theory 
satisfies  one  particular  invariance  group,  then  define  the  concept  <objectivity-at-any-
time>.
156  
                                                 
154 See (Friedman, 2010a, p.783n273). 
155 Lorentz invariance is broader than Galilean invariance in the sense that it includes Galilean invariance as a 
limiting group for low velocities. 
156 Cassirer’s use of scare-quotes around objectivity in the above quote suggests that he does not understand 
this to be a true notion of objectivity. Indeed, Cassirer could not possibly consider objectivity-at-any-time as 
indicative of objectivity-proper. He is quite clear in SF that “There is no objectivity outside of the frame of 140 
 
That  this  is  what  Cassirer  had  in  mind  is  clear  from  his  discussions  of  both 
Minkowski’s  version  of  special  relativity  and  Einstein’s  general  theory  of  relativity. 
Minkowski’s  theory  of  relativity  sought  to  derive  Einstein’s  relativistic  results  by  using 
group-theoretic mathematical methods: he reformulated the principle of relativity in terms 
of the four-dimensional Lorentz invariance group. This invariance group, then, formed the 
starting point of Minkowski’s analysis of special relativity.
157 In ETR (pp.424-5), Cassirer 
went  through  the  implications  of  Minkowski's  theory  of  relativity  and  argued  that 
Minkowski’s treatment of the transformation equations as an invariance group served to 
secure a sense of objectivity: 
[Here] too the transformation-equation reëstablishes objectivity and unity, since it permits 
us to translate again the results found in one system into those of the other. (ETR, p.425) 
There is a distinction, then, to be drawn between the ultimate invariants of experience and 
invariance principles on Cassirer’s account. The ultimate invariants of experience are those 
elements  of  our  knowledge  that, when  we  have  reached  the  end-point  of  science  and 
retrospectively consider the series of scientific theories, are presupposed in each theory. 
From  the  development  of  space-time  theories,  Cassirer  suggested  that  <spatiality-in 
general>, <temporality-in-general> and <magnitude> may, eventually, be understood as 
ultimate  invariants  of  experience.  This  is  quite  different  from  the  role  that  invariance 
principles play. The goal of the scientific endeavour is to seek out the ultimate invariants of 
experience; but how should this goal be pursued?  
  Cassirer answers this by examining the development of science. Science, it is clear, 
has  not  advanced  by  hoping  to  project  the  ultimate  invariants  of  experience  and 
incorporate these into its theories. Such a task would, of course, be hopeless for Cassirer 
since the ultimate invariants of experience can only emerge in retrospect. Instead scientific 
theories have progressed by widening their invariance groups: the Galilean invariance of 
Newtonian  physics  was  widened  to  Lorentz  invariance  in  the  development  of  special 
relativity and this was widened again to general covariance in general relativity. At each 
stage of the development of the sequence of scientific theories, there is an invariance group 
that establishes what is objective according to the theory—in general relativity for instance, 
objectivity  is  determined  by  diffeomorphism  invariance—and  the  invariance  groups 
become  broader  as  theories  approach  the  ideal  limit.  This  is  why  Cassirer  repeatedly 
                                                                                                                                               
number and magnitude, permanence and change, causality and interaction: all these determinations are only 
the ultimate invariants of experience itself, and thus of all reality, that can be established in it and by it” 
(p.309). 
157 See (Minkowski, 1915). 141 
 
mentions the importance of de-anthropomorphisation for the progress of science.
158 The 
invariance principles provide a sense of objectivity in that they act as a means to escape the 
parochial  perspective  of  individual  observers.  Invariance  principles,  then,  act  as 
approximations of the final, general concept of <objectivity> that act as the fundamental 
explanatory concept at each stage of the development of science.  
  We now have the answer to the first part of Cassirer’s version of CR, and the 
beginnings of an answer to the second part. The history of science is treated as all part of a 
single  logical  structure  with  the  common  goal  of  revealing  the  ultimate  invariants  of 
experience. Furthermore, we have seen that at each stage of science there is a concept of 
<objectivity>  embodied  by  the  invariance  group  of  the  theory  that  serves  as  the 
explanatorily fundamental concept at that period of the development of science. So, to 
provide an account of the rationality of adopting a new framework, we must ask what 
makes it rational to adopt a new invariance group. 
This is the feature of scientific development that Friedman argues that Cassirer’s 
account is ill-suited to capture. Friedman takes Cassirer to have made just one demand on 
the development of scientific theories: that each stage should “continuously emerge” from 
the previous state. For Friedman, this methodology “sheds no transcendental light on the 
actual historical process by which we arrived at general relativity in the first place” (2010, 
p.783n.273).  That  is,  while  Cassirer  provided  an  explanation  of  why  current  scientific 
knowledge is rational with respect to the ideal limit, he could not explain the rationality of 
the process by which a new theory emerges from an old one.
159 
  This, as should now be clear, cannot be the only aspect of Cassirer’s account of the 
rationality of theory change. The ultimate invariants of experience serve to ensure that 
science, throughout its history, is addressing the same subject matter. They are used to 
retrospectively identify a priori elements throughout the history of science. However, these 
a priori elements should not be understood as constituting either individual theories or the 
historical sequence of theories. These a priori elements are not constitutive of individual 
theories simply because they are not sufficient to make possible the empirical side of the 
theory.  For  instance,  the  ultimate  invariant  of  experience  <spatiality-in-general>  is  not 
sufficient  to  derive  Newton’s  law  of  gravitation:  it  must  also  be  treated  as  three-
dimensional and described by Euclidean geometry. The ultimate invariants of experience 
should also not be constitutive of the entire sequence of theories. Identifying elements that 
are approximated in each of a sequence of theories does not make the sequence of theories 
possible; it merely ensures that the sequence has a single subject matter. 
                                                 
158 See (SF, p.306), (ETR, pp.381-2, p.421, p.445) 
159 Friedman stresses this point again in his (2010b, p.186). 142 
 
  Cassirer, in both SF and ETR, provided a clear account of what would make the 
abandonment of an old theory for a new one rational. He discussed the possibility of 
abandoning the principles upon which Newton’s dynamics was constructed, arguing that 
they  do  not  need  to  be  taken  as  unchangeable:  “they  can  rather  be  regarded  as  the 
temporarily simplest intellectual hypotheses by which we establish the unity of experience” 
(SF, p.268). He also provided an account of what it would take to justify the abandonment 
of these principles. First, Cassirer clarified that there are situations in which we would 
accept changes to the principles without abandoning them: “We do not relinquish the 
content of these hypotheses, as long as any less sweeping variation, concerning a deduced 
element,  can  re-establish  the  harmony  between  theory  and  experience”  (ibid.).  Here, 
Cassirer,  then,  allowed  for  narrower  versions  of  Newton’s  principles  to  be  applied  to 
particular problem cases—without thereby undermining the principles as a whole—so long 
as the narrower version of the principle could be logically deduced from the universal 
version of the principle. So, for Cassirer, if anomalies within the classical framework, e.g. 
the advance of Mercury’s perihelion, can be explained by special versions of Newton’s 
laws—deducible from the universal versions—then the anomalies do not irrevocably break 
the “harmony between theory and experience”. 
So, if anomalies do not necessitate the adoption of new principles or laws, what 
does? Cassirer’s answer is just that there will eventually be anomalies within the context of 
any given theory for which this path is not open: that is, where the suitable limitations of 
the applicability of the universal principles either cannot be deduced from the universals or 
cannot adequately account for the anomaly. The potential difficulty with such an approach 
should be apparent: how do scientists working within the context of a given theory know 
that they have exhausted these possibilities? Once the new theory, with new principles, is in 
place it may be clear that the account it provides of any phenomena once considered to be 
anomalous is superior to any account that could be offered in the previous theory: but 
what is there to motivate one to seek to develop the new theory in the first place rather 
than seeking to amend the current theory? 
Cassirer  argued  that  there  are  a  number  of  possible  considerations  that  would 
justify abandoning one such stopping-point for another: 
 
(a)  As  we  have  seen,  Cassirer  argued  that  a  study  of  the  history  of  science 
demonstrated  that  scientific  theories  are  seeking  to  elucidate  the  ultimate 
invariants of experience. This means that we must require of any new theory 
that it leaves certain key features of experience unaffected  143 
 
(b) Cassirer  argued  that  certain  conceptual  developments  are  brought  about  by 
seeking to unify our physical concepts (ETR, p.360). Cassirer stressed that this 
was a purely regulative demand because “true unity is never sought in things as 
such, but in intellectual constructions” (ETR, p.361). 
(c)  Cassirer also argued that certain principles of theory selection play a role in 
explaining the rationality of theory change. These principles are just the demand 
that mathematically simple (SF, p.260) and general (ETR, p.360) theories are to 
be preferred. The demand of generality was especially important because it was 
this  that  Cassirer  took  to  mean  that  we  should  expect  new  theories  to 
incorporate and explain the success of old theories—often by treating the old 
theory as a limiting case of the new. 
 
Each of these is a regulative demand and, for Cassirer, this was sufficient to provide an 
account  for  the  rationality  of  theory  change.  Thus,  for  example,  he  argued  that  the 
equivalence principle of general relativity came about as an attempt to unify the concepts of 
energy and matter (ETR, p.401) and he argued that part of the appeal of both special and 
general relativity is that they incorporated the earlier, classical, theory of space-time as a 
limiting case (ETR, pp.378-9). 
  This, I think, goes some way towards addressing Friedman’s concerns, however 
there remains a significant problem for Cassirer’s account of the rationality of science: what 
if objectivity-in-general is radically different from objectivity-at-a-time? Science could, in 
future, develop in a quite different direction from that which it has taken so far; what is 
currently taken to be objective in science may eventually come to be seen as not even a 
loose approximation of objectivity-in-general. Furthermore, if we have no guarantee that 
objectivity-at-a-time does approximate objectivity-in-general, how can it provide a secure 
foundation for the analysis of scientific knowledge?  
Cassirer,  I  think,  must  accept  that  objectivity-at-a-time  may  fail  to  approximate 
objectivity-in-general  but  this  is  not  necessarily fatal  to  his  approach.  Cassirer’s  central 
claim is that scientific knowledge is the most secure form of knowledge: he recommends 
only that we look at the history of scientific knowledge to date and try to identify features 
of  scientific  thought  that  remain  constant  throughout  the  development  of  scientific 
theories.  If  there  were  to  be  a  radically  new  type  of  scientific  theory  developed,  then 
Cassirer’s  approach  would  recommend  reassessing  the  connection  between  the  new 
scientific theory and our current theories to identify alternative candidates for the concept 
of  objectivity-at-a-time  that  are  capable  of  approximating  the  new  understanding  of 144 
 
objectivity-in-general at each successive stage of the sequence of scientific theories.
160 This 
difficulty for Cassirer, then, is just a consequence of his belief that scientific knowledge is 
the most secure form of knowledge available to us: even though it is liable to—potentially 
radically—change, the task of  the philosopher is to understand how each stage of the 
development  of  scientific  theories  captures  some  relevant  feature  of  state-of-the-art 
scientific knowledge. 
The  regulative  framework  for  answering  CR  is,  then,  potentially  very  useful. 
However, it is not clear to me that it can be the full story. Friedman is essentially right in 
his objection that a purely regulative framework cannot explain how new theories become 
coherent possibilities. It seems that we would expect on Cassirer’s account that a broader 
invariance  group  alone  is  a  good  enough  motivation  for  theory  change:  however  the 
prominent examples of theory change all involve changes on a less fundamental conceptual 
level first and then a broadening of the invariance group later.
161 This represents the chief 
advantage of Friedman’s account over Cassirer’s, he pays more attention to the role that 
the development of physical principles plays in the development of new scientific theories. 
In the next chapter I show how, in fact, aspects of both Friedman’s and Cassirer’s accounts 
are needed in order to make sense of the actual historical development of general relativity. 
Cassirer’s answer to CR, then, can be summarised as follows. The most important 
idea is that of the ultimate invariants of experience, which are the elements of cognition 
that we will ultimately—at the idealised end-point of science—judge to have been present 
throughout  the  history  of  science.  These  serve  the  function  of  ensuring  that  all  the 
scientific  theories  in  a  sequence are  all  investigating  the  same  subject:  i.e.,  they  are  all 
engaged in the project of elucidating these fundamental invariants. These, I argued, were a 
priori only in a regulative sense because they could not be understood as constitutive either 
of individual theories or the sequence of theories. However, as Friedman points out, this 
alone does not suffice to give an explanation of the forward-looking rationality of theory 
change: it does not suffice, that is, to explain why, e.g., a Newtonian physicist would have 
been rational in accepting the theory of relativity. Cassirer suggested regulative a priori 
principles of theory selection and systematic unity to try and explain this aspect of theory 
change. The regulative a priori as a whole defined the concept <objectivity> for Cassirer. I 
have  also  identified  a  role  for  invariance  principles  as  instantiating  a  concept  of 
<objectivity-at-a-time> for any given scientific theory. 
                                                 
160 This would work in a similar fashion to Cassirer’s own discussion of classical physics: within the tradition 
of classical physics it would not have obvious that it was capturing objectivity-at-a-time through its Galilean 
invariance. This could only become clear from the perspective of the theory of relativity. This, for Cassirer, is 
precisely why his position remains meaningfully Kantian even while his account refutes central aspects of 
Kantian philosophy. 
161 This will be especially clear in the discussion of the development of general relativity in ch.4. 145 
 
Cassirer, I think, successfully resolved the first of the two branches of his version 
of CR. The regulative a priori, in defining a concept of <objectivity>, provided a clear goal 
that science could be understood as aiming at. However, I do not think that the regulative a 
priori alone is enough to explain the rationality of abandoning a given theory in favour of 
another. The reason is that a broader invariance group, on its own, does not necessarily 
make a theory a preferable. This is because, as we will see in detail in the next section, 
invariance  groups  do  not  provide  a  theory with a  physical  interpretation. The  physical 
interpretation is provided by constitutive principles and it is these that need to change—
just as Friedman suggests—in order to drive the development of a new theory.  
In the  rest of the chapter I develop an account of constitutivity—grounded in 
Cassirer’s group-theoretic understanding of mathematics—that is consistent with Cassirer’s 
emphasis on regulative principles.  
3.3.2.2.  Structuralism and the constitution of objects 
In this section I argue that there are two ways in which Cassirer’s regulative approach is 
able to answer CC. First, on Cassirer’s account laws are constitutive of the objects of a 
theory and, second, physical principles play a historical role in making laws possible. In 
order to understand Cassirer’s account of constitutivity, we must first clarify the role of the 
a priori in his philosophy. I argue—with Richardson (1998), Ryckman (2005) and Heis 
(2012)—that  Cassirer  understood  the  a  priori  to  function  both  constitutively  and 
regulatively. Second, it is now commonplace in the literature to treat Cassirer as having 
anticipated the central ideas of structural realism, in the sense that Cassirer advocated a 
structural  account  of  the  constitution  of  objects.
162  Having  identified  the  two  different 
senses  of  the  a  priori  in  Cassirer’s  account—and  how  they  stem  from  his  particular 
understanding of the function-theory of concepts—it is possible to precisely clarify the 
sense in which Cassirer offers a structuralist account of constitution.  
In the previous section I emphasised the regulative role of the a priori in Cassirer’s 
philosophy. The regulative a priori featured in Cassirer’s work in three ways: the ideal of 
the ultimate invariants of experience, certain principles of theory selection and a principle 
of systematic unity. However, Cassirer also identified aspects of science that are, I think, 
better understood as constitutive in a relative sense. Cassirer, I suggest, understood certain 
physical  concepts  and  principles  as  playing  a  constitutive  role  in  particular  scientific 
theories. This can be seen quite clearly in his treatment of the theory of relativity. 
                                                 
162 See (Ihmig, 1999), (Gower, 2000), (French, 2001) and (Cei and French, 2009). 146 
 
As we have seen, for Cassirer the concept <objectivity> is the starting point for the 
analysis of science: our experience of objects is ultimately to be explained in terms of the 
objectivity of science. However, we have seen that for Cassirer, as for Kant, the objectivity 
of  science  is  not  simply  a  brute  fact:  it  stands  in  need  of  explanation  itself.    Kant 
understood objectivity as resulting from the manner in which the manifold of sensibility 
was ordered under the categories of the understanding by means of spatial and temporal 
schema. This is why mathematics could so effectively describe objective reality, for Kant: 
geometry and arithmetic are related to the pure intuitions of space and time respectively. 
This is why, for Kant, natural science must be mathematical. The laws and objects of 
natural science are, as we saw in §2, for Kant then explained in terms of the objectivity of 
our experience of nature. 
Cassirer, since he rejected the faculty of intuition, cannot understand objectivity in 
the same way. This is the role of the regulative a priori for Cassirer: it provided a way to 
interpret objectivity within a sequence of dynamically developing scientific theories. The 
regulative  a  priori  provided  Cassirer  with  a  stock  of  concepts  that  were  common 
throughout  the  evolution  of  knowledge:  it  is  these  that  are  ultimately  objective.  The 
problem with this, of course, is that we will only know those elements of thought that were 
truly objective when science reaches its ideal end-point. Until that time we must find a way 
to encode the concept <objectivity> in a given scientific theory. It is at this point that 
Cassirer,  influenced  by  the  group-theoretic  approach  in  geometry,  came  to  understand 
objectivity-at-a-time  as  being  given  by  the  invariant  properties  of  a  group  of 
transformations. This is why general covariance was so epistemologically significant from 
Cassirer’s perspective: it provided a broader invariance group than had previously been 
available and, as such, was understood as providing a better approximation of the ultimate 
invariants of experience. 
However, there is a well-known problem with viewing general covariance as the 
fundamental statement of general relativity: it is not clear that there is any physical content 
to general covariance. This was an objection first raised by Kretschmann to Einstein’s 
(1916) formulation of the theory of relativity.
163 Einstein understood general covariance just 
as the claim that the laws of physics have the same form in any coordinate system: in this 
sense he understood it as the culmination of his project to extend the principle of relativity 
to  accelerating  frames  of  reference.
164  Einstein  was,  though,  well  aware  that  this 
requirement was too weak to provide any physical content to the theory, and so he argued 
                                                 
163 See (Norton, 2003) for a detailed discussion of Kretschmann’s objection.  
164 I discuss the importance of the idea that the principle of relativity should be extended to incorporate non-
inertial frames of reference in the next chapter. 147 
 
that the physical content of a theory was given by the catalogue of coincidences that are 
invariant under coordinate transformations.  
Kretschmann’s objection was that the claim that the physical content of a theory is 
given  by  the  catalogue  of  space-time  coincidences  is  not  a  unique  feature  of  general 
relativity: he claimed that any space-time theory can be given such a generally covariant 
formulation.  This  was  a  problem  that  Cassirer  was  aware  of  and  sought  to  provide  a 
solution to. Cassirer understood this type of objection to amount to the claim that general 
covariance is an analytic assertion in the sense that it is simply specifying what is meant by a 
universal  law  (i.e.  one  that  is  not  changed  in  form  by  arbitrary  changes  of  space-time 
variables) (ETR, p.384). However, general covariance insofar as it applies to physics should 
be understood as the demand that there are laws that are invariant through coordinate 
transformations,  which  is  a  synthetic  claim  (ibid.).  General  covariance,  then,  was 
understood as a regulative demand placed upon the structure of physical laws.
165  
Cassirer’s understanding of objectivity, then, is squarely based in the regulative a 
priori. That which is ultimately objective is that which serves as a premise in every valid 
judgment  throughout  the  development  of  science:  i.e.,  the  ultimate  invariants  of 
experience. The ultimate invariants of experience are a priori because they are necessary 
premises and regulative because uncovering the ultimate invariants of experience is that 
which is set as task for science. Invariance principles represent constraints that are placed 
on the form of the laws of a theory. They are regulative in the sense that they are intended 
to  remove  science  from  the  parochial  realm  of  individual  observers  and,  in  so  doing, 
provide an approximation of the ultimate invariants of experience.
166  
                                                 
165 As such, Cassirer understood general covariance in the same way as he had understood Lorentz invariance, 
i.e. as “a general maxim…for the investigation of nature” which serves as a “heuristic aid in the search for the 
general laws of nature”. Here, I think it is clear that the invariance principles serve as regulative demands: i.e. 
they do not make the laws of a theory possible—physical laws are possible without an underlying idea of an 
invariance group—instead they serve just to place formal limitations of the structure of the laws. It is for this 
reason, contra Ryckman, that I do not think that general covariance is constitutive of general relativity. I 
discuss the role of general covariance in general relativity in depth in §4.4. 
166  I  do  not  think  that  Cassirer  understood  the  concept  of  <objectivity>  as  constitutive  of  the  concept 
<object>: this is in contrast to the reading of Ryckman (2005, p.42ff.), who argues that Cassirer understood 
general covariance as an “objectifying unity” that  played both a constitutive and regulative role. This is 
because, an invariance group, on its own, provides us only with a mathematical structure to which the laws of 
a theory must correspond: it does not tell us to what this mathematical structure corresponds. An invariance 
group just provides certain limitations on what can be posited of the objects of a theory: invariance groups 
tells us nothing positive of the properties of the object that satisfy the invariance nor of the types of law-like 
relationship that the objects enter into. The role of the constitutive principles, then, is to guide the conceptual 
construction  of  objects in accord with the constraints  of a given invariance group. This is close to the 
understanding of permutation invariance defended by Massimi (2011) in the context of quantum theory. It is 
argued that permutation invariance alone permits both Pauli-obeying quarks and Pauli-violating paraparticles: 
contemporary physics supports a belief in quarks rather than paraparticles because experimental evidence 
supports predictions about the behaviour of quarks.  148 
 
Let us examine how Cassirer provides an account of constitutivity by means of an 
example: the equivalence principle. In ETR, Cassirer described the role of the equivalence 
principle in the following fashion: 
We conceive ourselves in the position of an observer, who, experimenting in a closed box, 
establishes  the  fact  that  all  bodies  left  to  themselves  move,  always  with  constant 
acceleration, toward the floor of the box. This fact can be represented conceptually by the 
observer  in  a  double  manner:  in  the  first  place,  by  the  assumption  that  he  is  in  a 
temporarily constant field of gravity in which the box is hung up motionless, or, in the 
second place, by the assumption that the box moves upward with a constant acceleration 
whereby the fall of bodies in it would represent a movement of inertia. The two: the 
inertial movement and the effect of gravitation, are thus in truth a single phenomenon seen 
and judged from different sides. It follows that the fundamental law that we establish for 
the movement of bodies must be such that it includes equally the phenomena of inertia 
and those of gravitation. As is seen, we have here no empirical proposition abstracted from 
particular observations, but a rule for our construction of physical concepts: a demand that 
we make, not directly of experience, but rather of our manner of intellectually representing 
it. (ETR, p.428) 
Cassirer introduced the equivalence principle here in terms of Einstein’s elevator thought 
experiment: if we experiment in a closed environment, with no access to anything beyond 
our immediate surroundings, we can explain the fact that objects accelerate towards earth 
either by postulating an appropriate gravitational field or by assuming that we are actually 
accelerating  upwards  ourselves.  This,  Cassirer  argued  meant  that  both  inertial  and 
gravitational  effects  were  two  different  ways  of  “intellectually  representing”  the  same 
phenomenon. This is not an empirical claim: the equivalence principle is, instead, a rule 
that  is  imposed  upon  the  construction  of  general  relativity  in  order  to  ensure  that  it 
captures the idea that inertial effects can be represented as gravitational effects. 
  This  served,  for  Cassirer,  to  provide  an  interpretation  of  general  covariance. 
General covariance meant that the physical law—the field equations—must have the same 
form when viewed from any coordinate system. In order to ensure that this invariance 
principle has physical meaning, some additional claim is required. The equivalence principle 
was able to play this role, for Cassirer, because it provided Einstein with a way to treat two 
physically distinct systems as being described by the same law. That is, it provided a way to 
understand the physical concepts of inertia and gravitation such that it made physical sense 
to use the same form of the physical law for two seemingly distinct physical situations. So, 
the equivalence principle was constitutive of Einstein’s field equations in the sense that it 
made it possible to physically interpret that demand of general covariance. 149 
 
  In §4 I examine the role of the equivalence principle in the development of general 
relativity  in  more  depth.  I  argue  that  Friedman  is  essentially  correct  in  taking  the 
equivalence principle to play this role in virtue of its historical role in the development of 
Einstein’s field equations. This approach, I think, is a little different from Cassirer’s as 
detailed  in  ETR,  where  Cassirer  seems  to  take  the  equivalence  principle  to  directly 
construct a conceptual framework within which to make sense of the demand for general 
covariance. However, it is consistent with his account of the role of physical principles in 
DIMP.  
  Here Cassirer argued that science could not be concerned solely with the process of 
gathering together empirical observations or data and generalising these observations into 
laws.
167 First, in doing so it would be hard to see how we could overcome the problem of 
induction. Second, the process simply does not reflect the practice of science: scientists are 
not satisfied simply with generating a list of generalisations, they also seek to explain how 
laws relate to each other. Instead, science progresses by seeking “a rule by which it can be 
guided from one law to the next” (DIMP, p.45): this is the role of physical principles such 
as the equivalence principle. In §4 I argue that the equivalence principle is a particularly 
good candidate to be understood as constitutive of general relativity in this sense because it 
is initially taken from Newtonian physics and serves to guide the development of general 
relativity out of Newtonian physics.  
  This,  I  think,  provides  a  means  to  understand  the  constitutive  role  of  the 
equivalence principle in a manner that is close to Friedman’s, but without some of the 
associated  baggage.  For  Friedman,  the  purpose  of  constitutive  principles  is  to  make 
mathematical possibilities physical possibilities, e.g., to make physical sense of the idea of 
four-dimensional space-time. Friedman’s Kantianism is premised upon the idea that there 
is  something  mysterious  about  the  application  of  mathematics  to  experience.  Cassirer 
understood the relation between mathematics and physics quite differently: he, following 
Cohen, sought to preserve Kant’s idea that mathematical statements are true in virtue of 
their application in experience to describe the behaviour of empirical bodies.
168 So, rather 
than viewing mathematics as purely a system of  implicit definitions devoid of physical 
                                                 
167 See §3.3.2.1 
168 “Although we know a priori in synthetic judgments a great deal regarding space in general and the figures 
which productive imagination describes in it, and can obtain such judgments without actually requiring any 
experience, yet even this knowledge would be nothing but a playing with a mere figment of the brain, were it 
not that space has to be regarded as a condition of the appearances which constitute the material for outer 
experience. Those pure synthetic judgments therefore relate, though only mediately, to possible experience, 
or rather to the possibility of experience; and upon that alone is founded the objective validity of their 
synthesis”  (Kant,  A157/B196).  Kant’s  idea,  then,  was  that  while  mathematical  judgments  are  obtained 
through construction in pure intuition, they count as cognitions only because they are necessarily connected 
to experience in the sense that geometrical space wars understood as a condition of appearances. 150 
 
content that needs to be connected to experience, Cassirer understood mathematics as 
“essentially  applicable”  to  physics.
169  This  means  that  the  regulative  constraint  on  the 
mathematical form of a theory’s laws and the manner in which constitutive principles serve 
to add physical content to the laws work together to account for knowledge of empirical 
laws. Constitutive principles do not make “mathematical possibilities physical”; they simply 
add physical content to a regulative constraint on the form of the laws. 
  This, then, is how Cassirer grounded the empirical laws of a theory: their form is 
determined  by  the  regulative  demand  of  objectivity  and  their  physical  content  is 
constructed by constitutive principles. Cassirer, in addition, argued that the objects of a 
theory are constituted by the laws of a theory. As we see in §5, this has become the subject 
of significant contemporary interest because, in advocating the law-constitutive account of 
objects Cassirer advocated a position that has much in common with modern structural 
realism. In the rest of this section I seek to clarify the sense in which Cassirer’s provided a 
structural account of the constitution of objects. 
  That  Cassirer  advocated  a  law-constitutive  account  of  the  concept  <object>  is 
most clear in DIMP, though it is also apparent in ETR. Since the contemporary discussion 
focuses on Cassirer’s law-constitutive account of objects in quantum mechanics, I will use 
Cassirer’s argument in DIMP to illustrate his position. In DIMP, Cassirer explicitly states 
that he understands laws to be conceptually prior to objects: 
 
The concept of law is now regarded as prior to that of object, whereas it used to be 
subordinate to it. In the substantialistic conception there used to be a definitely determined 
entity which bore certain attributes and which entered, with other entities, into definite 
relations expressible by laws of nature. In the functional viewpoint, by contrast this entity 
constitutes no longer the self-evident starting point but the final goal and the end of the 
considerations: the terminus a quo has become a terminus ad quem” (p.131) 
 
For  Cassirer,  then,  there  are  no  objects  in  the  sense  of  substances  that  bear  physical 
properties: instead objects emerge only through an interweaving of physical principles, laws 
of nature and empirical measurements. In classical physics, objective knowledge had been 
                                                 
169 The argument that Cassirer understood mathematics to be essentially applicable to physics is made in 
detail in (Heis, 2011a, §5). Cassirer made it most clear that this was how he understood the relationship 
between mathematics and physics in Kant und die Moderne Mathematik, where he claimed, e.g.: “If it is not 
possible to prove that the system of pure concepts of the understanding is the necessary condition under 
which we can speak of a rule and connection of appearances, and under which we can speak of empirical 
‘Nature’ – then this system, with all its consequences and conclusions, would have to still appear as a mere 
‘figment of the brain’ . . . The logical and mathematical concepts should no longer constitute tools with which we build up a 
metaphysical  ‘thought-world’:  they  have  their  function  and  their  proper  application  solely  within  empirical  science  itself.” 
(Cassirer, 1907, pp.42-3, translated in Heis, 2011a, p.785, my emphasis). 151 
 
associated with knowledge of objects; Cassirer, by contrast, associated objective knowledge 
with permanence.
170 It is for this reason that Cassirer continues, in DIMP, to claim that 
“objectivity…is attained only because and insofar as there is conformity to law” (p.132). 
While  substantial  objects  are  not  permanent  in  the  way  that  Cassirer  requires—their 
properties may change over time—the laws describing the changes in objects’ properties are 
permanent within the framework of a particular theory. In turn, the relations expressed by 
the laws of a theory must be objectively grounded in the sense that they must be invariant 
under transformations of the permutation group of a particular theory. Objectivity is not 
connected  to  the  existence  of  “things”;  it  is  concerned  with  the  “objective  validity  of 
relations” (p.143). 
  What, then, is a quantum object—e.g., an electron—for Cassirer? Cassirer is quite 
clear that an electron cannot be understood as an individual object and must, instead, be 
interpreted relationally: 
If then we continue to talk about the individuality of particles, this can only be done 
indirectly; not insofar as they themselves, as individuals, are given, but so far as they are 
describable a “points of intersection” of certain relations. (p.180) 
It  is  clear  that  in  quantum  physics  the  corpuscular  character  of  electrons  must  be 
abandoned: electrons extend throughout their configuration space and the charge of an 
electron is no longer confined to a particular location, instead it is spread across a “charge 
cloud”. While the charge of an electron is indivisible, it does not seem to be the type of 
property that can be localized. Cassirer is critical of Sommerfeld’s resistance to this idea 
(p.182): Sommerfeld, according to Cassirer’s account, took the indivisibility of electronic 
charge to imply that electrons are point like entities. This view is mistaken because “the 
constancy of a certain relation is not at all sufficient for the inference of a constant carrier” 
(ibid.).  
  Cassirer clarified his conception of the electron by linking it explicitly to Kant’s 
relational conception of objects according to which “All that we know in matter is merely 
relations, but among these relations are some self-subsistent and permanent, and through 
these we are given a determinate object” (Kant, A285/B341). We are in a position to 
consider the electron as a “determinate object” only because the indivisibility of electronic 
charge  is  such  a  self-subsistent  and  permanent  relation.  So,  for  Cassirer,  we  are  in  a 
position to consider electrons as objects only because they possess a certain property—
                                                 
170 This is most clear in SF, e.g. “We finally call objective those elements of experience, which persist through 
all change in the here and now, and on which rests the unchangeable character of experience" (p.273). This, 
of course, is why the invariants  of experience are ultimately that  which is  objective: i.e., they are those 
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charge—which enters into permanent relations with other entities and these relations are 
described by the laws of nature. That is, to identify determinate objects we must begin with 
the laws that express the relations from which objects are constituted. 
This, then, is the second strand of Cassirer’s account of constitutivity: the laws of 
physics have a relational form imposed upon them by invariance principles and, in turn, the 
objects of a theory are just the points of intersection of these relations. This is a structural 
account of the constitution of objects, then, in the sense that our knowledge of objects is 
only possible once they are embedded in a relational structure that is given by the laws of a 
theory.
171  
Cassirer’s answer to CC, then, has two parts. First, there is a role for constitutive 
principles in physically interpreting a theory’s invariance principles: in this sense they make 
possible  a  specific  theory’s  empirical  laws  because  without  such  an  interpretation, 
invariance  principles  do not  uniquely  determine  the  laws  of a  theory.  Secondly,  in  the 
fashion  just  detailed,  the  objects  of  a  theory  are  (structurally)  constituted  by  theory’s 
empirical laws. In this way Cassirer advocated both an absolutely and regulative a priori and 
a relativised and constitutive a priori. Both have a role to play in understanding his account 
of  constitution:  the  regulative  a  priori  determined  the  form  of  the  laws  while  the 
constitutive a priori determined the content of the laws.    
3.3.3.  Cassirer, structure and reason: a summary 
Cassirer’s philosophy of science, then, can be summarised as follows: 
 
i.  Cassirer interpreted mathematics group-theoretically and, as such, understood it as 
straightforwardly applicable to experience. 
ii.  The  fundamental  distinction  between  the  substance-theory  of  concepts  and  the 
function-theory of concepts should be understood in terms of a reversal of the 
explanatory  priority  of  the  epistemological  concepts  <object>,  <truth>, 
<knowledge>, <objectivity>. On the substance-theory of concepts <objectivity> 
is  explained  in  terms  of  <object>,  while  on  the  function-theory  of  concepts 
<objectivity>  is  taken  as  that  which  is  fundamental  and  the  possibility  of  the 
objects of experience is explained in terms of objectivity. 
                                                 
171 I examine the relationship between Cassirer’s structuralism and structural realism in §4, but for the time 
being  it  suffices  to  say  that  Cassirer  himself  does  not  advocate  structural  realism  because  the  relational 
structure of the laws of physics is a consequence of his regulative understanding of invariance principles. 
Furthermore, the physical content of the laws is given by constitutive principles, which are just rules for the 
construction of physical concepts. This understanding of law makes it impossible for Cassirer to think that 
the objects  of physics could refer to externally existing objects: this system is designed solely to ensure 
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iii.  The concept of <objectivity>, understood as a regulative goal, ensures the unity of 
science: i.e. each scientific theory is interpreted as seeking to identify the necessary 
premises of every true statement throughout the development of science. This—
along with other regulative principles—is supposed to ensure the rationality of the 
development of science.  
iv.  At  any  given  stage  of  science  <objectivity>  is  approximated  by  invariance 
principles. An invariance principle should be understood as a regulative demand 
that is imposed upon the mathematical form of a law. This, though, is not sufficient 
to  provide  laws  with  physical  content  and  for  that,  constitutive  principles  are 
required. 
v.  Finally, objects are reconceptualised as the points of coincidence of the various 
relations described by a theory’s laws. Thus, Cassirer offered a structuralist, law-
constitutive account of the knowledge of objects. 
3.4.  A regulative account of constitution 
Where, then, does the discussion of this chapter leave us? The discussion of Cassirer’s SF, 
ETR and DIMP has left us with alternative Kantian approaches to answering CR and CC. 
The characteristic feature of Cassirer’s analysis of science is that the concept <objectivity> 
should be understood as the fundamental epistemological concept. This means that the 
truth of any statement in the context of a scientific theory has ultimately to be explained in 
terms of the concept objectivity. There were two senses in which Cassirer understood 
objectivity. First, there was the idea of objectivity in general: this refers to the ultimate 
invariants  of  experience  that  are  the  necessary  premises  of  every  scientific  claim. 
Objectivity in this sense represents the idealised end-point of scientific inquiry. I identified 
another sense of objectivity that was important to Cassirer’s philosophy: he argued that 
invariance principles provide a concept of <objectivity-at-time> with respect to which the 
statements of individual scientific theory are ultimately to be explained. 
Cassirer answered CR as follows. Science is directed at uncovering the ultimate 
invariants  of  experience.  This,  in  light  of  Cassirer’s  emphasis  on  historicising  Kant’s 
transcendental  logic,  is  important  because  it  ensures  that  all  scientific  theories  are 
concerned with the same object of study. The ultimate invariants of experience, though, are 
just one of the absolute and regulative aspects of the a priori that Cassirer identifies: he also 
suggests that certain principles of theory change and a principle of systematic unity are 
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explaining the forward looking rationality of science. In particular, Cassirer would argue 
that  it  is  rational  to abandon  one  theory  for  another  if  the  new  theory has  a  broader 
invariance group, is more unified or, e.g., more mathematically simple. This insight, I think, 
can serve as the foundation for a Kantian account of the rationality of science, but it is not 
yet entirely satisfactory. This is an important part of the regulative answer to CR. I suggest 
that in order to secure the prospective rationality of the development of a new scientific 
theory, we need to also appeal to the historical role that physical principles play in driving 
the development of new theories: in light of the discussion of Cassirer’s understanding of 
the constitutive role of physical principles in §3.3.2.2, I take it that Cassirer’s account can 
make sense of this feature of the development of new theories. 
Cassirer’s account of constitutivity has two parts. First, he required that there were 
constitutive principles that served to give physical content to the laws of a theory, whose 
form  was  restricted  by  invariance  principles.  Second,  he  defended  a  law-constitutive 
account of objects. In this, I think Cassirer was essentially correct and in §5I will show that 
general relativity can be profitably understood in this fashion. 
In  the  next  chapter  I  turn  my  attention  towards  the  development  of  general 
relativity and seek to show that the historical process by which the theory emerged can be 
profitably understood in regulative terms. In particular, I am concerned to show that the 
regulative approach provides a better account of the rationality of the development of 
general  relativity  than  Friedman’s  account,  on  which  philosophy  plays  a  crucial,  meta-
paradigmatic role. 
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4 
 
Regulative principles and the rationality of theory change 
 
The equivalence principle in the development of general relativity 
 
 
4.1.  Introduction: the equivalence principle and general relativity 
Cassirer’s account of the rationality of scientific theory change provides us with a new 
Kantian framework within which to answer CR. In this chapter I seek to show that the 
regulative answer to CR makes better sense of the development of general relativity than 
Friedman’s constitutive approach does. In particular, I take issue with two of Friedman’s 
main claims: (1) that the adoption of general relativity over Newton’s theory of gravitation 
was rational on account of Einstein’s fruitful interaction with the philosophy of Helmholtz 
and Poincaré and (2) that the equivalence principle is constitutive of general relativity in the 
sense that it—with the rotating disk thought experiment—made a variably curved four-
dimensional space-time a genuine physical possibility. 
My analysis focuses on two key features of the development of general relativity. I 
begin  by  examining  the  role  of  the  equivalence  principle  in  the  early  stage  of  the 
development of general relativity between 1907 and March 1912. There are two features of 
this analysis that are of significance. First, I seek to counter Friedman’s claim that Einstein 
placed so much emphasis on the equivalence principle because he self-consciously elevated 
an empirical fact to the status of a principle in the manner of Poincaré. Second, I argue that 
the emergence of—and Einstein’s persistent emphasis on—the equivalence principle can 
more profitably be understood in regulative terms. That is, I argue that it is a principle 
taken from Newtonian physics that played a crucial historical role, via its broadening of the 
admissible class of coordinate transformations, in the development of the new laws of 
general relativity. 
I then turn my attention towards the role of the rotating disk thought experiment in 
the development of general relativity. As in the preceding discussion of the equivalence 
principle, my analysis of the rotating disk has both a negative and a positive aim. First, I 156 
 
seek to argue, contra Friedman, that there is no need to appeal to Helmholtz’s philosophy in 
order to understand the role of the thought experiment in the development of relativity. A 
central part of my argument to this end is to provide an alternative reading of ‘Geometry 
and Experience’ to that offered by Friedman, as on Friedman’s interpretation this lecture—
as we saw in §1.2.2—provides a strong motivation for thinking that Einstein did utilise 
Helmholtz’s empiricist account of geometry in developing general relativity. I argue that 
‘Geometry  and  Experience’  should  be  understood  primarily  as  Einstein  engaging  in  a 
contemporary debate between Reichenbach and Weyl about the status of the line element 
in general relativity: as such, I argue that this lecture does not provide a firm basis for 
Friedman’s claim that Helmholtz’s epistemology of geometry played a crucial role in the 
development of general relativity.  
I  also  develop  an  alternative  account  of  the  role  of  the  rotating  disk  thought 
experiment in general relativity, arguing that it—like the equivalence principle—served a 
regulative  function  in  that  it  broadened  the  group  of  coordinate  transformations  that 
Einstein could consider. In doing so I seek to clarify that if, in accord with Cassirer’s 
regulative Kantianism, we adopt group-theoretic methodology then there is no mystery 
about  how  four-dimensional  space-time  became  a  physical  possibility.  This,  I  suggest, 
undermines Friedman’s  particular understanding of the constitutive a priori and means 
that—while we can salvage much of Friedman’s insight into the role of the equivalence 
principle in the development of general relativity—the constitutive role of the principle is 
better understood in regulative terms. 
Finally, I turn my attention towards examining the role of general covariance in 
general relativity. Here, my main concern is to clarify the sense in which Cassirer’s took 
general  covariance  to  be  “the  epistemically  salient  aspect  of  the  general  theory  of 
relativity”.
172 In particular I seek to clarify the sense in which general covariance serves as a 
regulative  principle  that  defines  a  notion  of  <objectivity-at-a-time>  within  general 
relativity. I also argue, against Ryckman, that general covariance should not be understood 
as a constitutive principle.  
This chapter, then, is intended to be my main argument that a Kantian philosophy 
of science that emphasises the role of regulative principles is in a stronger position to 
answer CR than one that emphasises constitutive principles. In the following chapter I then 
turn  to  one  remaining  concern:  that  the  account  of  constitutivity  associated  with  this 
account of general relativity might be more naturally understood in structural realist rather 
than Kantian terms. 
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4.2.  The development of the equivalence principle: elevation or regulative 
demand? 
The development of general relativity can be divided into two phases: in the first phase 
(1907-1912) Einstein sought to develop a relativistic theory of gravitation that was adequate 
for the description of static gravitational fields, in the second phase (1912-1915) Einstein 
sought to extend his account of static fields so that it would apply to the more complex 
case of stationary fields. In this section I examine the role of the equivalence principle in 
the first of these two stages.  
  The first thing to stress is that there is not really any such thing as the equivalence 
principle: a number of physical principles get referred to as the equivalence principle and, 
as we will see, Einstein himself uses at least three different versions of the principle. The 
version  of  the  equivalence  principle  that  Friedman  argues  is  constitutive  of  general 
relativity is the following: 
[Gravitational] force is actually of the same kind as the so-called inertial forces (such as 
centrifugal and Coriolis forces) arising in non-inertial frames of reference, in so far as the 
accelerations produced by both types of forces are entirely independent of the bodies so 
affected. (Friedman, 2010a, p.659) 
In part, Friedman’s answer to CR, depends on the claim that Einstein understood this 
version of the equivalence principle as the result of his “elevating” an empirical fact to the 
status of a principle. The first goal of this section, then, is to show that this analysis does 
not do justice to certain facts about Einstein’s work in the period 1907-1912. In particular, 
I show that (i) this version of the equivalence principle is the third that Einstein used and 
that it emerged via a process of conceptual analysis from the previous two versions of the 
equivalence principle and (ii) there is no clear historical motivation to suppose that Einstein 
understood even the first version of the equivalence principle that he used as a convention. 
This, I suggest, means that it is unnecessary to appeal to Einstein’s adopting Poincaré’s 
methodology in order to explain the rationality of the development of general relativity. 
Furthermore, I argue in §4.2.3 that the development of the equivalence principle receives a 
natural alternative interpretation within the framework of a regulative Kantianism. 
4.2.1.  1907: The Newtonian statement of the equivalence principle 
In  1907  Einstein  began  work  on  developing  a  relativistic  account  of  gravitation:  by 
extending  the  relativity  principle  so  that  it  applied  to  uniformly  accelerating  frames  of 
reference, he was able to predict that the speed of light would vary in a gravitational field 158 
 
and  would  seem  to  bend  around  massive  bodies.
173  This  extension  of  the  relativity 
principle—though he did not yet refer to it as such—was Einstein’s first statement of the 
equivalence principle. In this  section I am concerned with two questions: (1) how did 
Einstein  come  to  be  convinced  that  the  key  to  developing  a  relativistic  account  of 
gravitation lay in extending the relativity principle? (2) What was the role of the extended 
relativity principle in the argument of Einstein’s (1907)? In response to the first question, I 
argue that Einstein took the equivalence principle form Newtonian physics in order to 
ensure that his new theory did not violate the universality of free-fall. Second, I argue that 
Einstein  understood  the  variability  of  the  speed  of  light  as  an  inconsistency  between 
Newtonian physics and special relativity. As we see in the next section, Einstein’s 1912 
theory of static gravitational fields, should then be understood as an attempt to resolve this 
apparent inconsistency. 
The  equivalence  principle,  as  it  features  in  Einstein’s  (1907)  can  be  stated  as 
follows: 
 
(EP1):  The laws of nature take the same form in a uniformly accelerating frame of 
reference as they do in a stationary frame of reference equipped with a 
homogeneous gravitational field. 
 
Let us begin our discussion of the equivalence principle EP1 by examining its early role in 
Einstein’s thought. EP1 was initially introduced as an extension of the relativity principle:
174 
 
Hitherto we have applied the principle of relativity, i.e., the assumption that the laws of 
nature are independent of the state of motion of the reference system, only to systems of 
reference free of acceleration. Is it conceivable that the principle of relativity is also valid 
for systems that are accelerated relative to each other? (1907, CPAE 2, p.302)175 
 
Using Σ to denote a resting frame with a homogeneous gravitational field and Σ’ to denote 
a uniformly accelerating frame, Einstein then stated EP1 as follows: 
 
                                                 
173 This early prediction would, of course, be confirmed by Eddington in 1919. 
174 The relativity principle is just the claim that physical laws take the same form with respect to all inertial 
frames. 
175  For  referencing  Einstein’s  works  I  follow  a  different  convention  from  that  which  I  have  adopted 
previously. I refer to their year of original publication and additionally give the volume and page number 
referred to in The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein where appropriate, rather than referring to the year of 
publication of the version of the translated version of the papers. 159 
 
As far as we know, the physical laws with respect to Σ do not differ from those with 
respect  to  Σ’;  this  is  based  on  the  fact  that  all  bodies  are  equally  accelerated  in  the 
gravitational field. At our present state of experience we have thus no reason to assume 
that the systems Σ and Σ’ differ from each other in any respect…This assumption extends 
the principle of relativity to the uniformly accelerated translational motion of the reference 
system. (ibid.) 
 
The most basic intuition behind EP1, then, is just that a physical situation described with 
respect to a uniformly accelerating frame of reference is described in exactly the same way 
with respect to a stationary frame of reference equipped with a homogeneous gravitational 
field. The sense in which this extends the relativity principle is quite clear: the equivalence 
principle extends the relativity principle so as to include a particular class of non-inertial 
frames (i.e. those that are uniformly accelerating). 
Why, though, did Einstein seek to introduce gravitation by extending the relativity 
principle? Einstein introduced EP1 in his (1907) without really providing any concrete 
explanation as to what motivated the principle: all that he says is that EP1 provides the 
most  natural way  to  extend  the  relativity  postulate.  Furthermore,  a  study  of  Einstein’s 
correspondence from around this period reveals little that gives us any extra insight. So, in 
order  to  understand  the  thought  process  behind  the  introduction  of  the  equivalence 
principle we must rely on the account that Einstein offers in his memoirs.
176  
Einstein’s most detailed memoir of the process which led him to the introduction 
of the equivalence principle—which is also emphasised by  Norton (1995, 2007b)—is his 
(1954 [1933]).
177 Here, speaking of the problem of extending the principle of relativity, 
Einstein wrote: 
I came a step closer to the solution of the problem when I attempted to deal with the law 
of gravity within the framework of the special theory of relativity. Like most writers at the 
time, I tried to frame a field-law for gravitation, since it was no longer possible, at least in 
any natural way, to introduce direct action at a distance owing to the abolition of the 
notion of absolute simultaneity 
The simplest thing was, of course, to retain the Laplacian scalar potential of gravity, 
and to complete the equation of Poisson in an obvious way by a term differential with 
respect to time in such a way that the special theory of relativity was satisfied. The law of 
motion of the mass point in a gravitational field had also to be adapted to the special 
                                                 
176  It  is,  of  course,  well-known  that  the  accounts  of  scientists  looking  back  on  their  own  work  can  be 
unreliable: however, in this case, the relevant memoirs are quite detailed and coherently fit with Einstein’s 
writing and correspondence from the period in question.  
177 The importance of this memoir is also stressed by Norton (1995; 2007b). 160 
 
theory of relativity. The path was not so unmistakably marked out here, since the inert 
mass of a body might depend on the gravitational potential. In fact this was to be expected 
on account of the principle of the inertia of energy. (1954, pp.286-7) 
So,  Einstein  initially  attempted  to  get  a  relativistic  field-equation  for  gravitation  by 
amending the Poisson field-equation for gravitation so as to render it consistent with the 
results of special relativity. The most natural way to do this is simply to exchange the 
Laplacian operator that appears in the classical Poisson equation with the Lorentz covariant 
D’Alembertian  operator.
178  This  much,  it  would  seem,  was  relatively  unproblematic. 
However,  it  would  seem,  that  there  were  more  serious  difficulties  here  in  terms  of 
understanding the equations of motion for a body in a gravitational field, with Einstein’s 
somewhat cryptic remark that “the inert mass of a body might depend on the gravitational 
potential”. 
What might this mean? Norton (2007b, pp.418-9) offers a plausible interpretation. 
The problem occurs when we try to derive relativistic, field-theoretic equations that govern 
the behaviour of masses in a relativistic gravitational field. In particular such an approach 
turns out to be possible only in cases where the scalar potential of the gravitational field is 
constant along the trajectory of the particle: as such, this approach is suited to describe only 
a very limited group of gravitational fields. Nordström suggested that this difficulty could 
be overcome if the mass becomes a function of the potential. This is, in all probability, 
what Einstein had in mind when he claimed that the inertial mass may depend on the 
gravitational potential.
179 
Einstein’s  attempt  to  understand  the  motion  of  a  mass  particle  in  a  relativistic 
gravitational field, then, seemed to raise some quite serious problems. Einstein’s memoir 
continues: 
These investigations, however, led to a result which raised my strong suspicions. According 
to classical mechanics, the vertical acceleration of a body in the vertical gravitational field is 
independent of the horizontal component of its velocity. Hence in such a gravitational field 
the  vertical  acceleration  of  a  mechanical  system  or  of  its  centre  of  gravity  works  out 
independently of its kinetic energy. But in the theory I advanced, the acceleration of a 
falling body was not independent of its horizontal velocity of the internal energy of the 
system. (1954, p.287) 
Einstein’s concern here is clearer. Renn (2007, p.55) suggests a thought experiment that 
neatly encapsulates this problem: consider a stone falling vertically and a projectile that is 
                                                 
178 Norton (2007b, p.417) also suggests that this may have been what Einstein had in mind here. 
179 See Norton (2007b, p.419) 161 
 
fired horizontally from the same height at the same time that the stone is dropped, then, in 
classical  mechanics  we  expect  the  two  bodies  to  hit  the  floor  simultaneously.  We  can 
consider this situation from a reference frame that is moving at the same speed as the 
projectile but in the opposite direction, so that the roles of the stone and the projectile 
appear to be reversed. Both bodies are still expected to fall to the floor at the same time. 
However in special relativity the matter is not so simple. The difficulty is that what is 
simultaneous  is  meant  to  be  frame  dependent;  this  means  that  if  two  events  are 
simultaneous in one frame then they should not be simultaneous in another frame. This 
means that the equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass would have to be violated. 
Einstein then went on to explain that this violation of the principle that all bodies fall with 
the  same  acceleration within  a  gravitational  field led  him  to  abandon  the  approach  of 
developing a Lorentz covariant gravitational theory: 
 
This did not fit with the old experimental fact that all bodies have the same acceleration in 
a gravitational field. This law, which may also be formulated as the law of the equality of 
inertial and gravitational mass, was now brought home to me in all its significance. I was in the 
highest degree amazed at its existence and guessed that in it must lie the key to a deeper 
understanding of inertia and gravitation. I had no serious doubts about its strict validity 
even without knowing the results of the admirable experiments of Eötvös, which—if my 
memory is right—came only later. I now abandoned as inadequate the attempt to treat the 
problem of gravitation, in the manner outlined above, within the framework of the special 
theory of relativity. It clearly failed to do justice to this most fundamental property of 
gravitation. (Einstein, 1954, p.287, emphasis added) 
 
What this tells us is that prior to 1907, Einstein had sought to develop a relativistic account 
of gravitation according to which the gravitational field was an external field imposed upon 
space-time in the same sense as Newton’s gravitational field was imposed upon Newtonian 
space.  However,  this  approach  towards  developing  a  relativistic  account  of  gravitation 
could not succeed because there was an incompatibility between a relativistic field-theoretic 
approach to gravitation and the experience of the universality of free fall. 
  After developing the special theory of relativity, then, Einstein sought to unify his 
theory of relativity and Newton’s theory of gravitation. This most natural way to do so was 
by  amending  the  three-dimensional  Poisson  equation  for  the  gravitational  field  with  a 
suitable relativistic candidate. However, he quickly saw that this method of proceeding 
would be hopeless: a relativistic field-equation for gravitation did not seem able to secure 
the universality of free-fall.  162 
 
I suggest that Einstein traced this problem back to a problem with the concept of 
acceleration in Newtonian physics.
180 DiSalle characterises the process by which Einstein 
introduced  the  equivalence  principle  as  one  of  dialectical  engagement  with  the  Newtonian 
concept  of  absolute  acceleration.  The  process  of  dialectical  engagement  is  related  to 
conceptual analysis, but is intended to be stronger: 
 
To  call  this  process  a  conceptual  analysis,  indeed,  is  to  understate  the  force  of  the 
argument: it is typically a dialectical argument from the prevailing definition to a new one, 
revealing the hidden presuppositions of the old conception, and exhibiting the internal 
difficulties that must be resolved by the new. (DiSalle, 2010, p.528) 
 
DiSalle,  then,  understands  conceptual  analysis  as  just  the  process  of  revealing  the 
consistency or inconsistency of ideas. Dialectical engagement is intended to go deeper by 
revealing what it is in the conceptual content of the old theory that needs to be revised in 
the new theory.  
What  does  it  mean  to  say  that  the  equivalence  principle  arises  from  Einstein’s 
dialectical engagement with the Newtonian concept of absolute acceleration (2006, pp.120-
31)?
181 If we consider a privileged centre of mass frame in Newtonian physics—DiSalle 
focuses on the system of Jupiter and its moons—in which all accelerations due to gravity 
are  equal  and  in  the  same  direction  then,  by  Newton’s  Corollary  VI  (and  Galileo’s 
equivalence principle) we can treat this system as inertial. For DiSalle, this is a contradictory 
situation that arises within Newtonian physics: “different local inertial frames separately 
satisfy  empirical  criteria  for  being  inertial  frames,  yet  are  non-inertial  relative  to  one 
another” (p.130). We may locally treat, e.g. Jupiter and its moons as inertial and Saturn and 
its moons as inertial, yet—because the acceleration due to gravity on each will be different 
                                                 
180 DiSalle (2006, §4.4) emphasises the importance of Einstein’s dialectical engagement with the Newtonian 
concept of acceleration in developing general relativity. My account differs from DiSalle’s in that he takes the 
process of Einstein’s dialectical engagement with the concept of acceleration to be sufficient to get to develop 
the  concept  of  curved  space-time  on  its  own.  I  think  that  the  process  was  important  for  Einstein’s 
identification of EP1 as the starting point for the development of a theory of relativity. However, as we will 
see, after that I suggest that EP1 was used to derive a different conceptual difficulty that needed to be 
resolved before the concept of four-dimensionally curved space-time could be arrived at. 
181 DiSalle also offers an insightful treatment of the development of the special theory. Einstein’s crucial 
insight—the conventional definition of simultaneity—came about, on DiSalle’s account, through Einstein’s 
dialectical engagement with the Newtonian concept of simultaneity. Prior to Einstein, DiSalle points out, the 
concept of absolute simultaneity gains its empirical content through its relation to the Newtonian account of 
gravitational  interaction.  However,  towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  some  physicists—DiSalle 
focuses on James Thomson—began  to  notice that  this was deeply problematic as there was no  way to 
empirically determine events to be simultaneous over great distances. Thomson was the first to point out that 
determination of simultaneity requires the use of signalling. On DiSalle’s reconstruction, Einstein combined 
this thought with the fact that the two-way speed of light was known to be both finite and invariant and 
conventionally sets the one-way speed of light to be invariant and used signalling by this means to determine 
the simultaneity of any two events. 163 
 
as Jupiter is nearer to the Sun—the two systems may be non-inertial with respect to each 
other. Einstein alone noticed that the concept of an inertial frame was not well-defined in 
classical  physics  in  this  way.  So,  for  DiSalle,  it  was  through  the  process  of  dialectical 
engagement that Einstein came to realise that the concept of an inertial frame was not well-
defined in classical physics in this way. 
If this is right and Einstein had indeed seen in 1907 that Corollary VI means that 
the concept of an inertial frame is not well-defined in Newtonian physics, then this sheds 
light on why he turned to EP1 to solve the problem that he described in his (1954 [1933]) 
memoir. To clarify this, though, we must first discuss the relationship between Corollary 
VI and EP1: in particular, I suggest that EP1 is equivalent to a combination of Corollary VI 
and Galileo’s equivalence principle. Corollary VI states: 
 
If bodies, any how moved among themselves, are urged in the direction of parallel lines by equal accelerative 
forces, they will all continue to move among themselves, after the same manner as if they had been urged by 
no such forces. 
For these forces acting equally (with respect to the quantities of the bodies to be 
moved), and in the direction of parallel lines, will (by Law II) move all the bodies equally 
(as to velocity), and therefore will never produce any change in the positions or motions of 
the bodies among themselves. (Newton, 1729, p.25) 
 
Here Newton claims that if bodies are all urged in the direction of parallel lines by equal 
accelerative forces then they can be treated as if they were not urged by any force at all. 
The primary application of Corollary VI in the Principia is to the system of Jupiter and its 
moons. Newton sought to determine the force exerted by Jupiter on its moons so that he 
would be able to determine the mass of Jupiter.
182 The difficulty that Newton faced in 
determining the central forces within the system of Jupiter and its moons is that the system 
is not isolated: the sun exerts an accelerative force on Jupiter and each of its moons. Before 
Corollary VI could  be  applied  to  this  situation, Newton  needed  to appeal  to  Galileo’s 
equivalence principle, which states that all bodies fall at the same rate in a gravitational field 
regardless of their mass. This is required to ensure that the Sun exerts an equal gravitational 
force on each of the bodies in the system. Then Corollary VI can be applied in order to 
permit Newton to treat Jupiter’s system as inertial. 
                                                 
182 This was important because it was the first stage in Newton’s calculation of the centre of mass of the solar 
system. This was the central task of the Principia: i.e., to show that neither the earth nor the sun is the centre 
of the solar system and that, rather, the centre should be understood as the centre of mass, which is very 
close to the sun. See (DiSalle, 2006, §2.8) for detailed discussion. 164 
 
  From the perspective of the development of general relativity, this is important 
because the conjunction of Corollary VI and Galileo’s equivalence principle is equivalent to 
EP1.  In  his  treatment  of  the  system  of  Jupiter  and  its  moons,  Newton  began  by 
considering the system as an accelerating one. Because the accelerative forces on the planet 
and its moons were gravitational, Newton could be sure that the outside accelerative forces 
were  all  equal  and  could  therefore,  by  Corollary  VI,  be  discounted.  In  effect,  then, 
Corollary VI and Galileo’s principle together enable Newton to claim that the motions of 
bodies among themselves are the same in an accelerating system as they are in a uniform 
gravitational field. The difference between this claim and EP1 is just that Newton refers to 
“bodies, anyhow moved among themselves” where EP1 refers to the form of the laws of 
nature and this, I take it, is not a substantial difference.
183 
  This helps to clarify why Einstein took the equivalence principle to be of such 
central  importance  to  the  development  of  a  relativistic  theory  of  gravitation.  Einstein 
(1954) claimed that he initially sought to develop general relativity as a relativistic field 
theory: however, he quickly saw that this contradicted “the old experimental fact that all 
bodies have the same weight in a gravitational field”. In 1907, I suggest that Einstein saw 
this problem as a consequence of the fact that Newton’s theory of gravitation and special 
relativity were inconsistent because special relativity relied upon the concept of an inertial 
frame while the concept was not well-defined in Newton’s theory. EP1 would have seemed 
a promising candidate to ensure the consistency of the two theories. Corollary VI was the 
source of Einstein’s realisation that the concept of an inertial frame is not well-defined in 
classical physics. By placing EP1—which incorporates Corollary VI—at the centre of his 
developing theory, Einstein could ensure that his new theory would not privilege inertial 
frames of reference in the same way that the special theory of relativity did. Furthermore, 
since EP1 also incorporates Galileo’s equivalence principle, Einstein could ensure that in his 
new theory all bodies would have the same weight in a gravitational field. While Newton’s 
theory contained an insight that was equivalent to EP1, it was not able to provide an 
interpretation of the insight: i.e., it remained a mystery as to how inertial and gravitational 
                                                 
183  The  claim  that  a  version  of  the  equivalence  principle  is  equivalent  to  the  conjunction  of  Galileo’s 
equivalence principle and Corollary VI is common in the literature: for noteworthy recent examples see 
(Disalle, 2006) and (Saunders, 2013). Saunders (p.37) is particularly helpful in understanding the relationship 
between Corollary VI and the equivalence principle. He shows that the conjunction of Corollary VI and 
Galileo’s equivalence principle can be states as follows: “If bodies moved in any manner among themselves 
are urged in the direction of parallel lines by equal gravitational forces due to outside bodies, they will all 
continue to move among themselves, after the same manner as if they had not all been urged by that force” 
(ibid.). Saunders then offers the following statement of the equivalence principle—which is equivalent to my 
EP1—that makes the relationship between this principle and Corollary VI clear: “If bodies moved in any 
manner among themselves are described in relation to an accelerating but nonrotating frame of reference, 
they will all move in relation to that frame as if acted on by uniform gravitational forces, producing the 
opposite acceleration” (ibid.). 165 
 
mass could be equal while also being conceptually distinct. By beginning his investigation 
into general relativity with EP1, Einstein could solve the problem of the inconsistency of 
special  relativity  and  classical  physics  while  also  laying  the  foundation  for  a  potential 
interpretation of an otherwise uninterpreted fact of classical physics. 
In this sense, the development of general relativity can be understood as being 
primarily motivated by the desire to remove inertial frames of their privileged status: this, as 
we will see, is equally clear throughout the development of the theory. EP1, of course, does 
not achieve this on its own: rather than remove the privileged status of inertial frames it 
extends  that  privilege  to  uniformly  accelerating  frames  of  reference.  However,  the 
equivalence principle did have an important role to play in the process by which Einstein 
stripped inertial frames of their privileged status: EP1 expanded the group of admissible 
coordinate  transformations  so  that  inertial  frames  were  no  longer  invariants  of  the 
admissible transformations of the theory.
184 
   
  While EP1 promised to neatly solve the problem that Einstein discusses in his 
(1954) memoir, it would also raise a further problem. In his (1907), Einstein used EP1 to 
demonstrate that the speed of light must change in the presence of a gravitational field, 
contrary to the expectations of special relativity. At some point between 1907 and 1911 
Einstein  became  convinced  that  the  essential  insight  of  the  equivalence  principle  was 
correct and that he must, therefore, resolve this new tension between the special theory of 
relativity and the prediction derived with EP1 that in a relativistic theory of gravitation, the 
speed of light must be variable. This, I suggest, was the most significant aspect of the 
development of a relativistic theory of gravitation in this period. It is clear from Einstein’s 
later publications that he retrospectively saw this as the main challenge of the period: 
 
This result [that light bends in a gravitational field] is not in agreement with the present 
theory  of  relativity,  for  it  leads  to  a  dependence  of  the  velocity  in  vacuum  on  the 
gravitational  potential.  However,  I  have  shown  together  with  Mr.  Grossman,  that  the 
theory of relativity can be generalized in such a way that it remains in agreement with the 
above mentioned equivalence hypothesis. (1913b, p.190) 
 
  The Einstein-Grossman theory is more complicated than that of Nordström in that it 
violates the…principle of the constancy of the velocity of light and thereby necessitates a 
generalization of the theory of relativity. But, in return, it eliminates an epistemological 
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weakness that hitherto attached to mechanics and that has long been felt by perspicacious 
epistemologists, especially by Ernst Mach. (1914b, p.292) 
 
In both these passages Einstein was concerned with a violation of the constancy of the 
speed of light and suggests that the purpose of his (1913a) is to show that it is possible to 
see it as result that is consistent with the equivalence principle. 
4.2.2.  1907-1912: The equivalence principle in Einstein’s theory of static gravitational fields 
As we have just seen, in 1907 Einstein derived a contradiction between Newton’s theory of 
gravitation and relativistic kinematics. EP1 is consistent with Newtonian physics and was 
used to derive a contradiction between Newton’s theory of gravitation and the theory of 
relativity.  The  1907  and  1911  papers  should  be  seen  as  Einstein’s  deriving  this 
contradiction: he showed that Newtonian physics and relativistic kinematics jointly imply 
the variability of the speed of light (which would seem to contradict the light postulate). 
Einstein, then, needed to find a way to resolve this conceptual tension.  This conceptual 
tension became apparent as a consequence of Einstein’s deployment of EP1, as such it was 
this principle that Einstein saw as being ultimately responsible for the conceptual tension 
of the 1907 and 1911 papers. In this section I examine Einstein’s two papers of 1912 in 
which he developed a theory of static gravitational fields: the equivalence principle in these 
papers is used to motivate Einstein’s abandonment of the Newtonian idea that gravitational 
interaction is mediated by a gravitational field.
185 
  The statement of the equivalence principle in this paper is similar to the statement 
of the principle that we saw in Einstein’s (1907), but differs from it a significant fashion. 
Here, Einstein introduced it in the following form: 
 
  Let the reference system K (coordinates x, y, z) be in a state of uniform acceleration in the 
direction of its x-coordinate…According to the equivalence hypothesis, such a system K is 
equivalent to a system at rest in which there is a mass-free static gravitational field of a 
specific kind. (1912a, pp.95-6) 
 
The difference between this formulation of the principle and the 1907 version is that now 
Einstein  explicitly  stated  that  the  gravitational  field  was  “mass-free”.
186  This  statement, 
then, specifically introduces the idea that gravitational fields can be conceived of as separate 
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from  the  masses  that  cause  them.  Whereas  in  the  papers  of  1907  (and  1911)  the 
equivalence principle was taken just as the claim that the laws of physics take the same 
form in both cases, here there is an additional claim that the systems are fully equivalent. 
That this is a novel—and, for some, troubling—claim is indicated by Laue’s rejection of the 
idea in an earlier letter to Einstein: 
 
I do not believe in this theory because I cannot concede the full equivalence of your 
systems K and K’. After all, a body causing gravitation must be present for the gravitational 
field in a system K, but not for an accelerated system K’. Thus, the presence or, else, 
absence  of  such  a  body  will  decide  immediately  whether  we  are  dealing  with  a  real 
gravitational  field  or  only  an  accelerated  system.  (Max  Laue  to  Albert  Einstein,  27th 
December 1911, in Beck (1995, p.244)) 
 
The formulation of the equivalence principle that Einstein gave in his (1912a) includes, in 
effect, the claim that it is possible to conceive of fields as having existence independently of 
their source.
187 The equivalence principle of 1912, then, can be stated as follows: 
 
(EP2):  An accelerated frame of reference and a frame of reference equipped with a 
homogeneous gravitational field are fully physically equivalent. 
 
The difference between EP1 and EP2 is as follows. According to EP1 the description of 
the  physical  situations  is  the  same,  however,  there  is  still  room  to  distinguish  a  “real” 
gravitational field from one generated by transforming away an acceleration. EP2, though, 
does not make this distinction. How does this alteration of the principle impact upon the 
development of the theory? Let us look at Einstein’s (1912a), (1912b) and (1912c) to chart 
the development of his thought in this year. 
  The year in question, 1912, is important in the development of general relativity for 
a number of reasons: (1) Einstein’s theory of static gravitational fields—which he took the 
first steps towards developing in his (1907) and (1911)—found its most developed form in 
his (1912a) and (1912b), (2) he moved to Zurich in August where he would meet up once 
again with Marcel Grossman, who would supply him with the mathematical tools to treat 
gravitation as space-time curvature and (3) in the winter of 1912 he began working towards 
his field equations in his Zurich notebook.  
Prior to Einstein’s work on developing a relativistic account of gravitation it had 
been assumed that gravitation was to be added to space-time structure as an additional 
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field. In 1905 there was not expected to be any special problem in modifying Newton’s 
gravitational theory to make it compatible with relativistic considerations. It was thought 
that it would be possible to develop a Lorentz-covariant version of Newton’s expression 
for  the  gravitational  force  between  two  objects.  Both  Poincaré  and  Minkowski  made 
serious attempts in this direction.
188 
The  equivalence  principle  provided  Einstein  with  an  alternative  to  the  field-
theoretic approach. Rather than needing to find a way to render an additional structure 
consistent with space and time as given by relativistic kinematics, Einstein was able to claim 
that  the  space-time  structures  of  special  relativity  are  all  that  is  needed  to  represent 
gravitation. The space-time of special relativity is all that is needed to deal with uniform 
accelerations; now that uniform accelerations are understood to be fully equivalent to the 
gravitational fields (as opposed to it being the case that only the equations of motion were 
the same in both cases) Einstein saw that the space-time structure of special relativity is all 
that is needed to account for gravitation as well. 
Einstein (1912a) began by considering the observation of an accelerated frame of 
reference from the perspective of a non-accelerating frame with a constant gravitational 
potential and seeking coordinate transformations to describe the relation between the two 
frames. For an accelerated frame K (x, y, z, t) and inertial frame K’ (ξ, η, ζ, τ) these are given 
by: 
 
  =   +	
  
2
 2 
  =   
  =   
τ = ct 
 
 
Where the velocity of light in system K is given by: 
 
  =    +    
 
where c0 and a are integration constants. Now, Einstein is in a position to appeal to a result 
of his (1911): that the gravitational field is determined by c (which is, of course, derived 
from the equivalence principle and is just the apparent contradiction between Newtonian 
physics and relativistic kinematics that we drew attention to in §4.3 considered from the 
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reversed  perspective).  The  description  of  the  gravitational  field  is  a  solution  to  the 
following equation: 
 
Δ  =
   
  2 +
   
  2 +
   
  2 = 0 
 
This  equation,  Einstein  says  (1912a,  p.99),  must  be  valid  for  every  mass-free  static 
gravitational field. The natural expression for the case with mass-sources would then be: 
 
∆  =     
 
Where k is the universal gravitational constant and r represents mass density. In a footnote 
Einstein adds that these equations cannot be considered as entirely correct. The matter is 
left there in his (1912a) and is fully explored in his (1912b). 
  Einstein explains the problem with the previous equation in his (1912b, pp.114-5). 
The problem is, as he goes on to show, that this eventually results in an incompatibility 
with  the  principle  of  action  and  reaction.  To  show  why  this  is  so  we  also  need  the 
expression for the force   that acts on a given density of stationary ponderable matter, r, 
that Einstein also derived in his (1912a):
189 
 
  = − grad 	 
 
Einstein then forms the integral: 
 
     
 
If this is taken over a space for which c is constant at infinity, the principle of equality of 
action and reaction implies that it should vanish: “Otherwise the totality of the masses in 
the space under consideration…would strive to start moving” (1912b, p.115). That is, if the 
integral does not vanish then we would find that a uniform and infinite distribution of mass 
would set itself in motion. Now, combining the expression for force with expression for ∆c 
we get: 
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     = −  grad 	   = −
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∆ 
 
grad 	   
 
The last part of this equality does not vanish, though, which places the expression for the 
gravitational field—derived from the equivalence principle—in opposition to the principle 
of action and reaction. 
  Einstein  tried  two ways to  avoid  this  incompatibility,  but  neither  proved to  be 
satisfactory.
190 Having exhausted these possibilities, Einstein’s only remaining alternative 
was to alter his expression for the gravitational force on a body. His final equation was 
given by (1912b, p.118): 
 
∆  =      +
1
2 
grad  
 
  
 
The  second  term  here  can  be  seen  as  naturally  representing  the  energy-density  of  the 
gravitational field.  
It is this term that ensures that Einstein’s theory conserves energy. The difference 
between this and the (1912a) expression for the gravitational force on a body is that, now, 
the gravitational field itself acts as a source of gravity rather than just the mass-energy of 
matter acting as a source of gravitation. The reason that this secured energy-conservation 
was that, according to Einstein’s famous equation E=mc
2, all energy should act as a source 
of gravitation (because matter and energy are of essentially the same type, so rather than 
matter causing gravity, energy does). This means that this expression and not the (1912a) 
one satisfies the demand of energy conservation, because it treats both the energy of matter 
and the energy of the gravitational field as a source of gravity. So, guided by the principle 
of action and reaction, Einstein had developed an expression for the gravitational force on 
a body that conserved energy. 
However, this expression does not admit a linear dependence of the potential c on 
distance and so it cannot be used to describe homogeneous gravitational fields. This means 
that Einstein had a choice between accepting this expression for the gravitational force on 
a body and securing both the principle of the equality of action and reaction and the 
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for the gravitational force on a body: neither approach succeeded. Here I see Einstein as simply trying to 
retain the strongest possible form of the equivalence principle that he can; ultimately it loses out here to the 
equality  of  action  and  reaction  and  so  is  weakened.  This,  though,  simply  provided  Einstein  with  the 
motivation to alter his understanding of the principle of equivalence again in the development of the final 
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conservation of energy, or insisting on the equivalence principle and finding some other 
equation. 
Einstein ultimately thought that it was more important that his equation did justice 
to well-established physical principles than obey a heuristic principle like EP2. As such, the 
only way to maintain a version of the principle of equivalence is to limit it to infinitesimal 
regions of inhomogeneous gravitational fields. Einstein’s dissatisfaction with this is clearly 
expressed in his (1912c): 
 
  I sought to make a first, quite modest contribution to the attainment of this goal [a theory 
of relativity that includes the equality of gravitational and inertial mass] in my papers on the 
static gravitational field…I have to admit that I was able to carry through this conception 
in a consistent way only for infinitely small spaces, and that I cannot give a satisfactory 
explanation for that fact. But I do not see this as any reason to reject the equivalence 
principle for the infinitely small as well; no one can deny that this principle is a natural 
extrapolation of one of the most general empirical laws of physics.[191] On the other hand, 
the equivalence principle opens up for us the interesting perspective according to which 
the equations of a relativity theory that would also include gravitation may also be invariant 
with respect to acceleration (and rotation) transformations. (1912c, p.133) 
 
Here Einstein explicitly stated that he regarded his task as finding a relativistic expression 
of  the  equivalence  principle.  He  regards  the  theory  of  static  fields  as  only  partially 
successful in that the equivalence principle only found expression in an infinitesimal form. 
However, Einstein thought that there was still promise for the principle in the sense that it 
suggests a more general invariance group—incorporating accelerations and rotations—for 
a relativity theory that includes gravitation.  
In this section we have seen that the principle of equivalence played a vital role in 
Einstein’s arguments of 1912 in that it permitted him to view gravitational effects as just 
part  of  the  space-time  structure  of  special  relativity.  However  his  attempts  to  derive 
satisfactory  equations  governing  gravitation  thus-understood  are  frustrated  by  a 
contradiction  between  the  demands  of  the  principle  of  energy  conservation  and  the 
demands of the equivalence principle. Ultimately, for the time being, the demands of the 
equivalence principle are lessened to avoid this problem. However, the principle still looms 
large  in  his  thoughts  and,  convinced  that  the  principle  is  a  “natural  extrapolation”  of 
empirical  laws,  Einstein  hints  that  the  principle  may  motivate  widening  the  invariance 
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group of relativity to include accelerations and rotations. At this point though, Einstein is 
stuck:
192 it is not until he is fortuitously reunited with Marcel Grossman that he will develop 
the tools to take the next step. 
  This is important from the perspective of understanding how Einstein would arrive 
at  the  version  of  the  equivalence  principle  that  eventually  finds  expression  in  general 
relativity: 
 
(EP3):  Inertia and gravitation are entirely identical in nature and one structure—
the inertio-gravitational field—is responsible for both. 
 
In §4.3 I show how Einstein arrived at EP3 via the rotating disk thought experiment. 
4.2.3.  The equivalence principle as a regulative demand 
In the previous two sections, I have detailed the introduction of the equivalence principle 
and shown how the principle developed in response to demands of the emerging general 
theory of relativity. In introducing EP1, Einstein did not go beyond Newtonian physics: 
the principle was used to draw attention to an inconsistency between Newtonian physics 
and relativistic kinematics in requiring the speed of light to be variable. The conceptual 
tension is resolved by strengthening the equivalence principle to the claim that uniformly 
accelerating  frames  of  reference  and  inertial  frames  of  reference  equipped  with  a 
homogeneous gravitational field are fully physically equivalent: this meant that gravitational 
effects could be seen as arising from the structure of space-time. It is important to stress 
that in the 1912 theory there is not a full unification of gravitational and inertial effects: the 
equivalence  principle  remained  the  limited  claim  that  a  class  of  accelerated  frames  is 
equivalent to a class of inertial frames that are equipped with homogeneous gravitational 
fields.  This  was  enough  to  motivate  a  move  away  from  field-theoretic  approaches  to 
gravitation but ultimately forced Einstein to treat EP2 as holding only infinitesimally. Let 
us now turn our attention to the question of how we should philosophically interpret the 
process by which Einstein introduced the equivalence principle. 
  Friedman argues that Einstein, in introducing the equivalence principle, sought to 
emulate Poincaréan methodology in elevating an empirical fact to the status of a principle. 
Whichever version of the equivalence principle Friedman has in mind, it should now be 
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have. I would like to ask all of my colleagues to have a try at this important problem!” (p. 133). 173 
 
clear that this does not fit the historical narrative developed in §§4.2.1-2. EP1 is a pre-
existing  principle  taken  from  Newtonian  mechanics  that  Einstein  used  to  identify  the 
source  of  a  conceptual  tension  between  special  relativity  and  Newton’s  theory  of 
gravitation. EP2 is developed from EP1: EP1 was understood to be problematic because it 
would still be possible to distinguish accelerating from gravitational systems on the grounds 
that a body must be present in order to generate a gravitational field. EP2 re-emphasises 
the  full  equivalence  of  accelerating  systems  and  those  equipped  with  a  homogeneous 
gravitational field. EP2, in effect, embraces in full the consequences of EP1 and seeks to 
treat gravitation using the space-time structures used to provide a relativistic account of 
gravitation.  EP3,  as  we  see  more  fully  in  §4.3.1,  emerges  from  the  application  of  an 
infinitesimal version of EP2 to the case of uniform rotation. 
  The important point is that the steps of this process that we have seen so far do 
not  depend  in  any  way  on  Einstein’s  seeking  to  implement  Poincaréan  methodology. 
Einstein’s concern was with the compatibility of Newton’s account of gravitation and his 
own theory of relativity. In his first attempt to unite these theories he discovered that the 
universality of free-fall was threatened. Rather than elevating the empirically observed fact 
of the universality of free-fall to the status of a principle, Einstein adopted a pre-existing 
classical understanding of the behaviour of inertial frames of reference and used this to 
guide the development of his relativistic account of gravitation so that there would be no 
further clash between the two theories. That is, there is no need to posit the elevation of a 
fact to the status of a principle because EP1 codifies the Newtonian understanding of the 
relationship between inertial and gravitational frames. 
  How, then, should we understand the motivation behind the equivalence principle? 
I suggest that it be understood as the implementation of a regulative demand to broaden 
the class of admissible coordinate transformations. In the period we have considered in this 
section, the equivalence principle certainly seems to act as a covariance principle. Prior to 
his work in 1907, Einstein treated all inertial coordinate systems as physically equivalent: 
i.e., special relativity was Lorentz covariant. In his work between 1907-1912 the equivalence 
principle is appealed to in order to expand the covariance group of special relativity so as to 
also include uniformly accelerating coordinate systems. To be sure, this does not extend the 
covariance group of relativity as far as general covariance eventually would do; however, 
the 1912 theory of static gravitational fields does represent an intermediate stage in the 
development  of  general  relativity  with  an  intermediate  set  of  physically  equivalent 
coordinate systems. 
  There is another important lesson to be drawn from this period of the development 
of general relativity. In §3.3.2.2, I suggested that on a regulative Kantian philosophy of 174 
 
science, constitutive principles should be understood as those that played a role in making 
the new laws of a theory possible. The equivalence principle certainly seems to have played 
this role in 1907-1912. Cassirer argued that for physical principles to play this role they 
must be “universal”, i.e., they must find some form of expression in both successor and 
precursor theories so that they can point the way from the old theory to the new theory. 
The equivalence principle is universal in this sense, because it finds expression in Newton 
use of Corollary VI and Galileo’s equivalence principle to permit the treatment of the 
system of Jupiter and its moons as an inertial system.
193 However, the principle should not 
be  expected  to  retain  the  same  form  throughout  theory  change  and  may  need  to  be 
amended in order to bring new laws under it: I have argued that, through a process of 
dialectical engagement, the equivalence principle develops in just such a way so as to enable 
the lawlike description of an ever-widening class of phenomena.
194 
  Now, this might raise a worry. Cassirer’s account of the role of principles in the 
development of new physical laws may seem very close to Poincaré’s account of elevation: 
Cassirer, after all, takes physical principles to be hypotheses that are held to be “universal” 
in order to develop new laws (DIMP, pp.53-4). Does the above, then, not go some way 
towards vindicating Friedman’s account of the development of relativity? I think not. It 
bears emphasising again that Friedman’s answer to CR requires that Einstein self-consciously 
implemented  Poincaréan  methodology.
195  I  do  not  see  any  evidence  that  this  is  what 
Einstein intended. Instead, his motivation seems to have been to unify Newton’s account 
of  gravitation  with  the  special  theory  of  relativity.  EP1  was  not  “elevated”,  it  was  a 
hypothesis of Newton’s theory that Einstein saw was able to serve the twin purpose of (1) 
enshrining the universality of free-fall and (2) beginning the process of gradually stripping 
away the privileged status of inertial frames of reference which Einstein saw to be the main 
                                                 
193 Here there is a parallel to be drawn between my account and Post’s (1971) account of the development of 
new scientific theories. Post seeks to show that heuristics play a crucial role in the development of scientific 
theories: he identifies eight heuristic criteria for the rational development of new scientific theories. There are 
two criteria that Post identifies that are particularly relevant to my account: the “footprint” and the “general 
correspondence principle”, which I discuss in §4.3.2.2. In general relativity, Post argues, general relativity has 
a footprint in classical physics in the sense of the equality of gravitational and inertial mass in classical physics. 
The two concepts of mass needed to be separated in order to give meaning to Newton’s laws of motion, 
but—as we have seen in §4.2.1—the separation is undone in Newton’s treatment of gravitation. In this sense 
we can treat EP1 as the expression of general relativity’s footprint in classical physics. 
194 Cf. (Cassirer, DIMP, pp.53-7) 
195 For the development of a new theory to be rational, on Friedman’s account, scientists must knowingly 
appeal to philosophy in order to ground their development of new concepts. This is important for two 
reasons. First—especially in the case of the type of meta-scientific philosophical discourse that Friedman is 
primarily concerned with—it ensures that the individual scientist or group of scientists that are developing a 
new theory appeal to concepts that are consistent with scientific knowledge up to that point. Scientists, of 
course,  may  also  make  original  philosophical  contributions  themselves,  but  I  would  speculate  that  on 
Friedman’s account these original contributions must be concerned with the same problems that characterize 
the philosophical meta-paradigm. Second, engagement with philosophy ensures that there is a paradigm-
neutral framework which can be appealed to in order to convince other scientists of the rationality of the new 
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obstacle towards successfully unifying the two theories. The rationality of this process lies 
in Einstein’s identifying a conceptual tension between the two theories he sought to unify 
and methodically seeking to resolve it. This requires no appeal to a philosophical meta-
paradigm to be seen as rational either retrospectively or prospectively: the desire for unity 
and the process of conceptual analysis are sufficient to jointly ensure the rationality of the 
development of the new theory.  
  A regulative answer to CR, then, is well-placed to account for this aspect of the 
development  and  role  of  the  equivalence  principle  in  the  emerging  theory  of  general 
relativity.  Regulative  answers  to  CR,  recall,  need to  show  first  that  each  theory  in  the 
historical sequence of, in this case, space-time theories deals with the same subject matter. 
Einstein’s introduction of EP1 as a principle taken from Newtonian physics offers a way to 
secure this: i.e., if general relativity is understood as emerging from a desire to correct a 
conceptual  ambiguity  in  Newtonian  mechanics,  then  there  is  a  clear  sense  in  which  it 
represents a continuous development from Newtonian physics rather than an entirely new 
theory.  Second,  the  process  was  begun  by  Einstein’s  desire  to  unify  two  theories:  the 
demand for unity is the paradigmatic Kantian regulative demand. Finally, CR must provide 
an  account  of  why  successor  theories  are  to  be  preferred  to  the  earlier  theories.  An 
important aspect of the regulative answer is that the successor theory represents a better 
approximation of objectivity in the sense that it endorses a broader range of coordinate 
transformations. As we have seen, there is a clear sense in which both EP1 and EP2 should 
be  understood  as  motivating  precisely  such  an  increase  in  the  number  of  admissible 
transformations. These are the foundational parts of a regulative answer to CR: I will show 
in  the  rest  of  the  chapter  how  they  can  be  applied  to  explain  the  rationality  of  the 
emergence of Einstein’s final (1916) statement of general relativity. 
4.3.  The role of the rotating disk thought experiment in the development 
of general relativity 
By  March  1912,  Einstein  had  completed  his  work  on  static  gravitational  fields  and 
immediately turned his attention towards considering stationary gravitational fields. The 
natural place to begin such a study was with the gravitational field that would be generated 
by a rotating disk.
196 Recent scholarship
197 emphasises the importance of the rotating disk 
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he clearly distinguishes between the static case and that represented by a rotating ring: “I am sending you my 
papers on gravitation, the latest of which you do not have. According to it, it appears that the equivalence 
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thought  experiment  as  a  “missing  link”  in  the  development  of  general  relativity:  the 
thought  experiment  is  understood  to  have  been  the  primary  motivation  for  Einstein’s 
coming to represent the gravitational field as curvature of four-dimensional space-time. 
The rotating disk also plays a crucial role in allowing Einstein to formulate the equivalence 
principle as EP3. As we have, seen, early in 1912 Einstein had been forced to adopt an 
infinitesimal version of EP2: as will we see in §4.4, when he began his search for his field 
equations in the winter of 1912 Einstein understands the equivalence principle as the claim 
that inertial and gravitational effects are both attributable to the inertio-gravitational field. 
As  detailed  in  §1,  Friedman—in  both  his  (2001)  and  (2010a)—places  great 
emphasis on the rotating disk thought experiment: it plays a role in his answers to both CR 
and CC. First, for Friedman, the rotating disk serves to answer CR by providing a concrete 
example of philosophy playing a crucial role in the conceptual development of a scientific 
theory.
198 Second, the rotating disk serves to ground the constitutive role of the equivalence 
principle:  it  is  through  the  equivalence  principle’s  role  in  the  rotating  disk  thought 
experiment that Friedman argues that variably curved four-dimensional space-time became 
a genuine physical possibility rather than a merely mathematical possibility.  
In this section I clarify the sense in which the rotating disk helped Einstein to the 
realisation  that  gravitation  could  be  represented  by  space-time  curvature,  given  by  the 
metric. Friedman’s account emphasises the role that measuring rods and clocks played in 
the thought experiment: he argues that it was through considering the behaviour of rods 
and clocks in a rotating frame that Einstein came to see that he could treat gravitation as 
curvature of four-dimensional space-time. In broad detail, Friedman’s account is right: the 
rotating disk does seem to have influenced the introduction of the metric as a measure of 
space-time curvature. However, I suggest the manner in which the thought experiment 
proceeds means that (i) there is no need to read Einstein as engaging in a delicate dance 
between  the  philosophies  of  Helmholtz  and  Poincaré  and  (ii)  it  is  not  plausible  to 
understand the rotating disk as grounding the constitutivity of the equivalence principle. I 
argue, instead, that the rotating disk plays a regulative role in the same way that we saw 
EP1 and EP2 did in the early stages of the theory: i.e., it broadened the range of admissible 
coordinate transformations. 
                                                                                                                                               
considered a static gravitational field, i.e., cannot be generated by masses at rest. A rotating ring does not 
generate a static field in this sense, even though it is a temporally invariant field.” (Einstein to Paul Ehrenfest, 
before 20 June 1912, CPAE 5, p.310, underlining mine). See (Stachel, 1989a; 2007) for a detailed account of 
the  importance  of  the  rotating  disk  thought  experiment  in  Einstein’s  development  of  general  relativity 
between March and July 1912.  
197 Most notably, (Stachel, 1989a) and more recently (Janssen, 2005) 
198 See §1.3.3: Friedman argues that in the thought experiment Einstein situates his view of geometry between 
Poincaré and Helmholtz’s epistemologies of geometry.  177 
 
4.3.1.  How did Einstein come to represent gravitation as space-time curvature? 
The first question to address is as to how Einstein understood the role of the rotating disk 
thought experiment: I suggest that Einstein primarily saw the rotating disk as impacting on 
his understanding of coordinate systems. Einstein’s memoirs repeatedly state that freeing 
himself  from  the  preconception  that  coordinate  systems  have  an  immediate  physical 
significance was the main problem that he faced in developing general relativity. In his 
Autobiographical Notes, Einstein asks why it took him so long—seven years from 1908—to 
arrive at the final theory of relativity and he answers as follows: 
 
The  main  reason  lies  in  the  fact  that  one  does  not  free  oneself  so  easily  from  the 
conception that an immediate physical significance must be attributed to the coordinates. 
(1996 [1949], p.67) 
 
Einstein gave a more precise answer in his (1954 [1933]): 
 
I soon saw that, according to the point of view about non-linear transformations required 
by the equivalence principle, the simple physical interpretation of the coordinates had to be 
abandoned; i.e., one could no longer require that coordinate differences be interpreted as 
signifying  the  results  of  measurements  with  ideal  measuring  rods  and  clocks.  The 
recognition tormented me a great deal because for a long time I was not able to see just 
what are coordinates actually supposed to mean in physics? The resolution of this dilemma 
was reached around 1912. (1954, p.288)  
 
Now, while these are both quotes from memoirs that Einstein wrote a significant amount 
of time after the period of the development of relativity in question, they do—I suggest—
provide insight into the particular problem that most troubled Einstein in 1912. In this 
section I argue that the introduction of the four-dimensional metric as the measure of 
space-time curvature was a response to this trouble with how to understand coordinate 
systems. However, this—as is suggested by Einstein’s (1949) claim that it took seven years 
to  free  himself  from  the  idea  that  coordinate  systems  have  an  immediate  physical 
significance—was not the end of his struggle to understand coordinate systems. 
  In developing special relativity, Einstein had understood coordinate differences as 
having  direct  physical  significance  in  the  sense  that  he  took  them  to  correspond  to 
measurements made by rigid rods. This is quite clear in the very first section of his (1905): 
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The theory to be developed—like every other electrodynamics—rests upon kinematics of 
rigid bodies, since the assertions of each theory concern relations between rigid bodies 
(coordinate systems), clocks and electromagnetic processes. (1905, CPAE 2, p.277) 
 
Here Einstein seems to go so far as to take “rigid bodies” and “coordinate systems” to be 
synonymous. It quickly became clear to Einstein, though, that this understanding of how 
coordinates should be understood—in terms of rods and clocks—was not tenable. Einstein 
began his (1907) paper with an argument intended to show that coordinate differences in a 
uniformly accelerating frame of reference correspond—to first order approximation—to 
measurements with rigid rods: this enabled him to apply EP1 to show that coordinate 
differences retain this direct physical significance in homogeneous gravitational fields. That 
Einstein felt the need to rehearse this argument suggests that even as early as 1907 he had 
begun to suspect that his (1905) understanding of coordinate differences might need to be 
revised when he came to deal with more complex gravitational fields. Furthermore, he 
went on to show that the local time measured by clocks must differ from the universal time 
that he took to be necessary to define the simultaneity of distant events.
199, 200  
  This difficulty was compounded by Einstein’s realisation in early 1910 at the latest, 
that rigid bodies are incompatible with the theory of relativity. In a letter to Sommerfeld, 
Einstein wrote: 
 
And now to the other problem child, the rigid body. I occupy myself very little with it. For 
it seems to me that the empirical data do not suffice for the construction of a theory of 
arbitrarily  accelerated  bodies.  Had  it  not  been  for  Fizeau’s  experiment  and  the 
measurements concerning the velocity of light in vacuum, we would not have had the 
material need for the construction of the relativity theory; we are, in my opinion, in a 
similar situation with respect to acceleration. It is only about infinitely slowly accelerated 
systems that anything at all can be asserted at the moment, in my opinion. Nevertheless, 
one should try to devise hypotheses about the behaviour of rigid bodies that would allow a 
uniform rotation. (Einstein to Arnold Sommerfeld, 19 January 1910, CPAE 5, p.229). 
                                                 
199 Einstein repeated this more clearly argument in his (1911): here he used the difference in the rate at which 
clocks read off time to explain the variability of the speed of light. See (1911, CPAE 3, pp.383-5) 
200  As  an  aside,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  Einstein’s  account  of  this  aspect  of  his  (1907)  in  his 
Autobiographical Notes (1949) is accurate. In his (1949) he wrote: “the time in which the [gravitational] field 
appears to be static is not measured by equally constituted stationary clocks. From this special example one can 
already recognize that the immediate metric significance of the coordinates is lost once one admits nonlinear 
transformations of the coordinates” (p.63 & p.65). So, here Einstein suggests that as long as we perform only 
linear transformations, then the immediate physical significance of coordinate differences can be maintained. 
As soon as we seek to go beyond such transformations, though, this approach is no longer tenable. This 
seems to  be the very same argument as given in (1907)—albeit that in  1907 Einstein did not explicitly 
mention  the  potential  problem  for  non-linear  transformations—and  this,  I  suggest,  should  increase  our 
confidence in the accuracy of Einstein’s 1949 diagnosis of the central problem that he faced in developing 
general relativity. 179 
 
 
While Einstein states that he is not, in 1910, spending too much time worrying about how 
rigid bodies can be made consistent with the theory of relativity, he is clear that it would be 
helpful to try and understand rigid bodies in such a way that they could be understood as 
relativistically rotated. A couple of months later, in a letter to Jakob Laub, Einstein seems 
to accept that this task is hopeless: 
 
  The latest relativity-theoretical investigations of Born and Herglotz interest me very much. 
It really seems that the theory of relativity there does not exist a “rigid” body with 6 
degrees of freedom. (Einstein to Jakob Laub, 16 March 1910, p.232) 
 
So, rigid bodies with 6 degrees of freedom are impossible in a relativistic setting, because if 
a rigid body rotates relativistically it will be deformed and, as such, is not a rigid body. Why 
is this a problem for Einstein’s understanding of coordinate systems? The problem is that 
as soon as one accepts that rigid bodies are incompatible with the theory of relativity, then 
Einstein’s  favoured  method  of  understanding  coordinate  differences  is  also  impossible. 
Einstein’s  first  published  account  of  the  problem  posed  by a  rotating  system  is  in  his 
(1912a) and goes as follows: 
 
The spatial measurement of K is done with measuring rods that — when compared with 
each other at the same place in K — possess the same length; the theorems of geometry are 
assumed to hold for lengths measured in this way, and thus also for the relations between 
the coordinates x, y, z and other lengths. That this stipulation is allowed is not obvious; 
rather it contains physical assumptions that eventually could prove incorrect. For example, 
it is highly probable that they do not hold in a uniformly rotating system, in which, on 
account of the Lorentz contraction, the ratio of the circumference to the diameter, using 
our definition of lengths, must be different from π. (Einstein 1912a, CPAE4, Doc.3, p.96) 
 
Here  the  problem  is  that  if  one  accepts  that  the  spatial  measurement  of  coordinate 
differences within a frame is to be performed with measuring rods, then one would not 
measure  Euclidean  geometry  in  a  rotating  system.  His  conclusion  is  that  such  an 
understanding of coordinate differences is a physical assumption that may well, ultimately, 
prove false.  
  The (1912a) statement of a rotating frame thought experiment, then, is primarily 
important because it encapsulates Einstein’s puzzlement about the relationship between 
measuring rods and clocks and coordinate systems. Einstein was, in all probability aware of 
this problem with a simple physical interpretation of coordinate differences as signifying 180 
 
measurements with ideal rods and clocks: the correspondence with Sommerfeld and Laub, 
above, suggests that Einstein was aware of this much by 1910. Stachel (1989a; 2007a) takes 
the rotating disk thought experiment to be such a crucial episode in the development of 
general relativity because it helped Einstein along to a new understanding of coordinate 
systems. How did it do this? More precisely, what was it about the case of rotation that led 
Einstein to adopt the Gaussian line element ds as the physically measurable quantity? 
  The first step was for Einstein to realise that, while rigid bodies are impossible in a 
relativistic theory that permits rotation, rigid motions remain perfectly possible.
201 Einstein 
would probably have been aware of this by 1911. Herglotz, whose work Einstein referred 
to in his 1910 letter to Jakob Laub, had argued in a paper of 1910 that when one of the 
points of a rigid body is fixed rigid rotation about that point is perfectly possible. Laue 
made a similar point in a paper of 1911: 
 
The limiting concept of a body that is rigid under all circumstances, which is so useful 
everywhere in classical mechanics, in my opinion cannot be taken over [to the special 
theory—JS]  on  account  of  the  impossibility  of  indefinitely  large  velocities  for  the 
propagation of elastic deformation. However, this does not exclude a body moving at 
times like a rigid one; even according to classical mechanics, under certain circumstances a 
drop of fluid can move as if it were rigid. (Laue, 1911, p.107 translated in Stachel, 2007a, 
p.90) 
 
So, by 1911 it was known that the problem of the impossibility of rigid bodies in relativity 
theory could be avoided by dealing only with the question of rigid motions—whereby a 
body moves as if it were rigid—and not concerning oneself with the more fundamental 
question as to whether rigid bodies really exist and as to how one should describe their 
behaviour under accelerations. Stachel (ibid., p.90) characterises this as the transformation 
of a dynamical problem concerning the nature of objects into a kinematical problem about 
rigid motions. The kinematical problem could be solved much more easily. 
This can be seen very clearly in the case of a rotating disk. The dynamical problem 
is to try and determine the behaviour of a rigid disk that undergoes a relativistic rotation: 
there is no obvious way to answer this question.
202 However, if the problem is understood 
                                                 
201 The importance of this realisation to the development of general relativity is emphasised in (Stachel, 
2007a, pp.89-90) 
202 In fact, the dynamical problem continued to exercise philosophers and physicists after general relativity 
had been completed. Petzoldt, e.g., argued that if a disk was understood as a series of concentric rings then, 
under rotation, the ratio of the diameter of a disk to its circumference would be less than π. This is because, 
he argued, the diameter of a disk would remain constant while the disks would contract. However, as Einstein 
pointed out to Petzoldt in correspondence, this is mistaken because if a disk were a series of concentric rings, 
then the radius of the disk would contract under rotation with its circumference. Petzoldt’s argument may 181 
 
kinematically,  its  solution  is  quite  simple.  Instead  of  concerning  ourselves  with  the 
behaviour of the disk itself, one asks instead how the geometry of the  disk would be 
measured. This involves only rigid motions, because any rigid rod that is placed on the 
surface of the disk does not, itself, rotate. This is the idea that is important: while one 
cannot determine the precise behaviour of a rotating disk one can determine its surface 
geometry and this is non-Euclidean. 
  This  is  the  point  at  which  Friedman  claimed  that  Einstein  made  appeal  to 
Helmholtz’s philosophy. On Friedman’s account, Einstein came to see the geometry of the 
rotating disk as non-Euclidean through the application of Helmholtz’s understanding of 
physical  geometry.  It  should  be  clear  from  the  above  that  no  appeal  to  Helmholtz  is 
necessary. Measurement of coordinate differences using rigid rods was common practice in 
nineteenth  century  physics:
203  in  developing  general  relativity,  Einstein  found  this 
methodology threatened by the incompatibility of rigid bodies and a theory of relativity that 
admits rotations. His solution to this problem was influenced by the physics community, in 
particular Einstein took from Herglotz the idea that while rigid bodies are incompatible 
with special relativity, rigid motions are not. This allowed Einstein to describe the surface 
geometry of a rotating disk by the familiar methodology of taking coordinate differences to 
correspond to measurements with rigid bodies. No appeal to Helmholtz’s philosophy is 
necessary here: it is a problem derived from physics and its solution is likewise derived 
from physics.
204 
At this stage, then, Einstein had the conceptual tools available to understand the 
rotating disk in the manner that he set out in ‘Geometry and Experience’. Measuring rods 
can be used to determine the geometry of the surface of a rotating disk: because these rods 
contract when placed along the circumference of the disk and are not affected when placed 
                                                                                                                                               
still, though, suffice to show that the geometry of a disk is unchanged by relativistic rotation: this was the 
understanding of relativistically rotating rigid bodies that Eddington argued for. See (Stachel, 1989a) for a 
detailed of alternative interpretations of the rotating disks. 
203 Indeed, in §3.3.1 we saw Hertz advocate precisely this understanding of measurement. 
204 There is a related problem, as we will see in the discussion of ‘Geometry and Experience’ in §4.3.2, about 
how the line element ds gains its physical significance. In ‘Geometry and Experience’ Einstein seems to 
suggest that the line element is only physically meaningful because it can be determined by measurements 
with rods and clocks. This, I take it, is a slightly different question than the one at stake here. In this section I 
have  argued  that  Einstein  realised  that  the  line  element  must  be  used  to  measure  space-time  curvature 
because it is frame-invariant and, as such, is a physically meaningful quantity. The question addressed in 
‘Geometry and Experience’ as to why the line element is physically meaningful—i.e. is meaningful because it 
corresponds to measurements with rigid bodies and clocks or because it is frame-invariant—comes after 
Einstein has realised that it must be appealed to on account of its frame-invariance. For Friedman’s account 
of the role of the thought experiment to work the philosophical question as to how a geometry is made 
physical must be prior to the development of the development of four-dimensional space-time as a physical 
possibility. However, I would argue that the philosophical question as to why the line element is physically 
meaningful  only  becomes  a  matter  for  concern  after  the  frame-invariance  of  the  line-element  has  been 
appealed  to  in  order  arrive  at  the  idea  that  gravitation  should  be  represented  by  variably  curved  four-
dimensional space-time. 182 
 
radially,  the  geometry  of  the  disk will  be  measured  as  non-Euclidean.  Similarly,  clocks 
placed on the surface of the disk will read off time more slowly the further away from the 
centre of the disk that they are placed. Friedman (2010a) suggests that, from this point, it 
was  a  relatively  straightforward  matter  for  Einstein  to  see  that  gravitation  should  be 
understood as curvature of four-dimensional space-time, given by the line element. The 
first step is to apply the equivalence principle—at this stage the infinitesimal version of 
EP2—so that the inertial forces caused by rotation can be treated as gravitational forces. 
From this point Friedman argues that the development of the representation of gravitation 
as space-time curvature followed quite quickly:
205 
 
It was at precisely this point, as Stachel shows, that Einstein first realized that gravitation 
could be represented by a non-Euclidean geometry, and, since an analogous effect holds 
for the temporal coordinate of the non-inertial frame in question (by time-dilation), he 
quickly realized that a non-Euclidean generalization of the flat (pseudo-Euclidean) metric 
of  Minkowski  space-time  was  exactly  what  he  needed.  The  idea  that  the  action  of 
gravitation could be represented by a variably curved four-dimensional geometry—by the 
(metric) affine connection in a perturbation of Minkowski space-time—was finally in place. 
(2010a, p.663). 
 
Friedman offers the following, more detailed account of this process: 
 
[The] crucial factor in motivating a truly four-dimensional understanding of the principle of 
equivalence is that the non-inertial (uniformly) rotating frame in question has not only a 
non-Euclidean  spatial  geometry  (due  to  length  contraction)  but  also  a  non-standard 
temporal  metric  (due  to  time  dilation)…rigorously  defining  the  non-Euclidean  spatial 
geometry in this case is actually rather delicate, requiring, in effect, the consideration of all 
the instantaneous inertial systems that are tangent to the non-inertial frame at every point. 
The  situation  is  similarly  delicate  with  the  non-standard  temporal  metric  in  question, 
where, once again, the result is rigorously well defined only if the frame is rotating uniformly. 
(Friedman 2010a, p.789n303) 
 
As we have seen, up until this point in the development of general relativity, Einstein had 
been working in three dimensions: the problem with the rotating disk thought experiment 
is that it cannot be straightforwardly analysed in three-dimensional terms. The reason for 
                                                 
205 See (Friedman, 2010a, p.663) for the other argument. The gist of the argument  183 
 
this can be expressed most clearly by making use of Norton’s (1989a, §3) notion of a 
relative space.
206 
To clarify this concept it will be helpful to explain how coordinate systems are 
currently  understood  in  general  relativity.  The  modern  understanding  of  space-time 
theories posits a differentiable manifold M, which represents space-times and upon which 
various geometric object-fields, O1, O2 etc., are defined. The manifold and the fields defined 
upon it determine the set of a particular theory’s models. So, special relativity has models of 
the form 〈M, gab〉 where M is a four-dimensional manifold and gab is the Lorentz metric 
field; general relativity has models of the form 〈M, gab, Tab〉, where Tab, additionally, is the 
stress-energy tensor which is such that it satisfies Einstein’s field equation. A frame of 
reference is understood as a congruence of time-like curves defined on 〈M, gab〉. Each event 
of the manifold has a world-line associated with it, and these world-lines together define a 
frame of reference. The frame, then, via its tangent vector also assigns a velocity to each 
event.
207  
With each frame of reference there is an associated three-dimensional manifold, 
which is given by the set of the curves of the frame: i.e., if we take the time-like curves to 
be world-lines of physical bodies then the three-dimensional manifold would be defined by 
these  physical  bodies.  This  three-dimensional  manifold  is  the  relative  space  that  is 
associated with a particular frame of reference.
208 The geometrical properties of a relative 
space can be determined by measurements with infinitesimal rigid rods: this means that we 
can  profitably  understand  Einstein—prior  to  fully  developing  the  four-dimensional 
formalism for general relativity—as working within relative spaces. 
Within a relative space it is sometimes possible to define a frame time. Consider a 
set of world-lines of physical bodies: it is possible to divide the manifold up into various 
hypersurfaces that are, in effect, various instantaneous “snapshots” of the relative frame 
from a variety of different perspectives. We can define a frame time within a relative space 
when the hypersurfaces are all orthogonal to the curves of the relative space in the relevant 
region of the frame. When this is the case, any curve that is in this way parameterised by 
the hypersurfaces can act as a clock that measures time within the relative space. 
We are now in a position to see why Einstein would have seen that, working within 
the three dimensional framework, there would have been a non-standard temporal metric 
in the case of a rotating disk. A rotating frame does not have orthogonal hypersurfaces and, 
                                                 
206 Here I follow Norton’s account, see his (1989a) for detail. 
207 We can also then say that a coordinate system {x
i} (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is “adapted” to the frame of reference if 
it is the case that the spatial coordinates—curves of constant x1, x2 and x3—are curves found in the frame. 
208 For a formal definition of a relative space see (Norton, 1989a, pp.11-2) 184 
 
as such, no frame time can be straightforwardly defined. This is why Friedman states that 
defining the non-Euclidean geometry requires “the consideration of all the instantaneous 
inertial systems that are tangent to the non-inertial frame at every point”: there is no simple 
way  to  describe  the  evolution  of  the  system  without  considering  the  sum  of  all 
instantaneous inertial systems. This requires four-dimensional mathematical methods and, 
thus, required Einstein to move beyond consideration of three-dimensional relative spaces. 
How  did  Einstein  come  to  realise  that  he  needed  to  use  a  four-dimensional 
generalisation  of  Gauss’s  theory  of  surfaces?  Simply,  non-Euclidean  spatial  geometries 
cannot be described using standard Cartesian coordinates; they must be described using 
Gaussian coordinates. This, combined with the breakdown of relative spaces in the case of 
rotations, means that a four-dimensional variably curved space-time would have seemed 
the most natural way to describe a rotating disk. 
This would mean describing space-time as a metric defined on a four-dimensional 
manifold. The curvature of such a space-time is given by the metric, gik. In the case of the 
rotating disk, space-time curvature could be understood either as an inertial effects or as a 
gravitational effect: the natural way to interpret gik physically, then, was as a combined 
inertio-gravitational field. This was how Einstein got to (EP3) as expressed in his (1913): 
 
(EP3):  Inertia and gravitation are entirely identical in nature and one structure—
the inertio-gravitational field—is responsible for both. 
 
Here it is worth noting a further distinction between my account and Friedman’s. For 
Friedman, EP3 is constitutive of general relativity on account of the role it played in the 
development of general relativity. On my account it is an infinitesimal version of EP2 that 
is applied to the rotating disk thought experiment and this gives rise to EP3 as the natural 
way to interpret the equivalence principle.  
Einstein was now in a position to begin the search for his field equations in the 
Zurich notebook. He had a starting point of three basic elements: (i) his 1912 scalar theory 
of  gravitation,  (ii)  the  four-dimensional  formalism  for  special  relativity  and  (iii)  the 
representation of gravitation by curvature of four-dimensional space-tine.
209 I do not intend 
to go into the process by which Einstein derived his field equations, as the matter is too 
complex to do justice to in a limited space and has been dealt with in great detail by Janssen 
et al. (2007). I have detailed the process by which Einstein arrived at each of these elements 
and highlighted the role of the evolving equivalence principle in this process. Let us now 
                                                 
209 See the commentary to the notebook (Janssen et al., 2007, §2.1) 185 
 
turn our attention to the question of how we should interpret the roles of the rotating disk 
and the equivalence principle in the development of general relativity. 
4.3.2.  How does the rotating disk help answer the challenges of rationality and constitutivity? 
Friedman’s  claim  that  the  rotating  disk  played  a  crucial  role  in  the  process  by  which 
Einstein came to treat gravitation as curvature of four-dimensional space-time is perfectly 
justified. However, Friedman makes two claims about the rotating disk thought experiment 
that I do not think can be sustained in light of the above historical analysis. First, he argues 
that the thought experiment can only be fully understood by situating it in the context of a 
philosophical dispute between Helmholtz and Poincaré. I suggest that it can be perfectly 
well understood without appeal to philosophy: Einstein considers rotation because it is the 
next natural extension of the class of admissible coordinate transformations and he assigns 
measuring  rods  their  particular  role  on  the  ground  of  physical  considerations.  Second, 
Friedman  claims  that  the  thought  experiment  is  important  because  it  makes  four-
dimensional space-time a genuine physical possibility: the equivalence principle played a 
crucial role in the thought experiment
210 and it is for this reason that it can be understood 
as  constitutive  of  general  relativity.  In  §4.3.2.2 I clarify  the  precise  sense in which  the 
rotating disk should be understood as having made four-dimensional space-time: I argue 
that the equivalence principle, at this stage of general relativity, should be understood as a 
regulative principle. 
4.3.2.1.  The rotating disk: a role for philosophy in theory change? 
The rotating disk thought experiment is—with the claim that Einstein was motivated by 
Poincaré’s conventionalist methodology—the basis of Friedman’s claim that philosophy 
played a crucial role in the development of general relativity. The discussion of the previous 
section should make it clear that it is not necessary to appeal to Helmholtz’s understanding 
of geometry in order to explain Einstein’s use of measuring rods to measure the surface 
geometry  of  a  rotating  disk.  Throughout  the  development  of  relativity  Einstein  was 
struggling to work out how he should understand coordinate systems. It was clear to him 
from a relatively early stage—around 1910—that coordinate differences could not have 
direct physical significance in the sense that they correspond to measurements with rigid 
                                                 
210 The discussion of the previous section has clarified the role of the equivalence principle in the thought 
experiment: it played an important role because it meant that a non-Euclidean spatial geometry was an effect 
of gravitation as well as an effect of inertial forces and it was this that led Einstein to treat gik as representing 
the inertio-gravitational field. 186 
 
measuring  rods;  rigid  bodies  are  incompatible  with  special  relativity.  While  it  seemed 
impossible to provide an account of rigid bodies that was consistent with special relativity, 
the  question  as  to  which  types  of  rigid  motion  are  possible  proved  to  be  much  more 
tractable. It was this step that permitted Einstein to describe the surface geometry of a 
rotating disk. 
Friedman’s claim that the scientific philosophy of Helmholtz and Poincaré played a 
crucial role in the thought experiment is derived from Einstein’s account in ‘Geometry and 
Experience’. As we saw in §1.3.3, Einstein’s lecture does provide strong support for this 
claim of Friedman’s: if the account of the previous section is to be compelling, then, we 
must provide some other explanation for why Einstein did place such emphasis on the 
work of Helmholtz and Poincaré. I argue that the real target of ‘Geometry and Experience’ 
is Weyl’s account of the role of the line element in general relativity.
211 Einstein delivered 
the lecture at the Berlin Academy’s Leibniz-day celebration on 27
 January 1921. In the years 
prior to this Weyl and Reichenbach had been engaged in a dispute over the epistemological 
status of measuring rods and clocks in the theory of relativity. Weyl understood rods and 
clocks as explananda to be explained by the total field; Reichenbach understood rods and 
clocks  to  be  epistemological  primitives  that  were  required  to  make  physical  sense  of 
mathematical geometries.
212 I suggest that Helmholtz and Poincaré were referred to in this 
lecture primarily because Einstein saw their dispute over the epistemic status of measuring 
rods as anticipating certain features of the debate that Einstein was actively involved in. 
 Einstein’s  formulation  of  general  relativity  is  in  terms  of  a  semi-Riemannian 
manifold. Weyl was deeply unsatisfied by Riemannian geometry and sought to apply the 
techniques  of  the  pure  infinitesimal  geometry—pioneered  by  Levi  Civita  in  1916—to 
Einstein’s theory. He thought that a pure infinitesimal geometry was capable of correcting 
a  “blemish”  in  Riemann’s  geometry.  This  blemish  arises  from  Riemann’s  asymmetrical 
treatment of the magnitude and orientation of vectors. The problem is that when one 
transports,  in  infinitesimal  steps,  a vector around  a closed  path, when  it returns  to  its 
starting position its orientation will have changed, but its length will not have. The direct 
consequence of this is that it is only possible to compare lengths of a vector that are 
separated by an arbitrary distance: one cannot so compare orientations. Weyl sought to 
develop a pure infinitesimal geometry that allowed for the comparison of the orientation of 
vectors across an arbitrary distance. 
                                                 
211  Ryckman  (2005)  also  emphasises  that  the  Reichenbach-Weyl  dispute  forms  the  proper  context  of 
Einstein’s lecture. 
212 See (Ryckman, 2005) for a detailed account of Weyl’s work on relativity. 187 
 
This is achieved by comparing neither orientation nor length directly: in both cases 
the comparison takes place by parallel transport of a comparison vector in infinitesimal 
steps along the path between the two vectors we wish to compare. With the Riemannian 
account so-adjusted, Weyl shows that it now has a much weaker, conformal—i.e., angle-
preserving—  structure.  The  concepts  of  conformal  (and  projective)  geometries  are 
important,  because  it  is  these  that  Weyl  thinks  bestows  upon  geometry  its  physical 
significance:  it  is  worth  taking  a  moment  to  clarify  what  conformal  and  projective 
geometries are and why Weyl takes them to be physically significant.
213 
Projective and conformal geometry are both arrived at by means of abstraction 
from affine geometry as described above. The conformal character of a space is captured 
by the claim that each point is associated with an infinitesimal cone of null directions, i.e.: 
 
          = 0 
 
The conformal character of space is preserved when the metric of the space changes while 
leaving  the  cone  at  each  point  of  space  unchanged:  this  can  generally  be  achieved  by 
arbitrary  linear  metric  transformations.  An  affinely  connected  space  has  a  projective 
character if there is a parallel displacement that acts on an arbitrary direction at an arbitrary 
point p when p is infinitesimally displaced in that direction. I.e., if it is the case that if a 
point  is  displaced  it  is  possible  to  project  parallel  displacements  onto  the  space. Weyl 
claimed that projective and conformal characters of space have direct physical significance: 
In relativity theory, the projective and conformal characters have an immediate intuitive 
meaning. The former, the persistence of the world-direction of a moving particle, which 
singles out a certain “natural” motion when it is released from a particular point, is a 
unification of inertia and gravitation that Einstein posed in place of either notion, for 
which,  however,  no  suggestive  name  has  emerged,  as  of  yet.  The  infinitesimal  cone, 
however, describes the difference between past and future in the neighborhood of a world-
point; the conformal character is the cause-and-effect structure of the universe, through 
which one may determine which world-points can possibly be causally connected to each 
other. (Weyl, 1921, p.2) 
Projective properties of space, then, are physically instantiated by the claim that force-free 
particles follow space-time geodesics. I will return to this point in §4.4, but it is worth 
noting in passing that Weyl takes the equivalence principle to amount to this—geodetic—
hypothesis. Weyl talks of the infinitesimal cones that define the conformal character of 
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space  as  describing  the  distance  between  past  and  future.  It  is  clear,  then,  that  the 
infinitesimal cones are interpreted as infinitesimal light cones: as such they fix the causal 
structure  of  space-time.  This  means  that  Weyl  is  able  to  claim  that  the  “projective  and 
conformal character of a metric space determine that metric uniquely” (ibid.): i.e., the space-time metric 
can be fully determined without appeal to rods and clocks. 
  This  was  in  stark  contrast  to  the  epistemology  of  Reichenbach.  Reichenbach 
followed  Schlick  in  drawing  a  sharp  distinction  between  mathematics  and  physics: 
mathematics was built upon a system of implicit definitions that, in order to be physically 
meaningful, needed to be coordinated with concrete physical objects.
214 Reichenbach and 
Weyl began to correspond on this difference of opinion in 1920 and would continue doing 
so  until  1925.
215  I  suggest  that  ‘Geometry  and  Experience’  should  be  read  as  Einstein 
weighing into this dispute on the side of Reichenbach: further, I think it is plausible that 
the philosophical concerns that faced Einstein in 1921 may have impacted on the accuracy 
of  his  recollections  on  the  role  that  Helmholtz  played  in  the  development  of  general 
relativity. 
  This reading is supported by the fact that Einstein seems to refer to his pre-history 
objection to Weyl’s theory in ‘Geometry and Experience’.
216 Friedman takes ‘Geometry and 
Experience’  to  be  a  defence  of  the  view  that  space-time  curvature  is  empirically 
determinable, against the conventionalism of Poincaré. It is not quite clear, though, why 
Einstein  would  feel  the  need  to  defend  the  view  that  the  geometry  of  space-time  is 
empirically  determinable  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  Eddington’s  1919  expedition’s 
empirical confirmation of the theory. The most likely explanation is that Einstein may have 
felt as though there was a contemporary objection to his theory that was Poincaréan in 
spirit.
217  Given that Reichenbach and Weyl were engaged in a dispute about the status of 
measuring rods in relativity, Weyl’s account of rigid rods is the most natural candidate. 
  Einstein’s defence of the use of rigid rods as grounding physical geometry, makes 
good sense when read as a response to Weyl. Einstein claims that generally relativity rests 
upon  the  idea  that  the  Riemannian  metric  can  be  connected  to  experience  only  by 
consideration of rigid bodies. He offers the following as evidence for this claim: 
Of the experimental reasons which warrant this assumption I will mention only one. The 
phenomenon of the propagation of light in empty space assigns a tract [distance between 
                                                 
214 See §1.4.1.1. 
215 See (Rynasiewicz, 2005) for an account of this correspondence. 
216 This point is noted by Ryckman (2005, pp.61-2). 
217 This is strongly suggested by the way in which he introduces the objection that rigid bodies are not 
suitable candidates to be considered fundamental epistemological entities: he asks why “Poincaré and other 
investigators” (p.236, my emphasis) object to this understanding of ideal rods. 189 
 
two points on a rigid rod], namely, the appropriate path of light, to each interval of local 
time, and conversely. Thence it follows that the above assumption for tracts must also hold 
good  for  intervals  of  clock-time  in  the  theory  of  relativity.  Consequently  it  may  be 
formulated as follows: if two ideal clocks are going at the same rate at any time and at any 
place (being then in immediate proximity to each other), they will always go at the same 
rate, no matter where and when they are again compared with each other at one place. If 
this law were not valid for natural clocks, the proper frequencies for the separate atoms of 
the  same  chemical  element  would  not  be  in  such  exact  agreement  as  experience 
demonstrates. The existence of sharp spectral lines is a convincing experimental proof of 
the abovementioned principle of practical geometry. (Einstein, 1954, pp.237-8) 
This is a version of the past-history objection that Einstein initially made to Weyl in 1918. 
The  objection  runs  as  follows.  Consider  two,  e.g.,  hydrogen  atoms  that  are  brought 
together  so  as  to  compare  spectral  emissions.  To  begin  with,  both  atoms  emit  sharp 
spectral lines at the same frequencies. They are then sent away, via different paths and 
brought together at the same point again. On Weyl’s theory, Einstein thought, we would 
expect to see the spectral lines at different frequencies because the electromagnetic field 
would be different along each of the paths of the two atoms. The fact that this is not 
observed, Einstein claims, can only be explained by the fact that any two “tracts” and 
clocks that are the same length or read time at the same rate in one place they continue to 
do so wherever they are placed.
218 
  Here, then, it is clear that Einstein considered the position outlined in his lecture as 
an alternative to Weyl’s account of the role of rigid rods in general relativity. This serves as 
a strong motivation to read ‘Geometry and Experience’ in the context of the Reichenbach-
Weyl dispute about the status of the metric in general relativity. In light of this, I do not 
think that the lecture serves as strong evidence for Friedman’s claim that the philosophy of 
Helmholtz and Poincaré played a crucial role in the rotating disk thought experiment: it is 
more likely, I think, that Einstein referred to the dispute between Helmholtz and Poincaré 
only as an earlier—and simpler—incarnation of the dispute that he was engaged in. While 
Friedman is right that Helmholtz’s view of geometry does play a role in the rotating disk 
thought experiment, there is no need to treat Einstein as motivated by this because, as we 
have  seen,  the  kinematical  account  of  rigid  bodies  was  being  considered  in  the 
contemporary physical literature with which Einstein was well-acquainted. 
                                                 
218 Ryckman (2005, pp.87-8) details Weyl’s response to this objection: in short, Weyl objected that Einstein 
needed to explain how physical bodies whose behaviour was indicative of the gravitational field could at the 
same time be used as instruments to stipulate metrical relations. From the present perspective the outcome of 
this dispute is not hugely important: what is important is that Einstein’s repetition the pre-history objection 
against Weyl in ‘Geometry and Experience’ as evidence for his view of the role of rigid bodies, strongly 
suggests that Weyl was the primary target of the lecture. 190 
 
There  is  a  further  reason  for  caution  before  endorsing  Friedman’s  account  of 
physical geometry: in his answer to CC, Friedman is clear that he seeks to move away from 
treating  constitutive  principles  as  coordinating  principles  that  connect  uninterpreted 
mathematical  frameworks  to  physical  experience.  In  taking  the  rotating  disk  thought 
experiment to rely upon Schlick and Reichenbach’s understanding of physical geometry, 
Friedman’s account of the development of general relativity still seems to be based upon 
the idea that we must coordinate mathematical frameworks with experience. Friedman is 
explicit  in  his  claim  that  the  rotating  disk  thought  experiment  plays  a  crucial  role  in 
grounding the constitutive role of the equivalence principle (2010b, p.186); it is difficult, 
therefore,  to  see  how  Friedman’s  account  of  the  rotating  disk  thought  experiment  is 
consistent with his expressed desire to remove coordinating principles from his account. 
We now have two good reasons for doubting that the philosophy of Helmholtz and 
Poincaré played a central role in Einstein’s thinking in 1912. First, it is not necessary to 
appeal to their philosophies in order to explain the role of the rotating disk. It is adequately 
explained by (i) a desire to treat rotation as rest so as to increase the number of admissible 
coordinate transformations and (ii) the investigations of Herglotz into the nature of rigid 
bodies. Second, the emphasis on Helmholtz and Poincaré in ‘Geometry and Experience’ is 
best read, at least in part, as a response to Weyl’s pure infinitesimal geometry. If we are to 
develop Kantian answers to CR and CC, they must both, then, be of a different form to 
those offered by Friedman. 
4.3.2.2.  The rotating disk and the rationality of science 
In this section I begin by clarifying that our rejection of the claim that there is a role for 
philosophy in the rotating disk means that we must also reject Friedman’s response to CC. 
I then turn my attention towards developing an alternative Kantian account of the role of 
the rotating disk in the development of general relativity. I argue that both the rotating disk 
and the equivalence principle (EP1 and EP2) should be understood as playing primarily 
regulative roles in the development of the final version of general relativity.
219 
What, then, of Friedman’s claim that the equivalence principle is constitutive of 
general relativity in virtue of the principle’s role in the rotating disk thought experiment? 
Friedman offers a historical narrative describing how the mathematical structure of general 
                                                 
219 Though there remains a sense in which they are constitutive of general relativity in the sense that they 
played a historical role in making the laws of the new theory possible. This underlines an important feature of 
the regulative account of constitutivity: whether a principle is considered to be constitutive becomes very 
much a question of historical context and of carefully identifying the precise role that a principle played in 
particular stages of the development of a theory. EP1 and EP2, I suggest, are constitutive of general relativity 
in a different sense than EP3 is. 191 
 
relativity gains its empirical meaning (2010a, pp.691-3). How does this account sit with the 
analysis  of  §4.3.1?  Friedman’s  argument  hinges  upon  the  claim  that  the  rotating  disk 
thought experiment made a variably curved four-dimensional geometry a genuine physical 
possibility.  Given  the  importance  that  Friedman  places  on  Einstein’s  account  of  the 
rotating disk in ‘Geometry and Experience’, it is reasonable to assume that he broadly 
ascribes to the distinction between pure and physical geometry that Einstein draws in this 
work. For Friedman, then, I take it that the rotating disk thought experiment makes four-
dimensional space-time a genuine physical possibility in the sense that it motivated the 
abandonment of the three-dimensional approach and the adoption of the line element—
determined by measurements with rods and clocks—as the physically meaningful quantity.  
From a regulative perspective, of course, the problem with Friedman’s approach is 
that Friedman assumes a relationship between mathematical and physical possibility that 
has  not  fully  taken  to  heart  the  importance  of  the  group-theoretic  approach  to 
mathematics.  That  is,  frame-invariant  quantities  do  not  need  to  have  their  physical 
significance explained in terms of measurements with rigid bodies and ideal clocks. As we 
saw in our discussion of Weyl’s approach to general relativity in the previous section, the 
line-element  is  physically  meaningful  in  virtue  of  its  frame-invariance  and,  furthermore, 
determines the behaviour of rods and clocks. In what remains of this section, I construct an 
alternative account of how Einstein understood the relationship between mathematical and 
physical possibility in the early stages of the development of general relativity. I will argue 
that both the equivalence principle (EP2) and the rotating disk played important roles in 
making the mathematical possibility of four-dimensional space-time a physical possibility; 
however, they did so in a manner that means they should not be considered as constitutive 
principles. 
In  §4.3.1  I  emphasised  that  Einstein’s  chief  conceptual  difficulty  in  developing 
general relativity was as to how he should interpret coordinate systems. Why did Einstein 
have such difficulty in freeing himself from the idea that coordinates have a direct physical 
significance?  Norton  (1989b)  provides  a  plausible  answer  to  this  problem:  whereas 
contemporary physicists understand differentiable manifolds as a bare topological space, 
Einstein understood the manifold to be imbued with a much richer intrinsic structure.
220 
How did this impact on Einstein’s understanding of how physically possible space-times 
should be understood? 
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detailed in (Norton, 1989b). 192 
 
First, let us clarify the contemporary canonical form of space-time theories,
221 as 
detailed in Norton’s (1989b).
222 Space-time theories have three types of structure associated 
with them, which Norton identifies as follows:
  
M1.  Physically possible space-times, one of which will be the physically actual space-time of 
our world if the theory in question is true. 
M2.   Geometric structures, which are mathematical objects such as 〈M, gab〉 or 〈M, gab, Tab〉. 
They represent the space-times of M1. 
M3.   Coordinate representations, which are mathematical objects such as 〈A, gik〉 (or 〈A,gik, 
Tik〉)). They are the component representations of the structures of M2 in some 
coordinate chart. Here A is an open set of R4, gik a 4 x 4 matrix of components, 
and the relevant coordinate chart is a diffeomorphism xi from some neighborhood 
of the point set of M onto A.. (Norton, 1989b, p.1223) 
This is an entirely general description of space-time theories: Newtonian space-time, and 
the space-times of special and general relativity can each be formulated in this manner.
223
  My interest in this lies in how the relationship between M1, M2 and M3 differs on 
the modern view from on Einstein’s view. On the canonical view, then, M2 represents M1 
and  M3  represents  M2:  however  the  type  of  representation  is  quite  different.  The 
representation of M1 by M2 is physical: the physically possible space-times of M1 are 
represented by the differentiable manifolds of M2. However, the representation of M2 by 
M3 is a matter of mathematical definition: 〈A, gik〉 is a subset of 〈M, gab〉. So, coordinate 
charts on the canonical view are true as a matter of definition. This distinction is important 
because it enables us to distinguish two types of coordinate transformation: active and 
passive. Passive coordinate transformations represent a redefining of the representation 
relationship between M3 and M2: they have no physical content. Active diffeomorphisms, 
however, drag-along the tensor field, meaning that a different metrical field is defined at 
                                                 
221 All theories of space-time treat it as a four-dimensional differentiable manifold on which geometric objects 
can be defined: i.e., they are of the form 〈M, O1,…,On〉. The models of a particular space-time theory are then 
those that satisfy that theory’s laws L. On the canonical view, a differentiable manifold is a topological space 
of points and a set of smooth maps which map the manifold’s open sets onto the open sets of R
n: these maps 
are known as coordinate charts because they coordinate the point set with the set of n-tuples of real numbers. 
See (Friedman, 1983). 
222 In this article Norton argues that if we read Einstein by imposing the contemporary canonical theory of 
space-time onto him, it becomes very difficult to understand, e.g., why Einstein seems to have confused 
active and passive coordinate transformations and why he took general covariance to lead to a generalised 
principle of relativity. However, if we take Einstein to be operating with a quite different understanding of 
space-time theories we can explain these problems without resorting to treating them as simple mistakes. 
223 See (Friedman, 1983). 193 
 
the same manifold point in the two models:
224 active diffeomorphisms correspond to the 
relationship between M2 and M1, so have physical content. 
  It is natural to read Einstein’s talk of coordinate systems as being analogous to the 
contemporary idea of coordinate charts. However to read Einstein in this way is to read 
him as being confused on some key points: in particular, it is not clear why he would take 
general covariance to lead to a generalized principle of relativity, nor is it clear whether he 
understood coordinate transformations to be understood as the equivalent of active or 
passive  transformations.  Norton  explains  that  this  interpretative  challenge  is  the 
consequence of the fact that Einstein did not understand the manifold as a differentiable 
manifold; he understood it as the open set of R
4.
225   
  R
4 has a richer intrinsic structure than contemporary differentiable manifolds. The 
two-step contemporary coordinate representation is necessary because there is a distinction 
between differentiable manifolds as general mathematical objects and R
n, which is a special 
case of a manifold. The manifold, as a general mathematical object, has a point set of 
unspecified elements that must be coordinated with R
n. Now, if Einstein understood the 
manifold simply to be R
4, then he would have no need of the relationship between M2 and 
M3  that  is  intended  to  relate  the  point  set  of  M  to  R
n.  For  Einstein,  then,  physically 
possible space-times were represented by models 〈A, (O1)ik...,..., (On)il〉 where the manifold 
A is an open set of R
4 and (O1)ik...,..., (On)il are n matrices.
226 Objects of the form 〈A, 
(O1)ik...,..., (On)il〉, then are direct coordinate representations of the possible space-times. In 
effect, then, Einstein’s understanding of coordinate representations contains both M2 and 
M3 and this is why, from a contemporary perspective, there is no clear distinction between 
active and passive transformations in his work. 
Now,  this  understanding  of  manifolds  would  have  left  Einstein  with  an 
interpretational challenge: the structural features of R
4 admit of a quite natural physical 
interpretation.  So,  simply  by  representing  space-times  with  models  of  the  form  〈A, 
(O1)ik...,..., (On)il〉, an implicit limitation is placed on the class of physical possible space-
times. The most noteworthy examples of this are as follows: 
 
(a)  R
4 has an origin (0, 0, 0, 0). This is naturally interpreted as space-time having a 
preferred central point.  
                                                 
224 For a tensor field O defined on a manifold M and a diffeomorphisms d, we can define a new tensor field 
d*O on M. The 
225 This, as Norton points out (p. 1236), was precisely how Riemann, Klein and Levi-Civita understood the 
manifold in their early on differential geometry. These were the sources that Grossman directed Einstein to in 
order that he may  
226 See Norton (1989b, pp1236-7) 194 
 
(b) R
4  is  inhomogeneous,  i.e.,  each  point  is  distinguishable.  This  is  naturally 
interpreted as implying that space-time points are distinguishable. 
(c)  R
4  permits  a  definition  of  absolute  simultaneity:  x1,  x2,  x3  represent  spatial 
coordinates and x4 represents instantaneous snapshots of this three dimensional 
space. 
(d) R
4 has a preferred rest frame: the curves of constant x1, x2 and x3 pick out a 
state of rest. 
(e)  In R
4 coordinate differences have a direct metrical significance: they correspond 
to measurements with ideal rods and clocks. 
 
Einstein  began  to  study  Minkowski’s  four-dimensional  formulation  of  special  relativity 
around  1910  and  by  early  1912  he  would  have  been  quite  comfortable  with  it.
227 
Minkowski’s four-dimensional formulation of space-time was seen as validation of Klein’s 
Erlangen program: he showed that special relativity described the space-time geometry of 
the Lorentz group. This suggests that at this time, Einstein would have been quite familiar 
with the methods of differential geometry necessary to view space-time in the manner just 
detailed. Importantly, he would also have been familiar with Klein’s fundamental insight: 
i.e. that each geometry has associated with it a class of admissible coordinate systems with a 
group of transformations between them, the invariants of the group of transformations 
represent physically real quantities. This is crucial, because it is this that will allow Einstein 
to strip away features of the implicit physical interpretation of as 〈A, gik〉 and replace it with 
a new physical interpretation. 
  By 1912, then, Einstein, by considering invariants of special relativity, would have 
removed (a), (c) and (d) from his physical interpretation of the manifold plus metric. (a) is 
eliminated  by  the  Galilean  group:  classical  physics  permits  a  number  of  coordinate 
transformations and (0, 0, 0, 0) is not an invariant of these transformations. (d) is also 
eliminated by the Galilean group: what is defined as a rest state is not invariant across 
Galilean transformations. (c) is eliminated in special relativity by the Lorentz group where 
simultaneity  is  no  longer  an  invariant  of  the  transformations.  This,  however,  still  left 
Einstein with the objectionable notion of an inertial frame, which remains invariant under 
Lorentz transformations. 
                                                 
227 Einstein initially did not see the importance of Minkowski’s reformulation of special relativity, reportedly 
referring to it as a “superfluous display of learning” (see Pais, 1982). In a review talk on special relativity given 
in Zurich in January of 1911 (see CPAE 3, doc.17), Einstein displays a quite different attitude, stating that it 
was  a  “very  perspicuous  representation  of  the  theory,  which  essentially  simplifies  its  application”.  This 
suggests that by 1910 at the  latest  Einstein had  started to  familiarise himself  with the four-dimensional 
mathematical  formalism.  In  the  process  of  responding  to  Abraham’s  criticism  of  the  theory  of  static 
gravitational fields, Einstein became much more familiar with these techniques. 195 
 
  From this perspective, then, the development of relativity is marked by the process 
of  stripping  away  implicit  physical  interpretations  from  mathematical  structures.  Post’s 
(1971) account of the development of new scientific theories also places importance upon 
the the process by which extraneous structure is removed from a precursor theory in the 
development of a new theory (p.229).Post identifies a series of heuristic criteria which he 
argues have played a vital role in guiding the development of novel scientific theories. The 
most important of these is the general correspondence principle: i..e, the requirement that 
any new theory L should account for the success of its predecessor S by replicating the 
predictions of S under those conditions where S was well-confirmed. Post argues that to do 
so, those aspects of S-theory that are not independently confirmed must be removed from 
the theory. The significance of the rotating disk thought experiment, and the early versions 
of the equivalence principle can profitably be understood in these terms: i.e., they were 
used to enable Einstein to broaden the range of applicability of his theory and identify 
those  aspects  of  the  precursor  theory  that  cannot  be  considered  well-confirmed  by 
identifying situations in which they do not hold. The process of stripping-away layers of 
implicit physical interpretation from mathematical structure, then, is important because it 
would help to ensure that the new theory corresponds only to the well-confirmed parts of 
the precursor theory. 
The  regulative  demand  to  consider  as  large  a  group  of  admissible  coordinate 
transformations as possible, then, plays a crucial role in the process: it serves as a demand 
to interpret a wider range of space-times as physical possibilities. EP1’s role in this process 
was to enable Einstein to expand the group of admissible coordinate transformations so 
that  inertial  frames  of  reference  were  no  longer  invariants  of  his  theory’s  admissible 
transformations. The rotating disk expanded the admissible transformations further still, so 
that measurements with rods and clocks no longer have direct metrical significance: in the 
move to four-dimensional space-time, coordinate differences cease to correspond directly 
to measurements with rods and clocks, eliminating (e). This leaves only (b), to still impact 
on Einstein’s thinking.
228 
  We have now arrived at a clear sense in which the rotating disk thought experiment 
served to make four-dimensional variably curved space-time a physical possibility. As we 
saw in §4.3.1, the rotating disk cannot be understood in three-dimensional terms because, 
in contemporary terms, a rotating relative space does not have a well-defined frame time. 
This problem led Einstein to introduce the Gaussian line element as a measure of space-
time curvature. Because the line element is invariant under arbitrary transformations, the 
                                                 
228 As Norton (1989b) shows, (b) played a crucial role in Einstein’s difficulty in initially understanding general 
covariance: in particular, it had a central role to play in Einstein’s account of the hole argument. 196 
 
four-dimensional formalism gave Einstein use of arbitrary coordinate systems, meaning 
that  coordinate  differences  could  no  longer  be  considered  as  corresponding  to 
measurements  with  rods  and  clocks.  The  rotating  frame  is  important,  then,  because  it 
allowed Einstein to overcome restrictions that his understanding of the manifold placed on 
physically possible space-times: i.e., that they be of spatial dimensions and one temporal 
dimension  and  that  coordinate  differences  correspond  to  measurements  with  rods  and 
clocks.  
  How does this impact on Friedman’s account of constitutivity? Friedman’s account 
of constitutivity is based on the idea that the mathematical formalism used to express 
general relativity lacks a natural physical interpretation: constitutive principles are those that 
have  played  a  historical  role  in  providing  a  physical  interpretation  to  the  increasingly 
abstract mathematical formalism of space-time theories. If we understand the development 
of general relativity as I have suggested in this section, then this helps us to clarify precisely 
why constitutive principles are needed to play this role. The mathematical formalism that 
Einstein  was  using  in  developing  general  relativity  came  with  a  very  natural  physical 
interpretation: 〈A, gik〉 is naturally interpreted as a space-time with a preferred central point, 
preferred rest states and inertial frames and in which coordinate differences have a direct 
metrical significance. In developing general relativity, Einstein came to see that each aspect 
of this natural physical interpretation of 〈A, gik〉 was mistaken. What is interesting about the 
development of general relativity, from a Kantian perspective, is the process by which 
elements  of  the  mathematical  structure  of  Riemannian  geometry  come  to  represent 
particular physical processes. My account differs from Friedman’s in that I understand this 
process as more two-way than Friedman does. For Friedman the mathematical structures 
are  abstract  and  come  with  no  natural  physical  interpretation.  On  my  account  when 
Einstein  was  first  applying  Riemannian  geometry  to  space-time,  he  understood  the 
mathematical structures to be such that they naturally represented features of space-time as 
it was understood prior to the theory of relativity. This means that in the early stages of 
developing  general  relativity,  Einstein’s  task  was  to  strip  away  those  elements  of  the 
mathematical  structure  that  do  not  correspond  to  anything  that  we  do  not  wish  to 
represent. This is where regulative principles play a significant role: they expand the range 
of physical situations that we require our mathematical structure to represent and then our 
understanding of the mathematical structure is adjusted accordingly.  
  So, initially Riemannian geometry had a natural physical interpretation, however as 
general relativity developed this was gradually removed. As this process was carried out, it 
required a constant re-working of the conceptual framework of the theory, and it is in this 197 
 
re-working of the conceptual framework that constitutive principles play an important role. 
So, for instance, consider the effect of EP1: as Einstein initially understood the manifold of 
Riemannian geometry, it was naturally interpreted as giving preference to inertial frames of 
reference. EP1 was important, in its regulative function, because it enabled Einstein to see 
that the mathematical structure needed to be able to represent physical situations in which 
inertial frames were not preferenced. This, though, left Einstein with a conceptual difficulty 
in his attempt to develop a relativistic theory of gravitation: i.e., special relativity made a 
sharp  distinction  between  inertial  and  non-inertial  motion  and  a  relativistic  theory  of 
gravitation could not do this. This problem, as we have seen, was ultimately resolved by 
strengthening  EP1  to  EP2  and  then  representing  gravitation  as  part  of  the  space-time 
structure rather than a field that is defined on to space-time. 
Here, I suggest that EP1/EP2 should be understood as playing a dual role: it plays 
a regulative role in the sense that it broadens the class of acceptable transformations but it 
also plays a constitutive role in that it suggests that gravitation be represented as a space-
time  structure.  This  consideration  of  EP1  helps  us  to  delineate  the  constitutive  and 
regulative roles of physical principles. In their regulative role, I suggest, physical principles 
broaden the range of physical situations which must be represented by the mathematical 
formalism: this is destructive in the sense that it exposes the inadequacy of the previous 
understanding of the representation relationship between mathematics and physics. The 
constitutive  role  of  principles  is  constructive  in  that  it  suggests  a  novel  physical 
interpretation of geometrical structure. This can be further clarified by consideration of the 
role of the rotating disk and EP3 in general relativity. 
  I  suggest  that  the  rotating  disk  thought  experiment  functions  as  a  regulative 
demand on the construction of general relativity and that EP3 serves as a constitutive 
principle that resolves a conceptual problem raised by the rotating disk. The rotating disk, 
as we have seen, serves a regulative function in that it broadens the class of accepted 
transformations  so  as  to  include  uniform  rotations.  The  consequence  of  this  was  that 
coordinate differences in the manifold could no longer be understood as corresponding to 
measurements with rods and clocks. This posed a serious problem for understanding the 
physical representation of mathematical coordinate differences: how could mathematical 
structures be used to represent physical situations when it was not even clear how physical 
distances should be represented in the mathematics? 
The problem is eventually solved by assigning EP3 a constitutive role. However, 
the precise sense in which EP3 could play this role would not actually become clear until 
Weyl had developed the notion of a manifold with an affine connection and interpreted 198 
 
affine geodesics as the paths of freely falling test particles.
229 EP3, recall, is the claim that 
gravitational and inertial effects are identical in nature and an inertio-gravitational field is 
responsible for both. It is this that enables a non-flat affine structure to be associated with 
the  behaviour  of  freely-falling  bodies.  This,  then,  provides  a  sense  in  which  EP3  is 
constitutive of general relativity: a geometrical notion—an affine geodesic—is associated 
with a particular observable process. 
This understanding of the constructive role of constitutive principles helps us to 
clarify Friedman’s claim in the Dynamics of Reason that constitutive principles determine the 
conceptual framework of a theory. On my account a theory is developed by analysis of the 
concepts of the old theory, combined with a regulative demand to expand the range of 
applicability of these concepts. In this section I have sought to show that this process leads 
to difficulty in interpreting the sense in which mathematical structures represent physical 
processes:  the  conceptual  framework  of  the  old  theory  becomes  inappropriate  for 
understanding the relationship between mathematics and physics. I have primarily been 
concerned with the constitutive role of the equivalence principle. I have demonstrated that 
EP3 was ultimately developed through analysing the Newtonian concept of acceleration: in 
the course of this analysis EP3 came to represent a novel concept—the inertio-gravitational 
field—which  is  eventually  required  to  physically  represent  mathematical  structures.  In 
relying on EP3 in this way, general relativity puts the idea of an inertio-gravitational field at 
its very centre and, in this sense, EP3 determines an aspect of the conceptual framework of 
general relativity. 
Friedman’s  objection  to  a  contemporary  Kantianism  that  emphasises  regulative 
principles  is  that  one  cannot  distinguish  constitutive  and  regulative  principles  without 
something like Kant’s division between sensibility and understanding. This, as we have 
seen, is difficult: I suggest that the distinction between constitutive and regulative principle 
be drawn on the basis of the historically contingent nature of the role of the principle in 
the  development  of  a  theory.  Thus,  I  have  argued  that  EP1  and  EP2  are,  from  the 
perspective  of  the  final  theory  of  general  relativity  best  understood  as  regulative  and 
constitutive.  They  are  regulative  in  the  sense  that  they  expand  the  class  of  admissible 
                                                 
229 Here again it is worth noting that the precise nature of the constitutive role of a physical principle only 
became  entirely  clear  after  the  construction  of  novel  mathematical  techniques.  This  implies  that  the 
relationship between mathematical structures and the physical processes that they represent is not quite as 
mysterious as Friedman takes it to be. Indeed, I would suggest that—when Weyl’s affine geometry was 
available—the  “coordination”  of  free-fall  trajectories  with  affine  geodesics  was  entirely  natural  when 
understood as guided by the dynamical character of the metric and the requirement of general covariance. See 
(Ryckman, 2010, pp.463-4) for detailed discussion. Without reference to affine geometry, there remains a 
sense in which EP3 played a constitutive role: i.e., it aided the construction of the conceptual framework of 
general  relativity  in  that  it  permitted  the  metric-tensor  to  be  interpreted  either  as  describing  inertial  or 
gravitational  effects.  However,  the  constitutive  role  principle  can  be  seen  more  precisely  if  we  permit 
ourselves to appeal to Weyl’s mathematical methods. 199 
 
coordinate transformations and constitutive in that they played a historical role in making 
the laws of gravitation possible. EP3, by contrast, is constitutive and not regulative: it 
determines the conceptual framework of general relativity but does not seem to be have 
any particular regulative role. Finally, general covariance, I suggest in §4.4 is regulative but 
not constitutive. So, while distinctions between regulative and constitutive principles can be 
drawn within the framework of a regulative Kantianism, Friedman is right that it is not a 
principled distinction.  
4.3.3.  What role did the rotating disk play in the development of general relativity? 
It  should  now  be  clear  why  I  prefer  the  framework  provided  by  Cassirer’s  regulative 
Kantianism to explain the development of general relativity to that offered by Friedman. 
First, we saw in §4.2 that Friedman takes the equivalence principle to have been elevated to 
the  status  of  a  principle.  However,  the  equivalence  principle  as  it  initially  appeared  in 
Einstein’s work (EP1) is consistent with Newton’s Corollary VI. EP1, then, does not need 
to be understood as the result of a process of elevation: Einstein identified EP1 as the 
pertinent  feature  of  Newtonian  physics  to  resolve  an  inconsistency  between  special 
relativity and Newton’s theory of gravitation. There was, then, no need for Einstein to 
elevate an empirical fact to the status of a principle, because the principle was already 
familiar from Newtonian physics. Einstein implemented EP1 (and EP2) by treating them 
as widening the class of admissible coordinate transformations. There is no need to appeal 
to  a  philosophical  meta-paradigm  to  explain  the  adoption  of  the  final  version  of  the 
equivalence principle (EP3): it emerged via a series of natural extensions of EP1 as general 
relativity  developed. This,  then,  is  quite  naturally  captured  on  a  regulative  reading:  the 
origin  of  EP1  in  Newtonian  physics  ensures  that  Newton’s  theory  of  gravitation  and 
Einstein’s  are  theories  concerned  with  the  study  of  the  same  object.  The  role  of  the 
equivalence  principle  in  broadening  the  admissible  coordinate  transformations  is  quite 
naturally  understood  within  a  regulative  framework:  i.e.,  more  admissible  coordinate 
transformations means a better approximation of objective reality. Similarly, in the case of 
the rotating disk I have argued that there is no  need to assign Einstein  any particular 
philosophical motivation in order to understand the role of the thought experiment in the 
development of relativity. 
  In §4.3.2, I develop an account of what it might mean to make a mathematical 
possibility a genuine physical possibility: I argue that this process should be characterised as 
one of overcoming limitations that were placed on Einstein’s physical interpretation of his 
theory by his understanding of manifolds. On this account the equivalence principle and 200 
 
the rotating disk both play a regulative role, in that they broaden the group of admissible 
coordinate  transformations. The  manifold,  on  this view,  comes with  a  natural  physical 
interpretation given by the invariants of the admissible coordinate transformations and it is 
these invariants that gave rise to Einstein’s understanding of a coordinate system. As the 
class  of  admissible  coordinate  transformations  increased,  the  number  invariants  of  the 
transformations  decreased  permitting  alternative  physical  interpretations  of  the 
mathematical formalism. Importantly, there is no need to assign anything a constitutive role 
in  this  process:  the  manifold  plus  metric  naturally  represents  possible  space-times: 
regulative principles are important just for permitting the formalism to serve to represent a 
wider variety of space-times. 
  This is the source of my most fundamental objection to Friedman’s approach: i.e. 
that  there  is  no  special  problem  about  how  to  apply  group-theoretic  mathematics  to 
experience. Indeed, I have argued that Einstein only did not see four-dimensional space-
time as a physical possibility because he was naturally physically interpreting features of his 
understanding  of  the  manifold  in  such  a  way  that  prevented  a  four-dimensional 
understanding of space-time. The key to seeing four-dimensional space-time as a physical 
possibility lay in Einstein’s revising his own understanding of the mathematical formalism: 
as he did so, the class of physically admissible space-times widened quite naturally and 
unproblematically. 
  In light of (a) it being unnecessary to assign a role to philosophy in answering CR 
and  (b)  the  role  of  the  equivalence  principle  and  rotating  disk  being  interpretable  as 
regulative  demands,  I  suggest  that  Friedman’s  answers  to  CR  and  CC  cannot  be  fully 
satisfactory. We are now in a position to state an alternative, regulative, answer to CR. I will 
address CC in the next section. 
The first part of a regulative answer to CR must establish that classical physics and 
general relativity deal with the same subject. I suggest that the process by which general 
relativity emerged out of Einstein’s dialectical engagement with aspects of classical physics 
can be used to provide an answer to this part of CR. I would suggest—following DiSalle 
(2006)
230—that the development of special relativity can be profitably understood as arising 
from  Einstein’s  dialectical  engagement  with  the  classical  concept  of  simultaneity.  My 
account has focussed on detailing how Einstein’s investigations into a relativistic theory of 
gravitation began by incorporating Newton’s use of Corollary VI and Galileo’s equivalence 
principle  into  relativity  as  EP1. This  served  as  a means  to  bring  to  light  a  conceptual 
tension between Newton’s theory of gravitation and relativity theory, i.e., if the admissible 
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relativistic  transformations  are  expanded  to  include  EP1  then  the  speed  of  light  is  no 
longer constant. The successive development of the theory was aimed at resolving this 
tension.  
  It is not necessarily the case that if a theory, B, has been developed by a process of 
analysing and transforming the concepts of an older theory, A, then A and B must deal 
with the same subject. However, the details of the development of general relativity are 
such that I think we can confidently state that, at least in this instance, A and B do deal with 
the same subject. This is for two main reasons. First, while the concepts of classical physics 
that feature in Einstein’s dialectical engagement are transformed, they are not transformed 
beyond recognition. For instance, the concept of simultaneity is not abandoned, instead 
Einstein recognised that our judgment of the relationship between two space-time events is 
dependent  upon  our  implicit  use  of  a  physical  phenomenon,  i.e.,  light-signalling. 
Similarly—while I have argued that EP1 can be found in classical physics and that general 
relativity is developed by a step-by-step transformation of the principle—EP1 and EP3 are 
not radically different claims: both secure the universality of free-fall and both identify—to 
an extent—inertial and gravitational effects. The distinction between the two principles lies 
in their scope: EP1 is limited to a particular class of inertial and gravitational effects while 
EP3 is not. Second, classical physics and general relativity both seek to provide an account 
of the same empirical observations. That is, both seek to provide an account of, e.g., the 
laws that govern the motions of the planets around the Sun. General relativity, of course, 
seeks to explain a greater range of phenomena than classical physics—e.g., it includes an 
explanation  of  the  advance  of  Mercury’s  perihelion—but,  crucially,  it  provides  an 
explanation of all of the empirical data that classical physics explained. So, I suggest, that 
we can say that a later theory, B, and an earlier theory, A, deal with the same subject if B 
emerged from a process of dialectical engagement with problematic concepts in theory A 
and (i) the concepts in question are not transformed beyond recognition and (ii) theory B 
provides a lawful explanation of all the empirical phenomena explained by theory A.
231 
  We are now in a position to answer CR in the following fashion: 
 
CR:  (i)  Conceptual analysis played an important role in the development of the 
theory  of  relativity.  Furthermore,  there  is  continuity  between  the 
concepts of classical physics and general relativity and general relativity 
provides an explanation of the same empirical data that classical physics 
explained. This provides a means to secure the regulative intuition that 
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successor and precursor theories are concerned with the same subject 
matter: the new theory grows from critical engagement with the earlier 
theory. 
  (ii) The equivalence principle and the rotating disk thought experiment are 
both to be understood as regulative demands to broaden the group of 
admissible coordinate transformations. It is rational to accept a theory 
that endorses additional coordinate transformations, as this represents a 
better approximation of objectivity. Furthermore, the role of conceptual 
analysis helps here, because it provides a means to clarify conceptual 
tensions  in  the  old  framework  and  show  how  the  new  framework 
resolves them. 
4.4.  General covariance as a regulative principle 
In  this  section  I  emphasise  the  importance  of  general  covariance  for  a  regulative 
Kantianism: general covariance is a regulative principle that serves to define a notion of 
<objectivity-at-a-time>  and,  thus,  is  the  fundamental  explanatory  concept  in  general 
relativity. In this section I defend this understanding of general covariance against well-
known  complaint  that  general  covariance  cannot  serve  as  a  fundamental  principle  in 
general relativity because it lacks physical content. I also address Ryckman’s understanding 
of  general  covariance  as  a  regulative and  constitutive  principle  and  clarify  that,  on  my 
reading  of  Cassirer’s  regulative  Kantianism,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  regard  general 
covariance as a constitutive principle.  
In §4.2, I argued that in the early stages of the development of general relativity, the 
equivalence principle should be understood as a regulative principle: i.e., it enabled Einstein 
to treat an extended class of frames of reference as physically equivalent. However, in the 
later stages of the development of the theory—after Einstein had adopted EP3, probably 
by around mid-1912—this role of the equivalence principle was taken over by a generalized 
principle of relativity, which Einstein sought to implement by making his theory generally 
covariant. Einstein now understood the equivalence principle as EP3: the claim that inertia 
and gravitation are of essentially the same nature and that the metric gik refers to the inertio-
gravitational field.
232  
                                                 
232 That Einstein understood the generalized principle of relativity and the equivalence principle as distinct is 
most clear in his (1918), where—with Mach’s principle—they are listed as two of the foundational principles 
of general relativity. That he understood them as distinct by mid-1912 is suggested by the fact—as we will 
see—that the two principles played quite different roles in Einstein’s search for gravitational field equations 
in the Zurich Notebook. 203 
 
  Let us begin by examining the role of general covariance in the development of 
general relativity. Einstein general covariance to be of great significance: it played a crucial 
role  in  his  investigations  in  the  Zurich  notebook  and  remains  central  to  his  (1916) 
exposition of general relativity. In the latter work, Einstein makes two demands of the laws 
of physics: 
 
(1) Generalised Principle of Relativity: “The laws of physics must be of such a nature that 
they apply to systems of reference in any kind of motion” (1916, CPAE 6, p.149). 
(2) Principle  of  General  Covariance:  “The  general  laws  of  nature  are  to  be  expressed 
through equations which hold good for all systems of co-ordinates, that is, are covariant with 
respect to any substitutions whatever (generally co-variant)” (ibid., p.153) 
 
Einstein went on to state that it was clear that a theory which satisfies (2) will also satisfy 
(1).  Einstein’s  connection  between  a  generalised  principle  of  relativity  and  general 
covariance has long been a cause for dispute.
233 It is now understood that it is a mistake to 
treat general covariance as securing the general relativity of motion.
234 I do not hope to 
resolve all the questions connected to the significance of general covariance within general 
relativity: I mean to show only that general covariance can be profitably understood as 
playing a regulative role in the development of relativity theory between 1912 and 1916. 
Ryckman (2005, ch.2) offers a similar account of the significance of general covariance; 
however, as we have seen in §3.3.2, he argues that general covariance is at once a regulative 
and a constitutive principle.
235 In this section I first seek to show, contra Ryckman, that 
general  covariance  should  not  be  understood  as  playing  a  constitutive  role  in  general 
relativity: in doing so, I aim to shed light on the significance of the equivalence principle in 
this period. 
  I  have  characterised  the  development  of  relativity  as  being  primarily  driven  by 
Einstein’s removing layers of structure from space-time that had been implicitly imposed 
upon it by his understanding of the manifold. Of particular importance was Einstein’s 
struggle to remove the privileged status of inertial frames of reference. EP1, EP2 and the 
rotating disk played an important role in the development of relativity, but none of these 
                                                 
233 See (Norton, 1993) for the standard account of the “eight decades of dispute” that general covariance 
sparked. 
234 See (Friedman, 1983) for the standard account of why this is so: the problem is that demanding that the 
laws of nature take the same form in every frame of reference is much too weak a criterion to express a 
relativity principle. The connection between covariance principles and relativity principles does hold in the 
context of flat space-times with privileged inertial frames of reference, however, as soon as we move to the 
dynamical space-time of general relativity the connection breaks. 
235 See, especially, footnote 156. 204 
 
fully  undermined  the  privileged  status  of  inertial  frames:  the  equivalence  principle  just 
extended  the  privileged  status  to  uniformly  accelerating  frames  of  reference,  and  the 
rotating disk extended it to uniformly rotating frames of reference. To be sure, both the 
equivalence principle and the rotating disk played an important role in the process, but it 
was only with general covariance that Einstein completed it. 
  While  general  covariance  was  important  for  this  reason,  Einstein’s  (1916) 
understanding of it included two significant confusions. The first confusion is the claim 
that general covariance entails the generalised principle of relativity.  As we have seen 
Einstein  initially  introduced  EP1  as  a  means  to  extend  the  relativity  principle  and  he 
implemented  it  by  treating  EP1  as  expanding  the  class  of  admissible  coordinate 
transformations. In the early stages of general relativity this is possible because Einstein 
was working within the context of three-dimensional Euclidean space. General covariance, 
like EP1, expands the class of admissible coordinate transformations: it would have been 
perfectly  natural  to  assume  that,  just  as  EP1  served  as  a  relativity  principle,  general 
covariance would too. However, with the move to four-dimensional variable space-time it 
was no longer permissible to treat general covariance as a relativity principle.
236 
  The second problem relates just to Einstein’s statement of the principle of general 
covariance. Here, Einstein treated general covariance as the claim that the laws of nature 
take the same form in every frame of reference. In 1917 Erich Kretschmann argued that 
this did not amount to more than a challenge to the ingenuity of mathematicians.
237 The 
problem  is  that  general  covariance,  understood  as  the  demand  that  the  equations  that 
express the laws of nature take the same form in every frame of reference, amounts to the 
claim that they preserve their form under arbitrary transformations between coordinate 
charts. This is known as a “passive” transformation: it does not change the physical system 
in question but merely re-describes the physical system in a different coordinate chart. 
Treating general covariance as the demand that equations maintain the same form for all 
                                                 
236 Einstein seems to have thought that the equivalence principle (EP3) would serve to enable him to treat 
general covariance as a relativity principle by providing a means to physically interpret different states of 
motion in different frames of reference. However, while EP3 captures an important intuition—i.e. that the 
effects of a gravitational field cannot be distinguished from inertial effects—it is not strictly true: in modern 
formulations, a gravitational field is present so long as the Riemann tensor is non-vanishing: this is something 
that all observers should agree on. So, when we move to the four-dimensional treatment of relativity, the 
equivalence principle can no longer be considered rigorously valid. As such, if this was meant to play a role in 
Einstein’s thinking that general covariance entailed a relativity principle, it is no wonder that the entailment 
fails in four-dimensional variably curved space-times. 
237  As  Norton  (1993;  2003)  points  out,  while  this  is  often  how  Kretschmann’s  objection  is  parsed, 
Kretschmann actually intended to make different point. Einstein attributed physical significance to space-time 
coincidences; Kretschmann showed that if one takes the catalogue of space-time coincidences to exhaust the 
physical content of general relativity, then this is not a feature that is unique to general relativity and it is for 
this reason that any space-time theory could be given a generally covariant formulation. 205 
 
coordinate systems, then, does not tell us anything of the behaviour of physical systems: it 
is a purely mathematical demand. 
  Unlike coordinate transformations, manifold transformations are “active”:
238 active 
transformations  do  not  effect  coordinate  labels  but  instead  act  on  points  so  that  the 
geometrical objects defined on the manifold change. The active transformations that we are 
concerned with are diffeomorphisms. Diffeomorphisms are maps between two manifolds, 
so if we have manifolds M and N then a diffeomorphism is a one-to-one C
∞ mapping
239 d 
from an open subset A Í M onto an open subset dA Í N.
240 Diffeomorphisms, then, are 
more physically interesting than passive transformations because they can spread the metric 
in  a  variety  of  different  ways  within  the  same  coordinate  system.  The  problem  with 
Einstein’s (1916) statement of general covariance should now be clear: he seems to take 
general  covariance  to  be  concerned  with  passive  transformations,  whereas  general 
covariance is better understood in terms of active transformations.
241 
  In  §3.3.2,  I  suggest  that  a  regulative  Kantianism  is  best  understood  as  treating 
general covariance as defining that which is objective within general relativity. We are now 
in a position to see how this will work. Corresponding to the distinction between active 
and passive transformations is a distinction between a theory’s covariance and invariance 
group. The covariance group of a theory is that which specifies all admissible coordinate 
transformations, while the invariance group of a theory is that which remains constant 
under all active transformations: these invariants are standardly referred to as the absolute 
objects of the theory.
242 The absolute objects of a theory are meant to be those that are 
unaffected by any interaction with the other objects of the theory. These objects are to be 
contrasted with the dynamical objects of a theory, which are affected by their interactions 
with  other  objects.  For  instance,  the  metric  of  special  relativity  is  an  absolute  object 
because it is Lorentz invariant and special relativistic object do not alter it. In general 
relativity the invariance group is the group Diff(M
4) of all diffeomorphisms of the space-
                                                 
238 See (Friedman, 1983, pp.46-61). 
239 A mapping m: A ® R (where A is an open subset of R
n as introduced in §4.3.2.2) is C
∞ iff m possesses 
continuous partial derivatives of all orders on A. See (Friedman, 1983, p.340) 
240 See (Friedman, 1983, p.358) 
241 This is not to say that Einstein was not aware of active transformations. As Norton (1989b) stresses, 
Einstein used the term “coordinate transformation” ambiguously: in some cases it is better to read him as 
meaning passive transformations and, in others, e.g. the hole argument, as meaning active transformations. 
The chief advantage of taking Einstein to have understood the manifold as R
n, as suggested in §4.3.2.2, is that 
it  explains  this  ambiguity.  In  the  modern  formulation  there  are  two  clearly  distinguished  representation 
relationships: i.e. between coordinate representations and the geometric structures and between the geometric 
structures  and  physically  possible  space-times.  These  correspond  to  passive  and  active  transformations 
respectively.  In  treating  the  manifold  as  R
n,  Einstein  effectively  ran  together  these  two  aspects  of 
representation and, in doing so did not have the means to so clearly distinguish between active and passive 
transformations. 
242 The terminology originates with Anderson (1967), Friedman (1983) offers a more accessible treatment of 
the subject. 206 
 
time manifold: the metric of general relativity is a dynamical object as it is not invariant 
under this transformation and is determined by matter-energy sources. 
  Diffeomorphism invariance can be usefully understood as background independence:
243 
from the present perspective this is helpful because it clarifies the regulative role of general 
covariance. General relativity is background independent in the sense that the metric is not 
determined with respect to any background structure: it is determined wholly by the mass-
energy distribution and evolves dynamically.
244  
On  a  regulative  Kantianism,  this  methodological  requirement  to  remove  the 
background-dependence  of  our  theories  is  well  placed  to  provide  an  account  of  the 
continuing  role  of  background  independence  in  physics.  In  the  previous  chapter  I 
suggested that the regulative ideal towards which science aims should be understood as a 
maximally  unified  theory  that  embodies  the  concept  of  objectivity-in-general. 
Understanding  general  covariance  as  background  independence  clarifies  the  manner  in 
which general covariance can serve as an approximation of this idea of objectivity that 
finds expression in general relativity.. The demand for background independence serves to 
ensure that there is no preferred frame of reference. The background-independent laws 
hold in every frame of reference and, in this sense, are objective.  
Ryckman  argues  that  general  covariance  serves  as  “an  a  priori  constitutive,  yet 
guiding  regulative  requirement  to  be  placed  on  the  conception  of  physical  objectivity” 
(2005, p.24). On the account above, the sense in which it is a regulative demand is clear: it 
ensures that the validity of the laws of nature is to be determined independently of any 
given  preferred  frame  of  reference.  However,  it  is  not  clear  that  this  amounts  to  the 
principle being constitutive of physical objectivity. From the perspective of the regulative 
Kantianism  developed  in  §3,  there  is  some  ambiguity  in  Ryckman’s  statement  about 
whether  general  covariance  should  be  understood  as  constitutive  of  the  concept 
<objectivity> or of the concept <object> in general relativity. It does not make sense to 
speak of general covariance as constitutive of <objectivity>: the concept <objectivity> is 
not  made  possible  by  general  covariance,  it  just  approximates  the  regulative  ideal  of 
                                                 
243 See (Giulini, 2006) for a detailed examination of the relationship between background independence and 
general  covariance.  That  general  relativity  is  background  independent  is  a  consequence  of  Anderson’s 
argument that general relativity has no absolute objects: any fixed and permanent background for general 
relativity would have to be invariant under the group Diff(M
4). 
244 Background independence continues to play a guiding role in attempts to develop a theory of quantum 
gravity. For instance Smolin (2005, p.204) argues that physics advances “by identifying the background structure in 
our theories and removing it, replacing it with relations which evolve subject to dynamical law”. There has been some 
dispute over whether a theory that seeks to unify quantum theory and general relativity should be background 
independent or not. Some approaches—i.e. string theory and peturbative quantum general relativity—are 
background dependent. However many of the more promising approaches—e.g., loop quantum gravity and 
background-independent string theory among others—prioritise background independence. Smolin, at least, 
urges that the background-independent approaches are to be preferred. 207 
 
<objectivity-in-general>. Can general covariance be understood as being constitutive of 
objects  of  experience?  This  does  not  really  make  sense  either.  The  natural  way  to 
understand  this  claim  would  be  to  say  that  general  covariance  is  constitutive  of  those 
objects that are diffeomorphism invariant: however, as we have seen, general covariance is 
epistemologically  significant  for  general  relativity  insofar  as  it  amounts  to  background 
independence,  which  is  just  the  denial  that  there  are  any  diffeomorphically  invariant 
objects. Within my regulative framework, then, general covariance cannot be constitutive 
of objects of experience.
245 
In this section I have sought to show, against the sort of concerns expressed by 
Friedman (1983) about taking general covariance to be a principle associated with general 
relativity, that there is a sense in which general covariance can be understood as a regulative 
demand that is instantiated by general relativity: understood as background independence 
there is a clear sense in which general covariance is a regulative principle and in which 
general relativity instantiates the principle in a way that earlier space-time theories does not. 
4.5.  A regulative reading of the development of general relativity 
In this chapter I have primarily been concerned to defend a regulative answer to CR. My 
account  is  intended  to  respond  to  Friedman’s  two  main  objections  to  a  regulative 
Kantianism: (1) that a regulative account cannot explain the forward-looking rationality of 
theory  change  and  (2)  that  a  regulative  Kantianism,  in  abandoning  Kant’s  distinction 
between sensibility and understanding, cannot answer CC. I have argued that both these 
challenges can be met and, furthermore, that the regulative reading, with its emphasis on 
invariance  principles,  provides  a  more  convincing  philosophical  account  of  the 
development of general relativity than Friedman’s constitutive reading. 
How,  then,  should  a  regulative  Kantianism  answer  CR?  As  was  the  case  for 
Cassirer, there are two aspects to this question. First, it is important to explain how it is 
that we can be sure that the sequence of scientific theories are dealing with the same 
subject. In the previous chapter we saw that Cassirer sought to answer this question by 
arguing  that  successive  space-time  theories  all  seek  to  reveal  the  ultimate  invariants  of 
experience, e.g., the notion of spatiality in general. While this remains defensible in its 
broad outline—i.e., general relativity refines the Newtonian conception of space—I do not 
think that this is the best way to address this part of CR. Cassirer understood the ultimate 
                                                 
245 This is not to say that Ryckman’s understanding of general covariance does not make sense within his own 
account of constitutivity: I claim only that when one reads Cassirer as I have advocated in ch.3, it makes no 
sense to treat general covariance as constitutive and regulative. 208 
 
invariants of experience to be ultimately constitutive of every judgment in the sequence of 
space-time theories: this does not seem plausible in light of the account of general relativity 
developed here.  
I have argued for an alternative. It is possible to secure the regulative intuition that 
classical physics and general relativity deal with the same subject by examining the process 
by which the latter theory emerged from the former theory. In §4.3.3, I have argued that 
when a later theory is developed by a conceptual analysis of an earlier theory—and (i) the 
concepts in question are not transformed beyond recognition and (ii) theory B provides a 
lawful explanation of all the empirical phenomena explained by theory A—this is sufficient 
to conclude that the two theories are concerned with the same subject. This, I suggest, 
provides a satisfactory answer to the first part of CR. 
The  second  part  of  CR  is  as  to  how  we  should  explain  the  forward-looking 
rationality of a theory change: i.e., why would it have been rational for a proponent of 
Newton’s theory of gravity to abandon it in favour of Einstein’s? The answer to this lies in 
the manner in which Einstein developed general relativity. His theory was developed in a 
step-wise process in which he incrementally increased the class of admissible coordinate 
transformations. On a regulative reading it is rational to prefer a theory that permits more 
coordinate transformations because it will offer a better approximation of the regulative 
ideal. In the case of general relativity, though, there is more to the answer than this: the key 
steps  along  the  path  to  general  relativity  are  made  by  exploring  and  resolving 
inconsistencies in the previous framework. DiSalle (2006, pp.103-11) shows that Einstein’s 
definition of simultaneity can be understood as a conceptual analysis of the Newtonian 
conception  of  simultaneity.
246  A  Newtonian  scientist  who  was  aware  of  the  difficulties 
involved in determining distance-simultaneity could easily see why it would be rational to 
accept Einstein’s definition of simultaneity. In his (1907) paper, then, Einstein displayed 
another conceptual tension: between his (1905) theory of relativity and Newton’s Corollary 
VI. This was eventually resolved in his theory of static gravitational fields by taking the 
variable speed of light to represent gravitational potential. However, it was immediately 
clear to Einstein that his 1912 theory could not be fully satisfactory because it could not 
provide an account of uniform rotations: this was a problem with the three-dimensional 
formalism and, as we saw in §4.3, embracing four-dimensional formalism was the most 
obvious way—given the mathematical tools available to Einstein—to resolve this problem. 
So, there is a clear path that leads from conceptual tensions in Newton’s theory to the 
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general theory of relativity: this, combined with the broader invariance group of Einstein’s 
theory, is surely enough to render the adoption of general relativity prospectively rational. 
In the next chapter I consider Friedman’s second objection in depth: i.e., that a 
regulative  reading  cannot  provide  a  distinction  between  constitutive  and  regulative 
principles. This objection is, as we have already seen hinted at, is going to be more difficult 
to respond to. I have characterised the equivalence principle as a regulative principle on the 
grounds that it expands the group of admissible coordinate transformations. In §5 I argue 
that there is a sense in which the equivalence principle is constitutive of the laws of general 
relativity. The difficulty in providing an account of constitutivity that is satisfactory from a 
contemporary perspective is to be expected: after all, constitutive principles were initially 
understood  as  synthetic  a  priori  principles  that  the  understanding  applied  to  the  bare 
manifold  of  intuition  provided  by  the  faculty  of  sensibility.  If  we  wish  to  develop  an 
account  that  is  meaningfully  Kantian,  without  also  accepting  the  division  between 
sensibility and understanding and the synthetic a priori, then it is inevitable that we must 
compromise somewhat in answering CC. 
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Objectivity and structuralism in general relativity 
 
 
 
 5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that Cassirer’s answer to CC represents a plausible and attractive 
contemporary Kantian option. There are two strands to Cassirer’s answer to CC: first that 
the principles of a theory are constitutive of its laws and, second, that the laws of a theory 
are constitutive of the objects of the theory. With the development of ontic structural 
realism, there has been increasing interest in Cassirer’s law-constitutive account of objects. 
In particular, Cei and French (2009) argue that Cassirer’s account of law-constitutivity can 
be  stripped  free  of  its  Kantian  roots  and  used  to  motivate  certain  features  of  ontic 
structural realism. In this chapter I respond to this claim in two ways: first, I suggest that 
Cassirer’s particular brand of law-constitutivity is tightly interwoven with his Kantianism 
and,  second,  that  the  Kantian  account  of  law-constitutivity  is  to  be  preferred  to  the 
structural realist account. 
I  begin  this  chapter  by  outlining  a  potential  problem  for  taking  the  law-
constitutivity of objects to count as a satisfactory answer to CC. In short, the idea that the 
objects of a theory are made possible by the laws in which they stand is not uniquely 
Kantian. As Brading has shown, the idea can—in all likelihood—be traced back to Newton 
and  can  be  used  to  defend  an  ontology  containing  metaphysically  real  objects.
247 
Furthermore, the idea that objects are law-constituted is also central to certain versions of 
structural realism.
248 Law-constitutivity on its own is too weak to deliver an answer to CC 
that leaves us with a meaningfully Kantian philosophy of science. 
It is this fact that opens the way for Cei and French’s attempt to deploy Cassirer’s 
structuralism as an argument for structural realism. They argue that if Cassirer’s account of 
                                                 
247 See (Brading, 2011) for the law-constitutive reading of Newton’s account of objects and (Brading and 
Skiles, 2012) for a contemporary defence of law-constitutivity. 
248 Here I have in mind eliminative ontic structural realism, which I will return to in §5.2. 211 
 
law-constitutivity is amended so as to utilise a structural account of laws—rather than a 
neo-Kantian account—then it can be understood in realist terms. In §5.3.1 and §5.4 I 
identify two features of Cassirer’s structuralism that I suggest complicate this move. First, I 
argue  that  Cei  and  French’s  reading  of  Cassirer  does  not  do  justice  to  his  distinction 
between  the  roles  of  objectivity  and  physical  principles  in  the  structure  of  scientific 
theories.  This  difference  is  important  because  on  Cei  and  French’s  understanding  of 
objectivity it is quite natural to ask whether our invariance principles represent any feature 
of objective reality. However, on my reading of Cassirer’s understanding of objectivity, 
such questions do not make sense.  
Second, I argue that physical principles have a far more significant role to play in 
Cassirer’s philosophy of science than is suggested in Cei and French’s reading of Cassirer: 
in §5.4.1, I argue that principles were of much greater significance to Cassirer than laws. In 
this section, therefore I clarify the role of physical principles in Cassirer’s philosophy of 
science and argue that, coupled with a law-constitutive account of objects, this amounts to 
a plausible contemporary Kantian answer to CC. 
This, I take it, shows that it is not a straightforward matter to deploy Cassirer’s 
structuralism as an argument for structural realism. This does not, of course, undermine the 
structural realist account of law-constitutivity: it is simply to say that Cassirer’s structuralist 
framework  cannot  be  straightforwardly  stripped  away  from  its  neo-Kantian  roots  and 
deployed  in  the  service  of  contemporary  forms  of  structural  realism.  However,  there 
remains a further problem for the Kantian: why should we defend Cassirer’s version of 
law-constitutivity rather than the structural realist version? In §5.3.2, I suggest that the 
strongest motivation for resisting structural realism, from a Kantian perspective, is that the 
conception of the role of philosophy in science that marks the structural realist approach is 
deeply  undesirable  from  a  Kantian  perspective.  In  §5.3.2  I  clarify  the  sense  in  which 
philosophy is a branch of science on structural realism and defend, instead, a Kantian 
conception of the relationship between philosophy and science. 
5.2.   The law-constitutive account of objects 
As we saw in §3.3.2, Cassirer took the laws of a theory to be conceptually prior to the 
objects of that theory.
 I argued that, for Cassirer, this means that there is an important 
sense in which the laws of a theory are constitutive of objects: i.e., for something to be an 
object of a theory is for that object to conform to the laws of that theory. On Cassirer’s 
account this meant that there are no mind-independent objects: the objects identified by 212 
 
our scientific theories are expected to evolve with our scientific theories. The idea of law-
constitutivity, though, is not one that is unique to a Kantian philosophy of science: it has 
also been deployed in the service of both entity and structural scientific realism. In this 
section  I  introduce  the  law-constitutive  account  of  objects  as  it  features  in  the 
contemporary debate.  
In contemporary philosophy of science there is increasingly a prevalent attitude that 
structural realism represents the most promising form of scientific realism. In its most 
general  form,  structural  realism  is  the  claim  that  scientific  theories  are  successful  not 
because they refer to actually existing objects but because they refer to structural features 
of the world. This view was first defended by Worrall (1989), who argues that it enables the 
realist  to  do  justice  to  both  the  pessimistic  meta-induction  (PMI)  and  the  no  miracles 
argument (NMA). Worrall’s structural realism grants, in response to PMI, that the entities 
posited  by  past  unsuccessful  theories—e.g.  Fresnel’s  aether—did  fail  to  refer  to  any 
existent metaphysical object. However, we must also be able to account for the success of 
past theories in spite of this failure of reference: Worrall argues that we may do so taking 
past scientific theories to correctly identify some aspect of the structural relations between 
whatever externally existing objects there may be. 
On  Worrall’s  epistemic  structural  realism  (ESR),  both  objects  and  relations  are 
metaphysically  real:  objects  are  primary  and  relations  hold  between  these  objects.  The 
characteristic claim of ESR is that while objects do exist, we are only ever able to have 
knowledge of the relationships in which they stand.
249 French and Ladyman developed ontic 
structural realism (OSR) as an alternative to ESR:
250 they argue that objects do not exist as 
individuals  independently  of  structural  relationships.  This  attitude  towards  objects  and 
relations can be understood in either an eliminative or non-eliminative fashion:
251 
 
Eliminative OSR:    There are only relationships; there no relata that stand in 
those relationships. 
Non-eliminative OSR:  There  are  both  relations  and  relata  that  stand  in  those 
relations,  but  relations  are  primary  and  the  relata  are 
                                                 
249 A proponent of ESR is not committed to the claim that objects exist, it is consistent with ESR to be 
agnostic about objects: i.e., to claim that there may or may not be objects but that it is impossible to know 
either way. I am not concerned here with this version of ESR; I argue in this section that a law-constitutive 
account of objects is the most promising way to understand objects in contemporary philosophy of science 
and I do not think that the agnostic version of ESR impacts on this argument. 
250 See (Ladyman, 1998) and (French and Ladyman, 2003; 2011) for arguments to the effect that OSR is to be 
preferred to ESR.  
251 I draw this distinction in the same manner as (Stachel, 2006, p.54). 213 
 
secondary. The relata can be understood either as objects or 
properties.
252 
 
On eliminative OSR, then, all that there is to know of the world is its structure: objects do 
not exist as individuals independently of structural relationships: this is the view defended 
by  French  and  Ladyman.
253  Non-eliminative  OSR  is  reluctant  to  do  away  with  relata 
altogether: it is assumed that while relationships are primary there must be something—
whether objects or properties—that is also ontologically primitive. The claim that relations 
are primary to relata should be understood as the claim that at least one essential property 
of the relata is relational.  
What  motivates  the  idea  that  objects  either  need  to  be  eliminated  from  our 
metaphysics or, at least, be reconceived in relational terms? The main argument supporting 
OSR is the argument from underdetermination.
254 This argument is based upon the idea 
that if objects do exist as metaphysical primitives, then there should be a fact of the matter 
as to whether or not those objects are individuals or non-individuals. Furthermore, if we 
are to adopt a realist attitude towards these objects, then we would expect our best current 
scientific  theories  to  accurately  reveal  whether  these  objects  should  be  considered  as 
individuals  or  non-individuals.  However,  the  question  of  the  individuality  of  objects  is 
metaphysically underdetermined by our best current scientific theories.
255 OSR urges that 
the appropriate response to this underdetermination is to accept it, and seek the structural 
commonalities between the two metaphysical options: this is achieved by giving up talk of 
objects and taking structure to be primary. 
                                                 
252 See (Lyre, 2011) for a version of non-eliminative OSR according to which properties are ontologically 
primitive and (Esfeld and Lam, 2008) for a non-eliminative OSR according to which objects are ontologically 
primitive. See (Ainsworth, 2010) for a taxonomy of approaches to OSR. 
253 Brading and Skiles (2012) suggest that there is some ambiguity in their position because they sometimes 
advocate reconceptualising objects rather than eliminating them, e.g.: “Let us be clear: we are not ‘anti-
ontology’  in  the  sense  of  urging  a  move  away  from  electrons,  elementary  particles  etc.  and  towards 
‘observable structures’ or the S-matrix or whatever; rather, we urge the reconceptualization of electrons, 
elementary particles and so forth in structural instead of individualistic terms” (French and Ladyman 2003, 
p.37). However, here I take French and Ladyman to mean that objects may retain a useful heuristic role in 
science, but that they need to be understood only in terms of relational properties: i.e., the objects should not 
be  understood  as  having  any  intrinsic  essential  properties.  This  may  seem  close  to  Lyre’s  (2011)  non-
eliminative OSR, but there remains a distinction: French and Ladyman are granting that it is reasonable to 
talk about objects as if they were a metaphysical category so long as they are characterised in solely relational 
terms, while Lyre thinks that there is a metaphysical category of objects. In their most recent article, French 
and Ladyman are clear that their purpose is to eliminate objects: “One key thesis of OSR is eliminativism 
about objects…” (2011, p.27). 
254 This argument is deployed in (Ladyman, 1998; French and Ladyman, 2003) and has been more recently 
defended in detail in (French, 2011). 
255 The most frequently cited example of a theory underdetermining the individuality of its objects comes 
from quantum physics, which is can be understood either as treating quantum particles as individuals or non-
individuals. See (French, 1989). 214 
 
Brading and Skiles (2012) argue that a law-constitutive approach to objects can be 
used to rebut the argument from underdetermination and to defend an account of objects 
according to which they are conceptually prior to relations: this amounts to the claim that 
there are objects such that none of their essential properties depend upon the relationships 
into which they enter. Brading argues that this notion of law constitutivity can be traced 
back to Newton,
  256 who seems to explicitly endorse a law-constitutive understanding of 
bodies in De Gravitatione (Newton, 2004). The law-constitutive approach of Newton, it is 
argued, provides a viable contemporary option and enables us to reject the argument from 
underdetermination: it does so by separating questions of objecthood and questions of 
individuality (p.105). That is, what it is to be an object is no longer tied up with notions of 
individuality: what it is to be an object, by contrast, is to satisfy a system of physical laws. 
This means that if, on a particular theory, the laws do not commit us to treating objects as 
either individuals or non-individuals then it is a mistake to try and provide a metaphysical 
account of those objects as either individuals or non-individuals. The laws of a theory 
exhaust all there is to say about the objects of a theory. This means that Brading and Skiles 
can respond to the argument from underdetermination simply by denying that there must 
be a fact of the matter about whether or not there objects are individuals. 
The law-constitutive approach to objects is very natural from the perspective of the 
regulative  Kantianism  developed  in  §3.  From  the  perspective  of  developing  a  Kantian 
answer  to  CC,  Brading  and  Skiles’s  (2012)  raises  a  problem:  a  Kantian  philosophy  of 
science  cannot  emphasise  law-constitutivity  alone  because  this  is  compatible  with  an 
ontology that contains either metaphysically real objects or metaphysically real structures. 
For law-constitutivity to represent a Kantian answer to CC it must be accompanied by an 
appropriate understanding of laws. In the next section I outline the two key features of a 
Kantian account of laws that will ensure that a Kantian version of law-constitutivity can be 
distinguished from both the law-constitutivity of both eliminative OSR and Brading and 
Skiles: i.e. for the Kantian invariance groups must be interpreted as regulative ideals and 
there must be a constitutive role for physical principles in making laws possible in the first 
place. 
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5.3.   Structuralist accounts of objectivity and objects 
Certain expositions of eliminative OSR take Cassirer’s account of law-constitutivity to be 
amenable  to  a  realist  interpretation.
257  In  this  section  I  argue  that  the  neo-Kantian 
understanding  of  law-constitutivity  advocated  by  Cassirer  cannot  be  straightforwardly 
deployed by OSR. While both Cassirer and OSR take the notion of objectivity within a 
particular  theory  to  be  secured  via  invariance  principles,  I  claim  that  the  concept  of 
objectivity actually plays a quite different role in the conceptual structure of OSR and 
Cassirer’s structuralism. 
5.3.1. From objectivity to objects 
There are striking similarities between Cassirer’s structuralism, detailed in §3, and OSR.
258 
Both (i) take the concept <objectivity> to be explanatorily prior to the concept <object> 
(ii) take objects to be constituted by the laws of a theory and (iii) take the laws of a theory 
to be objective insofar as they encode the relevant invariance group of a theory.
259 The task 
of this section is to explain the sense in which OSR endorses (i)-(iii) and to clarify how 
OSR’s approach differs from Cassirer’s. In a sense this is quite obvious: on OSR the laws 
of a theory are taken to refer to actual relations that make up the structure of the world, 
whereas for Cassirer laws are only made possible by the historical role of physical principles 
in  their  development  and  these  principles  do  not  refer  to  any  feature  of  metaphysical 
reality. However, in light of Cei and French’s (2009) argument that the only distinction 
between Cassirer’s structuralism and OSR is their differing account of laws, it is important 
to be clear about the precise source of this difference between OSR and Cassirer: I argue 
that it lies in a differing understanding of the relationship between objectivity, principles 
and laws. 
                                                 
257 E.g., Cassirer’s claim that the laws of a theory are conceptually prior to the idea of electrons is cited 
approvingly in (French and Ladyman, 2003, p.30; Cei and French, 2009, p.109; Cei and French, forthcoming, 
p.11). 
258 The similarity between OSR and Cassirer’s structuralism has been made most explicit  in the case of 
eliminative OSR, for the most detailed discussion see (Cei and French, 2009). However, I take it that non-
eliminative OSR is  similarly committed to the explanatory priority of  <objectivity>  to  <object>: this,  I 
suggest in §5.3.2, is the most natural way to make sense of the claim that while there are both relations and 
objects relations are primary. It is certainly the case that on non-eliminative OSR, as on eliminative OSR, 
objectivity  is  to  do  with  invariance  and  not  to  do  with  objects.  For  the  sake  of  the  main  body  of  the 
discussion of this section I do not, therefore, distinguish between the eliminative and non-eliminative forms 
of OSR. 
259 Non-eliminative OSR agrees on points (i) and (iii), but it’s not clear that all forms of non-eliminative OSR 
would need to accept that objects are constituted by the laws of a theory. Non-eliminative OSR, though, is at 
least consistent with a law-constitutive approach to objects. Here, though, I take the law-constitutivity of 
objects as the starting-point for my analysis and so am only interested in non-eliminative OSR insofar as it 
takes objects to be constituted by laws. 216 
 
Cassirer’s structuralism plays a quite central role in certain expositions of OSR, 
which appeal to Cassirer in order to help with key conceptual difficulties. For instance, 
French and Ladyman (2003, §3) appeal to a modified version of Cassirer’s account of 
objectivity in order to explain how OSR can satisfy the realist’s demand for objectivity 
without  objects.  Indeed,  Cei  and  French  (2009)  argue  that  Cassirer’s  structuralism—
separated from his neo-Kantian account of laws—can be deployed as a means to help 
clarify certain features of eliminative OSR.  
Cei  and  French  take  Cassirer’s  structuralism  to  be  derived  from  four  tenets 
(pp.112-3): 
 
(1) Holism: this is the view that statements of the results of measurements, laws and 
principles cannot be understood individually, and only make sense in relation to 
each other. 
(2) Functional Coordination: As we saw in §3.3, there are two features of functional 
coordination: first, there is a preference for relational concepts and, second, the 
starting point of  scientific analysis is the concept of <objectivity>. Cei and 
French do not emphasise this role for the concept of <objectivity> and instead 
treat the second aspect of functional coordination as determining the manner in 
which measurements, laws and principles relate to each other. The effect of this 
is  that  it  is  principles—and  especially  symmetry—that  take  on  the  role  of 
securing a sense of objectivity on Cei and French’s account.  
(3) The centrality of the notion of law: Cei and French identify laws as being central to 
Cassirer’s account: it is laws that express the general pattern that is observed in 
individual cases. They argue that principles play a less significant role because 
they just replicate the coordinative relationship between laws and singular cases 
at the more general level of laws themselves.  
(4) Neo-Kantian conception of laws: Laws are logico-mathematical elements that play a 
synthetic constructive role in thought in allowing knowledge to be derived from 
experience.  
 
Cassirer’s structuralism, on this view, is not a consequence of his neo-Kantianism. The only 
explicitly Kantian element in Cassirer’s philosophy is his particular understanding of laws. 
If laws and principles are reconceived in a realist relational fashion, then eliminative OSR 
can be derived from tenets (1)-(3) of Cassirer’s view. 
From the perspective of my reading of Cassirer in §3.3, there are two factors that 
make this process less clean than Cei and French would have it. First, as mentioned, Cei 217 
 
and  French  run  together  the  distinct  roles  of  the  concepts  of  <objectivity>  and 
<knowledge>  in  Cassirer’s  function-theory  of  coordination.  Second,  principles  have  a 
much more significant role in Cassirer’s system than Cei and French allow: I have argued in 
§3.3.2 that Cassirer takes physical principles to make laws possible and this, I think, means 
that it is principles that should be understood as central for Cassirer. In this section I focus 
on how the understanding of <objectivity> differs on the two accounts. In §5.4 I return to 
the question of the role of principles and argue that, for these two reasons, a realist account 
of laws and principles cannot be straightforwardly slotted in to replace the Kantian account 
of laws in Cassirer’s system. 
  Let us turn our attention, then, towards the structural account of laws. One of the 
central claims of OSR is that objectivity has nothing to do with objects. Instead, OSR seeks 
to secure the objectivity of scientific laws by taking the laws to be governed by higher level 
principles:  specifically  symmetry  principles  and  laws  of  conservation.  The  distinction 
between OSR and Cassirer’s structuralism, of course, is that for Cassirer the invariance 
group of a particular theory is understood as a regulative ideal, whereas for the structural 
realist symmetry principles—from which invariance groups are derived—capture relevant 
features of the structure of the world. 
  It would seem, then, that the structural realist is just as able to reverse the direction 
of  explanation  between  objectivity  and  objects  as  Cassirer  was.  This  should  not  be 
surprising:  Cassirer  argued  for  function-concepts  on  the  basis  of  a  detailed  historical 
analysis  of  the  development  of  concepts  in  physics  and  while  the  motivation  for  this 
historical analysis was Kantian,
260 the details of it are not. That is, whether the development 
of  physics  is  viewed  from  a  Kantian  or  realist  perspective  it  seems  equally  clear  that 
invariance  principles  are  increasingly  taken  to  be  more  fundamental  than  objects. 
Furthermore,  it  is  also  clear  from  either  perspective  that  in  modern  physics  it  is  the 
invariance group of a theory that is taken to be objective.
 261 
  The idea that objectivity can be understood in terms of invariance—which I will 
refer to henceforth as invariantism
262—has been criticised by Debs and Redhead (2007), who 
                                                 
260 That is, Cassirer was seeking to answer the transcendental question as to the possibility of natural science. 
261 We have seen in §3.3, how this works for Cassirer, where <objectivity> is understood as a regulative ideal. 
This idea, though, can equally well be understood in realist terms. E.g., (Nozick, 2000, pp.75-6) argues that 
the three strands of our everyday characterisation of an objective fact—accessibility, intersubjectivity and 
independence—can be quite naturally captured in terms of invariance: i.e., by the claim that “an objective fact 
is invariant under transformations” (p.76).  
262  Here  I  adopt  Debs  and  Redhead’s  terminology  (2007,  p.60).  They  characterise  invariantism  as  the 
commitment to the following three claims. First, is the claim that for something to be objective it must be 
invariant under symmetry transformations: they trace this idea back to Weyl’s claim that “objectivity means 
invariance with respect to the group of automorphisms” (1982, p.132). Second, they argue that invariantism is 
committed to the idea that the increased success of theories of broader invariance groups is to be explained 
by  the  fact  that  the  theories  have  a  broader  invariance  group.  Finally,  they  claim  that  a  key  tenet  of 218 
 
raise three objections to the position. Here I address the two most pertinent.
263 First, they 
draw a distinction between accidental and heuristic symmetries and object that there is no 
obvious way to determine which should be understood as representing the symmetries of 
nature.
264 Second, they object that invariantism is linked with the idea of unification and 
that this is a problem because it prevents us having objective knowledge of current theories 
because true objectivity is embodied in the GUT. 
French’s (2012, §1.7) response to these objections will prove useful in clarifying 
precisely how the ontic structural realist understands objectivity. French argues that one 
should view the GUT as the ideal limit upon which our current theories converge:
265 the 
idea  is  that  the  final  unified  theory  will  embody  a  certain  set  of  universal  physical 
symmetries. Our present theories are successful because they approximately identify some 
feature of the symmetries of the final theory. So, once we took parity to be a fundamental 
physical invariance and then quantum physics showed it was violated. However, rather than 
discarding  parity  invariance  altogether  it  was  absorbed  into  CPT-invariance.  On  OSR, 
parity  invariance  was  useful  to  past  theories  because  it  correctly  identified  an 
approximation  of  a  symmetry  that  was  valid  within  its  domain,  that  more  closely 
approximates  the  universal  physical  symmetries.  With  unification  and  invariance  being 
connected in this fashion, it is not clear why there is a problem with the notion of the idea 
of a given invariance group giving an idea of objectivity-at-a-time: our present invariance 
groups are simply taken to approximate some aspect of objective reality. Similarly, it is not 
clear why invariantism, so-understood, should be troubled by how the useful symmetries 
are to be determined. If a theory built upon an invariance group that finds an approximate 
                                                                                                                                               
invariantism is the attempt “to establish a connection between the condition for objectivity and universality” 
(Debs and Redhead, 2007, p.60). I take this to mean that invariantism includes the idea that by developing 
theories  of  a  broader  invariance  group,  we  have  theories  that  are  more  unified  and  progress  towards  a 
universal, theory-of-everything. 
263 I am interested in these two because through responding to these we can clarify the sense in which OSR 
takes objectivity to be the starting-point of scientific analysis.  
264 In particular they object to Nozick’s argument that the choice of invariance group upon which to define 
objectivity should be resolved just by “the bootstrap process of scientific investigation” (Nozick, 2000, p.84). 
For Nozick, then, the proper invariance group to describe that which is objective is determined by the usual 
scientific inductive procedure according to which new developments emerge out of past theories and lead to 
the development of new theories. This, Debs and Redhead claim, just asserts the heuristic value of certain 
symmetries. 
265 With respect to the second of Debs and Redhead’s objections, French also objects that it is not clear that 
invariantism is necessarily committed to the idea that the search for objectivity is linked with the search for a 
unified theory. On one level this seems quite right: there seems to be no reason that one cannot be, e.g., 
pluralist  while  insisting  that  objectivity  within  each  domain  is  to  be  determined  by  that  domain’s  own 
symmetry  groups.  However,  if  we  restrict  our  attention  to  physics,  then  it  seems  perfectly  plausible  to 
interpret  symmetries  as  playing  a  unificatory  role.  In  quantum  physics,  e.g.,  elementary  particles  can  be 
characterised according to their internal symmetry groups: this proved important in the development of 
quantum physics because the characterisation of hadrons in terms of the SU(3) symmetry group suggested 
that these particles had key similarities which, ultimately, led to the quark hypothesis. See Falkenberg (1988) 
and Morrison (2000, ch. 4; 2008). 219 
 
correlate in the final theory then that theory will be successful; if it is not built upon such 
an invariance group, on OSR, we would not expect it to enjoy the same success.  
On OSR, then, the world is ultimately to be described as a web of relations. This 
web of relations will contain certain invariants and it is these invariants, understood group-
theoretically, that symmetry principles are taken to refer to. Principles and laws relate to 
each other because laws encode invariance principles in their mathematical form:
266 e.g., 
Einstein’s field equations are objective just because they are invariant under the group 
Diff(M). Objects, then, are constituted by these laws. I take it that this much is common to 
both  eliminative  and  non-eliminative  OSR.  The  web  of  relations  that  composes 
metaphysical reality seems to do all of the explanatory work: i.e., it is the invariants among 
these web of relations being encoded into our laws that explains the predictive success of 
our laws. On eliminative OSR, this is understood as meaning that there is no explanatory 
role for objects and so there is no need to treat them as part of our ontology. From the 
perspective of non-eliminative OSR, this framework provides a means to understand the 
primacy of relations over relata—i.e., it is the relations that ultimately explain the success of 
science—while also maintaining that there must be some relata between which the relations 
hold. 
It should now be clear what it means for both eliminative and non-eliminative OSR 
to begin the analysis of science with the concept of objectivity. The analysis of science 
begins with the identification of a particular set of invariants and these symmetry principles 
are encoded in the laws of a theory. The objects of a theory are then identified as points of 
intersection between the relations described by laws. The two forms of OSR differ in how 
they interpret these objects, but I will return to that issue in the next section. For now I 
wish  to  emphasise  the  sense  in  which  this  is  a  different  picture  from  that  offered  by 
Cassirer. 
From the perspective of my reading of Cassirer’s structuralism, the concepts of 
<objectivity> and <knowledge> have somewhat been run together on OSR. For Cassirer 
the most fundamental goal of philosophy of science was to explain how it is possible that 
scientific  theories  can  be  objective,  while  human  experience  of  the  world  was  entirely 
subjective. Emphasising the foundational importance of particular invariance groups was 
important because they provide a means to describe frame-dependent experience in frame-
independent terms. An essential part of Cassirer’s philosophy of science is to show how 
scientific entities emerge out of the interplay of objectivity, principles and laws. This is a 
                                                 
266 This feature of OSR is influenced by Cassirer’s account of functional coordination. See (Cei and French, 
forthcoming, p.10): “The sense in which the data, laws and principles relate to each other can be captured via 
a kind of ‘Functional Coordination’ (Cassirer, 1956) which is encoded by the mathematical form of the laws 
and, further, grounds the possibility of scientific objectivity”. 220 
 
much more important feature of Cassirer’s philosophy of science than it is for OSR. On 
OSR science ultimately aims to represent the external world; for Cassirer, science ultimately 
aims to reveal that which is invariant in every judgment concerning objects.  
The upshot of this is that Cassirer and OSR have very different attitudes about the 
question  of  the  ontological  status  of  the  invariance  principles  that  form  the  basis  of 
particular  scientific  theories.  For  Cassirer,  invariance  principles  are  ultimately  aiming  at 
describing the regulative ideal of the ultimate invariants of experience. For Cassirer it does 
not  even  make  sense  to  ask  the  further  question  as  to  whether  or  not  these  ultimate 
invariants of experience correspond with an external reality: they are those elements that 
are invariant at the root of every human judgment and, as such, cannot be expected to refer 
to external reality. Indeed, for Cassirer, the study of science was equivalent to the study of 
human reason or the mind.
267 For Cassirer, if we take science to make claims about the 
nature of mind-independent reality, that is akin to taking it to make claims about science-
independent reality: clearly, then, for Cassirer the additional question that motivates OSR—
i.e., as to whether we should explain the success of our science in terms of the reference of 
symmetry principles to external reality—does not even really make sense.  
This, I suggest, is a problem for Cei and French’s argument that Cassirer’s account 
of functional coordination can be deployed as an argument for OSR. In running together 
the concepts of objectivity and knowledge, Cei and French effectively remove Cassirer’s 
separate understanding of objectivity as a regulative ideal. When this is emphasised as part 
of Cassirer’s functional account of coordination, it is clear that Cassirer’s Kantianism—and 
his refusal to make any metaphysical commitments on the basis of his structuralism—is 
more integral to his structuralism than Cei and French would have it. In the next section I 
introduce briefly the idea that this distinction is, at root, a distinction between two different 
accounts  of  the  relationship  between  philosophy  and  science.  In  §5.4,  I  return  to  the 
question of distinguishing Cassirer’s account of law-constitutivity from structural realist 
versions of the claim. 
5.3.2. Law-constitutivity and the metaphysics of objects on ontic structural realism 
In the previous section I have argued that, as a consequence of his account of objectivity, it 
does not make sense for Cassirer to ask the question as to whether or not invariance 
principles refer to any feature of external reality. In this section I wish to clarify that there is 
a  deeper  methodological  distinction  between  Kantian  and  realist  approaches  that  lies 
                                                 
267 “The ‘understanding’ here is not to be taken in the empirical sense, as the psychological power of human 
thought, but arather in the purely transcendental sense, as the whole of intellectual and spiritual culture. It 
stands directly for that entity which we designate by the name ‘science’”. (Cassirer, 1981, pp.154-5) 221 
 
behind this claim to do with the differing accounts of the role of philosophy in science. In 
particular, on OSR philosophy is seen as a branch of science, whereas for the Kantian 
philosophy of science is more properly understood as being concerned with epistemology. 
From  this  perspective  it  is  helpful  to  consider  how  we  might  choose  between 
eliminative and non-eliminative OSR. I argue that this is a question that cannot be decided 
by science itself and, instead, should be understood as a purely metaphysical question. This 
is  because  a  structuralist  account  of  laws  can  be  used  equally  well  to  support  either 
eliminative OSR or non-eliminative OSR: indeed the choice to either include or eliminate 
objects from one’s ontology seems to be independent of the question of whether or not 
the laws commit us to the existence of such objects. To clarify this, I will consider the 
relationship between laws and objects given on Cei and French’s (forthcoming) eliminative 
OSR with that of Lyre’s (2011) non-eliminative OSR. I argue that, if OSR is to take law-
constitutivity as fundamental, then it ought to be cautious about the manner in which it 
answers the question as to whether or not objects should be eliminated from our ontology, 
or  else  be  subject  to  its  own  version  of  the  argument  from  metaphysical 
underdetermination. By this I mean that the laws of our best scientific theories do not yet 
clearly allow us to say whether or not there are objects: on a realist reading laws refer to 
structural features of the world, but there is nothing in the laws to say whether or not these 
structural features are all that there is in the world or whether there are also secondary 
relata  underlying  these  relationships.  This  is  not  to  say  the  realist  should  not  seek  to 
provide an answer to this question; it would be a strange sort of realist who did not attempt 
to consider the nature of the world that is revealed to us through scientific theories. It is 
instead to say that there needs to be a clear demarcation between what is revealed to the 
realist by the nature of the laws of physics—i.e. the primacy of structural features of the 
world—and what is metaphysical speculation—i.e., how the primacy of structural features 
of the world should be interpreted. 
That OSR is not sufficiently clear that the question of whether or not there are 
objects cannot be settled by the current best scientific theories, I suggest, is ultimately a 
consequence  of  its  treating  philosophy  as  a  branch  of  science.  That  is,  the  task  of 
philosophy is to try and reveal how the world would be if our current scientific theories are 
correct. From the Kantian perspective this is a mistaken understanding of the relationship 
between philosophy and science, and I argue that the most promising Kantian way to resist 
understanding law-constitutivity in a realist fashion is to insist that philosophy of science be 
understood epistemologically. 
  According to non-eliminative OSR at least one of the essential properties of an 
object must be relational. Lyre defends a version of non-eliminative OSR that is very close 222 
 
to eliminative OSR in that he takes the relata to possess only relational properties, where 
relational properties are understood as including structurally derived intrinsic properties. 
Structurally derived intrinsic properties are invariants of the structure: e.g., mass and spin 
are characterised by Casimir operators of the Poincaré group while charge is derived from 
the U(1)´SU(2) and SU(3) interaction groups.
268 Particles then are “instantiations of the 
world structure possessing all structurally invariant properties” (2011, p.172).
269  
  Lyre’s version of non-eliminative OSR provides us with a quite natural conception 
of structural kinds: i.e., a structural kind of particle is associated with the invariance groups 
associated with particular values of mass, charge and spin. For Lyre, then, the structure of 
the world is ontologically primary, as it is on eliminative OSR.  Lyre is also committed to 
treating structural properties—relations and structurally derived invariants—as features of 
the total structure of the world that individuate kinds of relata. The structural laws, then, 
since they hold between structural kinds, simply reflect structures in nature. 
  So for both Cei and French and Lyre, structural laws are simply features of the 
ontologically basic structure of the world.
270 This, I think, leads to a problem if we seek to 
approach  OSR  from  a  law-constitutive  perspective:  i.e., a  structural  account  of  laws  is 
consistent both with treating the relata that stand in law-like relations as metaphysically real 
entities  and  with  the  understanding  the  treatment  of  these  relata  as  objects  as  merely 
heuristic. A law-constitutive account of objects on OSR is unable to tell us whether or not 
the objects that are constituted by the laws of a theory should be understood as substantial 
metaphysical entities or not. 
  This concern is similar to that expressed by Brading and Skiles (2012), who argue 
that OSR suffers from the same type of underdetermination as entity-realism, in that it 
cannot  distinguish  between  “reductive”  or  eliminative  OSR.
271  Their  version  of  the 
argument from underdetermination, re-cast in terms of eliminative and non-eliminative 
OSR is as follows: 
                                                 
268 See (Lyre, 2011, p.171). 
269 This approach also has the advantage of enabling us to make sense of what it means for a particle to have 
zero-value properties, such as mass. 
270 The difference between Cei and French and Lyre is as to whether the structures described by laws are 
modal or non-modal. For Lyre, taking structurally derived invariants to define structural kinds provides a 
means to embrace a Humean understanding of laws of nature: i.e., laws are to be understood non-modally 
and merely as the expression of certain regularities. So, laws like “all electrons have spin ½” is to be explained 
in terms of the non-modal invariances of the global structure. 
271 Reductive OSR is taken to be the view that objects should be reconceptualised as nodes in a structure, and 
eliminative OSR is understood as detailed in §5.2, i.e. as the claim that there are only relations and no relata. 
Brading and Skiles division of OSR into reductive and eliminative OSR is, perhaps, not the most helpful: i.e., 
I take the claim that objects should be reconceptualised as nodes in a structure to be perfectly compatible 
with eliminative OSR. Eliminative OSR is perfectly consistent with a heuristic appeal to objects, so long as 
they  are  understood  as  having  solely  relational  properties.  The  difference  between  eliminative  and  non-
eliminative OSR is better characterised as being over whether the nodes in a structure have any intrinsic 
properties. 223 
 
 
(P1)  If OSR is true, then there is a fact of the matter about whether objects exist or not. 
(P2)  If ([P1]) is true, then we should expect our best theories to say whether objects exist 
or not. 
(P3)  But our best theories fail to say whether objects exist; whether they do or not is 
underdetermined by the interpretations offered by eliminative and [non-eliminative] 
OSR. 
(C)   So OSR is (probably) false. (Brading and Skiles, 2012, p.112) 
   
However, this argument need not trouble OSR. If we take the law-constitutive approach 
seriously, then this underdetermination can be solved in the same sort of way as Brading 
and Skiles seek to solve the metaphysical underdetermination that motivates OSR. That is, 
the proponent of OSR can claim that the laws of our theory are such that they do not tell 
us anything about the existence or non-existence of objects. All that the structuralist laws 
tell  us  is  that  if  the  relata  that  stand  in  the  relations  expressed  by  the  laws  are  to  be 
considered  as  metaphysical  entities,  then  they  should  be  understood  as  having  only 
relational properties—perhaps including structurally derived intrinsic properties—and as 
non-individuals. This account of laws cannot tell us whether or not the relata need to be 
interpreted as substantial metaphysical entities because nothing in how the success of the 
laws is understood depends on this point. OSR, then, offers a law-constitutive account of 
objects only in that it places constraints on how the sense in which the nodes in a structure 
can  be  considered  as  objects;  it  should  be  silent  on  whether  or  not  they  should  be 
considered as objects. As soon as OSR ceases to be silent about the question of whether or 
not there really are objects, then it becomes vulnerable to Brading and Skiles’s version of 
the argument from underdetermination. 
  It may seem strange that a law-constitutive approach to objects does not actually 
commit  the  ontic  structural  realist  to  either  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  objects. 
However, if we consider the role of philosophy in OSR, then I think this makes sense. In 
particular,  on  OSR
272  philosophy  is  meant  to  take  science  seriously  as  a  guide  to  our 
ontology: i.e., taking our best scientific theories as a starting point the task of philosophy is 
to construct a metaphysical picture of the world that is consistent with our best scientific 
theories. From the perspective of OSR the most pertinent fact about the laws of our best 
scientific theories is that they are structural. In the appropriate structural realist metaphysics 
of the world, then, all that can be said with confidence is that the laws of physics refer to 
structural features of the world. It is, after all, the structural features of the world that are 
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explanatorily relevant for the success of science. Any claim beyond this must involve the 
application of characteristically philosophical arguments to science. 
  Let us consider briefly the type of arguments that may get brought to bear in order 
to argue for, e.g., non-eliminative over eliminative OSR. The most well-known objection to 
eliminative OSR is that it is impossible to make sense of relations without relata and, thus, 
if we are to advocate OSR we ought to support non-eliminative OSR.
273 As French and 
Ladyman (2011) make clear, there are other metaphysical objections to contend with: for 
instance part of the debate about whether OSR can make sense of the inherent “activity” 
of causation.
274 Chakravartty objects that, without relata, it is impossible to make sense of 
the active function of causality that transforms one set of relations into another. However, 
eliminative OSR responds to this by treating structures as being modal. If we accept the 
claim of OSR that laws do refer to features of the world, this only reveals a limited amount: 
i.e., that it is structures that are explanatorily relevant for the success of science. Going 
beyond this to endorse either eliminative or non-eliminative OSR requires deployment of 
metaphysical arguments. 
From a Kantian perspective, the problem with OSR ultimately relates to its account 
of  the  role  of  philosophy  in  science.  In  effectively  treating  philosophy  as  a  branch  of 
science whose task is to inquire as to the nature of the world that is revealed to us by 
science, philosophy exceeds its remit. While, from the last section, we have seen that the 
Kantian should object to taking invariance principles to refer to external reality in the first 
place, this understanding of the role of philosophy becomes even more problematic when 
it seeks to distinguish between eliminative and non-eliminative OSR.  
The most fundamental Kantian lesson that should resonate with us today relates to 
the role of philosophy in science. Specifically Kant cautioned against letting philosophy 
become a part of science, in the manner that it does on OSR, and instead seems to have 
understood it as a branch of epistemology. The role of philosophy, on this reading, is not 
to reveal to directly reveal to us the ontology of the world as described by metaphysics: 
instead the purpose is to ask what precisely the conditions of the human experience that 
                                                 
273 On occasion the attitude towards eliminative OSR is outright dismissive, e.g. Wüthrich claims that “Taken 
at face value, eliminative structural realism…clearly incoherent” (2009, p.1041). The point, from my 
perspective, is that all that OSR can say without appeal to metaphysical argument is that the best way to 
understand the success of scientific theories is to understand them as referring to structural features of the 
world. The scientific realist clearly has a duty to try and explain the primacy of relata over relations; 
eliminative structural realism is one of two potential explanations of this feature of the world. The argument 
that eliminative OSR is a viable option must be a metaphysical one: i.e., it must show that a metaphysics 
consisting solely of relations is coherent and, e.g., appeal to the principle of parsimony to suggest that this is 
therefore the best explanation of the successive of physical laws. Contra Wüthrich, I think it is clear that 
substantial steps have been made towards making such an argument that secures the coherence of eliminative 
OSR, see, e.g. (Ladyman, 2007). 
274 See (Chakravartty, 2003, p.872) 225 
 
give rise to science are. Cassirer similarly emphasised that the task of philosophy of science 
was primarily epistemological: i.e., its task was to help us understand science rather than to 
“dominate” science.
275 
I suggest, then, that this Kantian approach to science is worth emphasising in the 
contemporary debate. If nothing else, the Kantian understanding of the role of philosophy 
of science can serve as a prophylactic for OSR, to prevent it straying into the realm of 
metaphysical underdetermination itself. More generally, though, the Kantian account of the 
role of philosophy in science is important in its own right. If science is seen as the most 
characteristically rational human act that provides knowledge of the world—which, I think 
it is—then, surely, part of the task of philosophy of science must be to explore how the 
process of science enables us to achieve this knowledge. In this sense it is important to at 
least have the discussion as to whether invariance principles represent features of external 
reality or whether they are constructed so as to ensure that science is maximally objective: 
at the very least this question must be satisfactorily addressed before we can move to ask 
metaphysical questions about the nature of reality. 
5.4.   The constitutive role of principles in the development of laws 
In the previous section I identified one key difference between structural realist and a neo-
Kantian account of laws: for the structural realist the invariance groups that characterise 
scientific  theories  represent  some  feature  of  metaphysical  reality,  while  on  a  regulative 
Kantianism they should be understood as a regulative ideal only. In this section I address 
the  second  important  distinction.  For  Cassirer,  physical  principles are  interpreted  quite 
differently  to  how  they  are  understood  on  OSR,  where  the  significant  principles  are 
symmetry principles and laws of conservation that can be understood in terms of their 
symmetries. From the perspective of the account of Cassirer developed in §3.3, the version 
of OSR advocated by Cei and French  assigns physical principles the role that Cassirer 
intended  the  concept  <objectivity>—more  properly,  <objectivity-at-a-time>—to  play. 
This means that from a Kantian perspective there remains a role for principles that is not 
captured by OSR. In this section I argue that principles can be understood as playing a 
constitutive role in a theory in the sense that they make the development of the laws of that 
theory possible. Cassirer’s understanding of the constitutive role of physical principles, I 
suggest, is the main obstacle that stands in the way of taking Cassirer’s law-constitutive 
account of objects to fairly straightforwardly lead to a form of OSR.  
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  There is a distinction between Cassirer’s structuralism and OSR in their treatments 
of the ideal of objectivity. On OSR, the ideal of objectivity is represented by a particular set 
of symmetry principles which perfectly capture the structure of the world. For Cassirer, the 
ideal of objectivity is that which is invariant in all judgments concerning experience. This 
means that Cassirer places a much greater focus on securing the objectivity of the entire 
sequence of scientific theories than OSR does. This is not to say that OSR does not treat 
the entire sequence of theories as objective: it clearly does, but on OSR there is a sense in 
which later theories are more objective than earlier theories in that they more accurately 
represent the end-point of scientific inquiry. For Cassirer, the proper subject of philosophy 
of science is not individual theories; it is the entire sequence of scientific theories. As the 
sequence  grows  then  it,  as  a  whole,  better  approximates  objectivity.  This  is  important 
because I think it underlies the differing attitudes towards physical principles on the two 
views. So, on my reading of Cassirer physical principles are of central importance because 
they serve to ensure that new laws continuously emerge from old laws—and in so doing 
guarantee that the sequence of scientific theories can be treated as a singly object of study. 
On OSR, laws are of primary concern because the most significant question is as to what 
our present physical theories reveal of the nature of the world.   
Cei and French (2009), then, do not place too much emphasis on this historical role 
for  physical  principles,  instead—as  we  have  seen—emphasising  the  importance  of 
symmetry principles and laws. As we saw in §3.3, Cassirer sought to provide an account of 
the rationality of the entire sequence of scientific theories. For his answer to CR to be 
plausible he needed to find something that was constant in scientific theorising. Laws are 
ill-suited to this task because they change from theory to theory. Principles, on the other 
hand, are taken to be universal claims: while, as we have seen in the case of the equivalence 
principle, physical principles develop over time and are applied in different ways they are 
able to serve as a rule to enable the development of laws and secure the rationality of 
theory change. This is particularly clear in the case of the equivalence principle, which is an 
insight derived from Newtonian physics that Einstein interpreted regulatively and used to 
derive new physical laws. When Cassirer’s account of the role of physical principles in 
science  is  understood  in  this  way,  it  becomes  clear  that  OSR  does  not  emerge  from 
Cassirer’s structuralism as cleanly as Cei and French would have it. Laws are central to 
Cassirer’s  philosophy  only  insofar  as  they  were  developed  in  accordance with  physical 
principles. 
If  we  are  to  insist  that  the  law-constitutivity  of  objects  can  serve  as  a 
characteristically Kantian answer to CC, then, our account must be accompanied by an 
insistence on the centrality of physical principles rather than laws. There is some difficulty 227 
 
in  cashing  this  out within  a  regulative  framework  that  is  influenced  by Cassirer’s  neo-
Kantianism: Cassirer, in DIMP, is quite clear that the relationship between statements of 
the  results  of  measurements,  of  laws  and  of  principles  should  be  understood  as  non-
hierarchical. The different types of physical statements have a “mutual interconnection” 
and  each  level  conditions  and  supports  both  other  levels:  so  there  is,  for  Cassirer,  a 
complex “reciprocal interweaving” between empirical data, laws and principles (p.35). 
While  acknowledging  that  there  is  a  deep  inter-connectedness  among  the  three 
elements of physics, Cassirer also claims that “this cannot and must not prevent us…from 
ascribing to [physics] a determinate structure, a higher and lower order of elements” (ibid.). 
Cassirer is clear that his emphasis on the complex interweaving of the different type of 
statements is intended only to preclude the possibility of their actual separation, that is, of 
the assertion of independent existence of, e.g., physical principles. Within Cassirer’ system, 
then, there can be some justification for treating physical principles as being of the highest 
order and empirical data as the lowest order. In §3.3.2.2, I argued that Cassirer strongly 
associated objectivity with the idea of permanence: in particular, he argued that the laws of 
physics are constitutive of the objects of physics because the relations described by the 
laws are permanent whereas the properties of objects are subject to change. Similarly, there 
is a sense in which physical principles are in this sense more permanent than the laws of 
physics  because,  on  Cassirer’s  account,  physical  principles  can  survive  scientific  theory 
change  and  act  as  the  birth-place  for  laws.  So,  while  physical  principles  cannot  be 
understood in isolation from laws and empirical data, they are—I would suggest—central 
to  a  regulative  neo-Kantianism  in  that  principles  are  the  most  long-lasting  features  of 
physics and determine the content of physical laws. 
There is an interesting comparison to be drawn between this understanding of the 
relationship  between  laws  and  principles  and  that  advocated  more  recently  by  Lange 
(2007). Lange argues that physical principles—particularly symmetry principles—are meta-
laws: i.e., they are laws that govern and explain laws in precisely the same manner that laws 
govern and explain facts and events. On Lange’s account, for laws and principles to govern 
events and laws respectively is for them to be as resilient under counterfactual suppositions 
as they logically possibly can be (p.458). How should this idea of maximal resilience be 
understood? Consider a conservation law that is associated with a particular regularity. This 
conservation  law  can  be  derived  from  dynamical  laws—such  as  Newton’s  laws  of 
motion—force laws and a closure law that states that the only laws are the force laws 
(p.466). The law is a genuine law if it is the case that in every possible world that the 
dynamical laws, force laws and closure law are the same as they are in the actual world the 
conservation  law  holds.  However,  this  is  not  enough  for  maximal  resilience  under 228 
 
counterfactual suppositions because we can consider a wider range of possible worlds: i.e., 
those where the dynamical laws and force laws are different from in the actual world. For a 
conservation law to govern events in Lange’s sense, the conservation law must hold even in 
possible worlds with different force laws. So, similarly, for a symmetry principle to govern a 
law is to claim that the symmetry principle would have held even if the natural laws had 
been different. 
Lange’s approach provides a very clear sense in which principles can be central, viz. if the 
principle holds in possible worlds where the laws do not. This may help to clarify Cassirer’s 
view. For instance, in Cassirer’s account of the development of laws he is quite clear that 
principles come first historically and that the principles guide the composition of the laws. 
From this perspective it would seem that the content of the laws could have differed while 
the principles remained the same.
276  Physical principles have a central role in Cassirer’s 
philosophy, then, because they play a historical role in making laws possible: the content of 
the laws must be consistent with the demands of the physical principles. In §4, I develop an 
account of the role of the equivalence principle in the development of general relativity that 
can profitably be understood in these terms. As we have seen, the equivalence principle 
had its roots in Newtonian physics: there it was used in order to permit the treatment of 
non-inertial  systems  as  inertial  systems.  Einstein  used  this  version  of  the  equivalence 
principle in 1907 to derive equations that predicted that the velocity of light would decrease 
in a gravitational field. In 1912 Einstein extended the equivalence principle so as to claim 
the  full  physical  equivalence  of  uniformly  accelerating  frames  of  reference  and  inertial 
frames  of  reference  equipped  with  a  gravitational  field  and  this  move  enabled  him  to 
develop field equations for static gravitational fields. However, it also forced Einstein to 
limit  the  equivalence  principle  to  infinitesimal  regions.  Nevertheless  Einstein  remained 
convinced of the value of the infinitesimal version of the equivalence principle and used it 
to consider the type of gravitational field that would be associated with uniform rotation: 
this ultimately led Einstein to associate the equivalence principle with the claim that the 
metric tensor represents the inertio-gravitational field (EP3). 
                                                 
276 There are, of course, significant differences between Lange’s position and Cassirer’s. In particular, Lange’s 
account is within the realist tradition while Cassirer’s account is neo-Kantian. The significance of this is that 
Lange takes our scientific theories—including their laws and principles—to be referring to external reality 
whereas Cassirer takes the laws of a theory to be developed in such a way that they meet the demands on the 
one hand of relativized a priori constitutive principles and, on the other hand empirical data: he does not take 
these theories to refer to the external world. As such, the sort of counterfactuals that must be considered are 
to do whether we could feasibly have constructed alternative physical laws given the same principles and 
empirical data, whereas Lange’s counterfactuals are concerned with how else the world may have been. This 
difference,  though,  does  not  prevent  us,  I  think,  from  adapting  Lange’s  criterion  for  the  centrality  of 
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  We are also now in a position to make sense of Cassirer’s brief comments on the 
status of the equivalence principle.
277 The field equations of general relativity are frame-
independent, however the interpretation of the metric tensor gik, is frame-dependent: that is 
it can be interpreted either as an inertial or gravitational effect according to EP3. Janssen 
(2012) refers to this as the relativity of gravitation: i.e., it is possible for two observers in 
relative non-inertial motion to disagree about which of them is at rest so long as they agree 
to disagree about the presence of a gravitational field. The importance of EP3 is just that it 
secures the relativity of gravitation in this sense and, in so doing, enables the same frame-
independent laws to describe quite different frame-dependent experiences. This, I suggest, 
is how Cassirer understood the sense in which the equivalence principle is constitutive of 
general  relativity:  from  a  given  perspective  the  metric  tensor  is  interpreted  either  as 
describing some combination of inertial and gravitational effects and this serves to define a 
conceptual framework within which experience is to be constructed. In this sense EP3 is 
constitutive of the field equations just because it makes it possible that they apply equally to 
physical situations that are perceived of as quite distinct: i.e. accelerating and being at rest in 
a gravitational field.
278  
Now, this understanding of the constitutive role of the equivalence principle is very 
close to the account offered by Friedman: i.e., the equivalence principle is understood as a 
constitutive principle in virtue of its historical role in the development of the gravitational 
field equations. The distinction between my view and Friedman’s lies in the understanding 
of  why  constitutive  principles  are  required.  On  Friedman’s  account,  recall,  ostensively 
defined frames of reference play a role analogous to Kant’s faculty of intuition: i.e., our 
experience of the universe is from a particular perspective associated with a given frame of 
reference. Within our own frame of reference the basic mechanical concepts such as space, 
time and motion are coordinated with experience in a particular fashion. The challenge 
posed by the development of relativity is as to how our frame-based experience can be 
related to the increasingly abstract mathematical structures of space-time theories. This, for 
Friedman, is affected by constitutive principles that provide particular ways to coordinate 
abstract mathematical structures with elements of experience: e.g., EP3 coordinates free-fall 
trajectories  with  null  geodesics  in  space-time.  These  constitutive  principles  count  as 
synthetic a priori principles for Friedman: they allow us to construct mathematised law-like 
                                                 
277 Recall the central feature of Cassirer’s claim: “The inertial movement and the effect of gravitation, are…in 
truth a single phenomenon seen and judged from different sides. It follows that the fundamental law that we 
establish for the movement of bodies must be such that it includes equally the phenomena of inertia and 
those  of  gravitation.  As  is  seen,  we  have  here  no  empirical  proposition  abstracted  from  particular 
observations, but a rule for our construction of physical concepts” (ETR, p.428). 
278 As detailed in §4.3.2.2, this is not an entirely satisfactory account of the constitutive role of EP3: the 
situation is made much clearer when we have access to affine connected manifolds.  230 
 
descriptions  of  the  experience  given  to  intuition—understood  in  terms  of  ostensively 
defined frames of reference—in a manner analogous to how Friedman understands Kant 
to have applied the laws of motion in order to derive Newton’s law of gravitation. 
  Friedman,  recall,  rejects  the  possibility  of  developing  a  Kantian  account  of 
philosophy  of  science  along  Cassirer’s  lines  because  in  rejecting  the  division  between 
sensibility and understanding Cassirer cannot explain the distinction between constitutive 
and regulative principles. In §3, I argued that this was not the case, and that Cassirer can 
distinguish between constitutive and regulative principles. The account of the role of the 
equivalence  principle  has  served  to  clarify  the  distinction  between  the constitutive  and 
regulative roles of this principle. The equivalence principle played a regulative role in the 
development of general relativity when Einstein interpreted it as a covariance principle: i.e., 
in  permitting  a  broader  group  of  coordinate  transformations,  the  equivalence  principle 
provided a closer approximation of the regulative ideal of objectivity than the more limited 
group of Lorentz transformations. Regulative principles, then, are those that serve to drive 
theory change towards the regulative ideal of objectivity: they do so either by broadening 
the invariance group of a theory or by increasing unity. Constitutive principles are those 
that have played a historical role in making new laws possible by determining a conceptual 
framework  within  which  the  laws  can  be  applied  to  experience.  A  particular  physical 
principle can be either: 
 
(i)  Constitutive  but  not  regulative:  Some  principles  may  be  constitutive  without 
being regulative: I would suggest that EP3 could be seen as such a principle. 
This  principle  is  constitutive  in  the  sense  that  it  provides  a  means  to 
interpret the frame-independent field equations in such a way that they can 
be interpreted in a frame-dependent fashion. EP3 is not regulative insofar 
as it does not license a broader class of coordinate transformations.
279 
(ii)  Regulative but not constitutive: If a regulative principle does not serve to govern 
the  application  of  concepts  to  experience,  then  it  does  not  play  a 
constitutive role. General covariance, as detailed in §4.4, is such a principle. 
It  is  regulative  in  the  sense  that  it  broadens  the  class  of  admissible 
coordinate transformations; however it is cannot be constitutive because it 
has no physical content. 
                                                 
279 We may want to treat it as regulative in the sense that it does seem to unify gravitational and inertial 
effects,  however.  I  have  decided  against  doing  so  on  the  grounds  that  for  a  principle  to  be  properly 
considered regulative, in the sense that it helps answer CR, its motivation ought to be to provide a better 
approximation of the regulative ideal. While EP3 does unify gravitational and inertial effects, this was not 
really the motivation behind the principle, rather it is a consequence of its development out of EP1 and EP2.  231 
 
(iii)  Regulative and constitutive: Certain principles would seem to be both regulative 
and  constitutive:  e.g.,  EP1,  EP2  and  the  principle  of  relativity.  These 
principles  are  regulative  in  the  sense  that  they  increase  the  group  of 
admissible coordinate transformations. They both play a constitutive role, 
though in that that they develop a new conceptual framework within which 
to interpret new physical laws. The principle of relativity does so because its 
inconsistency  with  the  light  principle  is  resolved  via  the  relativity  of 
simultaneity. EP1 and EP2 play a constitutive role in that they lead Einstein 
to  the  realisation  that  gravitation  should  not  be  understood  as  a  field 
defined onto space-time but, rather, should be accounted for using space-
time structures.  
    
So, the regulative and constitutive roles of physical principles should just be distinguished 
by the type of role that they have played in the development of a particular theory. This is 
important because it undermines Friedman’s main objection to Cassirer’s regulative neo-
Kantianism. The regulative approach, then, enables us to make sense of the distinction 
between constitutive and regulative principles without needing to understand frames of 
reference as somehow standing in for the Kantian faculty of sensibility and without being 
committed to the synthetic a priori.  
With the role of principles and laws understood in this fashion, we are then able to 
clarify  a  Kantian  law-constitutive  understanding  of  <objects>  in  general  relativity.  In 
general relativity the field equations are diffeomorphic invariant laws that hold between 
diffeomorphic variant quantities. The diffeomorphism invariance of the laws is important 
because it secures the objectivity of our knowledge of the objects between which the laws 
stand. Without this, there is no way to have objective knowledge of objects in general 
relativity because there are no objects that are invariant under all possible transformations 
of  the  theory. There  is  a  clear  sense  in  general relativity,  then,  in which  mathematical 
structures are epistemologically prior to objects: objective knowledge of the objects of the 
theory is not possible independently of the structure of the theory. In particular, then, there 
is  no  objective  account  of  how  the  metric  tensor  is  spread,  what  is  invariant  is  the 
relationship between metric and Ricci tensors and the stress energy tensor: observables, 
such as the line element, can only be known in virtue of this invariant relationship. In this 
sense the laws of the theory are constitutive of the objects of general relativity: knowledge 
of observable quantities is only possible in virtue of the laws of the theory. 
Friedman’s main concern with a regulative Kantianism is that one can no longer 
make sense of the distinction between regulative and constitutive principles. While it is 232 
 
clear  that  constitutivity  cannot  be  understood  in  terms  of  relativized  synthetic  a  priori 
principles, I have argued that CC can be answered in two ways: 
 
CC:  Principles  can  be  constitutive  of  the  laws  of  a  theory  if  they  provide  a 
conceptual framework within which to interpret key terms, e.g., gik, from a 
particular perspective. Laws are constitutive of the objects of a theory, in 
the sense that they permit the individuation of these objects. 
 
While my answer to CC does not salvage a notion of constitutivity that is anything like as 
strong as Kant initially intended, it is, I think, the best that can be done while doing full 
justice to his insights about the regulative role of reason and it is these insights that prove 
more helpful in developing a philosophy of science that does justice to the development of 
space-time theories. 
  In answer to the problem that motivated this discussion, then, we can now say that 
the law-constitutive answer to CC is characteristically Kantian insofar as it is accompanied 
by a suitable understanding of laws. I have given reason, in §4 and this section, to take the 
laws of general relativity to have been made possible by the equivalence principle. If this is 
right, then the field-equations do not just straightforwardly reveal the objects of experience 
on their own. There is some sense in which the conceptual framework provided by the 
equivalence principle is required in order to physically interpret the field equations and, 
from there, construct a frame-dependent account of objects.  
5.5.    Lessons for contemporary philosophy of science 
I  have  now  provided  answers  to  the  challenges—of  the  rationality  of  science  and  of 
constitutivity—that I suggested a Kantian philosophy of science must seek to answer. I 
have argued that an internal account of the rationality of scientific theory change can be 
offered  by  emphasising  the  role  that  conceptual  analysis  has  played  in  driving  theory 
change coupled with the regulative demand that later theories be of a broader covariance 
group than earlier theories. With respect to constitutivity, I have argued that there are two 
senses  in  which  the  idea  of  constitutivity  remains  relevant.  The  main  candidate  for  a 
constitutive principle that I’ve considered is the equivalence principle. In §4 I have shown 
how  this  principle  emerged  out  of  Einstein’s  dialectical  engagement  with  the  classical 
concept of acceleration. I have shown that EP3 plays an important role in permitting the 
physical  interpretation  of  the  mathematical  structures  whose  natural  interpretation  had 233 
 
been stripped away by the regulative demands placed upon the theory of relativity. EP3, I 
have suggested is constitutive in that a new conceptual framework—including the inertio-
gravitational field—is required in order to explain the sense in which free-fall trajectories 
represent affine geodesics. Second, I have argued that physical laws are constitutive of 
objects in the sense that they permit their individuation. 
There may still be a question mark over the sense in which this account is Kantian. 
As noted in §4 my account of the rationality of the development of science has significant 
overlap with Post’s realist (1971) account and my account of constitutive principles seems 
quite far removed from Kant’s original intention. 
First, I suggest that my account of the rationality of science is meaningfully Kantian 
in the sense that it provides an internal account for the rationality of the development of 
science. I have argued that general relativity has emerged from a conceptual analysis of an 
inconsistency between classical physics and special relativity. My answer to CR is intended 
to show that the success of general relativity can be explained without reference to an 
external reality whose truth the theory approximates. If the success of general relativity can 
be explained without reference to an external reality this would significantly lessen the 
force of the no-miracles argument that underlies most contemporary forms of realism. 
Second,  it  is  only  to  be  expected  that  a  contemporary  account  of  constitutive 
principles  differs  significantly  from  Kant’s  own  account.  My  main  disagreement  with 
Friedman is related to his claim that for a contemporary Kantian philosophy of science to 
be meaningfully Kantian it must salvage the syntheticity of the constitutive a priori. I would 
suggest that this is to underestimate the significance of how science has changed since 
Kant. On Kant’s understanding of the transcendental approach, the fundamental principles 
of synthesis are fully determined by the nature of human cognition. This is why, e.g., he 
understood our idea of a triangle to really be a rule for the construction of a triangle in pure 
intuition. Similarly, he sought to investigate the conditions for the possibility of Newtonian 
physics solely by reference to the nature of human cognition. Kant could be successful in 
developing  his  account  of  Newtonian  physics  because  of  the  peculiarly  geometrical 
methodology that Newton used in the construction of his theory: this enabled Kant to treat 
the notions of space and time that Newton used as immediately given to us. 
However, with the work of Helmholtz it became clear that spatial relationships are 
not immediately given to us: they are constructed in accordance with rules relating to the 
displacement of rigid bodies. The development of special relativity reinforced this point: 
simultaneity  was  not  immediately  given:  the  concept  needed  to  be  constructed  in 
accordance with rules of light-signalling. The significance of these developments is that it 
means that a transcendental analysis of the possibility of science does not solely tell us 234 
 
about the nature of human cognition, instead it informs us about the relationship between 
the world and our cognition: in particular the type of transcendental analysis I have carried 
out places great emphasis on those principles that permit us to represent features of the 
contingent world mathematically. 
These constitutive principles cannot be understood to be synthetic principles in 
Friedman’s sense: they are principles, derived from contingent features of the world, that 
permit the representation of physical processes within a particular conceptual framework. 
While this is clearly a quite different view from Kant’s, I think that it still warrants being 
considered as a Kantian view. Kant’s emphasis was on analysing the possibility of science 
as it was understood at a particular time: given the changes in science it is to be expected 
that constitutive principles should identify those features of the world that we exploit in 
order to represent physical processes. On my account constitutive principles play a vital 
role in the process by which we construct conceptual frameworks in order to represent 
physical processes. This, I would suggest is as close to Kant’s original insight as we can 
hope to get given the development of scientific theories since Helmholtz. 
The  Kantian  approach  can  also  be  distinguished  from  a  realist  approach  to 
philosophy  of  science  by  emphasising  the  difference  between  the  realist’s  naturalist 
conception  of  philosophy  of  science  and  the  Kantian’s  epistemological  conception. 
Friedman’s Dynamics of Reason was, in part intended to salvage a role for philosophy that 
prevented  it  being  seen  as  a  branch  of  science  itself.  The  attitude  that  the  task  of 
philosophy is to cash out the metaphysical commitments of our current best scientific 
theories seems to hold significant sway within contemporary philosophy of science. While I 
do not think that Friedman is successful in arguing that philosophy should be understood 
as a meta-paradigm that enables the rationality of theory change, I am in sympathy with his 
desire to mark out a role for philosophy independently of science. 
From the contemporary perspective the important lesson to take from Kant is that 
the first philosophical question that we should be concerned with is as to the possibility of 
our  natural  science  as  it  is  understood  today  (or,  as  Cassirer  understood  it,  as  to  the 
possibility of the entire sequence of scientific theories). When the role of philosophy is 
understood in this way, there is no reason at all to think that a contemporary Kantianism 
must concern itself with salvaging the synthetic a priori. 
Now, while I have argued that Cassirer’s regulative neo-Kantianism provides the 
most  promising  route  to  a  contemporary  Kantian  philosophy  of  science,  I  am  not  in 
complete agreement with his approach. In particular, I doubt the claim that the study of 
science was effectively the study of the human faculty of reason, or the “mind”. It was this 
feature of Cassirer’s account that made it impossible for him to even consider whether the 235 
 
invariance principles at the root of general relativity and quantum physics might represent 
some feature of external reality. 
I suggest that, if we seek to amend this feature of Cassirer’s account, then a Kantian 
approach to the philosophy of science may be able to commit itself to a form of scientific 
realism. On some readings of Kant, he took it to at least make sense to ask, e.g., whether 
the world was such that matter was composed of attractive and repulsive force. On this 
understanding of Kant the importance of the transcendental question is to clarify which 
aspects  of  natural  science  derive  from  either  the  human  faculties  of  understanding  or 
reason. Once we have clearly identified those aspects of scientific knowledge that have 
their source in the nature of the human intellect, we can set about asking what features 
must come from the external world. 
This is the sense in which I see a Kantian approach ultimately being important in 
contemporary  philosophy  of  science.  The  important  Kantian  question  is  as  to  the 
possibility of the objectivity of science. In the case of general relativity I have argued that 
the  equivalence  principle  and  general  covariance  should  be  understood  as  regulative 
demands:  i.e.,  as  demands  that  originate  from  the  human  desire  to  develop  frame-
independent  laws  of  nature.  On  my  account,  these  regulative  principles  act  as 
methodological  demands  that  guide  the  development  of  scientific  theories,  therefore  I 
suggest that there origin lies primarily in the practice of science. Once we have identified 
regulative  demands  in  this  sense,  only  then  are we in  a  position  to ask whether  these 
regulative demands might also represent some feature of external reality. 
However,  this  question  cannot  be  straightforwardly  answered.  If  the  Kantian 
account of the development of general relativity is right, then the success if science can be 
explained without recourse to something like the no miracles argument. So, we cannot 
argue  simply  that  the  structure  of  the  world  must  be  approximately  diffeomorphism 
invariant so as to explain the success of science. This, I think, is promising because, if the 
problem can be solved, it points a way to a version of scientific realism that (i) does justice 
to the Kantian intuition that philosophy of science should be understood as a branch of 
epistemology and (ii) would provide the foundations of a scientific realism that need not 
rely on such a notoriously questionable argument as the no miracles argument. 
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